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A.I.D. Evaluation Papers represent the views of their authors and are 
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I. IN]TRODUCTION 
This paper reports on a study carried out by PPC's Evaluation 
Staff covering the period Fiscal Year 62_throu Fiz. r 8. 
The initial aims of the study were to determine whether program loans pro­
vide "leverage" on self-help performance, and also whether a number of
 
Among
factors sometimes hypothesized to influence leverage in fact do so. 

the latter, the formal conditioning system, with its quantified targets and
 
staggered tranche releases preceded by performance reviews, was prominent
 
in our thinking. We were intrigued by a discrepancy between the written and
 
oral records on these issues. On the one hand, Program Loan Papers, LAS's,
 
CAP's aid PM's describe the program loan as A.I.D.'s major vehicle for in­
fluencing the host government's economic policies. On the other hand, many
 
A.I.D. officers who had been involved in loan negotiations and tranche reviews
 
seemed to question the value of aid conditioning, especially formal condition­
ing mechanisms. They argued that the host country does little that it would
 
not have done otherwise and that formal conditioning puts an unjustified strain
 
on work loads, tempers, and bilateral relations in the field. Our aim was to
 
step back from the rhetoric and heat of the loa negotiations and see whether
 
the seven-year documented record of eight major program loan countries in
 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America yields any general conclusions regarding
 
leverage" and its relation to conditioning and other hypothesized influences.
 
In Phase I, PPC/POL/ES reviewed
The study was carried out in two phases. 

in considerable depth the history of A.I.D. Development Loan non-project
 
assistance to India, Pakistan, Turkey, Tunisia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile and
 
Korea. These countries have all been receiving U. S. program loans since
 
FY 1962 or FY 1963 (except for Korea, which got its first program loan in
 
FY 1966). Phase I research was limited primarily to documentary evidence, in
 
particular the regional loan files and budget submissions. Draft country and
 
Any gaps or misconcep­general papers were prepared on the basis of this work. 

tions present at the end of Phase I have been corrected, we hope in Phase II,
 
In this part of the study, we interviewed principal A.I.D. participants in all
 
eight of the country experiences studied, often using our draft country papers
 
as a starting point. Besides sharpening and filling out the narratives
 
derived from the documentary record, the interviews helped to breath life into
 
our understanding of the country experiences and clarify our perception of
 
which of the many issues surrounding program lending are decisive and which
 
less important.
 
Our conception of what the study was about changed somewhat as we went
 
along. We originally intended to define the limits of the study rather narrowly
 
We decided to limit ourselves to the leverage effects of the program loan and
 
ignore the other rationale for program lending -- the recipient country's need
 
ce of payments and/or investment gap,
for a resource transfer to fill a balu 

encourage private enterprise, or incre.se the utilization of existing productive
 
capacity. We also decided to concentrite on thie leverage effects of the program
 
loan and look only incidentally at th, leverage effects of other aid instruments
 
In practice, 4e found these two boundary lines difficult to maintain. We dis­
ow sense defined in the succeeding
covered tha, leverage, at least in the na 
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section, is only part of' a significant broader concept, which we will call
 
influence. And we learned that various types of influence and various aid
 
instruments are often so closely interrelated that one often cannot study
 
one without examining others at the same time.
 
As restated, then, the questions we tried to answer are whether the pro­
gram loan (perhals supported by other instruments) has been used to influence
 
policy, what factors either internal to the influence process or external to
 
it affect the degree of influence obtained, and how the program loan compares
 
to other aid instruments as a vehicle for influence. The last of these ques­
tions can only be answered relative to a general idea of' what other forms of
 
aid can do, since we have not studied project or sector lending in anything
 
like the detail devoted to program lending.
 
By concentrating or, the program loan we do not mean to imply that it is 
the only way to exert influence. A.I.D. and its predecessor agencies have al­
ways wielded some influence on host government policies, by a variety o4 means. 
For instance, the immediate precursor of the program loan -- the SA grant -­
was sometimes used as an instrument of leverage and still is in Korea, Bolivia,
 
the Dominican Republic, and the Congo(K). Nor is it,possible completely to dis­
entangle the influence of the program loan in particular from that of the aid
 
package in general. We decided to study the program loan because we thought
 
that it has become the main focus of attempts to obtain influence. Our conclu­
sions, we believe, bear this out
 
One important aspect of' our subject which we have chosen to ignore is
 
the correctrnes2 and quality of' the policies A.I.D. has urged upon program Joan
 
recipients. A judginerit on this question would clearly be worth having, arid 
could be crucial to one's overall view of' the influence process. However, any
 
formal evaluation of' this aspect would have to cover the whole range of devel­
opment economics. We have, therefore, chosen to concentrate on whether the 
Agency's attempts to influence policy have been successful with only an implicit
 
assumption that they have generally been well conreived. In other words, we
 
have done an effectiveness rather than a significance evaluation.
 
As all evaluation studies should, we hope this one will inifluence Agency
 
policy. We have, therefore, tried to formulate and substantiate conclusions
 
which can be taken into account in future choices between program loans on the
 
one hand and both project arid sector loans on the other, in decisions ab'-t the
 
kind of conditioning system to use, and in W,,,2r operational questions.
 
The study was conducted as a part-time activity during the year beginning 
March 196P. It was directed largely by Donald Sncdgrass, Chief' of the PPC 
Evaluation Staff'. Others who worked on the project were Edward B. Rice, Allen 
CIoldsteiri, E;.lizabeth Carter and Carl J. Iemmfrer. (The final stager of the study 
were carried out under the general direction of Donald 11.McClel!and, who suc­
ceeded Mr. Snodgrass as Chief' of' the Evaluation Staff in November 1968.) During 
Phase II of' the work, interviews were conducted with approximately 40 AID officials. 
Useful corments were also received from other officials, as well as from members of 
C011FUYNT--A 
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the Administrator's Advisory Committee on Economic Development. The
 
generous cooperation of all these people has greatly improved the quality
 
of this paper, and the authors are high appreciative.
 
II. DEFINITIONS
 
"Leverage" is a commonly used term but a slippery one. It can be 
precisely defined as the process of bringing about host government actions 
which would not otherwise have been taken, using fore:ign aid as an indirect 
quid pro quo but not as a direct means of financing the desired action. 
"Influence," as we will use the term, is a broader concept. It embraces 
both leverage and persuasion. A.I.D. of'ten simply persuades a host government 
it would not otherwiise have done, without conditioning anyto do something 
specific amount of' aid upon it. The poterit'.al fur persuasion depends on 
A.I.D.'s possession of superior knowledge about ti.e benefits or costs of' par­
ticular actions, plus the ability to convince the LDC govternment of its 
superiority.
 
There is, of' course, one -tVer way for A.I.D. to get things done -- by 
reducing or eliminating the co. of the desired action to the host country by 
directly financing it, entirely or in part. We confine the ideas of both 
leverage arid influence to actiorns not directly financed by A.I.D. The building 
of a powe' plant is not an example of leverage if A.I.D. pays the costs of con­
struction, but the introduction of power rate reforms as a condition of the 
loan is.
 
In a very narrow sense, program loans do not directly finance any specific
 
activity. In this srise, any activity they generate represents influence. In 
a very broad sense, any action a host government agrees to take as part of a
 
progr_ loan agreement is "financed" by the loan, since ti:e agreement is volun­
tary and the host government would not enter into it if it did not Judge the 
benefit of the loan to cutweigh the costs of the actions it has agrced to under­
take. 
Within fhiese wide limits, some prog~ram loan conditions are more directly 
financed by t'te loan than others. Import liberalization is the most important 
example of a loan condition for which the linkag~e is relatively direct. The 
host governmf.nt may well favor import liberalization per se but be unwilling 
to pay the cost (in the form of' other actions necessary to achieve it) within 
fixed resource availabilities. 1hut if' aid is increased the internal cost of 
liberalization is reduced and the action becomes easier to take. This kind 
of loan condition is a less clear-cut example of leverage than the kind in 
which A.I.D. does nct reduce the painfulness of' the action requested, but com­
pensates by allowing the host government to get something it values in some 
other sphere. Thus, i' a program loan "buys" an income tax reform,the reform 
C I 
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itself does not become easier to effect, but the host government becomes
 
more willing to tackle it because it received other benefits (e.g. reduced
 
need to restrict imports). In all cases, however, leverage is a two-way
 
process in which each side gives somethin to get something in return.
 
Program loan negotiations generally involve both persuasion and leverage.
 
The relation between the two is complex and debatable. Some say (though, as
 
noted below, we do not agree) that leverage in the sense defined above does
 
not exist, that aid recipients will not perform loan conditions unless they
 
are persuaded that the policies advocated are desirable in themselves. In any
 
case, having defined the key concepts involved in our study in precise terms,
 
we must admit that it is frequently impossible to distinguish them from each
 
other in practice. Accordingly, we will use our terms more loosely in the
 
rest of the study than in this section, allowing leverage and influence to be 
near synonyms.
 
III. A.I.D. 's PROGRAM LOAN EXPERIENCE 
A. General
 
We date program lending from FY 1962, although three countries (India, 
Israel, and rkrgentina) receiied dollar loans for commodity imports in FY's 1958­
1961. Use of the program .Loan was greatly expanded in FY 1962, responding to 
the basic policy decision taken at the time of' A.I.D.'s creation to shift from 
grants to loans. In !>akistan, Turkey, and Tunisia, the new lending instrument 
replaced DS/SA grants (DS before FY 1()61 and SA in FY 1961). India, as just 
m entioned, had already shifted t0 loans. Brazil, Chile, and Colombia had not 
participated in the commodity,' grant progrmn; f'or them, program support was 
entirely new and resulted from the recently christened Alliance for Progress. 
Our eighth country, Korea, did riot begin the transition to loans until FY 1966. 
The feature of the riogram loan which distinguished it from the com­
modity grant -- aside from th, unpopular repayment factor -- was the idea that 
it would only ',.- vided to -ountries which could formulate a program of 
development and offer - .,lrificant "self-help" contribution to it. To ensure 
compliance with these criteria, conditioning nystems with varying degrees of
 
rigor were developcd b, the Regional Bureaus. As the Agency's interest in 
self'-help has increased, these conditioning systems have been strengthened. 
The eight countries we have studied are the only ones in which DL 
program lending has been sustained for a number of years and still continues. 
Korea is included because, although program loans are a recent addition to 
the countiry program, the country has been the scene of innovations in condition­
ing. Annual. fijgures for proiram lending to these eight countries are shown in 
Table I. Summarized descriptions of the lending aid conditioning experiences 
follow. In addition to the eil,;hi count -ies we have examined, program loans 
have also been extended to Argrentina (17 1962), Taiwan (FY 19(2 and 1963), 
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Ghana (FY 1967), Tanzania (FY 1964), Afghavistan (FY 1966), Ceylon (FY 1.967), 
Greece (FY 1963) and Costa Rica (FY 1968). iAoreover, SA and PL 480 programs 
in still other countries have been invested with a self-help conditioning 
system comparable to one of the program loan models. We have not studied 
these other experiences, however, because we believe that the most important
 
lessons are to be learned from the eight countries in which program lending
 
has been sustained and systematic.
 
C
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TABLE I
 
PROGRAM LOANS - MAJOR COUNTRIES
 
gross loan obligationsl/, millions of dollars
 
BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA INDIA PAKISTAN TUPKEY TUNISIA KOREA
 
7/
 
(SA)
 
3/ 
FY 62 74.5?, (100.0).!/ (30 .0)i 200.0 132.0 - 10.0 - (89.8) 
FY 63 (25.5)-3/ 35.0 60.06/ 240.0 100.5 35.0 15.0 - (89.0) 
-/
FY 64 (50.0)1 55.0 60.0o- 275.0 100.0 70.0 10.0 - (75.1) 
FY 65 150.0 80.0 - 190.0 140.0 80.0 10.0 - (69.7) 
FY 66 150.0 8o.? 65.0 300.:W  120.0 70.0 15.0 10.0V60.5) 
FY 67 100. 00.Q 182.0 70 0 65.0 15.0 15. (44.1)
FY 68 75. 15.Cg 58. 2 4 8 .5IV 140 0/ 40.0 10.0 io.o (30.0) 
relative lending levels
 
av. 	level-/125.0 80.0 6Q.o 235.0 113.0 70.0 13.0 13.0
 
$ per cap * 1.5 9.1 3.2 0.4 0.9 2.2 2.9 o.4
 
(population 4.0) (8.8) (18.7) (501.0) (117.0) (31.9) (4.5)(29.1)
 
% of imports 9.7 12.3 10.5 8.0 11.2 11.5 5.2 2.5
 
(imports)1-(1290) (650) (570) (2830) (980) (610) (250) (530)
 
Footnotes
 
Some figures differ from those in the individual country papers. The latter usually
 
show net obligations, and they occasionally include loans in a subsequent fiscal year.
 
_/ $100 million was committed in FY 61 for future obligations. Only $74.5 million of
 
DL was ever obligated.
 
3/ Contingency loans. The Chile $100 million FY 62 loan was for earthquake reconstruction.
 
4_/ 	 $100 million was obligated in irY 67; however $75 million was withheld pending agreement 
on a new stabilization program in early CY 1968. Of that $75 million, $50 million was 
tied to new FY 68 obligations of $75 million as part of the FY 68 program loan package. 
5_/ 	Icludes fertilizer loans (India, Pakistan).
 
Of which $10 million was deobligated for nonperformance.
 
7/ 	Net commitments of SA grants. See narrative.
 
8/ 	Of which $2.5 million was deobligated for nonperformance.
 
2/ Hypothetical average annual program lending level, assuming harmonious negotiations
 
($millions).
 
1/ 1966 midyear population (millions).
 
l4/ Average annual commodity imports 1964-1966 ($ million).
 
1/ Excludes sector loans (Braz1, Chile, Colombia).
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N " B. BRAZIL 

Capital assistar e to Brazil started with a program loan of $75 million
 
to President Goulart's Government in FY 62. Negotiations broke down the
 
following year and w2re riot resumed till Castello-Branco replaced Goulart in
 
Al 10,though smaller, contingency loans and about $75 million of project
 
loans were authorized in both FY 63 and FY 64.
 
Three program loan agreements were signed with Castello-Branco's
 
Administration: $150 million in each of FY 65 and FY 66 and $100 million in
 
FY 67. Disbursements of the last loan, which took place under a successor
 
Administration (President Costa e Silva), have been considerably delayed. An
 
FY 68 loan of $125 million was signed in June 1968, but this included $50 of
 
undisbursed FY 67 funds. Project lending has continued at an annual level
 
between $70 and $100 million. A PL 480 program began in FY 61 but it has been
 
fitful, with no deliveries in FY 65 and FY 67. IMF has maintained a presence
 
in Brazil since 1961, and after the 1964 revolution helped establish a compre­
hensive stabilization program. But IMF-GOB relations have not heca contin­
uoug, and the U. S. sometimes had to prop them up. There is no donor consortium.
 
A.I.D. developed an elaborate conditioning system in Brazil. The first
 
A.I.D. quantitative policy performance targets established anywhere as conditions
 
of loan disbursements were written into the abortive Bell-Dantas Agreement of
 
FY 63. When the "modern" era of LA program lending began in early FY 65, a
 
quarterly tranche release schedule with preceding performance reviews was insti­
tuted and this system has continued -- not entirely smoothly -- ever since.
 
Explicit conditions were written into an annual letter from GOB to the CIAP and
 
extensively quoted in the bilateral loan agreement. These conditions involved
 
a variety of monetary, fiscal and other stabilization indicators and an increas­
ing number of development policy targets (though sectoral targets in education,
 
health and agriculture are now being transferred to sector loans).
 
Performance has varied and so have disbursements. Since 1964 the GOB
 
gradually brought inflation under control by improved management of public
 
expenditures and bank credit. But there have been relapses, with credit exceed­
ing quantitative targets and pressure building on exchange reserves. A.I.D. 
has maintained a credible posture by delaying tranche releases in FY 66 and 
terminating them in FY 67. This position appears to have paid off in desirable 
policy and institutional changes that would not have occurred as early otherwise, 
particularly when Roberto Campos was in a position (as Minister for Planning 
and Economic Coordination under Castello-Branco) to use the A.I.D. conditions 
for leverage on his own government. In addition to aggregate fiscal and mone­
tary policies, one can point to import liberalization and to changes in the 
operation of state economic enterprises, in domestic coffee policy, and in 
incentives to farmers as areas where U. S. leverage probably worked. "Success" 
f£11 considerably short of announced expectations, but the latter were often 
set at the optimistic end of the feasible range as an incentive for action. 
-8-

C. CHILE 
Program assistance began in FY 1963, a year after the first major
 
U. S. loans to Chile. These consisted of emergency earthquake reconstruc­
tion aid and the immediate predecessor of program aid- a $40 million project 
loan to the Chilean development bank. Two program loan agreements were 
signed with the Alessandri a(inistration: $35 million in T!Y1963, and $55 
million in FY 1964. Four have been signed with the succeeding Frei govern­
ment: $80 million it,both FY 1-965 and FY 1966: $15 million in FY 1968 and
 
$20 million (to date) in FY 1969. The GOC voluntarily declined program 
assistance in FY 1967 when copper prices rose sharply. AID also negotiated 
and an agricultural ctoreducational sector loans in FY 1967 and FY 1969, 

loan in YF 1968; Chile w3.s the first country to experiment witi, sector
 
assistance as a complement to program aid. Project lending started in the 
PL 480 authorizationslate 1950's, but shrank to very low levels by FY 1969. 

have averaged $18 million per annum since FY 1962. Thus program lending has
 
dominated the bi:1ateral negotiations since FY 1962.
 
There is no donor consortium for Chile, but U. S. aid was dwarfed by IBRD/IDB 
been an IMF standby agreement in each pro­loans in FY 1967 and 1968. There has 
gram loan year, and performance requirements for standby eligibility have also been
 
conditions for tranche releases.
 
Explicit loan conditioning began with the FY 1963 loan. Quarterly review 
sessions were introduced the following year. Frei's inauguration in late 1964 
initiated the "standard" LA conditioning system -- which called fcr a host 
government letter to CIAP announcing economic policy and a schedule for perforn­
in the budget year, a schedule to which AID program loan disbursements were
ance 
tied. The letter covered development plans as well as stabilization policy and,
 
consequently, the program loan conditions spanned the same broad spectrum.
 
Only a handful of conditions were regarded as essential; these included the
 
growth of the money supply, the level of the public sector budget surplus on
 
current operations, and the rate of exchange depreciation. During FY 1966 the 
Mission also took a firm position with respect to agricultural support prices 
(which it wanted announced earlier in the season and at higher levels), the 
GOC use of copper windfall revenues, and policy on public sector wage readjust­
ments. 'The F? 1968 and 1969 loans retained the form of earlier conditioning 
but, due to circumstcanes that greatly reduced the prospects for self-help gains,
 
the performance sbandaras were substantially relaxed. 
In varying degrees, Chile
The GOC performance has been uneven since 1962. 

met most of the quantitative budget and monetary conditions of the loans. The
 
but had nearly doubled again by
rate of inflation dropped sharply through 1966, 
the end of 1968. Overall, the GOC managed exchange rate devaluation with 
reasonable efficiency. A few of the institutional changes included as 1'xn 
conditions were carried off according to the original timetable; most fell behind 
schedule. Frei has had trouble executing his pi.rty's announced plans for 
Public
agrarian reform, in part because of opposition from the Chilean Senate. 
and private investment has expanded, and the popular participation programs in 
-9-
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rural and urban areas appear successful. In 1968, the Frei regime began
 
to experience the political limitations of' a laxne-duck administration, an 
obstacle to needed self-help reforms that was greatly compounded by the
 
beginning of a disastrous drought that is reducing tax revenues and expand­
ing public expenditures. Despite the recent setbacks, the record shows 
markedly better performance under Frei than under Alessandri, particularly 
in view of the larger range of reform measures undertaken by Frei during 
1965 and 1966.
 
All loans were fully disbursed. There were delays in the release of 
many tranches, but only two of these were clearly associated with non­
fulfillinent of performance conditions (i.e. in mid-1965 and mid-1966). The 
usual reason for delays was the late submission of material by the GOC for 
the review.
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D. COLOMBIA 
A.I.D. has made seven program loans to Colombia, involving gross obli­
gations of $373 millinn. The first was a rather haphazard balance of payment
 
loan extended on short notice in FY 1962. After that inauspicious beginning,
 
A.I.D. made a series of increasingly serious attempts to use program loan
 
money to influence GOC policy. An FY 1963 loan tried to support a recent IMF
 
recommended devaluation, using tranche releases and reasonably explicit per­
formance conditions, but it failed. The Mission's reaction was to make con-­
ditions more numerous and specific in its FY 1964 loans. However, this attempt
 
also failed, as Colombia entered a foreign exchange crisis and GOC relations
 
with the aid agencies broke down amid a dispute over devaluation and other
 
policy reforms. Part of' the second FY 1964 loan was withheld and eventually
 
deobligated.
 
Not until thc Fall of 1965 did the 2OC take the steps necessary to bring 
the aid agencies back. When it did, A.I.D. concluded an elaborately conditioned 
FY 1966 $65 million loan, involving 73 separate conditions and quarterly per­
formance reviews. The reviews went off fairly well and all funds were released, 
but in December 1966 another exchange crisis flared up. Again, GOC-11,F rela­
tions were strained beyond the breaking point over the devaluation question. 
The COGC imnosed trade and exchange controls, revcrsing much of the liberaliza­
tion the U. S. had been seeking. Relations resumed in early 1967, however, and 
a 15-month agreement, similar in structure to the FY 1966 one, was signed. Again 
the reviews were generally favorable, but again there was a diplomatic crisis
 
at the end of the program loan year (early 1968). This latest dispute, over
 
additionality and import liberalization, has since been patched up and FY 1968
 
program and agriculture sector loans have been zigned. They generally repeat 
the conditioning pattern of FY's 1966 and 1967, though they are nci;iceably 
looser in terms of' number and specificity of conditions but, we are told, sharper 
and more realistic in focus. In the last year, the IBRD's Colombia Consultative 
Group has begun to play an important role in the policy arena. 
Colombian experience appears to have substantial relevance for our study.
 
It is a case in which (since FY 1963) we indisputably tried to exert leverage with
 
the program loan. Colombian performance was mixed. The FY 1963 and 1964 loans 
are clearcut failures from the leverage point of view, but the FY 1966 and 1967
 
loans were successful in the sense -that most of' their policy conditions were 
satisfied. However, in both years generally favorable review findings were 
quickly succeeded by crises and backslidinf. Over the 1962-67 period as a whole 
it is possible to point to many important measures which were taken after A.I.D. 
and its IMY and IBRD allies experssed a strong interest. On the other hand, 
Colombian performance with respect to most of' the variables the aid agencies were 
trying to influence was laeluster. There were signs of improvement late in the
 
period, but still no decisive shift to a more dynamic pattern of growth. 
Colombia provides an example of fruitful multilateralism. It also demonstrates 
both the strengths and weaknesses of a strict, multi-condition system. It
 
gives some credence to the notion that the political costs of exerting everage 
cumulate through time, making it increasingly difficult to get leverare in 
successive negotiations. However, one can argue that this pressure car. work 
against the formal trappings of the "LA system" without necessarily under­
mining aid conditioning imposed and enforced by less formal means. Time
 
will tell.
 
Many of the disappointm,nts encountered in attempting to influence
 
Colombian development are probably attributable to the severity of Colombia's
 
structural economic problems and the shortcomings for development of its
 
unique political system.
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E. INDIA 
Non-project lending to India began in FY 1958. The level was increased 
substantially in FY 1962 with the start of' A.I.D.'s program loan period. A.I.D. 
program assistance to India averaged about $225 million from 1961-1962 to 1964­
1965 in terms of cointments to Indian fiscal years (IFY's are April to March.) 
There was a low year of $50 million in IFY 1965-196 following the India-Pakistan 
war in the Fall of 1965. Commi:mrints rose to $382 million in 1966-1967 and 
$275 million in 1967-1968. DL project lendint declined after 1962, when A.I.D. 
decided to give higher priority to non-project assistance. Since the India-
Pakistan war and the conimencement of India's economic reform program in 196, 
program loans have completely dorinated the category of' dollar aid, comprising 
about 85, of A.I.D. assistance in FYs 1967 and 1968. Program loas have run 
at a level lower than PL-480, Titie I. The latter (country uses) averaged over 
$230 million between -1961 and 19164 and peaked at : 548 million in _(6. 
Before 1964-1965, leverage, both bilateral and multilateral, was quite 
low key. The ]BiRD taid the U. S. discussed desirable Indian se lf-help actions 
informally with the GOI, but indian performiance and development policies were 
generally considered acceptable. U. S. program Imns during this time had no 
conditions attached. After the India-Pakistan war, conditioning becamre more 
explicit and some quantitatiwe targets were ngotiated though usually not 
linked specifically to program lon agreements. U. S. bargaining probably was 
more effective, both because inr.ia was suffering from a drought and. because the 
routine of a constant level o1' A.I.D. comiitments had been broken. Also, It 
had become more obvious to the (,01 that its economic policies needed a significant 
change. 
Since the war, the principle role for conditioning of' non-project assistance 
from the U. S. and other Consortium members has been assumed by the IBRD, acting 
both as Consortium chairman and a major donor. In the Spring of 1966, IBRD 
negotiations with the Indians were quite rigorous and specific achievemnt targets 
were set. There was particular emphasis at this time on import liberali,-;atien 
and agriculture, Other policies such as e>.port promotion, decontrol of inu'stry, 
encouragement of private foreign investment, and family planning were also covw.red. 
Some target dates ,ere stated ['or the coming year,; others related to the end of 
the Five Year Plan (1971). After the discussions, and an Indian commitment to a 
new economic reform program, the Consortium pled $000 million in non-project 
assistance for that IFY to enable the Indians to c.rr', through the program. 
Over the nex few years; the IBPJ) and the Consortrur reiewed Indian performance 
on the policies agreed to in the SprinF .906 meetir Pledges of annual Con­
sortlimr non.-project assistance were conting-.cnt on adluate Indian 'progress. The 
U. S. has pledged about 421, of this assistance each year; and as the largest 
single donor, the U. S. has had an important role in determining multilateral 
leverage policy. 
Though the U S. has let the IBRD perform the major leverage role in India 
since 1966, U. S. bilateraL leverage has been significant too. The approach 
has been predominantly one of a "continuinx dialocute" with ('Ol officials, not 
specifically related to program loan agreements, except for fertilizer matching 
requirements. Loans for a given Indian fiscal. year have been made in more than 
one agreement, but releases have not been cycled to formal reviews and 
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specific target achievements. However, since program loans constitute the 
bulk of U. S. dollar assistance, they have implicitly been the basis for 
U. S. leverage on Indian policies, primarily on fertilizer policy, general
 
agricultural policy, decontrol and more recently on export promotion. GOI 
self-help actions have often been taken before a loan is sigMed. For instance,
 
a loan was signed in 1966 after the GOi had devalued the rupee. Further loan 
agreements have been held up to induce the (Ol to take action. 
An imprtant source of U. S. leverage on Indian agricultural policies 
has been the negctiations preceding PL-i80, Title I agreements, beginning in 
the latter half of 1965. After a four-year PL-48C commitment expired in July 
1965, the U. S. signed only short-term agreements for a one to three month 
supply of food grains until a six month agreement was negotiated in late 1967. 
These short-leash agreements were designed to maintain a continuing watch on 
Indian agricultural policies and increasingl., on family planning as well. U. 3. 
leverage here was more closely linked to the signing of aid agreements than that 
relating to the program loan.
 
Many of the policies which established a new priority for agriculture in 
India's Fourth Five-Year Plan (1966-1971) were agreed or. initially between the
 
U. S. and Indian chiefs ot" agriculture in Iovember 1965. They were subsequently 
accepted by the GO and presented to the Indian p-rliament. Probably most of 
the policies were those previously advocated by thie Indian Minister of Food 
and Agriculture but he had lacked the support of the Indian cabinet. The 
following and subsequent PL-4iSO agreements listed unilateral Indian actions taken 
or planned. Evidence of' U. S. imposed conditions was not apparent, but before 
each agreement was signed a hard look was taken at the progress of the agricul­
ture progranis and sometimes quantitative targets were negotiated and s-pelled out 
in side agreements or minutes. Some agreements were held up pending rarther
 
GOi commitment to action. PL-480 agreements were thus used in concert with 
program loans to influence Indian self-help performance, particularly concerning 
agriculture.
 
Between 1)62 and 3.966, OI self-help performance rates fairly law. This 
is also the time of fairly low U. S. and Consortium pressure on the GO!. Since 
the 1965 war, however, when the A.I.D. and Consortiim positions stiffened, 
there has.been noticeable improvement in self-help performance, though less
 
than the donors had hoped. India did not receive as much assistance as antici­
pated to liberalize imports during this time. Further, tnere were two severe 
droughts, a resultant depression, and political difficulties within a govern­
ment that is both federal and actively democratic. There has been substantial
 
progress in some areas stressed by the U. S. and the Consortiw. Great strides 
have been made in agricultural production, foreign private investment has been 
encouraged particularly in the fertilizer industry, controls of the domestic
 
economy have eased considerably and a family planning program is underway. 
Some liberalization of imports did take place and has been maintained despite
 
decreasing aid flows. Indian performance is partially due to factors other than
 
the ].everage process, but U. S. and Consortium leverage clearly played an im­
portant part.
 
F. PAKISTAN 
Program lending began in FY 62, with two loans totalling $132 million. 
Program lending replaced an old SA grant program, that averaged $90 million 
annually from FY 59 to FY 61. Project lending was almost as large as pro­
gram lending through FY 64, but has fallen to $30 million per annum since. 
PL 480 imports -- measured by U. S. prices -- have usually outranked the 
progran loan; thus, although the progrmr loan has recently dominated the U.S. 
dollar aid program, it has not dominated the U. S. aid package as a whole. 
At least one program loan has been made in each PY since .1962, the average 
annual authorization being about $110 million. Mhen two loans were authorized 
in the same year (FY 62, 63, 66 and 68), the second was independently negotiated 
and never handled as a tranche. That is, the release of the second loan was not 
conditioned upon performance goals established by the first. One partial excep­
tion to this pattern was when war disrupted AID-GOP relations for four months 
and, for a time, slowed the rate of annual programi lending. 
The bilateral conditioning system has been relatively informal, though 
not so informa1 as in India. Bargaining was confined to the original negotia­
tions carried on within the framework of a "continuing dialogue." The Mission 
never used the loan release mechanism for leverage: once the Agreement was 
signed, release was automatic. Only a few conditions were introduced into Loan 
Agreements, most of them since the India-Pakistan war. The primary condition -­
which has been a continuing area of negotiated change since the inception of 
the prog ram loan -- is import liberalization. There have also been clauses re­
quiring improvement in fertilizer policy and -- beginning in 1966 -- reduction 
of the military budget and a shift of funds to the development budget. The 
conditions were generally stated in qualitative form, that is, without quaiti­
tative targets or a schedule for progress. 
The program loan as an explicit instrument of leverage was used more 
narrowly in Pakistan than in most countries. The principal fortun for self-help 
discussions was not the bilateral negotiations but the annual IBP) Pakistan 
Consortium sessions, in which the U. S. representatives and U. S. resources 
played a major role. There, in addition to import liberalization, joint posi­
tions on fiscal policy, population control, agricultural development and indus­
trial dec:ontrol were hamered out and revealed to the GOP representatives. 
Apparently the Consortium position was not structured by quantitative targets
 
and deadlines, or threats on the aid level, though the difference between this 
process and an overt leverage operation may only be one of degree, since any in­
adequate perf'ormance on the part of the GOP could easily have been penalized
 
in the subsequent plcdging session.
 
ha_ Aside from the war period, the overall Pakistan performance since 1962 
has been good, considerably better than India's. The major economic indicators 
have exceeded expectations: the annual increase in real GNP averaging 6%. The 
GOP properly claims most of the credit for establishing the economic environ­
ment which produced the creditable record. In the areas stressed by the 
Consortium and reinforced by the A.I.D. bilateral negotiators -- liberalization, 
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the military budget and agriculture -- the record is good. The most 
immediate test of program loan leverage ought to be GOP performance in 
import liberalization (and indstrial decontrol) -- the policy area of 
highest U. S. priority. Here performance has been spotty. Considerable 
progress before the war was wiped out by renewed restricticns in the year 
following it (1966). This ground was regained, however, and tnere has becn 
a move toward further relaxation in FY 1968. To a large e:xt'nt, however, 
the variable behavior reflected the (;OP's expectations of t,e availability 
of foreign exchange-, an ii.dication that bota progress and retrogression were 
as much the result of A.I.D.'s willingness to finance import liberalization 
as it was of leverage. The GOP has signiticantly reduced the military budget 
proposed in early 1966, and is apparently achieving a major breakthrough in 
agric ultural productivity. 
UN
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G. TURKEY
 
Program lending to Turkey started in FY 1963, replacing at about the same 
$70 million level the ten-year old SA grant program. A program loan was made 
at approximately that rate each year through FY 1966, after which it fell to $4o 
million in F( 68, in part becaise of A.I.D.'s worldwide funding cuts. The loans 
have usually been disbursed in two tranches, conforming to the GOT's semi-annual 
import progran. Mission documents describe the second tranche as an opportunity 
to reengage the GOT in discussion of broad policy, but in fact the reviews when 
made have been perfun:tory and all tranches have been rel2ased on tine. Pro­
ject lendini started in the 1950's. In FY's 1963-57 it was maintained at a level 
not much below the program loan. PL 4bo imoorts have been heavy in the past, 
but tapered off to zero by FY 1967. The U. S. is a member of the Turkish Con­
sort-u'n, an OFCD sponsored group including mtt donors. The Consortitur has been 
an 3ffect~ive device for increasing the other-donor share in Turkey's aid commit­
ments during the 15IJ's from 1O/ to 6¢ff, but it has not been aan effective forum 
for promoting self-h lp p,:rformance, On the other hand the IPH' has had a har­
monious relation with GOT since the officers' revolt of 1960, signing Stand-by 
Agreements each year. The Fund can take considerable credit for the prudent
 
fi3cal and monetary perform,nce of the Turks. 
The GOT rejected written conditions on U. S. program aid in 1963, and
 
still regards them as an affront to Sovereignty. However, the Turks have not
 
objected to detailed discussions of policy issues during loan negotiations and
 
A.I.D. has used those opportunities, plus the many others that present them­
selves during the "continuing dialogue" with the GOT, to press U. S. policy 
views. Sometimes an informal agreement on specific tests has been reached, with 
an unspoken underst,,nding that non-performance could affect the size of the 
next arnual loan offer (though not the second tranche of the negotiated loan). 
In the FY 1966 and FY 1967 discussions, the A.I.D. negotiators insisted on in­
cluding among the conditions the II4F quantitative stabilization tests for those
 
years. Recently, A.I.D.'s main thrust has been in improving and restructuring
 
the balance of payments, in pe.rticular on increasing foreign exchange eaxnings
 
and import liberalization.
 
Turkish economic performance has been well above average during the period 
studied. The general lines of GOT policy have also been acceptable to the U.S., 
with the increasinglyipatnt exception of the external trade and payments policy. 
Program aid has not been conditioned on Turkish performance, except in the 
general sense that the U. S. approved of the broad lines of Turkish policy. We 
have asked ourselves whether U. S. influence could have been greater and Turkish 
performance still better if more specific conditioning had been employed. We
 
conclude that U. S. influence on GOT policy has been lilited especially relative
 
to the large volume of U.S. aid Turkey ha.- received. We are also convinced that
 
U. S. influence could have been greater if GOT had been made to believe that the
 
volume of aid it received was more directly related to its self-help performance.
 
We arrive at these conclusions even while accepting that overriding U.S. political/
 
military interests in Turkey constrained the U. S. from establishing a completely
 
credible bough" posture on economic performance. Recent improvements in trade
 
and payments policy, consequent upon A.I.D.'s toughened position in the FY 1968
 
negotiations, strengthen this conviction.
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H. TbISIA 
Program loans were introduced in FY 62, replacing an SA grant series at
 
about half its level. Program loans of either $10 or $15 million have been
 
made every year since. A.I.D. released the FY 66 and FY 67 $15 million loans
 
in two tranches, tying the second disbursement to mid-year performance. These
 
two mid-year reviews were not exacting, however, and both second tranches were
 
released on schedule. A.I.D. has frequently delayed agreement and disbursement,
 
hut the purpose has usually been to patch up the leakage of loan funds to France -­
an apparently difficult exercise -- rather than penalize the GOT for nonperformance. 
Project lending has recently been running at half the level of program lending, 
aind PL 4R,0 deliveries have occasionally been very large, esp-cially in FY 67. 
Nevertheless the progrnam loan dominates bilateral negotiaticas. 
A.I.D. played a role in getting the Il,{F and GOT together in 1964, when a 
loss of exchange reserves forced the latter to seek a Stand-by. The Stand-by 
has been ,extended each year since. A.I D. also promoted the LBRD Consultative 
Group, and used the autumn CG meetings that began in 1965 to drum up some support 
for A.I.D.'s seif.-help performance program. However, except for allies on the 
IBRD staff and in the 11.7 (whose stabilization conditions the Mission once con­
sidered too weak) the U. S. has carried the burden of' the self-help conditioning 
process. This has been awkward for the U. S., because every year since FY 62 
it has insisted that it must soon phase .itof nonproject assistance, and it 
couldn't easily threaten to cut the loan for nonperformance factors as well. 
But A.I.D. has tried without success to shift the burden onto the French and
 
the EEC.
 
A.I.D. attached the first policy condition to program lending in 1964, when 
it obliged the GOT to draw the outline of a remedial balance of payments program 
and call. in the IBPD staff to help. in F 65 it got the GO1' to initiate an 
Annual Economic Budget. In FY 66, a formal tranche system was installed, with 
quantitative and qualitative indicators identified in the Loan Agreement and 
observed in the mid-year review. The FY 66 conditions were limited to stabili­
zation policy -- credit, public expenditures, taxes, state enterprises, etc. 
Agriculture and private investment targets were added in FY 67 and FY 68 against 
considerable GOT objection. The number of conditions has not been large, 
however, and the tranche reviews have been perfunctory. 
GOT performance has been good, A few of the I W and A.I.D. quantitative credit
 
and expenditure ceilings were exceeded, but the excess appears not to have been
 
excessive and has been excused. The GOT has worked with the IIAF, IBRD, CG and
 
A.I.D. to develop a more prudent fiscal policy, to the point of' cutting back on
 
President Bourguiba's popular social welfare programs. Moreover, private 
investment rates and general economic activity have done well. A.I.D.'s
 
announced prirmary goals have been to restore the viability of Tunisia's foreign 
accounts, and find another principal donor. In this respect the conditioning
 
exercise failed, but it probably should not be judged on these grounds since
 
Tunisia was up against problems, aggravated by the loss of official French 
capital and naval base earnings, that were unsolvable in the short run. 
I. KOREA 
The first program loan (FY 1966 - $10 million) was signed in December
 
1965 and conditioned on performance in the third and fourth quarters of
 
CY 1965. The second (FY 1967 - $15 million) was signed in July 1966 and
 
conditioned on performance through the second and fourth quarters of CY 1966.
 
The third (FY 1968 - $10 million) was signed in February 1968. It was
 
initially conditioned on performance through the second and fourth quarters
 
of CY 1967, then renegotiated to be based on mid-1968 performance as well.
 
Each loan has had two tranche releases, based on fulfillment of up to five
 
quantitative conditions, all relating to credit, fiscal, foreign exchange and
 
other stabilization policies. Till 1968, each condition was worth a share of
 
the loan, so that the penalty for non-performance waE clear and depended on the
 
number of conditions missed. A miss on one condition theoretically could be
 
compensated for by good performance on another, though the possibility of
 
such a trade off was not mentioned ir the agreements and was probably not
 
divulged to the ROGK. The targets and penalties were explicit and agreed in
 
writing. The Koreans objected to the "schoolmasterish" approach of a point 
system in the first loan, so this system was subsequently put in a side
 
letter. A.I.D. has used the penalty on several. occasions. When the ROKG
 
failed to meet one of three year-end targets for the second tranche of the
 
second loan in 1966, A.I.D. withheld $2.5 million (one-third of one-half of
 
$15 million). Performance did not improve sufficiently in the next few
 
months, so the $2.5 million was deobligated. No other deobs have occured
 
but the criteria for release of the second tranclie of the third program loan
 
were renegotiated and applied to mid-1968 performance when not all end-of­
1967 targets were met. All criteria for release of the other tranches of the
 
three loans have been met successfully.
 
This tight loan conditioning system is only a part of the Korean experi­
ence. The larger, though declining, SA conmodity assistance grant program
 
has been conditioned since 1962-63, and disbursements have been made in
 
tranches tied, in varying degrees, to Korean stabilization performance. In
 
the SA case the umbrella condition has been implei.: .itation of a formal stabili­
zation program negotiated in the beginning of the calendar year. Quarterly 
and annual targets were established in the stabilization agreements, though 
releases were not complrbely cycled and were not tied dollar-by-dollar to 
specific indicators. Some targets in the stabilizati.on agreements were 
emphasized more than others, and overall performance, with the money supply 
as a key indicator, was judged. All SA grants -- which have run at a level 
at least three times the program loan level -- have been disbursed, though 
some tranches have been held up pending performance improvement or renegotia­
tion of conditions. ($10 million withheld in the fall of' 1967 was recondi­
tioned on satisfactory negotiation of the 1968 stabilization program.)
 
In effect, the program loan piggy backs on t1B SA grant, emphasizing or 
sharpening certain "key" policies explicit or implicit in the stabilization 
agreement. The release of the loan funds has been clearly linked to perform­
ance. The grants have had other important purposes, such as covering critical 
short-term import flows and providing local currency support for the Korean 
URI ED
 
military budget, so some SA funds have been released regardless of perfor­
mance.
 
Self-help performance has significantly increased since the election
 
in 1963, and overall performance has been outstanding, with GNP growth 
averaging some 10 percent per year. President Park's government adopted an
 
anti-inflation policy which has been carried out on a sustained and fai:rly
 
successful basis. American influence on Korean policy is obvious, through
 
not all of it may be attributed to the program loan, which has represented a
 
small proportion of U. S. non-project assistance &id an even smaller propor­
tion of the total aid program. The quality of U. S. technical advice and
 
American goodwill with the ROKG are other important elements in the leverage
 
picture. Yet, the program loan provided a marginal incentive element of
 
ones they probably
assistance to induce the Koreans to reach for high goals, 

would not have met without the program loan system. Important instances of
 
leverage attributable to the program loan conditions include the major interest
 
rate reform of September 1965 and the impressive revenue jump in CY 1966.
 
The IMF has played a secondary role in the conditioning process, but will
 
become more important as U. S. assistance phases out. A Consultative Group
 
exists but has not played a major role.
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IV. THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES 
A. Did A.I.D. try to use the program loan to influence policy? 
Some critics of A.I.D.'s ideology argue that in practice A.I.D. has
 
been interested in the program loan primarily as a convenient way of trans­
ferring resources and has generally not used it for leverage, except to
 
ensure implementation of the import program according to U. S. law. They
 
cite as examples "unconditioned" loans, made without any strings attached,
 
and "conditioned" loans whose conditions were not rigcrously applied.
 
Such critics usually have one or more of the NESA countries in mind,
 
and frequently are thinking of a period at least three years in the past.
 
We find that this argument does not apply to Latin America or Korea, and
 
does not even apply to NESA anymore.
 
In Latin America, serious attempts to obtain leverage seem to have
 
begun in FY 1963, in Brazil. The Colombia Mission picked up the new theme
 
and developed it further. Program lending in Chile has followed a similar
 
pattern. LA has usually been tough in both negotiations and performance re­
views, frequently delaying tranche releases and even deobligating money com­
mitted earlier in Colombia. It is true that there have been instances in
 
which tranches were released even though the host government failed quantita­
tive tests and performed poorly in qualitative areps. But A.I.D. has stood firm 
on enough "fighting issues" to establish a credible leverage position, at
 
least on stabilization policy. This is true of Korea as well. In Tunisia
 
conditions were not applied in the first two years after the conversion from
 
SA to DL, but after FY 1964 the process was tightened and by FY 1966 it in­
cluded qome quantitative tests and tranche reviews.
 
NESA has not used the program loan for leverage the way it is
 
used elsewhere. A tranche system with quantitative tests was instituted in 
Turkey in FY 1966 and FY 1967, but does not appear to have been followed 
rigorously. Tranches have never been used in India and Pakistan. Only
 
Pakistan was asked to sign bilateral agreements on loan conditions, and the
 
number of those conditions was then only two. A variety of factors explain
 
NESA's style. First, both Turkey and Pakistan were "conversion" countries -­
they had enjoyed politically motivated, economically unconditioned balance of
 
payments support via SA grants in the pre-DL period -- and it took time for 
negotiators on both sides to adjust to stiffer ground rules. Second, program
 
aid to both India and Pakistan is organized under IBRD consortia, and A.I.D.
 
has preferred to frame the self-help conditioning process in multilateral
 
terms (the OECD Turkey Consortium and the IBED Tunisia Consultative Groups 
are apparently much weaker arrangements for applying leverage). Third, at 
least in Pakistan and Turkey there seems to have been some feeling that the
 
country was doing well enough without leverage, and that the program loan
 
could be justified as a reward for past performance instead of an instrument to 
induce future performance. Fourth, inflation hap not been a problem in the NESA
 
countries, and tere wae generally little need for either major stabilization 
programs or the intensive, continuing surveillance process which of necessity
 
characterized the Latin American conditioning system. Finally, some people in
 
NESA are convinced that the more formal and mechanical elements of aid
 
conditioning as practiced in Latin America are irrelevant at besti, impolitic
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and self-defeating at worst. NESA prefers to use informal and multilateral
 
methods. It emphasizes thie "2ontinuing dialogue" in place of the explicitly
 
conditioned loan or tranche. As we will explain later in this paper, we re­
gard the NESA system as another way of' obtaining influence, rather than an
 
absence of influence. It is, however, a more difficult form to evaluate.
 
The fundamental difference from the LA system is that the latter tries to
 
exert leverage at two stares, negotiation and performance review prior to
 
tranche release. In INESA there is just the negotiation. Often, the agree­
ment is finalized only after the prescribed policies have been adopted. Once
 
the loan is signed, disbursement is inevitable.
 
B. Did the recipients perform? 
The policy measures A.I.D. has tried to get program loan countries to 
undertake each have a chain of consequences, stretching all the way from 
enunciation of' a policy to the effect on the ultimate economic, social, and 
political groals. Performance can be gauged at any point along the causal 
chain. Normally, when we look at the earlier links in the chain we say we are 
measuring self-help (i.e. the actions of' the LBC government to influence those
 
variables in the development process which it can influence).
 
Compared to the LDC average, the eight program loan countries as a group
 
seem to have done relatively well on self-help. Whereas one might quarrel with
 
the relative emphasis each gave to stabilization, growth, and distributional.
 
objectives -- as well as to the specific policies followed -- each of the eight
 
pul.licgovernments pursued policies aimed at long-term improvement in the 
welfare. They aEl justified their inclusion in A.I.D.'s li.'st of "concentration 
countries." They all exhibited a serious development intent. 
Beyond the question of intent, one seeks a standard for evaluatii.g their 
performance. One measure close to the self-help end of the causal chain is 
their ability to attain targets specified in program loan negotiations. Here 
the record is highly mixed. In Latin America, where A.I.D. has set explicit 
conditions on a wide-range of stabilization and growth policies, we find hits 
The latter have been frequent andpredominating but misses far from rare. 

serious enough to prompt several interruptions in aid flows, and even a few
 
breakdowns in U. S.-recipient aid relations. In Korea, A.I.D.'s conditions
 
have been reasonably well satisfied. Pakistan's liberalization program was
 
But in
successful up until the war, and has now been restored and extended. 

India, where liberalization was singled out for special emphasis in bilateral
 
negotiations, and in Turkey, where foreign exchange earnings, liberalization,
 
and devaluation have received continuing emphasis, results have generally been 
more modest . Finally in Tunisia, the stated targets -- increasing reserves 
and finding another donor of' last resort -- were never achieved, though a num­
ber' of' subsidiary, and perhaps more practicable, goals were.
 
Sustained self-help fitinvolves choice of the right policy measures)
 
must 
eventually result in high levels of achievement of' a country's ultimate
 
goals, at least relative to limits imposed by exogenous forces. If the growth
 
*In contrast, the fertilizer programs in both Pakistan and India appear to ha
",
 
been successful.
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rate of GNP is taken as 1 sure of ultimate performance the program 
loan countries do not emerge as uniformly impressive performers. Only
 
three of them -- Korea, Turkey, and 9lakistan -- are above the LDC average 
for the 1962-67 period, although fiv? -- Brazil, Chile. Colombia, Turkey,
 
and Korea -- did improve their perfo-manc , ovcr that period. India and 
Tunisia have performed unevenly diring the last three years, largely 
because of exogenous forces. Pakist-n has slipped from its outstanding 
record before 1Lrs wa-:. with Ind' t. Macroe:cniomic indicators, however, fail 
to identify clearly the government's contribution to development. Nor do
 
they reflect recent institutional, attitudinal, and policy reforms whose
 
economic effects are apparent only efter a lag. Taking such changes into
 
account, the performonce records of our Aght countries are all at least 
moderately encouraging. 
C. Did A.I.D. Influence Polic,?
 
There is no conclusive way to determine whether given host govermnent 
actions are attributable to U. S. leverage. Other possible explanations 
are that: 
(1) the hc'st government was planning to do it anyway; 
(2) the U. S. simply persuadel the host government to do it
 
(i.e. we were the cause of' the action, but we could have 
achieved it without a loan);
 
(3) the U. S. directly financed it; 
(4) other donors or international bodies brought it about, 
through persuasion, leverage, or direct financing.
 
In practice, these causal forces are often so tightly intertwined that the 
analyst cannot possibly unravel them. If the local planning commission, a 
team from the IBLIR, and thr. USAID staff have all been urging a given action 
which is then undertaken, who can say which elements of support were essen­
tial and which :erely incidental? 
Host government initiatives. One hears the comment that a donor can't 
get a government to do anything it do:esn't want to do. A more plausible vari­
ant of this is the assertion that at least some group in the host government 
must favor the action the donor is urging. Even so, we argue that most possi­
ble prescriptions are somewhere on the host country's list of priorities, and 
most have at least some internal support. By lowering the cost of a prescrip­
tion, or simply making a persuasive case on its bL;half, the donor can help 
realign priorities. Moreover, the donor can focus attention on issues hitherto 
suppressed not for want of nuppor-;ers but simply for lack of exposure. Thus 
we feel that, in principle, t donor can influence country priorities, timing 
and policies. And in practick. we think A.I.D. has. There are too many changes 
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on too many fronts aggressively pushed by A i D in Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
 
Tunisia, Korea, India,-Pakistan and Turkey for us to suppose they would all
 
-have_ happen ed..anywy.And..there..are -several-important .instance s where -we---... 
1are sure they would not have happened without A.I.D.'s influence. These 
occurrences, which are documented in the country papers, are the best evi­
dence we know -- albeit circumstantial evidence -- that A.I.D. has actually 
achieved leverage. 
At the s r eI time, we do not mean to belittle other means of influence. 
f "Persuasion. One also hears that any influence A.I.D. may have had is at­
_tributable not to leverage from the program but to good relations between A.I.D.
 
,and government officials, Where the Mission Director has strong contacts with
 
the Ministries, and where the Mission's negotiating and review staff are re­
spected by their counterparts, the possibility of bringing about policy changes
 
through persuasion is increased. We accept this proposition, but also see its
 
limitations. Friendship is not a substitute for a program. Nor can goodwill 
do everything millions of aid dollars can do. But goodwill does have a value, 
both by itself and as an adjunct to leverage. Sometimes changes can be effected 
-
through persuasion alone; whether the U. S. makes a program loan or not is irrel
 
,
evant At other times the fact that a loan has to be negotiated opens up dis­
cussion in which the U. S. side io able to persuade the other side of the merits
 
S of a particular policy; in this case although no leverage has been applied the 
loan is a key element in the policy change. Finally, there is the case in
 
Swhich aid is genuinely conditioned and the host government adopts the policy
 
i'becauseit has been convinced that it must do so to get the loan, Some observors
 
vigorously argue that this kind of assent is worthless unless the recipient 
genuinely believes in the course he has agreed to follow. If he has not been 
persuaded, they say, he will fritter away the agreement in half-hearted implemen­
"tation. While agreeing that persuasion is a desirable comT,lement to leverage, 
"	we would not go this far. We believe that leaders of devc .oping countries are 
capable of balancing considerations off against each other and agreeing to 
take actions they are less than enthusiastic about if they are convinced. 
that they must in order to obtain more aid. And we think that non-performance 
of agreed conditions can be forestalled by conscientious performance reviews 
S . "tied to tranche releases of new loan signings. Moreover, there are several 
_ 	important instances when lukewarm acceptance of A.I.D. recommendations has 
shifted to vigorous support as the benefits materialized. 
Direct finance. As noted in Part II, above, A.I.D. comes close to 
financing~some program loan conditions directly (e.g., import liberalization). 
*~: :However, even this kind of condition is often far from painless. And most ­
loan conditions are not of this sort anyway. They remain difficult things, 
for the host governinent to do, even when A.I.D. provides some form of indirect 
cpensation.
 
Other donors and organizations.' Other foreign aid agencies have played
 
a role in all eight of our countries, through the use of persuasion, leverage,
 
and direct financing. However, we must carefully distinguish between their
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own initiatives and the U. S. Government's use of them as a means for
 
achieving its own objectives at reduced diplomatic cost. (One must
 
distinguish, that is, 4n principle; in particular instances it is often
 
hard to tell who is ie ' uLin and who is following). 
The IMFT has played a decisive role in formulating stabilization policy in 
Colombia., Brazil, Tunisia, Turkey and Pakistan. A.I.D. has consistently sup­
ported IT v recomendations, lending them far more weight than they otherwise 
would have had. On the other hand, the Fund's presence has relieved A.i.D. 
of much difficult and occasionally disagreeable work in a major area of 
policy. In Latin America, the I1MF has been less popular and A.I.D. has some­
times (but not consistently) reacted by partially disatrociating itself from the 
Fund's rc-ommendations or by performing the overall advisory rele when IMF sup.. 
port was not required. 
The IBRD Consortia for India and Pakistan are other multilateral organi­
zations which play a major le verage role. In these countries, A.I.D. has 
thrown most of its weight into the Consortium negotiations and reserved for 
bilateral negotiations only the extra stress it has given to liberalization 
and agricultural production. The Consortia. are more clearly creatures of 
U. S. policy than is the I4F; it is hard to imagine them existing and exer­
cising influence without the large U. S. contribution. 
Even outside the Consortium countries the IBRD is an important source 
of persuasion and leverage bought with its own and others' money. It is 
especially influential in Tunisia and Colombia, where it backstops Consulta­
tive Groups. 
However, the principal occasion for the exercise of leverage in our 
eight countries are A.I.D. program loans in all eight, the periodic Consortium
 
discussions in India and Pakistan, and the IMF Stand-by negotiations in
 
Colombia, rinisia, Turkey, and Pakistan.
 
D, Can A.I.D.'s leverage be attributed specifically to the program loan?
 
It seems obvious to us that any leverage A.I.D. has had in the primary
 
policy areas, at least since the conversion from SA to DL was completed in
 
1963, can be attributed primarily to the program loan. Sector lending is too
 
new to have had much impact on development policy, though we expect its in­
fluence to be sizeable. Capital and technical assistance projects "tend to 
consume their own leafage," as one USAID offioial nut it. PL 480 plays a 
significant role in India and Pakistan, but elsewhere it has generally not 
been used to get leverage, except occasionally with respect to agricultural 
policy. SA was formerly used to influence general economic policies. In 
Korea, it still is. But SA and DL are close substitutes in the leverage 
operation and whatever we learn about the effects of one should apply to the 
other as well. The proposition to which we subscribe is that the nonproject 
capital input program provides our negotiators with a ticket to the chambers
 
where stabilization and growth policies are framed.
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The NESA countries deviate from this generalization less than one might 
think. Particularly in India, leverage has been exerted mainly through the 
consortium, in th; contcxt of =nnual discussionz about the total aid level. 
But the distinction between program aid and the total package has lost most 
of its meaning in recent years, as project lending has all but disappeared 
in response to overall funding reductions. What the consortia discuss, 
therefore, is basically program,- aid, including PL )480. 
In sulamary, we have found self-help performance i.r, policy areas stressed 
by A.I.D. and, having considered other possible explanations for that perform­
ance. are satisfied that part can be attributed -o the leverage effect of the 
progrmr loan. Exactly how much we cannot say. The most clear-cut examples 
are ':orea, Brazil, Tunisia, and pre-war Pakistan. But the overall pattern is 
not particularly impressive and we think we can agree with those critics who 
argue that the leverage effccts have sometimes been exaggerated. 
The modesty of results to date is not necessarily an indictment of the 
principle of program loan leverage, only of A.I.D.'s practice since F1!1962. 
Conceivably, if circumstances propitious -to influence can be clearly identi­
fied, and an improved. conditioning system developed, A.I.D. can significantly 
increase its efficiency in influencing policy. Our next problem, then, is to 
ascertain whether certain conditioning systems, lending circumstances or 
other variables active in the past have been more conducive to influence than 
others. 
UNmRL 
V. 	 DETERJINANTS OF INFLUENCE 
A. The con,1tionin syt:m 
This may or mwy not be the most important determinant of leverage, but it 
is certainly the most ontraversial. The divergence in almost every character­
istic of the NESA erid LA cystems is the heart of the controversy. It is hard to 
imagine how such a divergence could have grown up within a single Agency, where 
expericnces are presumably communicated and people presurmably learn from past mis­
takez. We find it impossible to conceive of any differences in national charac­
teristict which would make both stylev. optimal in their own regions. We know that 
stabilization calls for a different conditioning system than development; neverthe­
less LA handled development and NESA handled stabilization (when it became an 
issue) in a manner which suggests that Bureau styles rather than problem type were 
the decisive, irfluance. We reject glib generqa.jzations to the effect that 
L-.tin Arneri ,ns will sign anything, or tl'.t loan conditions canmot be imposed 
in countric-s which have h-Ld a decade of gernerous, untied commodity aid. We 
have thus regarded the NTSA/LA split priLmurily as a confrontation of le verage 
strategies, and have optimistically searched for generalizations of' universal 
vale reuardj.n!f relative effici encies. 
Table II atti;mpts to highlight some of the important inter-country dif­
ferences in the conditioning system, as well as the frequency with which 
penalties for nonperforrmance have been applied. 
We identify four principal dimensions to che conditioning system: 
() 	 the explictness and specificity of' the loan conditions; 
(2) 	 review and enforcement of' conditions; 
(3) 	 the number of conditions; 
(4) 	policy areas in which conditions are specified. 
1. Explicitness and specifi-ity of conditions. 
By ex_icitness we mean the medium employed to express loan conditions.
 
A wide variety of such media have been used in the countries we have studied.
 
Starting at the "hard" end of the scale and working toward the "soft" end, 
the principal ones are­
(a) 	statements made directly to U.S. Government in loan agreements
 
or supporting documents;
 
(b) 	statements to international bodies (IMF, IBRD, CIAP) which are
 
explicitly referenced in the bilateral agreement;
 
(c) 	similar statements, implicitly regarded as part of the bilateral
 
agreement;
 
(d) 	general public statements of 'the'LDC government (e.g. national
 
development plans), to which general adherence is pledged;
 
(e) 	oral statements not committed to writing or publicly announced.
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TABLE II (For explanation of' 
PROGRAM LOAN CONDITIONIDG SYSTEM columns, see notes 
on following page.)
 
LOANS RELEASES CONDITIONS -PNALTIES 
$Mill. Loans Tranches Written Verbal Delays Deobs. 
Loan Side Bilat. Uni. # ill. 
(Coin I)(1) (2) (3) (1 ) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)__ 
BRAZIL 	 FY 62 74.5 1+2A 2,1,1 X 14 
FY 3 (25.5) 1 1 x * 
FY 64 (50.0) 1 1 x * 
FY 65 150.0 1 4 X X 720 
Fy 66 1.50.0 1 4 X X 720 1 
FY 67 100.0 1 4 X X >20 3 
Fr 68 75.0+ 1 2 X X >20 
CHILE 	 FY 63 35.0 1 3 X X 8 
FY 64 55.0 2 4,1 X x 8 
FY 65 80.0 1 4 x x '20 1 
FY 66 80.0 1 4 X X )20 2 
FY 67 - + 
FY 68 15.0+ 1 1 X X 7 
COLOMBIA 	 FY 62 (30.0) 1 1 x 4 
FY 63 60.0 1 2 X X 10 1 
FY 64 60.0 2 1,3 X X >20 3 10.0 
FY 65 - * 
FY 66 65.0 1 4 X X >20 
FY 67 100.0 1 4 X X >20 1 
FY 68 58.0+ 1 2 X X >20 
KOREA 	 FY 66 10.0 1 2 X 5 
FY 67 15.0 1 2 X X 3 2.5 
FY 68 i0.0 1 2 X X 4 
INDIA 	 FY 62 200.0 1 1 
FY 63 2L0.0 1 1 
FY 64 275.0 2 1,1 X 
FY 65 190.0 1 1 x 
FY 66 300.0++ 3 1, 1,1 X 
FY 67 182.0 2 1,1 X 
FY 68 248.o++ 2 1,1 X 
PAKISTAN 	Ff 62 132.0 2 1,1 
FY 63 100.5 2 1,1 X 
FY 64 100.0 1 1 X 
FY 65 140.O 1 1 x 
FY 66 120.0 2 1,1 X 3 
FY 67 70.0 1 1 X 3 
FY 68 140.0++ 2 i1 X 2 
TURKEY 	 FY 63 35.0 1 1 X 
Ft 64 70.0 1 2 X 
FY 65 80.0 1+2A 2,1,1 X X 
FY 66 70.0 1 2 X 15 
FY 67 65.0 1 2 X 15 
FY 68 40.0 1 1 X 8 
TUNISIA 	 Fy 62 10.0 1 1 X 
FY 63 15.0 1 1 X 
FY 64 10.0 1 1 X 3 
FY 65 10.0 1 1 X 
FY 66 15.0 1 2 X X 13 F-CY7 15.0 1 2 x x 15
 
FY 8 10.0 1 2 X X 18
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TABLE II: 	 .VNotes 
1. Explanation of Column Headings 
Column 1: 	 Gross new obligations of program loans and (in paretheses) contingency loans. 
Later deobligations due to non-performance ore shown in column 10, apposite 
the year of the original obligation. Where fipares are followed Ly a plus 
1+1, sector loans were also made in that year; by a double plus "++ , felti­
liz~r loans were nude anc. are included. 
Column 2: 	 Number of Program Loan Agreements. +2A indicates that two AmendmehtF -added 
new funds. 
Column 3: 	 Numbar of tranche releases scheduled for each loan, including ther first 
release of each loan. Wtere two or more figures are shownt reading fros the 
left they refer in chronological order to separate loans or amendmentus They 
are the schedul nuber, not the actual number. 
Column 4: 	 An "X" indicates economic policy conditions on A.I.D. lending w3re written 
Into the loan agreement. 
Column 5: 	 An "X" indicates economic policy conditions on A,I.D. lending ware witten 
into side letters to CTdP, IBRD, USAID, etc. 
Column 6: 	 An "X"' indicates economic policy conditions on A.I.D lending were agreed 
to in bilateral negotiations, but not in writing. 
Column 7: 	 An "X" indicates A.I.Do officials announced to the host government the policy 
areas where A.I.De ould expect to see some improvement, but no formal 
bilateral agreement on conditions wna made. 
Column 8: 	 Approximate number of conditions on A.I.D. lendIng that wore agreed to 
Include both quantitative and qualitative conditioas. Inter-country comparisoni 
are difficult, since one USAID may squee-Oe into one condition several policy 
actions that another USAID has itemized 
. 
The recent Latin Amrican loans have 
listed well ove-h 20 conditions. We counted 73 fcr the il 66 Colombia loazo 
Column 9: 	 The number of tranche releases from that year's lons that were delayed for 
more than two months because of poor self-help pwformance. Delays attribat­
able to other factors are not included0 
Column 10: 	 The amount doobligated from the program loan. Imcase of poor self-help 
performance. An asterick (-) indicates that bilateral negotiations either 
broke down or were not started because of poor selft-help performance and 
related factors. 
2, Other Notes 
Table does 	not include conditions agreed or &nnormice in multilatera. negotia­
tions. The India and Pakistan IERD consortia wer ttUprincipal vehicles for 
the A. °D. 	 conditioning effort, though oven the conso.tia never developed the 
formal system found elsewhere. 
Conditions 	on lending can affect either the release of funds from the condiftra 
loan, or the level of subsequent 4yeLajr lendings. The latter is almost aliays 
the case with loans released in one action (i.e., one trancho).
 
= Greater than 
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By specificity we mean the language used to express loan conditions. 
Conditions are all either quantAt'iable in principle or unquantifiable. 
Again ranging from hardest to 2,ftest, we see the main possibilities as: 
For quantifiable actions 
(1) 	 directly quantified commitments: 
(a) 	 ceilings (e.g. "money supply will increase by no more 
than 4"); 
(b) 	 floors ("the GOX's current account surplus will be at 
least y million pess"); 
(c) 	 sliding5 scalfe,- ("if the price (A' coffee is between x 
dollars and y dollars, the currnt account surplus will 
be at least z million pesos; if the price of' coffee is 
above y aollars, the surplus will be at least z+]"). 
(2) 	 unquantified corrmitments, supported by a mutual understanding 
on an euilftlent quanLitativi, targlet ("consumer price increases 
will be I- , to reasonable ariounts," which is mutually under­
stood to mean 15, or less). 
unsupported by any mutual understanding(3) 	 unquantifi-_!d commitmcrt, 

on an e4quivalent quantitative target.
 
For unquaitiiable actions 
() 	 dated coitments to take specific discrete, identifiable actions 
(e.g. "Par.) iament will pass the pending land reform bill by 
September I"). 
processes ("GOX will strengthen(2) 	 commitments to further continuing 

its levelopment planning capacity").
 
(3) 	 undated corarLitments to take specific actions. 
determine the overall formality orExplicitness and specificity combined 

set of' progran loan conditions. A formal set of con­informality of a given 

ditions comprises a relatively unambiguous standard against which subsequent
 
an informal set leaves much more
performance judgments can be. made, whereas 
room 	for interpretation and maneuver later on. Without counting the early
 
used 	 for leverage, the eightNESA and Tunisian progran loans, which were not 

into two distinct groups with respect
countries we are studying breaK cieanly 

to formality of the conditioning syst,:mr,. Table II shows quite clearly that
 
three Latin Aerican countri,. have had relatively formal
Korea and the 
IIESA countries relatively ihfornal ones. With­systems, Tunisia and the three 
can be said to be the mostin the foirmal group, the distinctive Korean systemIlI0 
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formal of all, the LA system as applied in Colombia, Brazil, and Chile
 
somewhat less so. Within the informal group, rankings are unclear,
 
since there has been a general trend toward greater formality during the 
last six years, and since the three Consortia have tended to substitute
 
for bilateral aid conditioning. However, the differences in both specificity 
and explicitness represented by the full sweep of' this range are sizeable. 
What generalizations can be made about the benefits and costs of formality 
in loan conditioning? For one thing, it is easy to dispose of the least formal 
forms of loan conditioning. If the alleged loan conditions are never written 
down aid if they are never specified. as precisely as their basic character 
permits, then they are not really conditionls of the loan at all. The perform­
ance decision wich must be madie when the ne:xt trancle is due to be released 
or the next loan extended will in effect be rad( by criteria determined at 
that time, not in advance. (Thc exception to this is the rare case in which 
the U. S. anmounces unilaterally but in advance what it considers acccptable 
performance, and then adheres to the announced criteria.) And if' the criteria 
for funds release are not known in advance by the LDC government they can 
hardly guide its policies.
 
At the other end of the scale, we can see shortcomings in extreme for­
mality. The impnerfect state of the economic arts is a limiting factor because 
unpredicted exogenous ev-ents -- or mis-predicted endogenous ones -- can turn
 
a seemingly reasonable loan condition into an unreasonable one. Exogenous 
factors (.eatler and export prices are the two most troublesome) can be handled 
through the device of a sliding scale, if' their effect on the system is cor­
rectly specified. But there, is no defense against misspecification, as in the 
common case in whiub r.ney supply is held to the desired magnitude but prices 
rise more than anticipated. 1,ore generally, extremely specific public commit­
ments may give both parties less room for m.meuver than they would like. They
 
can rob the donor of the ability to reward "a good try" which does not quite 
reach the specified mark, and this in turn deprives him of the ability to use 
tough conditioningf as an incentive devi'e by setting conditions a bit higher
 
than he expects actual performance to reach. What, then, is the optimal degree 
of formality? Or -- since fcrmal conditioning may have political costs -­
what is the min imm degree needed to make conditioning work? We think that if 
leverage is to be obtained the LDC government must be firmly committed -- to 
itself, to us, to the international agenci:s, and, if' politics permit, in 
public -- to the program we have all agreed is the quid pro quo for the loan. 
Only if it is will proponents of the agreed program within the LDC government's 
own ranks be able to win out over those who question the wisdom of the program 
or are reluctant to pay its costs. For this kind of commitment to be obtained, 
the program must be definable in terms specific anid explicit enough to permit
 
a reasonably unequivocal judgment about the adeqluacy of' performance later on. 
Beyond this, we find it hard to generalize. We would not say that conditions
 
must be public or that they must be quantified, only that they be firm enough
 
to permit a performance judgment, which in turn can influence later funding
 
decisions.
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2. Enforcement
 
We do not think that the questions of whether to use tranches, and, if 
so, how many trancnes to have, are fundamental. Negotiations for new loans 
can in principle do anything performance reviews prior to tranche releases 
can do, although their potential to do so has not been fully exploited by 
A.I.D. so far. There is no reason why rESA, for example, could not explicitly 
condition negotiation of' the next loan, just as explicitly as IA conditions 
tranches. 
The frequency of tranche releases or loan negotiations should be related
 
to the nature of' the loan conditions (whether they refer to rapidly or slowly 
changing phenomena) and to the costs to all concerned of' conducting frequent, 
comprehensive, ministeria-level reviews. The reccnt trend in !A away from 
quarterly reviews of' all loan conditions appears well founded. At the same 
time, some kinds of' policies, especially stabilizat:iJon policies, require con­
tinuous surveillance. 'here such issues are central, weekly or monthly staff­
level meetings (as in Korea) arc highly desirable. 
The proposition has been put forth that leveragfe is a function less of 
what we ask for in tne curirent loan than of what we have insisted upon in the 
past. We subscribe to it. Leverage cannot be obtained unless the threat im­
plied in the process is minle credible. The donor must in some way prove that 
he means business. We are tempted to conclude that A.I.D. cannot obtain sig­
nificant leverag:e in a country until it has at least once inv(ked its ma;jor 
sanctions; non-release of a tranche or non-negotiation of' a loan on schedule. 
A major reduction in loan levels mighit be an alternative. However, we can 
see from the experience we have studied that use of' major sanctions elsewhere 
or employment of minor sanctions (especially judicious stalling) in the coutry 
concerned sometimes does the job. We do question whether countrir progrmrjs in 
which everything seems to comne off on schedule, year after year, contain genuine 
aid conditioning. They may possess elements of influence, but it is likely to 
be purely of' the persuasive kind. 
In establishing credibility, A.I.D. has a problem akin to that of a
 
nuclear power. Its only real weapon is a devastating one, which has the poten­
tial of destroying all possibility of future cooperation. Yet how can it 
exert its power without using the bomb? The answer, of course, is to develop 
conventional weapons. The USAID/Korea practice of' tying specified pieces of 
the loan to specified policy ccnditions is one imaginative weapon, which auto­
matically limits the extent of its fire. Most recipients do not like this 
"schoolxnsterish" approach, however, and most USAID's and Embassies would. 
despair to see their own freedom thus limited. The aore coramon approach is to 
rely on the arts of diplomacy -- to threaten, cajole, plead, stall -- in hopes 
of bringing the LDC government into line. Yet these strateg(ems will utinvtely 
prove useless if' the other side stands firm, and the decision on whether to 
give in or employ the ultimate weapon must then be faced. If'A.I.D. gives in, 
its credibility and ability to exercise leverage in the future may be 
seriously compromised. If' it stops a tranche or breaks off' negotiations it 
creates a crisis, in which economic conlitions may worsen rapidly and bargain­
ing positions harden. Pressure builds up on both sides and one party or the 
other usually gives in, but sometimes not before the whole environment for 
cooperation and rational discourse is destroyed. It is quite a dilemma. 
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The only solution, easily prescribed but not so easily implemented,
 
is to avoid crises whenever possible. To do so without jeopardizing lever­
age requires setting firm but fair loan conditions, with a degree of flexi­
bility in them. Even at best, crises will occur from time to time.
 
3. Number of conditions 
These have ranged in A.I.D. experience from one to several dozen. A 
Mission which is genuinely interested in influencing stabilization and growth
 
policies soon learns that (as USAID/Colombia did) it must set numerous con­
ditions so as to avoid the loopholes which exist in an underspecified policy 
package. As cc:iditions proliferate, however, problems arise. The costs of 
negotiation and review rise, and it becomes harder to do the job well. More 
important, the meaning of performance becomes clouded. If many conditions 
are specified, the recipient usually fails to satisfy at least one of them. 
Is this grounds for withholding the tranche? if not, are two missed conditions? 
Or three? The concept of an agreed prograi which everyone understands and the 
recipient must implememt begins to dissolve. Of course, some conditions are 
more important than others. Some are "fighting issues," in behalf of which
 
A.I.D. is prepared to employ its ultimate weapon. But many others are not.
 
And the recipient does not always know which are which. 
It is doubtful whether A.I.D. can maintain credible leverage over more
 
than a very few issues with a single loan. Other items listed in an agreement
 
are either there for window dressing (the host government expects to do them
 
anyway and both sides think they would look good in the agreement) or for
 
bluff (we want something done but are not willing to spill blood to get it
 
done). In the latter case, A.I.D.'s real objective may be to legitimatize
 
future discussion of the issue, in hopes of getting it done through persuasion
 
alone.
 
Should window-dressing and persuasion items be included in lists of con­
ditions, undifferentiated from fighting issues? They have been included in 
the past for back-patting purposes, and in an attempt to extend leverage to 
more areas by keeping the recipient guessing about which issues were fighting 
ones. But the former motive should find expression in a publicity release, 
not a policy document. As for bluffing, we doubt that it helps. The LDC 
government usually has a good idea of which things A.I.D. will fight for and 
which not. And even if it does not, large numbers of conditions open the 
door to capricious ex-post tinkering with the relative weights of various con­
ditions, a practice which is destructive in the extreme. We feel A.I.D. should
 
enumerate no more than 3-4 major conditions in any given loan, selected and
 
specified in such a way that both we and the recipient realize that we will be 
ready to withhold our funds if they are not met. 
4. Areas in which conditions are specified
 
There has been a great deal of confusion about the relationship between
 
policy areas and leverage. Thus, one often hears that program loans attain
 
leveraxe over macroeconomic policies, but not sectoral policies. This is
 
often ascribed to the fact that we "talk to the Minister of Finance," and not 
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CONFIDEN T I
 
the heads of ministries implertK = ams. The sector loan has
 
been advanced as a solution to this alleged shortcoming of the program loan.
 
We find two types of confusions to be involved in this view. One is
 
between kinds of conditions and numbers of conditions. As just noted, if
 
an agreement has dozens of condit'oris only a few can be fighting issues. In
 
LA, these have tended to be stabilization issues. Sectoral issues, especially
 
in agriculture and education, have been added to the agreements but have usually
 
received short shrift in the review process and have generaly resulted in a 
lower level of performance. We feel, however, that the reason is riot that the
 
issues are agricultural, say, but that they are considered to be subsidiary
 
parts of a large package. We see no reason why, noting the caveat discussed
 
below, A.I.D. could not negotiate program loans with sectoral rather than
 
aggregate issues as their center of' gravity.
 
This, indeed, is what the sector loan tries to do. By breaking off a
 
piece of the program loan for separate negotiation with purely sec[,or condi­
tions, it acccmplishes much the samie objective as USAID/KOREA's practice of 
earmarking pieces of the program loan for release if specific conditions are 
attained. The sector loan (which we have not explicitly evaluated) also 
takes A.I.D. closer to the heart of sectoral decision-making. It is not clear 
just how much clnser, howevr, since the operating ministries must still get 
their resources through the ministry of' finance, and since they sit in on pro­
gram loan discussions in the best-run programs anyway. 
The second source of confusion is the tendency to ignore the important 
instrmrentsdistinction between instrument and structural variables. Policy 
are much more easily and (uickly manipulated than are economic or social insti­
tutions. Most of the conditions set in the monetary and fiscal fields relate 
to instruments; many of those in agriculture and education are deeply struc­
tural. It is not at all fair to apply the same performance yardstick to 
monetary policy and agriculture, say, when the mix of conditions among instru­
mental and structural changes varies so widely. In general, we find that 
structural changes (e.g. tax reforms) are just as hard to bring off in "good" 
leverage areas as in "bad" ones.
 
Having eliminated the two main sources of confusion, we must still admit
 
to the possibility that there are "good" and "bad" areas for exercising
 
leverage. Contrary to the rough generalization just made, it may be that like
 
policy measures (whether instrumental or structural) are easier to induce in
 
some fields than others. Our study has not been fine enough in gauge to tell.
 
5. Dissipation throufgh time 
Another common view which we must evaluate is that capacity to exert 
leverage is somehow limited, and tends to diminish through time. The costs of' 
exerting leverage, it is said, build up andi make it more (lifficult to get 
leverage on each succeeding rrund. Gradually, it becomes a choice between giv­
ing up the attempt or continuing, to move forward only at increasing political­
cost. Latin Paerican experience- give; soe redrnce to this hypothesis, and 
the sector loan approach is partially motivated by it. 
UHCLAS~FIE
 
CONFIDENTIAL 
In all three of' the LA countries we studied we did notice a "honeymoon
 
effect," in which smooth relations and attainment of considerable results in
 
the early months of a new LDC administration were followed by deteriorating
 
performance and souring relations. Partly, this is explained by the U. S.
 
Government's willingness to be tolerant of a new government to which it is
 
favorably inclined (e.g. those of Lleras and Frei), a
 
willingness which gradually dissolves as the new administration proves unable
 
to work the miracles expected of it. In addition, however, it is clear that
 
the program loan process, as it has been employed in Latin America, creates
 
frictions. These frictions can build to a high level of emotionalism on both
 
sides. Thus, the U. S. becomes disenchanted with its former best hopes, while
 
progressive leaders such as President Lleras bitterly denounce the leverage
 
process.
 
The difficult question which we feel must be addressed is whether such
 
cumulating bad feelings are a necessary consequence of' vigorous attempts to
 
achieve leverage such as A.I.D. h- undeniably made in Latin America. Is 
leverage, as some have said, a wasting asset? We conclude on the basis of our 
study that it certainly is difficult to maintain it year after year, especially
 
in a situation in which the aid level and the recipient's expectations about 
future assistance remain approximately stable. In these circumstances, re­
cipients may begin to regard the current aid level as their due and increasingly
 
resent continued demands for performance (commi.hltments. We conclude that stability 
over a period of years in both the aid level and conditioning system is dangerous.
 
It may well lead to dissipation of our leverage.
 
In the most favorable influence relationships, however, there is a growrth 
in policy-making ability and susceptibility to persuasion which leads to
 
precisely the results A.I.D. desires without the use of leverage. Program loan
 
negotiations and reviews can be exhausting educational experiences for both
 
staffs. They force the recipient to muster statistics never before collected,
 
and explore policy options never before entertained. Notably in Korea and
 
Pakistan, this educational factor has led to a secular improvement in self-help
 
performance and a "graduation" from the need for leverage. Under favorable
 
circumstances,this transition can be accelerated by a cut in the assistance
 
level or formulation of' an aid phase-out plan, since these can lead to a
 
heightened appreciation of the need for self-relionce. Thus, self-help seems 
to have been promoted in Turkey by recent aid cuts, and in Korea by agreement on
 
a phase-down schedule. This is not to say, of course, that all aid cuts will
 
achieve this objective. The country must have the latent will, a fairly well­
developed capacity for discretionary policy-making, and a resource gap that can
 
be filled (but preferably only with some difficulty) at the lower aid level
 
contemplated. 
In countries which are not yet ready for the transition, we would advocate 
conscious attempts to keep leverage from becoming routinized, The conditioning
 
system and even the aid level should be varied from time to time. One-time
 
offensives of the type the IBRD launched in India in 1965-66 might be tried
 
elsewhe.'e. If policies are bad but little influence is possible, A.I.D. should
 
be true to its philosophy and cut back on aid. 
B. The Loan
 
1. Loan size
 
The most relevant measure of loan size for most country situations
 
is probably percentage of annual imports financed (A more sophisticated mea­
sure, which we have not computed, is the share of non-capital goods imports
 
other than those financed by P1 480 which the program loan finances), although
 
share of central government receipts or share of gross investment financed
 
might also be pertinent measures in some cases. By the import measure, the
 
program loans to all our countries except Tunisia and Korea have been similar
 
in size, all hovering around 10%. Thus, the experience we have exmnined. pro­
vides little basis for evaluating the rather simple-minded hypothesis that a
 
larger loan buys more leverage in the cross-section sense. We doubt, however, 
that the proposition that leverage is proportional to the size of the loan has
 
any merit at all. 
2. Direction of change in loan size
 
Some would expect leverage to be associated with a rising aid level.
 
Thus, the Turkey LAS argued that increases in program aid over a level of
 
$40 million a year could be used to buy improved policies. Here, too, w3 lack 
evidence. One major upsurge in loan size we c:.n observe is the one in LA at
 
,the start of the Alliance. But leverage doctrine and technique were still in
 
their infancy while this rise was occurring, so we gain no knowledge of how it 
might have been exploited to gain more influence. The only other notable in-­
crease occurred in India in 1966 after the war. (Table I on page 6 shows this 
to some extent, but it is clearer when loans are arranged by Indian fiscal 
years.) That increase definitely was accompanied by substantial policy adjustments. 
We do have experience with declines in loan size to observe. In FY 67
 
Brazil dropped to $100 million after two years at the $150 million level. Turkey
 
and Tunisia also suffered one-third cuts in FY 1968. In Korea, the small program
 
loan has been held constant but SA has been progressively reduced as part of an 
aid phase-out plan. In at least two of these cases (Turkey and Korea) falling
 
aid has successfully been combined with tightened conditioning and improved
 
self-help.
 
Probably the most sensible thing that can be said about the leverage­
loan size relationship is that it really pertains to the aid level the LDC ex­
pects. That is, we can derive leverage from upward deviations from whatever
 
path the recipient expects aid to take -- whether level, rising, or falling.
 
This proposition may relate more closely to the total aid package than to the
 
program loan itself. Its converse is that there is nothing more destructive
 
of leverage than reinforcement of the notion that a given aid level is a
 
country's "due," regardless of its performance. The important thing is to con­
vince the recipient that better performance means more aid than it would get
 
otherwise.
 
C. Environmental influences
 
We have just outlined our findings on the conditioning system and the
 
loan itself as determinants of leverage. The next step is to examine the
 
major environmental influences which can affect the outcome -- U.S.-recipient
 
diplomatic relations, the recipient's internal politics, unanticipated eco­
nomic developments and the role of third.parties (multilateralism).
 
lEDM 
- 36 ­
1. U. S.-recipient dipl:matic relations
 
Foreign aid and -the quest for influence over the recipient's develop­
ment policies take place within a much wider environment of bilateral dip­
lomatic relations. This fact influences the leverage operation in two basic
 
ways.
 
it has a passive, permissive effect, in that a basic minimum level of
 
good relations must exist if' the kind of' interaction involved in leverage is 
to come about. No one likes to be told what to do, and a country which is 
overtly hostile to the U. S. for whatever reason can hardly be expected to 
accept the leverage relationship. At the other cnd of the scale, it is clear 
that in a country which approaches satellite status the U. S. cmn get almost 
anything done that it wants° The most common relationship is nei he,! of 
these, but an ,rrms-].en(,,th relationship involving an equivocal mixture of 
respcct, distrust :iCe'it vi ty, and other human emotions on the part or the 
host trovernment h, important question is whether this environment permits 
the exercise of 'iv r'age. We think it does, althoug.h even our "friends" 
have a sizeabi" r,[mjYture of negative elements in their attitudes toward us, 
and it is importnit to avoid trigfgering these feelings. Avoiding this is 
simpjy one aspect of' diplomacy. 
Bilateral relations assume a much more active role in some cases. When
 
the U. S. has much bigger relationships with an LDC than its aid relation­
ship -- notably military or major commercial interests -- much nondevelopment 
fgive and take may impjnge on the program ].oan bargain. If aid is seen in 
Sarge part is a payment for military support, as it has been at times in 
Turkey, PaVIst a, tr-id Korea, the recipient will be understandably reluctant 
to 'pay twice" t'or aid by tak:lng7 difficult development policy steps as well. 
In a case sucii as Turkey, what seems to be unconditioned aid from a strictly 
developmental point of' view can also be viewed as a reasonable quid pro quo 
in a broader deal. 
The recipient country may also have broader interests which affect its 
response to the leverage approach. Thus a country like Brazil, which places
 
a high value on its international credit rating for commercial reasons, may 
be much more willing to do the "respectable" thing than it would if its com­
mercial interests were not involved. 
2. Domestic politics
 
A.I.D. often asks recipients to do things whose costs are likely to be 
more visible in the short run than their benefits. Only a government which 
possesses a reasonable margin of political security can agree to such a 
bargain. In the common case in which the LDC government must take a series of 
such steps it is necessary that it be able to maintain such political security 
over several years' time. One is drawn almost irresistibly to the unattractive
 
conclusion that lively democracies, in which elections -'e frequent, fair, and 
hotly contested, are poor subjects for the exercise of influence. So are
 
countries in which military or other coups are frecuent or feared. These
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points apply not only to influence but also to policy action by the LDC
 
government in the absence of influence. The contrast between the consis­
tent and effective policy lines taken by the Ayub and Park governments,
 
on the one hand, and the alternating periods of prog2-ess and backsliding
 
in Colombia and Brazil, on the other, dramatically makes this point. We
 
would not go so far as to say democracies cannot develop so fast as author­
itarian states, but of' two equally dedicated recipient gcvernments, the
 
more authoritarian is likely to look better in a self'-elp review.
 
We have already noted that in countries where governments change
 
frequently there is a "honey-moon effect", in which a new government is 
tolerantly perceived as doing well, while one that has been around two years
 
ur more is invariably regarded more critically.
 
Political security aside, leverage obviously cannot work if the host 
government lacks the administrative capacity to implement courses of action 
it decides upon. All LDC's have this problem to some extent, but in some 
countries it is so se.,2re that it turns the influence operation into some­
thing much more similar to technical assistance. In such cases, helping the
 
host government do what it agrees to is much more important than obtaining 
agreement in the first place. A.I.D. has generally chosen its program lean
 
and "concentration" countries so as to avoid the worst manifestations of 
this problem, but it does confront it head-on in places such as Indonesia and
 
the Congo.
 
3. Economic developments
 
Unanitic.ipated changes in the economic environment of program lending may 
alter the recipient's ability or inclination to take the hard steps specified
 
in the loan conditions. This is a good reason for USAID to allow a measure of 
flexibility in the standards it applies in measuring self-help performance,
 
since quarterly reviews tied rigidly to projections made at the time of the
 
primary negotiations may penalize where penalty is no longer warranted, or
 
praise where performance c-wes less to deliberate action than to fortuitous
 
changes in the weather or some other exogenous variable.
 
There is one economic factor, however, which has a more immediate impact
 
on the amount of leverage A.I.D. can extract from any loan. It is the 
severity of the host country's balance of payments disequilibrium. Either 
because the negotiators misjudged the need for balance of payments relief, or 
because subsequent events undermi ,ed the assumptions underlying those judg­
,ments, there is a possibility that the donee may need the loan less, or more, 
than it once expected. In many ces, the need seems to have been overstated. 
We are surprised at how long it often takes to implement a program loan, even 
without penalty periods. Disbursements under the first Tunisian program loan, 
for example, did not start until nineteen months after it was authorized and
 
eleven months after it was signed. Additionality pnoblems exrlain the delay, 
but one wonders whe ier the urgency of the initial negotiation was exaggerated. 
Disbursements under the third started alriost immediately after the signing.
In LA, first disbursements have usually lagged the tranche releases by half
 
a year, and another year may go by before 501 of the tranche has been dis­
bursed. By contrast, the secordd Fiscal Year 1967 program
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loan to India was used to cover imports that had already been made. The
 
point here is that the economic need for the program loan varies, but is
 
often less immediate than the program loan papers suggest. Where the
 
need is greater, we would expect the recipient government to be prepared
 
to pay a higher price in terms of self-help performance, but we are also more
 
willing to make the loan.
 
4. Multilateralism
 
We have already discussed other donors and international bodies as alter­
native sources of policy influence. They can also be important adjuncts to
 
the leverage operation, as A.I.D.'s generally successful use of the INI, the
 
IBRD (including its consortia and consultative groups) and ClAP shows. There
 
can be no doubt that such arrangements spread the odium of applying leverage
 
and lessen the diplomatic costs to the U. S. However, leverage can be lost
 
in the process if'the other participants are not willing to be tough when
 
toughness is needed. The creation of an atmosphere of cool technical objec­
tivity in which the "right" technical policies are sought (with their political
 
implications played down) can do much to further leverage, but the U. S. must
 
often lend backbone to the operation.
 
Especially in LA, and particularly with reference to stabilization policy,
 
the IMF has played (and sometimes overplayed) a vigorous, important role.
 
The IBRD role in the India and Pakistan consortia has also been generally
 
effective. In all these cases, U. S. support was a crucial ingredient. It is
 
apparent that the failure of the donor groups for Turkey and runisia to develop
 
a strong position on development policy forced A.I.D. to follow a more inde­
pendent negotiating line.
 
D. Personal touches and the art of influence
 
One of the things our study has impressed strongly on our minds is the
 
importance of the human element. Many of the observable differences in approach
 
and degree of success among countries and.between periods within countries seem
 
attributable to variations in personality, training, and competence on the part
 
of both U. S. and host cotutry participants. To build effective policy in­
fluence into a program loan, we believe that the following personal traits are
 
necessary.
 
The Mission Director must have a firm grasp of and deep belief in A.I.D.'s 
mission, in genera. and as applied to the host country. He must be willing 
and able to defend that mission against conflicting short-term political and 
commercial objectives of the U. S. At the same time, he must be an effective 
diplomatic operator vis-a-vis the host government. This requires firmness at 
times, but empathy and integrity throughout. He must be viewed by his 
Ministerial counterparts as a sympathetic man, a competent man, and a man of 
his word. Serious failings on any of these counts can undermine his mission. 
He must practice the arts of influence, which have been codified by one former 
Mission Director as follows: 
If at all possible, induce the host government to put forward its
 
program.
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--	 As much as possible, make aid adjustments in response to local 
performance look like bonuses rather than penalties. 
--	 Select relatively few explicit conditions, but make them key 
ones. 
--	 Work to get conditions which are genuinely accepted as valid and 
feasible by those who agree to them and must direct their achieve­
ment. 
--	 Don't bluff, at least not completely (i.e., when sanctions are 
threatened, make sure they can be applied, if necessary, without 
cutting off our own noses in the process). 
--	 Demonstrate faithful and consistent follow-through on the U. S. 
action called for by any agreements. 
The 	Mission Staff must contain some analytical talent, which is willing
 
and able to immerse itself deeply in the local milieu. This means it must be
 
professionally trained, practical in approach, and free enough of' implementa­
tion, reporting, and other responsibilities to devote a large block of time
 
to policy. The size of the polioy staff depends on the ambitiousness of the
 
influence operation being attempted. For an LA-type program, 4-5 good
 
analysts ar. needed. 
The 	local counterparts crust be Janus-like, looking toward the aid agencies
 
and their own governments simultaneously. Vis-1-vis the aid agencies, they
 
must possess the training and outlook to be receptive to rationalisti2 policy
 
arguments. Vis-a-vis their colleagues in their own government, they must nave
 
the power and prestige tc lend the commitments they make to the aid agencies
 
practical significance. Outstanding influence operations in the countries we
 
have studied have usually pivoted around a key man in the local government
 
who possessed both these sets of traits (e.g. Roberto Campos in Brazil under
 
Castello-Branco, Mohammed Shoab in Pakistan). Support for such men from above
 
and below is also important. Presidents Ayub and Park are notable for the
 
strong, continued support they have given to development. At the staff level,
 
Pakistan and Korea also stand out for the competent e'onomic staffs they have 
developed. (In Korea there has been no figure corresponding to Campos or
 
Shoab; however, a strong Assistant Minister of Finance and the staff he has 
built up around him have compensated for a high rate of turnover at the 
Ministerial level.) 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Having come this far, we are impressed by the ambitiousness of the task
 
we have undertaken. We feel that the specific, limited generalizations we
 
haxe made above have some merit. We are not entirely confident of whether we 
have laid an adequate basis for the kind of grander generalizations appropriate 
to a conclusions section. But we do want to make four kinds of conclusion-like
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comments. These concern the degree of generality possible in this area,
 
what few descriptive generalizations seem universally valid, what we have
 
learned about program loans versus projcct and sector loans as vehicles
 
for influence, and what future actions by A.I.D. seem.desirable.
 
A. Degree of generality possible 
As between the extreme of viewing rhe countries in our sample as undif­
ferentiated testing grounds for the causal relations we have hypothesized and
 
that of regarding each country as unique, we come down closer to the former.
 
Wlehile we cannot say that the LA system, the NESA system, or any other variety
 
of conditioning system is best for all countries at all times, we do think
 
there are many things to be said that do apply to all countries. There is a
 
general art or science of influence which is not invalidated by differences
 
in national culture, politics, or economic structure.
 
B. Generalizations from experience
 
We now recapitulate what we consider to be the most important generaliza­
tions established (or at least suggested) by our study.
 
(1) 	A.I.D. has been true to its self-help philosophy in all the countries
 
examined, at least during the second half ofm1961-68 period; this has
 
generally been/much the case in countries in which the aid condition­
ing system has been subtle and implicit as in those in which it has 
been highly explicit.
 
(2) The performance of program loan countries as a group has been only 
about 	average, although it has improved during the program loan
 
period.
 
(3) 	A.I.D. has influenced self-help and performance substantially:
 
through direct financing, leverage, and persuasion, bilaterally end
 
in consort with other national and international lenders.
 
(4) 	The program loan is A.I.D.'s primary instrument of leverage and per­
suasion, although some influence also attaches to other forms of
 
aid and to the country assistance program as a whole.
 
(5) 	The trappings of the formal loan conditioning system, many explicit
 
and specific conditions, frequent reviews and tranche releases,are,
 
by the-mselves, irrelevant; what matters is whether the message is 
somehow conveyed to the recipient that the aid level depends on
 
performance; this in turn requires only that the agreed program
 
be described in terms specific and explicit enough to permit a
 
reasonably unequivocal performance judgement later on, and that the
 
agreement be enforced.
 
(6) Enforcement, while essential, poses difficult tactical oroblems
 
because of the fact that the most effective sanction, withholding 
of aid, is often a devastating one; the aim thus becomes to maintain 
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this sanction as a ible threat without actually having to 
use it. 
(7) 	 Persuasion is highly preferable to leverage, although it is
 
possible to effect policy changes without it.
 
(8) 	 If real leveroge is needed, it should be applied only to a very 
small number of areas at any one time. 
(9) 	 Any area of policy is susceptible to influence, except those
 
which are ruled out by strongly held ideological views.
 
(10) 	 At the same time, structural chanves take far longer than changes 
in instrument variables, and due allowance should be made for this 
in A,I.D.'s expectations and in the conditioning, system. 
(11) It is hard to maintain a constant level of' inf'luence through time, 
especially at a constant lending leve!; aid cuts at the right 
moment can help; what is r_.ally desirable, however, is a gradual 
growth process in the host governent, in which leverage, and 
eventually !J. S. inf'luence in atny form, become unneeded. 
(12) 	 The most i.mportant rclation between influence and loan size is 
that influence can be obtained from increments of aid above what the 
recipient expects, whatever that is. 
(13) Influence can n-e undermined by generally hostile U.S.-host country 
diplomatic relations, and also by broader political, military, or 
commercial relations in which the quid pro quo for U. S. aid lies 
outside the development field. 
(14) 	 Successf-ul loan conditioning requires a substantial degree of 
nolitical and administrative strength on the part of the recipient 
government.
 
(i1) 	 Multilateralism is often useful tactically, but a strong U S. 
insistence on self-help is usually a necessary ingredient i. 
success. 
(16) 	 The human element (in the Missirn Director, his staff, and their 
host country counterparts) is aii important part of the story. 
(17) 	For A.I.D. to presumc to take positions on stabilization and devel­
opment policies in a major country it must be prepared to field an 
excellent analytical team.. This is serious business, amd A.I.D.'s 
"intuition," and capacity for casual appraisal, are insufficient for 
sorting out the relative weight of the many critical variables involved. 
C. Proam loans vs other forms of aid 
loans,
The main alternatives to program lending are project loans, sector 

and the aid package or consortium approach. Each can be a complement to oro­
gram lending as well as a substitute. Although we have looked at all of these
 
in passing, we have not giv.en them the attention we devoted to the program loan 
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and thus cannot make conclusive judgments on the merits and limitations
 
of each. However, we do have some confidence in the following remarks.
 
(1) 	 Project loans are good only for a narrow range of influence,
 
extending at best throughout the sector in which the project
 
is located. We have not examined the few cases in which a
 
'package of' projects" approach 'gxs used (e.g. Peru), but we 
understand the experience has been unfavorable. We do not 
intend to demean the project loan as a means of' financing 
desirable activities ad exerting localized policy influence, 
but as a device for influencing general policies its inherent 
limitations -- the distracting effect of the heavy demands 
for analysis and negotiation of details of the project itself, 
the fact that project loans often do not seem to recipients to
 
be appropriate occasions for general discussions, a-nd the dif­
ficulty of applying sanctions for nonperformance once physical 
construction has begun -- are crippling.
 
(2) 	 The sector loan is a new device, which we consider a promising 
means of focusing on frequently neglected sectoral conditions.
 
However, there are definitional problems with sector lending,
 
and we suggest a separate analysis of it,. including an evalua­
tion of experience so far, in the near future.
 
(3) 	The consortium approach seems to work well if it gets motive
 
power from its donor members and adequate staffing from its
 
institutional sponsor. We see it as a valuable adjunct -to pro­
gram loan influence rather than a substitute for it. Unfortu­
nately, this approach is in serious trouble right now because
 
of the unwillingness of the donors to put up enough aid funds
 
to make it work. 
D. Recommendations
 
(1) 	 Retain program lending as the major element in the aid package
 
in those countries where the U. S. wants to influence broad
 
overall policies and is willing to supply tLe material and
 
human rescurces to succeed in this effort, cnd where the shape
 
of the host government gives some hope of success.
 
(2) 	 Avoid using the device (or at least the label) in countries
 
where these conditions do not hold -- where short-term con­
siderations dominate U. S. policy, where the U. S. is not
 
willing to make a significant commitment, or where there is
 
little or no hope of influencing policy.
 
(3) 	Keep policy conditions of the loan few in number; work for
 
clear definitions of these conditions and differentiation of
 
them from pseudo-conditions. 
(4) Ayoidroutinization of the approach in a particular country;If other reasons for change do not present themselves, vary 
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the routine merely to reduce the chances that our influence
 
will decline.
 
(5) 	 Pay close attention to casting the drama: pick a Mission 
Director who has the qualities referred to above, give him 
a good economic staff, and look for the best point of contact 
in the host government. 
(6) 	In countries where significant influence is successfully being
 
wielded, work on building up the local capacity for policy for­
mulation; think in terms of a phase-out plan for U. S. policy
 
intervention similar to an aid phase-out plan but aimed at an
 
earlier completion date.
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APPEN[DIX: A Sum.ary of Reviewers' Views 
by: D. H. MeCleland 
This evaluation study is a statement of the views of the authors. 
Although they sought througthout to obtain information and opinions from 
most of' the people in AID/W most knowledgeable on the subject, the report 
explicitly does not seek the least common denominator necessary f'or an 
agreed document. 
The final draft (as well as earlier versions) was circulated to the 
Regional Bureaus and country specialists. This Appendix endeavors to surmma­
rize the general observations and criticisms received. The focus here is on 
qualifications and disagreements, but th tenor of most cormnents was clearly 
one cf general agreement with most of the findings and conclusions of the 
study. 
The most frequent type of comment was concerned with what the study 
did not do.
 
One important observation was that the question of' whether program 
loans have been used to influence policy or performance is less sii,,nificant 
than the question of hcw well the U. S. has been able to influence policy by 
the use of all of its instruments.
 
A still broader study aimed at the development effectjveness of U. S. 
policy influence wou.1d certainly have had advantages, if practicable. The 
study, however, considers the broader review to be unmanageable and focuses 
on whether and how influence has been exerted through program lending, not 
on the merits of the polies eneouraged or the other instruments employed. 
Another otission, which is c-rhaps inherent in the self-imposed 
boundaries of the study, is the limited attention given to what is perhaps 
the basic ratlonale for program lending -- the need to transfer resources 
in suplport of a development program. There is some consideration of this 
point in connection with import liberalization; e.g. in Pakistan, the pro­
gram loai included this as a major objective and simultaneously provided at 
least a Part of the foreign excha-nge necessarj to achieve the objective. 
It is tre, however, that resource transfer questions are not dealt with as 
an integral part of' the study. 
There were also comments in some cases about the very limited treat­
ment given to Supporting Assistance. This is largjely relevant in South-east 
and East Asia, where only Korea has had program loans, and where even in 
Korea, SA has been the principal instrument for achieving influence. It may
 
be that the paper could have expanded the discussion of SA in Korea, although
 
the study itself notes that "in effect, t e program loan piggy backs on
 
the SA grant". But the possible 'nfluence achieved by SA grants elsewhere
 
in the area is not considered as ih is beyond the scope of the study.
 
Another criticism was that insufficient emphasis was given to objective
 
between the two classes of country cases grouped by "formality of the con­
ditioning system." The study observes that Korea and the three Latin A-erican 
countries have had relatively formal systems, Tunisia and the three NESA 
countries relatively informal ones. In the first group of countries, however, 
domestic stabilization conditions have been in the forefront ,ithmore general 
develosental policies receiving less emphasis. For the second group of 
countries, inflation has been a less serious problem and the objectives of 
program loans have focussed more on other policy questions. A case can be 
made that stabilization objectives lend themselves more to (and perhaps 
even
 
require) specific, detailed conditions i.n the afgreements, as in the general
 
pattern of IF agreements. The study does mention that this difference may
 
explain a good part of the difference in "style" between the two groups, but
 
some critics felt that more analysis could have been made on this point.
 
One commentator observed that the study did not give sufficient atten­
tion to the "art" of establishing conditions and evaluating satisfactory
 
performance. It is argued that two conflicting biases are likely to be con­
sidered. On the one hand, the possibility of setting targets somewhat beyond
 
the range of expected achievement may be considered to make the policy makers
 
stretch or try harder than they otherwise would. On the other hand, there
 
may be an incentive for Missions to "play safe" and make the conditions less
 
rigorous than they could be in order to reduce the danger of being criticized
 
for not meeting the targets, particularly should the shortfalls be due to
 
conditions beyond the control of the government. No very definitive treatment
 
of these considerations is possible within the limits of this, or perhaps any,
 
study. Even so, they do qualify any findings about successes or shortfalls in
 
achieving targets.
 
In addition to these suggested qualifications of the study for what it
 
did not do, there were two major criticisms of -the findings themselves.
 
One criticism was the inadequate weight given to the importance of "the
 
continuity in financial support required to achieve certain policy objective-."
 
It is argued that a combination of' objectives such as priority to agriculture,
 
devaluation, import liberalization and market oriented investment decisions
 
cannot and should not be renegotiated annually, and that it is not necessary
 
that each loan "get" something. While the difference here is one of degree,
 
there does appear to be a real difference of opinion as to how explicitly and
 
repeatedly the potential leverage of program lending should be exploited.
 
The other specific disagreement was a more narrow one related to the
 
primacy of program loans in obtaining leverage. While agreeing that A.I.D.
 
can be primarily attributed to Program
leverage in the primary policy areas 
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Loans, the criticism suggested that the statements on the usefulness of
 
PL 480 and Capital and Technical Assistance projects in influencing primary
 
policy areas appears to give too little weight to them.
 
These suggestions of possible errors of omission and commission, al­
though important, do not appear to bulk large in terms of the whole study.
 
Although the final review process reguested only comments and not concurrence,
 
the fact that the number of major criticisms was small suggests a fairly 
general agreement, in broad outline if not in all details, with most of the
 
findings of' the study. And it is important to note that there was no dissent
 
expressed on the central conclusions that A.I.D. has exerted considerable in­
fluence over policy and that the program loan is A.I.D.'s primary instrument
 
of leverage and persuasion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
 
A.I.D. has signed five program loan agreements with Brazil, the first in
 
IF 62 a-nd the others in FY 65, 66, 67 and 68. The FY 68 program loan
 
package includes, for the first time, several sector loans (which still
 
await signature). All of these l:q.ns including the first were to be pro­
vided in tranches whose release was conditioned upon the implementation of
 
stabilization policie-s and the achievement of quantitative stability tar­
gets. With the FY 65 and later loans, quarterly pre-release reviews of pro­
gress were instituted and a group of agricultural and other sectoral devel­
opment policies were added to the list of indicators. The gap in FY 63 and
 
FY 64 resulted from the breakdown of' negotiations with President Goulart's
 
administration over stabilization policy. Smaller, contingency loans were
 
authorized without conditions in those two years. Full-scale negotiations
 
on DL non-project assistance did not resume until after the revolution in
 
March 1964 and the assumption of power by Castello-Branco.
 
A.I.D. experience in Brazil must be evaluated against the backdrop of an
 
eiuremely unstable political scene. Negotiations have been conducted with
 
four different regimes within seven years and with a score of government
 
officials whose tenure for effecting agreements was quite uncertain.
 
Braz-, with a population of 97 million, has received less U. S. loan aid,
 
or program loan aid, per capita than either Chile or Colombia (the ratios
 
are 2: 6: 3), but twice as much as Pakistan and four times as much as India.
 
A more instructive statistic is the ratio of program loans to imports.
 
Brazilian imports ran at a level of about $1,400 million during the 1960's.
 
Thus A.I.D. program loans have covered a little less than 10o of the import 
bill since 2.965. This is the same order of magnitude as the Chilean and 
Colombian program loan coverage, and, for that matter, of the Indian and
 
Turkish coverage. It is less than in Pakistan (16%) and more than Tunisia
(5%). 
II. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE
 
A. Summary of U. S. and other donor assistance
 
Before 1961 the U. S. program in Brazil consisted of a large technical
 
assistance operation, minor PL 480 Title III deliveries, and Ex-Im Bank
 
loans averaging $100 million per annum. A Title I food program was initiated
 
in FY 1961 which ran for four years, stopped, started (FY 66), and stopped
 
again. It does not appear to have played a major role in the negotiation
 
process.
 
The Development Loan program in Brazil was kicked-off with President 
Kennedy's commitment to President Quadros in March 1961. The first loan 
was the FY 62 program loan for $74.5 million, released in four successive 
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steps. Two contingency loans provided some non-project dollar aid i.n 
FY 63 and FY 64, when negotiations over DL program loan conditions broke 
down. In FY 65 the DL Prograrm Loan operation moved into high gear and 
ever since the Program Loan negotiations have been the focal point of 
USAID strategy in Brazil. Project loans began in NY 63, when $37 million
 
was obligated. They have continued at a substantially higher rate ever 
since, though still less than the program loan rate. 
The F( 65 Progra:r Loan totalled $150 million, FY 66 $150 million, 
FY 67 $100 million (only $50 million of which was released), and the FY 68 
package $170 million (including $5c million FY 67 carry over and 
$45 million in sector loans). These program loan amounts compare with 
annual averages since FY os of $75 million for project loans, $13 million 
for technical assist;JAnce and $115 million for Export-Import credits. The 
dominance of' thk programn loan is obvious, but it is equally apparent that 
project loans and technica_ operations continue to make substantial 
contributions, and have done so even in years when the program loan nego­
tiations ran into difficulty. Indeed in the FY 65 CAP submitted in 
November 1963, tihe expreszed USAID strategy was to take advantage of the 
large project loan ccmponent, to exert influence on official Brazilian 
policy, since a Forogram loan did not appear to be negotiable at the time. 
U. S. aid in recent years has exceeded the combined total of other
 
donor aid, though not by much. In the three year period FY 65-FY 67
 
obligations of' the international institutions -- IBRD, IDA, IFC, and IDB
 
(including SITF) -- totalled $560 million, compared with AID DL obligations 
of $650. Other bilateral aid amounted to $150 during the same period. No 
consortium arranrgement exists, though USAID has betnr pushing Brazil to per­
suade IBRD to expand its loose multidonor arrangemeins in the transport 
sector into a wider and more formal device. The Brazil-IMF relationship 
has been stormy but productive. An IMF Stand -by Agreement in 1961 soured 
after only $60 of $160 million had been used. Hew Stand-bys were granted inb' Lways 
FY 65 and each year thereafter, but neither Brazil nor IMF have been/nappy 
with each other since 1961 and only U. S. insistence on ani IMF role in the 
stabilization program joined to Brazil's desire for an acceptable credit
 
rating in the international community has kept them together on occasion.
 
B. FY 62: 100 million authorized, $74.5 million released.
 
President Kennedy had promised President Quadros in March 1961 $100 
million of A.I.D. funds as part of a U. S. package. Disbursement was 
generally understood to be conditioned on the success of a stabilization 
progiam which the Quadros Administration was putting together with IMF 
support. Quadros' sudden resignation in August contributed to a fiscal 
and credit crisis upon which the stabilization program foundered. Despite 
an obvious lack of progress, but in an effort to give the new President 
Goulart the benefit of the doubt in his announced intention to salvage the 
*Most of those project loans were directed to particular regions, however, 
particularly t e orth East 
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stabilization platform, AID proceeded to obligate part of the $100 
million. In four separate actions between October and May 1962. 
$74.5 million was released ($30, $20, $15, $9.5). 
The use of conditions accelerated in that period. The first $50
 
million was released with only general referpnce to U. S. expectations
 
that the essential elements of the I14F stabilization plan would be re­
spected -- reduction of the federal cash budget deficit and restraint in
 
The third release, howeer, was
official credit to the private sector. 

The fourth was de­conditioned upon GO acceptance of a new IMF visit. 

layed four months while Goulart's finance officers and the I14F team pre­
pared a new stabilization plan. The release -- a modest one of $9.5 
million -- followed announcement of' the new plan and an exchange of 
letters between Finance Minister Salles and the U. S. Secretaryj of the 
Treasury conditioning further obligations under the original Kennedy com­
mitment to the successful processing of' the new austerity measures and 
progress toward quantitative targets. The latter included explicit ceil­
ings on the cash budget deficit, Executive Office expenditures, cash 
transfers to the railroad and other parastatal transport entities (the
 
and credit to the private
"Autarquia"), and Bank of' Brazil rediscounts 
sector. Other parts of the program included tax reform and more flexible 
and timely manipulation of' commercial bank reserve requirements and foreign 
exchange rates. The thrust of the 1962 stabilization program was against 
-- on the federal budget deficit, theinflation, and its principal chapters 

Autarquia deficits, official credit to the private sector, and exchange
 
were to remain the centerpiece of' USAID program loan negotiations
reserves --

first emphasized
(together with the handling of the coffee fund, which was 
in the FY 63 negotiations) until the present. 
The 1962 stabilization plan never got off the ground. For various
 
reasons Goulart refused to take the decisive and generally unpopular actions
 
called for under the plan. The political situation was confused throughout 
CY 1962, with the President struggling to establish an extreme leftist regime 
and business and some military interests trying to thwart him. Further dis­
bursements of the $100 million loan under the original DL program were 
abandoned.
 
C. FY 63: $25.5 million (Contingency) authorized and released
 
In early 1963, Dantas, the new Finance Minister, visited Washington in 
hopes of' working out a new agreement. Negotiations were successful and, in 
an exchange of letters between Dantas and Administrator Bell, a new A.I.D. 
commitment was made. It was conditioned upon a series of self-help stabili­
zation measures comparable to the 1962 plan. One of the explicit targets 
was that a new IP' agreement should be reached by June 1963. The U. S. 
package included the release of $84 million funds remaining from the 1961
 
commitment ($25.5 million of which were A.I.D.) and over $300 million of
 
new money to be spent over two fiscal years FY 63 and FY 64.
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In April, A.I.D. fulfilled ali understanding of the Bell-Dantas 
agreement by obligating $25.5 million. Shortly thereafter it becwrie 
obvious that Goulart was not prepared to support Dantas' plan; in fac* 
Dantas was replaced in June. The projected I.F visit never materialized, 
and the agre:ement in effect was terminated. USAID was careful not to 
close the door. It continued to assert to th- GOB officials that large 
program loan reserves could be made available provided self-help stabiliza­
tion conditions were taken seriously. Howev r, at the political level U. S.-
Brazilian relations were suffering from increasingly outspoken criticism of 
U. S. international ob ectives on the part of' some of roulart's teamr, and
 
the U. S. Goverrment was increasingly disturbed by the growing Communist
 
influence in Goulart's regime.
 
D. FY 6): $50 milion (Continfv,.ency) authorized and released 
While Goulart was in power, f'ormal program! loan negotiations were not 
resumed. The FY 65 '10- submitted in ovember 1963 identitled the types of 
self-help criteria against which USAID mtasured Brazil's credit worthiness -­
emphasizing the same points as the unsuccessful !.)62 and 1563 stabilization 
plans -- hut the (;Oh was not interested in meeting them. 
The revolution, and Castello-Branco' s accession in April 1964,, com­
pletely changed the picture. Various actions, including the appointment of 
Roberto Carspos as economic minister suggqsted tl1at the now adminis,tr'ation 
intended to get tough with inflation. As a support fio'1' debt .reschedul. hg 
agreements, an interim contingency loan of 0 million ,fs app-oved in 
June 1964, and contacts proliferated in the proce:;s of working out a 
new donor-recipient review mechanism upon which a larger and continuing 
program loan series could be based. 
The evaluation of the leverage effects of program loan experience in
 
Brazil through FY 64 shows that U. S. attempts to use generous balance of
 
payments support to influence stabilization policy during the quadros and
 
Goulart Admdnistrations failed. But it is also true that U. S. refusal to
 
proceed with loan disbursements contributed to Goulart's increasingly inde­
fensible fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange position, and that the evident 
U. S. preparedness to resume a loan program once stability conditions were 
met probably led Goulart's critics to believe that revolution, if followed by
 
vigorous corrective measures, would be financed.
 
E. FY 65: $150 million authorized and released
 
In December 1964 the first of the "modern" program loan agreements was 
reached. It called for the immediate release of $52.5 million (conditioned,
 
in retrospect, upon an impressive number of institutional reforms and policy 
changes adopted in late CY 1964, including the halving of Goulart's projected
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budget deficit, creation of a Central Bank, development of major tax
 
reform legislation, railroad rate increases, and a much tougher position
 
vis-a-vis the coffee growers) and thiLee subsequent releases that were to 
follow quarterly reviews of progress toward explicit quantitative indi­
cators and qualitative measures of reform. The quantitative indicators 
were accepted by both sides as the fundafrental test of' progress. As in 
earlier years these indicators placed ceilings on the cash budget deficit, 
transfers to the Autarquiasa, and official cred'it to the rurivat.,e sector. 
They also allowed for no deterioration in public holdings of foreign 
reserves. The qualitative indicators involved other fiscal, monetary and 
balance of payments corrective devices, as well as special treatment of 
the sensitive wage and coffee supoert issues. In addition to these 
stabilization conditions, a few qualitative indicators of progress in 
dfevelopment planning and agricultural production were thrown into the 
agreement. 
The quantitative and qualitative targets were described in detail only 
in the GOB's letter to the Chairman of' CIAP. The Loan Agreement and initial 
implementation letter referred in summary fashion to those targets, emphasiz­
ing the quantitative tests and the few qualitative measures in which the 
U. S. was particularly interested. They also described the review process and 
anticipated timing of tranche releases. Occasionally an agreement too sensi­
tive to be oublicized in the CIAP letter -- for eyample on coffee pricing 
policy -- would be handled in side-agreements and formally mentioned only in 
the implementation letters.
 
The review dnd release of thr- FY 65 loan tranches proceeded smoothly. 
A slight delay in the reoleafe oi the second and third Lranches can be attri­
buted to the problems that the GOB statisticians and economists initially 
experienced in prep..aring thce requisite data. The fourth tranche was released 
in December 14, 1965, two and one,-half months after the end of the quarter 
being reviewed and only one and one-half months after the implementation 
letter predicted it would be released 11 months earlier. All of the quanti­
tative targets were met as stipulated in the original CIAP letter. A most 
welcome sign was the strong recovery of foreign reserves. The significance
 
of the credit ceilings was thrown into doubt because the money supply ead 
the price level increased well beyond the levels which were thought to be 
implicit in the USAID credit tests. (The FY 66 loan agreement on monetary 
policy was written with a more spacific indicator). Because of a shortfall 
in coffee earnings, the coffee tund ended in deficit rather than surplus. 
Slippage occurred in other qualitative measures, but in general the GOB's 
program and the leverage exercise were considered a success. 
F. FY 66:*150 million authorized and released
 
The FY 66 program loan was signed in February 1966. The format was
 
the same as the FY 65 loan -- tranche releases were conditioned upon progress,
 
reviewed quarterly, toward quantitative and qualitative targets described in
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the GOB's annual submission to CIAP. in three respects the latter changed

slightly. First it refined the monetrry indicator for official net riome':tic 
assets, a final line item appearing in a new "monetary budget" designed 
jointly by OOB and IRP and the major negotiating document for 11U Stand-bys. 
Second, a strong coffee price policy (covering the prices paid by the (GOB 
Coffee Authority to exporters and producers out of' export earnings) was
 
covered in a side agreement. Third, there was an enormous expansion of
 
conditions concerning sectoral development policies. These were admittedly
 
weaker, qualitative, conditions, but they announced a series of'reforms and
 
improvements in education, agriculture, and housing which presumably the
 
U. S. was prepared to follow closely in determining whether to proceed with
 
tranche releases.
 
The FY 66 loan was in trouble even before it started. A sudden surge 
of liquidity in the last quarter of' CY 19)65, which was not picked up in the 
statistics until after the monetary targzets for December 31, ].965 had been 
established, made it virtually impossible to meet those conditions. The 
liquidity situation improved by March and again by June. but not before it 
had spilled over into the import register and helped occasion a disturbing 
loss of reserves. By June, a serious credit and exchange crisis was in the
 
makinL. The review of the first CY 1966 quarter, which was supposed to have 
been over in time for a May release of' the second traiche, was prolonged 
till July 29 while USAID and AID/W officials hanmered out with the Brazilian 
officials a new monetary plan for the second half of' CY 1966. A letter from 
the then Finance Minister Bulhoes stated the new targets, which were adopted 
as the new conditions for tranche releases. The second tranche was delivered 
in August, three months behind schedule, followed shortly by the third. 
The economic results of the adjustment were satisfying, since reserves re­
covered and the new monetary targets were easily met.
 
The fourth and final tranche of FY 66 was also delayed. The problem 
now came from the fiscal indicators, which previously had been performing 
splendidly. Transfers to the Autarquia and the cash budget deficit both 
exceeded their ceilings. These excesses were excused on the basis that the 
overall federal account was in surplus -- a new experience in recent history -­
and that the transfers and budget deficits, while excessive, were substantially
 
below 1965. The fourth tranche was released in February 1967, three months
 
late.
 
One of the principal subjects of discussion throughout CY 1966 was coffee
 
price policy. The mechanism fo:r quantifyin coffee support price policy was
 
the surplus on the coffee account in the monetary budget. The initial imple­
mentation letter referred to an oral understanding that the nominal coffee
 
price would be held constant, implying a fall iM.-al return. The
 
reference was shortly thereafter deleted. But/1,ranco was firm with the
 
coffee producers and exporters during the year aid the fund made a contribu­
tion to deflationary policy by showing a healthy surplus. At the sane time
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the coffee eradication and. diversification programs proceeded twice as fast
 
as expected. U.S. negotiatorF had taken a-prime interest in encouraging
 
success.
Castello-Branco's coffee polipy and have taken some credit for its 

Towards the end of 1966, the Mission took a firm stand on import liber­
alization, and persuaded Campos to take immediate and effective action. The
 
While the Mission's concern
effective tariff rates were cut by 70% or more. 

fcr additionality-was self evident, 'it.position on liberalization reflected 
a genuine U.S. interest in freeing the Bra7ilian import regime and providing 
a stimulating environment for the Brazilian private sector. 
The developient targets in education, agriculture and housing were not 
stressed in the quarterly reviews. The airgram dispatches covering the reviews 
merition some misses, and only a few significant success stories. Progress in 
these areas obviously did not trigger the tranche release mechanism, but it is
 
cl.ar that failure would not have delayed it. It is relevant, however, that 
the Brazil USAIL Mission Director we interviewed feels that the reorientation
 
toward price parity for farmers and the development of ruralof public policy 
incentive programs is one of the most significant leverage effects A.I.D. can 
claim in Brazil. These price and incentive programs were part of the FY 66 
program loan agreement, and one should probably have to attribute part of the 
leverage he spoke of to the program loan, not withstanding the influence specific 
p:oject loans and technical assistance projects were having in the same direction.
 
This is instructive, since it shows that A.I.D. may get important leverage
 
effects in areas other than those highlighted by the quarterly review mechanism. 
G. FY 67: $00 million authorized. "50 million released 
The FY 67 negotiations were held with the Castello-Branco Administration,
 
although the job of a carrying out the program after March 1967 would fall to 
Costa e Silva. The early negotiation was preferred to either a two step dis­
cussion or postponement because it emphasized continuity in basic policy and 
because Costa e Silva, during a stopover in Wm1shington, had expressed his in­
tention to implement his predecessor's agreements. But the negotiated
 
conditions were soon outdated by the developing recession and fiscal crisis.
 
Moreover, some of the principal stars in the Castello-Branco constellation 
unexpectedly disappeared, including the President of the Central Bank, and
 
a very different "style" of' operation. Continuity
the new finance minister had 

was thus i-.)t perserved, awl the problem of' implementing the FY 67 loan mounted.
 
was released.
In effect, it had to he aborted after' 1he first $25 millinn tranche 
The format and review arrangements were almost identical with the FY 66 loan. 
The first review, held in April to cover the October-December 1966 quarter, noted 
with sati sf'action the recovery of monetary indinators and foreign reserves. It 
exr-ased them on thenoted also the continuing excesses in fiscal policy but again 
By this time, however, Costa e Silvaba:-is of their favorable relation with 1965. 
was in and had appear as if' either through indecision or intent power, it begun to 

he was not prepared firmly to pursue the stabilization program. USAID held back
 
on the first ranche. When the tranche was finally released in July, four and
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one-half months late, it was already clear that the agreement would have to be 
substantially rewritten. In short, what had happened was that Costa e Silva
 
did not act tocorrect the growing inbalance inherited in the budget and (id­
deliberately, violate the credit prescription in the hopes of ending the
 
industrial recession around Sao Paulo. Liquidity built up and the foreign
 
balance, aggravated by speculative capital movements, began to deteriorate.
 
A contributing element was the inflationary settlement Costa e Silva presented 
to the coffee interests in June, (although owing to the reduced crop, the year 
end coffee account was contractionary compared to the preceding year). 
A review session begun in June to cover the Jaruary-March quarter re­
ported that major indicators had been viol.ated. USAID and GOB attempted to 
develop a new program in July, hut it did not work. Actually it was only 
premature. The new President and his young Finance Minister (Delfim Neto) 
began to tighten the s-rews in the lasc semester of' CY 1967. Fiscal perform­
ance improved substantially in the third quarter. They waited longer to 
apply the brakes Lo credit policy, but most observers by then were admitting
 
that despite its initial hesitancy and indulgence, the new Administration was
 
probably as serious obout stabilization as its predecessor.
 
Delfim Neto visited Washington in December 1967, and was told that any
 
further tranche releases depended upon resolving exchange rate prices and
 
the attendant exchange speculation, as well as adoption of some additional
 
credit control to sop up the (:onsiderable expansion whirh had already taker,
 
place. Shortly after his return, devaluation was carried out and some con­
trols were instituted, USATD was satisfied with the performance and proceeded
 
to release the second tranche of' $25 million in early February 1968 and
 
started serious negotiations over the FY 68 program. 
The FY 67 program loan reviews do not discuss the qualitative conditions. 
The violation of the quantitative indicators washed out any consideration of 
performance in the other areas. Thus it is not clear whether the sectoral 
program described in the CIAP letter (which, incidently, were expanded to in­
clude health projects) proceeded at an acceptable rate. The impression one 
get's from those officials who argue for oectoral loans is that the program 
loan was tested and found to be a poor vehicle for sectoral reform, with the 
exception perhaps of coffee policy. In general, too many conditions were 
attached to the annual program loan to permit an effective concentration on 
sectoral problems. Overall, however, progress in agriculture was quite good. 
The previous discussion ignores several administrative reforms which had
 
been referred to in almost all the program loans but had not been considered
 
critical to tranche release. They were ignored not because of any lack of
 
importance to overall stabilization and development policy, but because it
 
was impossible to compute a timetable of progress. Legislation was usually
 
required anl the reforms were understood to require many years. In four
 
areas -- tax reform, budget control, the administration of the Autarquia,
 
and import liberalization -- the GOB had gradually accomplished a great deal.
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The link between U.S. influence and these reforms is not hard to trace.
 
USAID's insistence on including them in the annual negotiations and lists
 
of conditions prodded the GOB to move faster than it would have otherwise.
 
Somce of the problems that appeared in the quantitative indicators in 1967 
were indirect results of these successes in the qualitative measures. In 
particular the new tax system which was imposed with USAID blessing in early 
CY 1967, a system which redirec.ted some revenue to local government authorities, 
had not proceeded as expeditiously as expected. The local authorities needed 
temporary financia. support from the federal government, which aggravated the 
latter's own fiscal woes and contributed to the excessive build-up in the 
money supply. Second, the increasingly flexible import controls system made 
it all the more likely that excess domestic liquidity would spill over onto 
imorts. I-rior to signing the 1967 Loan, the U.S. negotiators insisted on 
some form of' liberalization. The result was a striking reduction of effective 
tariffs from 10(, to 30%, and an increased exposure of the Balance of Payments 
dometic market forces. 
H. FY (8: :,,125 million. plus $/I million in sector loans 
Tit FY (; package includes $75 million of new obligations and the $50 
Million carryover from FY 67. In an attempt to get greater leverage on 
zectoral progravi, sectoral development targets will be tied to the sector 
loans and not to the program loans. Presumably a shortfall in sectoral 
accomplishm~lents could lead to delays in disbursement of the sector loans. 
Urilcr the old system, where sectoral conditions were attached to the program 
loan, such shortfalls did not influence the tranche release process, and
 
conversely, as the argunment goes, the tranche release process did not provide 
le.,'erage on sectoral policies. 
Th-e draft negotiating instructions for the A.I.D. team were prepared in
 
January 1968. Substantial agreement had been reached with the GOB by April,
 
but there was some problem in getting clearance from all of Costa e Silva's
 
principal offic,rs on the letter to cIAP. The new Agreement, and the re­
lfase of the $50 million carry over, were made in late May. AID/A officials
 
are confident that the Costa e Silva Administration intends to pursue the
 
agreed stabilization plan vigorously.
 
The most outstanding recent development has been the flexible exchange
 
rati, system decreed in August 1968. The system is designed to discourage the
 
speculation experienced in the past. A.I.D. pressed for such a system be­
ginning in February, but without making its adoption an explicit condition
 
for assistance. Delfim Neto favored the idea but other GOB officials were
 
opposed. The serious reserve losses of June through August finally moved
 
the govern.ent to adopt the hage, and the new system has worked very well
 
so far.
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III THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES
 
A. Did A.I.D. try to exert leverage with the program loan?
 
Obviously A.I.D. tried in the negotiations to influence policy. Quanti­
tative and qualitative targets were linked to all loan agreements, starting
 
in FY 62, and it is inconceivable that the GOB would have assigned the same
 
priorities or set the same level of accomplishments in a unilateral expression
 
of intent. This nominal linkage in itself distinguishes Brazil from the NESA
 
countries, in which conditions were fewer and often undon.,mented. The more 
important question is whether A.I.D. tried in the disbursement process to in­
fluence policy. The tranche review syST.em alone serves as a reminder of U.S. 
interests, even if tranches are released on schedule. In Brazil's case the 
delays av. withdrawals of tranches clearly indicate that the U.S.not only 
talked about performance but established a credible penalty. 
If the main reason for U.S. tranche delays was to avoid losing dollars 
to third countries during a run of Brazilian reserves, it cannot qualify as 
an attempt for leverage under the ground rules of this study. The theory of 
program loan leverage is that the bribe is sufficient to get action in unre­
sort out in
lated or once removed areas of policy. This is a hard issue to 

Brazil, since the main tranche tests were stability tests, and instability
 
anywhere in the domestic economy usually affected the foreign sector. A.I.D.'s
 
principal target was inflation, however, and A.I.D. was tough whenever the
 
concern for prices threatened to rise. A.I.D.'s interests were obviously broader
 
than Brazil's level of reserves, and thus this is a .egitimate case of attempted
 
laverage.
 
B. Did Brazil perform? 
One can identify four periods in which lack of progress toward or a short 
fall from stated targets resulted in delays and cut-offs in program loan dis­
bursements: (1) after the failure of the March 1962 stabilization plan, A.I.D. 
held back on release of the final $25.5 million of $100 million originally 
committed in March 1961 for FY 62 obligations. It was finally obligated in 
March 1963 from contingency funds; (2) the Bell-Dantas negotiations in the Spring 
of 1963 produced agreement on stability conditions and the size of an FY 63 
aid package, but before dishursement instructions could be written the new 
stabilization plan collapsed and the 'oan program was aborted. USAID left the 
door open for further negotiations, but the Goulart Administration felt that
 
a continuation of the then chaotic conditions was more to its political interest,
 
(3) credit and foreign exchange crises developed in the Spring of 1966, and 
USAID delayed release of the 3,cznd FY 66 tranche for three months until the 
Minister of Finance agreed to various corrective action; (4) credit and ex­
change crises reappeared in the Spring of 1967, following heavy deficit spending 
B 59
 
-11­
by Castello-Branco in the closing months of his administration and an initial
 
period of uncertainty and credit relaxation under the Costa e Silva regime.
 
The FY 67 $100 million loan was in effect aborted, though a second $25 million
 
tranche was released in February 1968 and a third $50 million tranche in May
 
under ground rules for FY 68.
 
On the other hand, the record shows notable achievements as well. The
 
GOB not only reduced the rate of inflation, but improved the administration
 
of budget and revenue policy, and introduced significant reforms into the
 
monetary and credit system. Moreover, there was commendable progress in import
 
and agriculture policy.
 
C. Did A.I.D. get leverage?
 
A.I.D. did not get leverage during the Quadros and Goulart Administrations,
 
that is clear. But A.I.D. seemed to have had a considerable impact on Castello­
Branco's policies, and it appears that A.I.D. is now beginning to have an im­
pact on the Costa e Silva government through the Minister of Finance, Delfim
 
Neto. There are simply too many najor institutional and policy changes over
 
the past four years in areas in which the U.S. has expressed a strong interest
 
since 1c6l -- in budget procedures, the tax system the economy of the Autarquias,
 
the mor.y and credit system, the use of the coffee fund for diversification
 
and deflation import controls, exchange rate policy, and agricultural price
 
policy -- to suppose that it would have happened anyway, or even that it would
 
have happened eventually. In other words A.I.D. not only accelerated changes,
 
A.I.D. heled initiate some of them, such as import liberalization.
 
D. Can the leverage be attributed specifically to the program loan?
 
The program loan did not replace a non-project A.I.D. grant program, as it
 
did in other countries, so whether the pattern of' A.I.D. leverage had already
 
be;n developed and the program loan instrument merely continued is not an
 
issue. There is the possibility that the program loan partially replaced
 
EX-IM Bank loans. The fiscal year figures suggest such a substitution. But
 
Bank authorities in any case did not try to execute leverage on fiscal and credit
 
policy. In'other words, the USG's credible leverage position in Brazil developed
 
wi.h the program loan. This is not to say that the level of project loans was
 
not used in the bargaining process. Indeed the FY 64 CAP written in December
 
1962 states "It is believed that the level of U.S. aid can bea most effective
 
instruinent for inducing economic stabilization actions ... /_bu__7 ...
 
only project-type assistance is presently recommended," and the FY 68 loan ne­
gotiating instructions clearly indicate that the entire loan program will be
 
negotiated as a package. But we were told that the actual negotiating leverage
 
of project loans on general fiscal policy was nil, after the beginning of the
 
program loan period. The FY 64 CAP discussion represents the period when large
 
project loans to the North East were A.I.D.'s only negotiating instrument. In
 
fact, some project loans requiring large public budget allocation (e.g. power
 
loans) made some of the restrictive fiscal policies Inore difficult to achieve.
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The local currency counterpart generated by program loans was also used 
to advance the objectives of the A.I.D. program. Local currency funds were
 
being used to finance some of the government's budget deficit. In effect,
 
they substituted for funds that would have been created via a deficit finance
 
mechanism. By insisting on the sterilization of the local currency equivalent
 
of program loans, A.I.D. forced Campos and Neto to rely on other sources of
 
finance for the government budget -- sources related to the conditions specified
 
in assistance agreements.
 
IV DETEIRAINANTS OF LEVERAGE 
A. The Loan 
1. Size of loan. The FY 62, abortive FY 63, and FY 67 loans all
 
were prieed at $100 million. They all failed to achieve their objectives.
 
The FY 65 and FY 66 loans were priced at $150 million. They both got through,
 
the first one handsomely, the next by a hair. The relationship between size
 
and leverage is tenuous.
 
2. CL-nging aid level. When A.I.D. jumped from the FY 62, FY 63 
level of $100 million to the FY 65 level of $150 million, the result was 
action (and a new President). When A.I.D. slipped from $150 in FY 66 to $100 
million in FY 67, there was trouble (and another new President). So far the
 
implicit hypothesis is confirmed, though the relation may be spurious. It
 
appears, however, as if the further' slip to $75 gross new funds in FY 68, will
 
produce an improvement over FY 67 (though, in FY 68 net terms -- $170 -- , the 
shift in direction of leverage effects is consistent with the hypothesis). 
3. Dissipation through time. The loan level was constant at $150 
million in FY 65 and FY 66. There was no significant difference in performance 
results. There are no other tests of the dissipation hypothesis, except for 
th- further deterioration in achievements between FY 66 and FY 67, which has 
other good explanations. 
B. TL, Conditioning System 
1. Nwnber of loan conditions. There is nothing to indicate that 
overall performance correlates one way or another with the number of conditions.
 
The addition of a large number of sectoral development targets in 1966 and
 
1967 does not appear to explain the deterioration in progress from 1965 to 1966
 
and again from 1966 to 1967. On the other hand, according to one observer, it 
may have encouraged the GOB to undertake a very important reform of agrarian 
pricing policy. In any one year only a few conditions were emphasized and both 
USAID and the GOB knew that the other knew which they were. The other conditions 
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were not all "frosting", though some were added merely to satisfy U.S. 
Congressional requirements. Since the number of "key" issues presented by 
the U.S. negotiators did not fluctuate much, there is no information on which
 
to test the hypothesis.
 
2. Specificity of loan conditions.* Specificity has two dimensions.
 
On the one hand it means the detail with which conditions spell-out institutional
 
and policy reforms. On the other it means the setting of fixed quantitative
 
'tests of progress. It may be possible to infer from the Brazilian experience
 
that the post FY 6/ loans were more successful than the earlier ones partly
 
because USAID provided both the motivation and some valuable technical assistance
 
to the Brazilian authorities in working with them to design the details of a
 
stabilization program. The monetary budget, for example, is part of the fall­
out from U.S. (and IMF) insistence on the development of a coherent, practical
 
assault on all contributing forces to inflation. It may also be possible to
 
say that USAID's insistence on including in the FY 66 agreement detailed
 
measures for agricultural price and credit policy prodded the GOB into taking
 
the remarkable steps toward restoring parity to the rural sector which some
 
observers have noted.
 
With respect to quantitative tests, however, it is hard to make any
 
judgments about the desirability of specificity. The significant achievements
 
in Brazil have been in the qualitative dimensions: tax reform, agricultural
 
diversification, improved budget procedures, etc. But that is not surprising,

since the quantitative tests are not prescriptions but ceilings on indicators 
influenced by an agglomeration of policies, and real success is measured not 
by meeting the tests but by improving those policies. Indeed there is some 
reason to believe that by holding firm on the quantitative tests, as A.I.D. 
did to the point of cutting off further tranche releases, it could happen that 
a couitry would be penalized for problems beyond its control and not given due 
recognition for long-term self-help achievements which, though failing to 
meet the Lest in one year, may be sufficient in the nest. I do not think the 
tests were pushed this far in Brazil. But the danger exists. Conversely, 
without quantitative tests the GOB may not have made as good a show as it did. 
The use of quantitative tests is a delicate art -- they can encourage the 
recipient to make changes he otherwise would not hare made, but if drawn too 
tightly they may penalize where penalty is not advised.
 
3. Ar-a in which exerted. A.I.D.'s main conditions were related to 
stabilization. Within this general category, however, there seemed to be 
greater progress toward stabilizing the federal budget than either the monetary 
budget or the balance of payments. Some observers point also to coffee policy 
and wage policy as areas of substantial achievement. 
VSee note page 16
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4. Ripor of loan condition enforcement. It is hard to show that the
 
host gc ternment's concern for fulfilling conditions correlates positively with
 
A.I.D.' , There is evidence that this may have happened in 1966. Unforturately,
 
in 1962 and 1967, the two years when A.I.D. appeared to have been the toughest
 
on further releases from loans which were already being disbursed, the situation 
never recovered and later tranches had to be withheld. 
The establishment of credibility for A.I.D. loan conditions was particularly
 
critical after the first few years of the Alliance when the effort to move large
 
lnan funds set aside by Congress had left the impression that large and relatively 
unconditioned loans were readily available in exchange for pledges of' self-help.
 
A severe mec' anism of quarterly progress reviews prior to tranche releases was 
designed to generate this credibility. This device is now being relaxed, to 
one oi- two reviews and tranches per year, in the belief' that credilility has 
been established.
 
C. Environmental Factors 
1. National politics. There is an obvious pilitical imprint on the 
course of program loan negotiations and releases. Nothing seemed to go right 
under the Goulart Administration. But after the Castello-Branco accession two 
loans were released in relatively good order. Then when Costa e Silva took over 
in 1967, there was a period of difficulty that led to the effective termination 
of the FY (,7 loan. This correlation with Presidencies is over-simplified, 
however, since Castello-Branco wis getting into trouble with the loan con­
ditions when he left office, and Costa e Silva ias getting out of trouble by the 
end of CY 1967. Moreover, part of Castello-Branco' s success -is attributable to 
his tough wage policy in 1964-196.. It is doubtful whether Castello-Branco could
 
have continued to depress real urban wages throughout his presidency. He prE­
sented his successor with a political situation which inevitably demanded some
 
relaxation in econimic controls. Nevertheless, the difference between both these
 
Presidencies and the Goula_'t period is striking.
 
2. International politics. A.I.D.'s anxiety over Goulart's domestic
 
policy stemmed from the leftward drift within his administration as well as from
 
incidents such as the exproporiation cf ITT. Subsequently, Castello-Brancol­
honeymoon with the A.I.D. disburser, which lasted through the final tranche of 
the FY66 loan, was longer than it would have been had he not exhibited such a
 
reasonable accommodation to U._. forr-gin policy. 
" Maltilateralism. The Brazil-IMF relation was discontinuous, broken
 
during periods when foreign reserves were accumulating and an IMF standby was
 
unnecessary. There are also reports of friction between the two vides and relations
 
may have been less harmonious than in other countries we have reviewed. But the
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I\4F and A.I.D. presences undoubtedly reinforced each other with good communication 
between staffs and accomplishing more than a bilateral approach would have. The 
U.S. opened doors for IMF in Brazil, and the large and seasoned joint, Embassy-
A.I.D. analysis team had a better comprehension of local matters than tht visiting 
IMF teams. Generally, however, the U.S. preferred to keep the I14F out in front 
in the negotiations in years when a standby was necessary. 
Th IBHD is now acquiring a major influence on policy. Its special interests 
in the transport sector advance the pursuit of' stabilization since the transport 
deficits are considered a contributory factor to Brazilian inflation. The IDB,
 
on the other hand, has not advanced self-help. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The Brazilian program loan experience enhances the credibility of the 
conditions-precedent strategy -- the U.S. Government has shown itself wj.'ing 
to delay and even terminate disbursements. A.I.D. tolerated slippage from
 
sp,:;cified targets. The oleration appears to have varied somewhat from one 
GOB administration to another. It was a function of the U.S. country team's 
perception of the relative importance of' the different targets for se uring U.S. 
and GOB policy goals. And it,was also partly explained by the deliberate choice 
to set some targets within the "incentive" range rather than the " probable" 
range. In addition, the d:gree of Brazil's support of U.S. foreign policy may
 
have influenced disbursement policy in some years. But overall, the U.S. position
 
has beer corivinrcirg,and the Brazilians know they cannot take U.S. non-project 
aid for granted. 
What is not clear is whether the leverage has worked as well as expected. 
The problems attfributable to declining coffee earnings and an ingrained expecta­
tion of inflation continue, and the country slips back often into credit and
 
exmhange crises from which the Federal authorities are poorly equipped to extri­
cate themselves without upsetting the coffee growers, and Sao Paulo industrialists
 
and other entrenched domestic interests. When it has come to a showdown between
 
meeting program loan conditions and obliging those interests, the latter have
 
usually won. Still, inflation has been brought under better control, the
 
authorities have become more sophisticated in the application of stabilization 
policy, and they have made major improvements in budget and revenue administration 
and the morley and credit institutional apparatus. It is a well-grounded judgment, 
therefore, that A.I.D. leverage has significantly influenced this process, by 
forcing the Government both to take corrective actions sooner and with greater 
erfici-.ncy than would otherwise have been the case, and to improve the statistical 
and institutional bases for decisions. 
B 64 
PPC/mOL/ES: ERi ce/CHemmner: j ew: 9/15/69 
UNGM
 
-16-
Note by John H. Kaufmann, PFC/RC/LA 
It was necessary for the study to use targets, goals or quid pro quo's
 
as a means of evaluating country performance and AID program leverage when making
 
a Washington desk evaluation study, but these conditions can and have been mis­
leading when evaluating AID progren loan leverage in particular instances.
 
The establishment of meaningful conditions is truly a negotiating art;
 
so is the evaluation of satisfactory performance. On the one hand, these
but 

conditions should be tough enough to achieve actions which would not otherwise have 
been taken, tough enough to make the policy makers stretch or try harder than they 
otherwise would, and often they should be set somewhat beyond the reach of 
anticipated achievement, but yet be within the realm of possibility so as not to 
decrease the condition's credibility daring negotiation or later review. In
 
addition to the artistry and wisdom required in establishing these conditions to
 
make the USAID/country negotiations more effective, the U.S. designers of these
 
conditions always had to recognize the difficulties of accounting for performance
 
under program lending to AIDA'ashington and later investigating powers such as
 
the GAO, Moss Cor-mittee, etc. This, I fear, too often tended to influence the
 
USAID missions to either "play safe" by reducing the condition's toughness, 
making the writttn comiitment more obsculre or less quantifiable. A margin of 
leverage was thus lost by limiting the condition from an otherwise credible level 
because of fear that it would be viewed as a quantitative performance target which 
had to be arithmetically mec in order to release the tranche, rather than a goal 
toward which satisfactory performance could be judged. 
These important consiocerations are not, adequately discussed ..... the
 
discussion in the Brazil paper (p. 12) plays with the point as an afterthought.
 
Granted that this kind of analysis is difficult to make from afar, but this fact 
ought to be recognized in the study as one of its inherent limitations, particu­
larly when the achievement or non-achievement of specific targets is necessarily
 
given such detailed attention in the evaluation and when judgments are made such
 
as "U.S. leverage probably worked though certainly 'success' fell considerably
 
short of announced expectations" (p. 7). 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 
Since 1963, A.I.D. has made five program loans to Chile involving

total gross obligations of $262 million. In addition, there were two
 
sector loans --
for FY 1967 in education and for FY 1968 in agriculture 
-­for a total of $33 million. Stated in per capita terms, this aid level was
 
several times higher than for any other country granted progrea assistance
 during the period. As 
a lending record, it reflects the vigorous U. S.
 
effort to support and influence the development policies of the Frei Govern­
ment as 
that regime attempted to implement the objectives and prescriptions

of the Alliance for Progress.
 
Briefly, A.I.D.'s experience with progran lending in Chile shows the
following pattern. 
The loans of 1963 and 1961. to the Alessandri Government
 
initiated the practice of program assistance to Chile and served as a hold­
ing action in a pre-election period. 
In 1965 and 1966, substantially larger
loans and a considerable increase in the number and breadth of loan condi­
tions responded to Frei's initiation of a wide range of reforms. Meanwhile
 
a gradual increase in copper prices beginning in 1964 led the GOC to decline
 program assistance for 1967; internal pressures had brought excessive wage
increases, accelerated inflation, and a deterioration of the balance of
 
payments position. 
The small program loan of 1968 was not expected to re­
verse this undesirable trend. Meanwhile, sector loans (in education and

agriculture) were introduced in 
1967 and 1968 in an effort to effect policy

changes that had not yielded to pressure through program loan conditions.
 
Overall, the objective of program loans to Chile has been to generate

a self-sustained growth process and to eliminate Chile's chronic balance of
 
payments crises. 
 To this end, the required self-help measures have focused
 
on the control of' inflation, realistic exchange rate adjustment, and reforms

of GOC taxation and expenditure policy. In addition, sectoral loans have
 
attempted to support structural reforms in agriculture and education. More­
over, through the continuing dialogue over self-help performance, A.I.D. has

constantly encouraged the development of a regular, systematic, and critical
 
self-examination process within the structure of the GOC itself.
 
The manner of negotiating and administering program loans has 
con­formed to a fairly standard pattern since 1963-1964. Negotiations produce
 
a set of specific commitments which are then expressed, outside of the loan
 
documents, in a-letter of intent to the CIAP and in standby agreements with
 
the IMF. 
As far as possible, the specified goals are accompanied by

quantitative or temporal measures by which performance can be tested.
 
Finally, the loan funds are released in quarterly or semi-annual tranches
 
following a comprehensive A.I.D.-GOC review of performance up to that point.
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II. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF Crii. EXPERIENCE 
A. Pre-196 3 and Subsequent Non-Proj .. am Aid 
Prior to FY 1963, A.I.D. assistance to Chile was relatively insig­
nificant and consisted mainly of project aid and technical assistance.
 
Together with PL 480 loans and grants, these kinds of aid averaged a little
 
over $20 million annually in the period just prior to the Alliance for
 
Progress. In addition, the TExport-Import Bank and the IBRD were occasion­
ally large lenders to Chile.
 
After FY 1962, project lending by A.I.D. declined sharply, disappear­
ing altogether in 1968. PL 480 authorizations continued at an $18 million
 
annual rate. Program lending, therefore, has dominated the bilateral nego­
tiations since 1962. Export-Import Bank loans have been extended on a
 
substantial level in coordination with the program loans. Treasury Exchange
 
Agreements have also been employed to support the program assistance strategy.
 
A donor consultative group led by the IBRD was proposed as early as
 
1962, but the projected consortium was never formed. Nonetheless, the IBRD
 
and the IDB have provided substantial assistance to Chile, even exceeding
 
U. S. aid in FY 1967 and 1968. In each program loan year, the GOC has
 
arranged an IMF Stand-by Agreement containing self-help conditions to which
 
A.I.D. has tied release of the program loan.
 
The first major U. S. loans to Chile occurred in Ff 1962. A large 
$100 million loan was extended for earthquake relief aid. However, the 
determined U. S. effort to get Chilean development underway began with the 
Goodw~n-Moscoso mission to Santiago in March 1962. The discussions focussed 
on sources of finance for Chile's ten-year development plan which had been
 
endorsed by the OAS Wisemen. The initial U. S. commitment was estimated at
 
up to $350 million over the first five years of the plan. An immediate
 
assistance package of $80 million was worked out with the first $40 million
 
designated as a two-stage project loan to CORFO (the GOC development bank).
 
This loan was apparently the immediate predecessor of the later series of
 
program loans. Mission correspondence with AID/W later identifies it as
 
the first program loan since it was designed to support Chile's balance of
 
payments on the dollar side and the GOC capital investment budget on the
 
escudo side. A.I.D. expected to influence GOC exchange reform policy as a
 
result of this assistance; when the GOC did not carry out an expected
 
devaluation in September 1962, no further discussion of the second $40 mil­
lion loan took place.
 
B. FY 1963: $35 Million
 
The unsatisfactory leverage derived from the loan to CORFO induced
 
A.I.D. to work directly with the Central Bank in negotiating the conditions
 
for the second Alliance for Piogresa development loan. USG representatives had
 
some misgivings about the seriousness 6f Chile's commitment to Punta del Este
 
goals and the approach of 1964 presidential elections suggested that little
 
headway could be made on Chile's pressing problems lmtil after the question
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of governmental leadership had been resolved. Nonetheless, an 
aid
 
package was put together consisting of' a $35 million program loan, $15
 
million in Export-Import Bank credit, and a $10 million Treasury Exchange
 
Agreement providing drawing rights, pari passu, with the IMF.
 
The program loan was authorized in early January and negotiations
 
on the complete package were finished by the end of' the month. In the
 
Negotiating Instructions, the central concern and basic strategy of this
 
and successive program loans found succinct expression.
 
The IBRD, the Wisemen, and we have agreed that a stabiliza­
tion program forms an essential element of Chile's development
 
effort. The USG has for the past several months been encourag­
ing the GOC to reach agreement with the IMF on such a program
 
supported by IMF assistance. Without the exchange adjustment,
 
increased public savings and monetary and fiscal restraint
 
which such an agreement implies, a deterioration in the Chilean
 
economic situation can be anticipated, together with a lower
 
level of other external resources and inevitable requests for
 
emergency aid from the U. S.
 
Accordingly, the release of the first tranche of $17.5 million was condi­
tioned on Chile's entering into an IMF standby agreement. The program loan
 
agreement viewed fulfillment of the conditions for standby eligibility as
 
evidence of satisfactory performance on exchange reform and monetary policy.

The IMF standby was established in January and the first tranche was re­
leased.
 
Self-help conditions for release of the second and third tranches included
 
the following: (1) continued IMF standby eligibility -- as evidence of
 
continued progress towards needed exchange adjustment and monetary policy
 
reform; (2) tac and other fiscal reforms designed to generate a budget
 
surplus on current operations sufficient for the non-inflationr*ry finance
 
of public sector investment; (3) establishment of an escudo counterpart
 
fund and agreement with A.I.D. on its use for appropriate developmnent projects.
 
The second and third tranches were initially scheduled for release in
 
May and August 1963. Agreement on the use of counterpart funds was quickly
 
reached in March and A.I.D. secured priority for social overhead development
 
projects such as hospitals, housing, and schools. However, the evaluation
 
of other prescribed self-help performance encountered difficulties that de­
layed both releases some two months. The exchange rate was depreciated in
 
all markets, spot and future, but the 151 devaluation for the year was far
 
below that warranted by domestic price increases. However, the Mission accepted
 
this performance as satisfactory due to the earlier depreciation in 1962.
 
Similarly, the budget surplus targets were exceeded by some E0 30 million, but
 
CH 70
 
-4­
since the surplus defined did not include the state enterprises and auto­
nomous agencies, the public saving generated outside the fiscal budget
 
actually fell in real terms. In view of these oversights in the required
 
self-help conditions, it was not surprising that prices rose some 45% and
 
little discernible progress was made towards the stabilization target.
 
C. FY 1964: $55 million
 
The political climate throughout 1964 was very unfavorable for
 
strict conditioning procedures. From the very beginning of negotiations,
 
the Mission and the GOC argued that the fall elections constituted special
 
circumstances that would greatl affect the feasibility of self-help per­
formance. The Mission stressed that the premise of 1964 aid strategy 
was that 
.1964 would be a difficult election year. Chile's economic 
situation was far from satisfactory and proper corrective action
 
could not be taken by Chilean authorities in 1964. But the mani­
fold U. S. interests in Chile would probably be best served by
 
continuing substantial development assistance, the purpose of
 
such assistance oeing the effort to hold development gains already
 
made and provide a better starting point for the new development
 
undertakings by a new Chilean Administration.
 
Specifically, there was no solid assurance that the GOC could or would
 
achieve the needed budget surpluses or that the rate of inflation could
 
be held to less than thirty percent. Chile also faced an extensive debt
 
renegotiation problem during 1964 for which IMF assistance would have to
 
be negotiated.
 
The first GOC estimate of its CY 1964 assistance needs, in
 
November, 1963, amounted to $85 million. The Mission quickly scaled this
 
down to a basic package consisting of a $40 million program loan and $16
 
million in P1 480 assistance. Although AID/W had settled on the amount of
 
program aid by mid-December, 1963, the signing of the 1964 package was de­
layed for four months while negotiations over self-help conditions con­
tinued. In part, the signing was put off in an effort to secure a more
 
credible GOC commitment to a schedule of current account surplus targets
 
that would reduce the likelihood of excessive inflation and offset un­
anticipated increases in public sector wages. A.I.D. was also insisting
 
on a role in approving the use of local currency generated by program assistance
 
and by PL 480 aid.
 
The signing of the 1964 loan was also delayed by protracted debate of
 
a Chilean request for program aid beyond the agreed $40 million level. The
 
GOC vequest for supplementary assistance began with a request for $45 mil­
lion more but finally took the form of a bid for an additional $10 million
 
in exchange for a doubling of property taxes and reform of tax incentive
 
legislation. The Chilean negotiators held out for some form of explicit
 
/ 
commitment to this additional aid within the $40 million loan agreement,
 
but AID/W preferred t, keep the issue of supplementary assistance as a
 
separate matter for future discussion.
 
The $40 million program loan was finally signed in April, 1964.
 
The required IMY standby had been secured in February and, as in the
 
previous year, disbursement of the program loan was tied to continued
 
eligibility under %he IMF agreement. In addition, the ambiguities that
 
plagued enforcement of the budget surplus targets in 1963 were hopefully
 
remedied by tying disbursements to specific budget surplus goals for the
 
public sector and for the decentralized agencies, taken separately.
 
Disbursement was arranged in four tranches, with cumulative budget sur­
plus targets for each quarter. The loan agreement also conditioned dis­
bursement on the presentation, in each quarter, of satisfactory plans for
 
the use of the equivalent escudo counterpart of the cumulative sum to be
 
released. All tranches were released, usually several months after the
 
date projected in the loan agreement. The price level rose 38% during 1964,
 
considerably above the target rate of increase for the year, and the GOC
 
self-help performance did not outstrip A.I.D.'s modest hopes.
 
The amount of supplementary program assistance for 1964 was finally
 
settled in May. Although the Mission and the GOC had developed an under­
standing in the initial negotiations that additional help would be related
 
to self-help measures beyond those specified in the loan agreement -­
namely, the tax reforms described above --, A.I.D./W was unmoved by
 
determined GOC action to effect the tax reforms. It urged, in agreement
 
with the OAS Wisemen, that the GOC was not sufficiently committed to achieve
 
the targeted budget surpluses and that aid in excess of $40 million should
 
require other self-help measures (i.e. other than the tax reforms) related
 
to the budget surplus targets.
 
Decision on the matter had apparently been deferred indefinitely when
 
the issue of additional aid was quickly settled by an unforseen exchange
 
crisis. In April., the IMF warmed that the GOC might not be eligible for a
 
drawing in May due to a rapid deterioration of its net foreign exchange posi­
tion. Since IMF eligibility was a central condition for the entire program
 
of assistance (and, incidentally, for Chile's critical debt renegotiations in
 
1964) and since a faster rate of A.I.D. disbursement could enable the IMF to
 
find no net use of foreign reserves -- the test of standby compliance --, the
 
$40 million program loan was amended in May to provide for a $15 million cash
 
transfer which neatly resolved the potential problem. This decision to pro­
vide essentially unconditioned supplementary aid, despite the prior protracted
 
debate over satisfactory conditions for the same, was consistent with the
 
1964 loan strategy (outlined at the beginning of this section). The over­
riding U. 3. con,:ern was to prevent an economic crisis that would strengthen
 
the election prospects of extremist eandidates 
-. in particular, the leader
' 

of the extreme left, Salvador Allonde.
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D. FY 1965 - $80 Million 
With the election of the Frei Government in 1964, A.I.D.'s
 
expectations that the program loans could yield significant leverage
 
on self-help performance rose sharply. In an unprecedented pre­
negotiation session, Frei's entire cabinet came to Washington in late
 
1964 to discuss the development program for which they wanted A.I.D. 
support. AID/W persuaded the new GOC to emphasize short-term objectives -­
in particular, monetary and fiscal policy -- rather than longer range goals 
such as large scale public housing and measures to effect a major redistri­
bution of income. 
As a result of the new government's interest in implementing a wide
 
range of policy reforms, the Mission increased the number and breadth of
 
conditions attached to the loan as well as the amount of the loan. The
 
Mission explicitly stated that the
 
...present program loan proposes a broader over-all 
approach . . . _ich7 is established in the government's 
Letter of Intent to CIAP. The quarterly reviews will cover 
specific achievements and will also entail a broad review 
of developments in all fields a..d sectors. 
The Letter of Intent contained a minimum of fourteen measures which
 
the GOC indicated it intended to pursue. Many of these were of a general
 
nature and included e.g. educational, banking and social security reforms;
 
review of present wage policies and establishment of new wage policies
 
during 1966; re-examination of the rate structure of decentralized agencies
 
with a view towards raising the level of savings; re-examination of the
 
entire GOC administrative structure for the purpose of reducing general
 
operating costs and reform of pricing and marketing policy.
 
Among the precise targets were the following:
 
(1) Achievement of a specific level of current account budget
 
surplus for the fiscal sector and the decentralized agencies.
 
The amount of surplus was established on a quarterly cumulative
 
basis;
 
(2) An annual increase in the money supply of 25 percent "geared
 
to achieve" the target of a price increase not greater than 25
 
percent.during 1965;
 
(3) Retention of a flexible exchange policy as measured by the
 
usual quarterly international reserve test. The Mission stated
 
that this was a "key" condition.
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(4) Total 1965 public investment targeted to reach E° 2,038.8 mil­
lion financed f'rom internal and external sources. If public sector
 
savings or external financing falls below anticipated levels, the
 
GOC would reduce the public investment program by the amount of the
 
shortfall.
 
The program loan would be disbursed in four equal tranches. The 
first tranche would be released in December 1964 as soon as conditions 
precedent were met. The next three tranches would be released as soon 
after April 1, July 1, and October 1, as possible. This would depend on 
formal presentation of quarterly progress by the GOC and completion of the 
forma A.I.D. review. 
in the September 1965 Country Assistance Program book the Mission
 
stated that "While the U. S. has expressed some concern with the monetary,
 
fiscal and exchange rate policy, the GOC has passed the basic quantitative
 
tests .... WiLh regard to longer term measures, accomplishments have not
 
been outstanding. Yet, there are indications that some progress is being
 
made in reform measures." 
Although prices increased by only 26 percent in 1965, monetary expan­
sion rose well in excess of targets, approximately 65 percent. This unex­
pected expansion resulted from an uncontrolled accumulation of overdrafts
 
that the budget plans had overlooked. The rate of exchange did depreciate by
 
14.5 percent from December 1964 to December 1965 but as prices rose 26 percent
 
the escudo remained over-vaLued. The Mission voiced considerable dissatis­
faction with this GOC performance. Despite the shortfall in the exchange
 
rate, however, Chile's net international reserve position did improve.
 
The total public sector current account surplus was E01194 million,
 
four percent below the target of E01243 million. This rebulted from a short­
fall in the public sector surplus which was partially offset by a larger
 
surplus in the decentralized agencies than had been anticipated.
 
Public sector investment totalled E01,771.5 million compared to the
 
target level of E02038.8 million. This shortfall exceeded the slight decline
 
in public sector savings and therefore was in !ine with obligations under the
 
"IAP letter. Nevertheless, the GOC did borrow heavily from the Central Bank
 
in order to finance its expenditures.
 
Adherence to the other conditions stipulated in the CIAP letter was
 
mixed, and in view of the fact that many conditions were stated broadly and
 
were not open to piecise measurement, decisions on accomplishments were
 
open to individual value judgements. The Mission reported that "Performance
 
in 1965 was hindered by determined opposition from both the right and the
 
left but considerable progress was recorded." All funds were released.
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E. FY 1966 - $80 Million 
This loan was conditioned as usual on adherence to the specific
 
measures listed in the CIAP Letter of Intent as well as conclusion by the
 
GOC of a Stand-by agreement with the IMF. The Mission stated that the
 
loan
 
will not require that all of the conditions be fully met . . . the
 
GOC will be required to explain any failure to meet specific tar­
gets to the satisfaction of A.I.D. and to show intention of taking
 
steps to correct significant problems. A.I.D. will then determine
 
whether or not the overall situation, including intended corrective
 
measures, is such that the release should be made.
 
The CIAP letter contained a summary of almost every policy measure
 
which the GOC intended to pursue during 1966. The IMF Stand-by refined
 
some of the conditions so as to make them more readily measurable. Al­
though the loan was conditioned on a whole series of policy measures the
 
Mission emphasized that achievement of the public finance targets was
 
essential for stabilization and growth of the Chilean economy.
 
Among the conditions stipulated in the CIAP letter and the IMF
 
Stand-by were the following:
 
(1) Public sector savings targeted to reach E01,536 million in
 
1966, with specific quarterly targets set for both the fiscal
 
sector and decentralized agencies;
 
(2) Net reserve position of the banking system targeted to
 
increase about $30 million but "the exact timing and amount
 
of surplus will depend upon many unpredictable factors."
 
The Mission stated that it would reach a confidential
 
italics added_7 understanding with the GOC that it will allow
 
the exchange rate to depreciate in 1966 to the full extent of
 
any price increase during the year plus the percentage of in­
-crease in overvaluation during 1965;
 
(3) 0Gross public sector investment targeted to reach a level
 
of E°2,625.8 million, a 26 percent increase over the 1965 level;
 
(4) The maximum level of fiscal current account transfers to
 
state enterprises would be E0240.6 million;
 
(5) The 1966 floor price for agriculture productsespecially
 
for milk and wheat, would be announced "well before" the 1966
 
planting season in May;
 
CH 75
 
9 
(6) GOC borrowing from the Central Bank would be limited to
 
E070 million;
 
(7) Efforts would be directed to limiting the price rise in
 
1966 to 15 percent; and monetary expansion would be limited to
 
25 percent;
 
(8) Legislation would be introduced in January 1966 to limit
 
wage increases for certain groups to 100 percent of the cost­
of-living increase and 60 percent for other groups.
 
As in previous agreements funds would be released in tranches on
 
the basis of a quarterly review of accomplishments. The first review would
 
cover the last quarter of CY 1965, at which time about $29 million would be
 
reieased. After performance reviews in the first, second and third quarters
 
of CY 1966, $17 million each would be released.
 
All funds were released although some of the many conditions specified
 
were in fact not met. The major shortfall was with respect .o wage policy
 
where the GOC lacked the power to effect its policy objectives.
 
The cost-of-living index rose 17 percent, as then estimated, almost
 
precisely on target but the money supply increased by 39 percent. The
 
foreign exchange rate depreciated more than the increase in prices as
 
targeted i.e. 23 percent compared to 17 percent. This approximately com­
pensated for the earlier 1965 shortfall. The public sector current surplus
 
exceeded the target set by about 27 percent. In contrast, public investment
 
in industry, agriculture, and mining sectors fell short of targets and in
 
fact investment in the latter two sectors failed to reach 1965 levels, as
 
easured by their share of total investment.
 
The net reserve position in 1966 improved upon the target set; this
 
was due in large part to the rise in copper prices during the year. Con­
ditions set as regards wages and agricultural prices were not met.
 
Although all funds were disbursed, there was some delay in tranche
 
releases. The second tranche was authorized on June 18 only after the
 
Mission had reached agreement with the GOC on specific issues dealing with
 
the copper windfall and despite a further delay in the promised announcement
 
of agricultural support prices. The third tranche was withheld because of
 
delays on the part of the GOC in providing information for the second
 
quarterly review. This tranche was then combined with the last tranche after
 
the final September review.
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F. FY 1967 - No Program Loan; $10 Million Sector Loan
 
In December 1966, AID/W approved an assistance package which in­
cluded a program loan for $35 million and sector loans for agricultture

and education. During the month, President Frei announced that he would
 
forego program assistance for 1967 as well as an IMF Stand-by. There
 
were economic as well as political reasons for this decision. Copper

prices exceeded 50 cents per pound, a level in excess of what Chile con­
sidered the "normal" price. There was Congressional pressure in Chile to 
increase government expenditures and raise wages above the government's 
recommended level. 
Thus, at a time when coppsr prices assured increased
 
external resources, the GOC attempted to disarm its opposition by materially

reducing its dependence on foreign assistance, while making strenuous
 
efforts to win Congressional acceptance of domestic fiscal discipline.
 
The Government did announce that if copper prices were to fall and the
 
need developed for additional resources, it would request a program loan 
from the United States.
 
Performance in 1967 showed some commendable successes as well as 
an array of failures. The Gross National Product increased by about four 
percent and the cost-of-living index rose 22 percent. The exchange rate
 
did depreciate in line with the cost-of-living increase and monetary

expansion was ccnsiderably less than in past years. The proportion of
 
public sector investment in agriculture, industry, education and mining 
rose somewhat. 
In contrast to these relatively favorable developments,
 
Chile's international payments position deteriorated in 1967 partly be­
cause of a dip in copper prices, but mainly as a result of increased import

demand generated by excessive domestic credit expansion. The GOC borrowed
 
more from the Central Bank than A.I.D. earlier had recommended and prices
 
rose about 22 percent, well above the 12 percent target for the year. 
In 
toto, then, Chile's performance in 1967 was mixed and would have violated 
the usual program loan conditions to the same degree as in previous years. 
The first sector loan -- $10 million to education 
-- was granted 
out of FY 1967 funds. Sector loans were diccussed within A.I.D. during
1966 as a way of obtaining additional leverage by unburdening the program 
loans of prescriptions for specific sectoral performance. The Mission
 
preferred this approach to the Korean technione of specifying parts of the 
program loan to be attributable to performance on one or another indicator. 
The GOC decision to forego program assistance tn 1967 provided an oppor­
tunity to work out the $10 million package fcv the educational sector which 
was signed in September 1967.
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G. FYY1 -$15Million Program Loan; $23 Million Sector Loan 
Copper prices were fal.ing in the spring of 1967 xA, inMay, program
 
loan negotiations began. There was frank recognition that CY 1967 assistance
 
would serve as emergency aid to support the stabilization program. Major
 
leverage for CY 1968 would develop from a later and larger aid package. 
Despite the urgency of the request for help, a series of issues delayed 
the signing until October, 1967. For domestic political reasons, the
 
GOC decid.d not to seek an IMF Standby. A.I.D. acceded to this exception
from the normal pattern with the understanding that an IMF Standby would 
be arranged in 1968. (The Standby was signed inMarch 1968.) Further
 
delay occurred in July 1967, over discussion of the need to include PL 480 
asL.Stance in the aid package.
 
A.I.D. argued that the loan was designed for a rapid anti-inflationary
effect. Since there was a strong demand for the goods to be financed, it 
was hoped that purchasers would make downpayments that would withdraw pur­
chasing power from circulation before the goods would arrive and before new
 
expenditures would swell the GOC budget. In line with its special character, 
the 1968 loan was not conditioned in the usual sense. Instead, the agree­
ment recorded seven GOC commitments addressed to 1967 activities -- although 
nine months of the year had alr'eady passed. In short, the FY 1968 loan 
was not conditioned on future performance, but, like program assistance to 
the NESA countries, was extended, in the formal sense at least, in response 
to satisfactory past performance. A less sanguine view of COC performance
in 1967.-68 would conclude that the 1968 loan was supporting assistance under 
the guise of a program loan.
 
An agricutltural sector loan for $23 million was also signed in
 
October, 1967. This loan was originally offered in December, 1966, with
 
the announced purpose of inducing lower prices for key agricultural inputs -­
i.e., fertilizer, pesticides, and machinery. In mid-1967, Frei's ambitious
 
agrarian reform bill was passed and a broad attack on the major sectoral 
problems (inparticular, the fragmentation of governmental jurisdiction,
 
traditional GOC policy to hold urban food prices low, excessive conzentra­
tion of land holdings, and monopolies in supply, marketing and credit facilities)
 
could be undertaken. A.I.D.'s sectoral assistance was intended to support
 
GOC efforts by tying tranche releases to policy decisions to raise crop
 
support prices.
 
This particular measure of self-help proved difficult to execute. 
The GOC was sensitive to the political repercussions of higher urban food 
prices and the announcement of higher crop floor prices was postponed. In
 
April 1968, A.I.D. threatened to deobligate the loan if a satisfactory price
policy was not announced in the near future. By the end of FY 1968, little 
progress had been made and A.I.D.'s internal discussions suggested that
 
agricultural sector aid would not be expanded until a major review of
 
strategy had been carried out. 
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H. FY 1969: $20 Million PrograLn; o.3 Million Sector Loan 
The difficulties affecting program loan negotiations in 1968 we 
broadly similar to those that dominated the 1964 discussions. The pren. 
of negotiating strategy, in fact, could have been expressed in much the 
same terms: 
...a difficult election year...economic situation far from satis­
factory.. .p'irpo3 :f i3s*_:jtance to hold development gains already 
made... 
--see page 4 above.
 
The difficulties in 1968 were numerous. The GOC had lost ground
 
on its stabilization program in 1967 and the rate of inflation was once
 
again increasing. With the approach of the 1969 Congressional and the
 
1970 Presidential elections, policy choices would be increasingly Ji.m-nated 
by inter- and intra-party jockeying for political support. The putlic 
sector wage readjustment bill, a test of the GOC capacity to get
 
Congressional cooperation on stabilization policy, passed inMay, 1968,
 
in a form that increased the government deficit and added to inflationary
 
pressures. A natural disaster further compounded these difficulties. A
 
serious drought began to cause major production losses and extensive un­
employment in agriculture, as well as a significant slowdown in industries 
dependent on hydroelectric power. Simultaneously the GOC began to experience 
falling tax revenues and a demand for additional expenditures to create 
employment and aid recovery. 
In short, the prospects were dim in mid-1968 for any advance on the 
long-term goals of price stabilization followed by self-sustained growth

and a phasing out of program aid. The IMF Standby promised earlier was 
arranged in March, 1968 and a $45 million package for CY 1968 was proposed

wJthin A.I.D. The first $20 million wou3,d come from FY 1968 funds and 
the other $25 million was to come from FY 1969 appropriations. The purpose 
of the assistance was 
to help meet the critical foreign exchange requirements of an 
ambitious development program and to assist in financing the 
public sector investment program in a manner that does not 
aggravate inflationary pressures. 
In short, the proposal was for a holding operation. AID/W candidly noted 
that the objectives of self-sustained growth and a phaseout of aid within 
a few years were no longer sustained by the rationale of the assistance 
program. 
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In September, 1968, a $20 million program loan was signed, arranged
 
for disbursement in two tranches. The conditioning was again minimal. The
 
Mission stressed the importance of supporting the Frei administration and
 
argued for release of the final tranche in December, during the final
 
Congressional preparation of the 1969 budget and public sector wage re­
adjustment measure. Preliminary plans for the CY 1969 assistance program

also stress the need to support the government's efforts to prevent economic
 
distresc during the election period. Estimates of Chile's 1969 needs.suggest
 
an additional $20 million from the FY 1969 A.I.D. budget and possibly another
 
$20 million from FY 1970 funds later in the year. An agricultural sector 
loan may also be extended.
 
Together with the program loan, a $16.3 million educational sector
 
loan was also signed in September, 1968. This was the second educational
 
sector loan and continued the emphasis of the first measure in supporting
 
the Education Reform Program begun in 1967.
 
III. THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES 
A. Did A.I.D. Try to Exert Leverage Through the Program Loans? 
The historical record shows a consistent effort by A.I.D. to in­
fluence GOC policy in many respects. In most cases, the self-help condi­
tions tied to tranche releases defined difficult performance targets and
 
the seriousness with which A.I.D. regarded these conditions was often
 
reflected in delays of tranche releases ,mtil the GOC provided satisfactory
 
evidence of performance. (A fuller discussion of the enforcement issue is
 
developed below in Section IV. B. 5.) 
The degree of influence sought by A.I.D. i another question.

Advocates of the "tough" approach would probably disapprove of the reticence 
with which difficalt issues of self-help have been handled. Ii 1963 and 
1964 and, later, in 1967 and 1968 the limited political power of the GOC 
administrations to effect reforms has led to an essentially "holding operation" 
rationale for program aid. In 1965 and 1966 when the loans bristled with 
self-help conditions, the apparent "toughness" largely reflected the new 
Frei regime's toughness with itself in its effort to laumch a wide-ranging 
program of reform. Overall, the reasons advanced to justify the program
 
loans show that A.I.D. has continually tried to move the GOC to adopt policy

reforms. However, the Mission has always believed that, despit3 adverse
 
prospects for a particular year, A.I.D. should continue to exlend assistance
 
and maintain a position of potential influence that will translate into
 
leverage when circumstances change and the GOC again adopts a reform program
 
with favorable prospects.
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B. 	 Did the GOC Meet the Specified Performance Standards? 
A.I.D.'s judgement has consistently been that Chile deserves at
 
least an overall passing grade on the set of performance tests attached to
 
All tranches were released; no funds were deobligated.
the program loans. 

On the other hand, the overall performance was of passing, not excelling,
 
quality. The release of many tranches followed delays of several months
 
until satisfactory proof of performance was available and, in one instance,
 
A.I.D. threatened to deobligate funds if agreed-upon policy measures were
 
not carried out (see Section II. G. above). In nearly all cases, the
 
shortfalls from performance targets have ultimately proved acceptable to
 
A.I.D. inasmuch as the Chilean Government has convincingly argued that 
special circuamstances restricted its capacity to meet the performance 
goals. 
The record for specific areas of GOC performance shows uneven re­
sults. Government budgeting procedures have markedly improved and net 
borrowing from the central bank to finance expenditures is now generally 
avoided. Public investment, particularly in agriculture and also in 
education, has risen relative to total public expenditure. The foreign 
exchange rate is regularly devalued with increases in the domestic price 
level. And minimum prices for wheat have been substantially raised. 
Nevertheless, the performance efforts have only briefly succeeded
 
in slowing Chile's endemic inflation. The increase in the price level
 
slowed substantially throagh the end of 1966, then began to increase more 
rapidly once again. Whatever the explanation, the time when Chile can do 
without program assistance remains a future date quite beyond the range 
of plausible forecasts. The Frei regime has been unable to effect many 
needed reforms in the agricultural sector and it must continue a rinning 
battle with the Congress to restrain the upward adjustment of public sector 
wages. No really effective remedy for inflation has been pursued for more
 
than 	a few years, and uncertainty regarding the outcome of approaching 
national elections creates doubt that policy reforms now adopted are likely
 
to be carried forward by the new government. 
C. 	 Can Satisfactory GOC Performance be Attributed to A.I.D. Efforts 
and, in Particular, to the Program and/or Sector Loans? 
There can be little doubt that A.I.D.'s program and sector assistance
 
were productive of much of the satisfactory GOC performance described above.
 
Obviously, the election of the Frei Government provided far more vigorous
 
local support for a wide range of difficult policy reforms. Nevertheless,
 
A.I.D. and the GOC frequently found themselves at odds over the selection
 
and pace of reforms to be adopted.., In some instances (by definition difficult
 
to identify), A.I.D. adopted loan onditions that.embodied measures which the
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Chilean Government had independently decided upon. The record suggests,
however, that a great part of the satisfactory GOC performance came about 
only through the consistent and firm A.I.D. position that certain policy

measures were essential conditions for continued program assistance. In

particular, A.I.D.'s insistence broke the lengthy GOC debate over advance
 
announcement of agricultural price policies. 
The IfF and CIAP participated

in the effort to induce GOC policy refon 
 but their roles were clearly

subordinate to and largely defined by A.I.D.'s concept of the job to be
 
done (see Section IV. C. 3 below0). 
DETErmINANTS OF LEVERAGE
 
A. The Loan 
1. Size of Loan
 
The level of program lending in Chile has varied considerably
during the seven FY's under study here. 
In absolute terms (and for program

and sector loans taken toghether), the loan size in 1965 and 1966 was nearly

eight times that of the low year, 1967,and twenty-five to fifty percent
larger than lending in the other four years. 
 A.I.D. clearly experienced

its peak influence in the high loan years; moreover, GOC policy that
 
strayed farthest from A.I.D norms occurred in the lowest loan year. 
But
the experience illustrates what one might expect -- that negligible lending
produces negligible influence -- while failing to demonstrate the contraryproposition -- that high lending levels produce extensive influence. The 
highest loan levels, in 1965 and 9166, coincided with the first two years
of the Frei Government. The significant degree of influence A.I.D. enjoyed

in that period must be attributed to the read!ness of the new government

to undertake sweeping reforms rather than to the lending level itself,

unless a similar degree of influence is once again achieved if the lending
level of FY 1969 approaches that of the earlier years.
 
2. Changes in Size of Loan
 
Five marked changes in lending levels have occurred since 
FY 1963. Loan size increased by over fifty percent in 1964, and by more
 
than forty percent in 1965; it dropped precipitately in 1967, then more

than doubled in 1968 and, if the Mission proposals are carried out, will

nearly double again in 1969. In general, the increases represent A.I.D.
 
efforts to gain leverage; the single decrease in loan size resulted from
 
a GOC decision to decline program aid for that year.
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The first large increase in loan size, in 1964, did not yield
 
increased leverage. The following increase, in 1965, initiated the Frei
 
era and was associated with a marked expansion of A.I.D. influence on GOC
 
policy. Although the aid level was unchanged in 1966, the level of influence
 
was equal to or greater than that of the previous year. In 1968 and 1969,
 
a rising aid level yielded growing influence on GOC policies. Overall,
 
experience to date indicates that increases in aid levels may (but do not
 
necessarily) produce increased leverage; Chilean experience does not shed
 
light on the effects of deliberately decreased loan levels.
 
3. Number of Successive Loans
 
Experience with Chile neither proves nor disproves the hypothesis
 
that leverage tends to dissipate over time. No real opportunity to test
 
the view occurred until the election of the Frei Government in late 1964.
 
A case can be made for the proposition that leverage increased over the
 
following four years. During 1965 and 1966, leverage increased, judging
 
from ae wide range of self-help measures that were included as loan con­
ditions and undertaken by the ±e, government. Chile's decision to do without 
an aid package in 1967 was an attempt to escape the conditioning process -­
a kind of backhanded admission that the GOC still associated program assistance 
with an uncomfortable degree of A.I.D. leverage on Chilean policy. Finally, 
with the renewal of program loans in 1968, A.I.D. continued its insistence 
and Chile continued to accept the view that aid would be tied to self-help 
policy commitments. 
However, one can also argue that, while in 1965 and 1966, A.I.D.
 
enjoyed considerable leverage from program aid, the substantial loss of
 
ground on major development objectives in 1967 and 1968 is not adequately
 
explained merely by the fact of more adverse economic circumstances.
 
More importantly, it evidences the growing cost of leverage from continled
 
program aid. To sum up, neither of these lines of reasoning decisively
 
resolves th6 issue of whether or not a dissipation of leverage occurred
 
over time.
 
B. The Conditionin, System
 
1. Area in Which Conditions were Specified
 
A.I.D.'s experiencc with Chile provides some lessons in the
 
art of gaining leverage in diverse area, of policy when the host government
 
is staffed by semi-autonomous cabinet ministers. Initially, A.I.D. tried to
 
establish credible conditions for performance in various sectors of tr
 
economy as a part of the program loan agreement. Experience through 1966
 
showed, however, that the Minister of Finance who signed program loans
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did not have the authority to ensure that conditions dealing with policy
in non-monetary sectors of the economy would be carried out. 
While de­
lays in tranche releases could prod the Minister of Finance to carry out
commitments relating to budget policy exchangeor devaluation, the with­
holding of funds for shortfalls in other sectors would tend 
 to produce
budget cuts across the board, thereby penalizing sectors other than the
 
offending one.
 
While continuing to emphasize the need for reforms throughout
the economy, therefore, the USAID began to utilize sector loans to education 
and agriculture in 1967 and 1968 an toin attempt influence policy more 
effectively in these sectors. 
 Through this means, the Ministers of
 
Agriculture and Education would be obligated to implement the agreed policy
actions, and decisions to hold back tranche releases would have the 
specific impact desired. 
In summary, the introduction of sector loans probably yielded
increased leverage for A.] .D. although the results in the agricultural
 
sector have been disappoirting. 
Several more years of experience with
packages of program and sector aid are needed before any well-grounded 
conclusions can be drawn.
 
2. Specificity of Loan Conditions
 
The conditioning of loans to Chile was, for the most part,

expressed in quite specific terms. Budget surpluses were defined as mini­
mum escudo sums to be achieved by specific dates. Acceptable rates of
increase in the price level were set down as so many percentage points of
 
increase between particular dates. 
The only area of vagueness in the
 
agreements was the relationship of the exact targets to the concept of
acceptable performance that A.I.D. would employ in deciding upon tranche 
releases. The record seems to show, however, that the exactly-stated
conditions were credible despite the implicit understanding that they 
were not strictly binding targets. The GOC apparently refused to commititself to conditions that seemed genuinely unrealistic; hence, the Chilean
 
Government generally made an honest effort to achieve the specific condi­
tions of the loan agreements, and the USAID was generally ready to accept

the explanations for shortfalls that the GOC advanced.
 
3. Number of Conditions
 
The loan agreements with Chile carried a r''atively 1 .rge number
of performance conditions. 
Some A.I.D. officials who were involved report
that a significant nmber of the conditions were included at the insistence 
of GOC negotiators who wanted to use the agreement to reinforce internal 
governmental decisions. Other conditions were specified as part of an 
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A.I.D. effort to keep particular policy problems in view, even though there
 
was no serious hope of getting GOC action on all of the matters mentioned.
 
In general, the number of loan conditions that required GOC action of a
 
sort that might not have been forthcoming apart from the loan was not so
 
great as to dissipate the Chilean Government's capacity to carry out the
 
needed reforms.
 
4. Frequency of Reviews and Tranche Releases 
Quarterly reviews prior to tranche releases have worked fairly well
 
in Chile. The relative frequency cf these sessions forced the GOC to press
 
steadily for the prescribed refoms and to develop the kinds of statistical 
reporting needed in the reviews. One significant modification that increased 
the leverage from thesoe sessions was that of scheduling separate meetings 
with the cabinet Ministers apart from their subordinates to facilitate a
 
franker exchange of criticisms ani suggestions.
 
5. Enforcement of Conditions 
Despite the many precise conditions for disbursement set by each 
loan, decisions to release the funds were ultimately based on A.I.D. judg­
ments as to whether performance was satisfactory in the light of prevailing 
problems.
 
In September, 1965, the Mission recommended that the third tranche 
of the 1965 loan be released, although review of the entire period ,as not 
complete and not all conditions were met. 
While the U.S. has expressed some concern with the monetary, 
fiscal and exchange rate pclicy, the GOC has passed the basic 
quantitative tests . . . with -regard to longer term measures, 
accomplishments have not been outstanding. Yet there are indica­
tions that some progress is being made in reform measures. 
In fact the money supply far exceeded the targets in 1965 and the rate of
 
exchange did not depreciate at a rate commensurate with the price increases;
 
several other conditions were met however. 
The FY 1966 loan was released despite the shortfall in some quanti­
tative and qualitative targets. The GOC's wage policy in 1966 did not ad­
here to the loan commitments. In February 1966, the Mission "defended" 
the GOC's decision to increase wages above target ceilings for, while .uch
 
increases
 
vitiate to a certain extent our deve]opment objectives, it may
 
be a small price to pay for the maintenance of good morale among 
the military and good relationships between the administration
 
and the military which is among the most important of our over­
all objectiies. 
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The GOC also did not announce agricultural floor prices for wheat
before May 1966 as agreed. The Mission recommended release of the tranche
 
on the grounds that the GO, in response to Mission urging, agreed to
 
announce the same by the end of June. Floor prices for some agricultural
commodities were announced in July, but not for wheat. 
Nevertheless, all
 
funds were released. 
Some of the basic quaititative targets were not met in each year

e.g. money supply and sectoral public investment. Others were met and

still others were only partially met. Progress in some areas was substan­
tial e.g. tax revenue rose considerably, a meaningful agrarian reform pro­gram was instituted and educational opportunities were expanded. 
Given this mixed picture of GOC accomplishments and A.I.D. enforce­
ment of loan conditions, the role of enforcement within the conditioning

process was evidently quite limited. According to an A.I.D. working paper,

it was 
stated the A.I.D. would not require that all conditions be met but

rather that "the overall performance be consistent with the total objectives
of the program and therefore worthy of further drawings." As all funds 
were released, it is obvious that the A.I.D. posture was one of general
satisfaction. It was A.I.D.'s judgement that there was relative progre sin Chile compared to earlier periods of development and reforms were insti­
tuted in some sectors of the economy. 
There is no evidence, however, to indicate that the Mission explicitly

established priority conditions or trade-offs between conditions. 
Monetary

and fiscal policy were major issues but there was only partial success in

meeting these conditions as stated in the loan agreements. The determina­
tion of satisfactory performance was an A.I.D. juidgment in which any trade­
offs wore implicitly made. Would performance have been better if A.I.D. had

strictly adhered to the loan conditions? Was the credibility of precise

conditions lessened each time a tranche was released even though individual

conditions had not been met? 
 Or were the actual achievements the best that 
could be hoped for under the circumstances? Did A.I.D. in fact get thebest performance possible because of (and not despite) the flexibility
of its interpretation of adequate performance? 
Answers to these questions may not be possible. First, there is
 
no precise way of knowing whether enforcement of the letter of loan con­
ditions would have led 
to better achievements. Second, it is obvious
 
that Chile's domestic situation made it impossible for a GOC with the
best of intentions to control every variable that could obstruct or 
negate performance efforts. 
Third, as U.S. aid is only a small fraction
 
of Chile's total resources, some would argue that the U.S. could not have
 
exerted more leverage than it did.
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Although all program loan funds were released, some of the tranche
 
disbursements were delayed. The second tranche release covering the first
 
quarter of 1966, was authorized on June 18 (at least two months late)
 
pending U.S.-GOO agreement in May on several issues, among which were the
 
following: (1) the GOC would limit its expenditures of the copper wind­
° 
fall to $15 million (E 60-70 million); the additional E° 110-120 million
 
which the GOC had intended to add to its budgeted expenditure from high
 
copper earnings would be covered by other means; (2) agricultural support 
prices would be announced by the end of June (the GOC had not adhered to 
the May deadline previously agreed upon) and (3) a budget reform law
 
would be submitted to Congress by the end of June. As noted earlier, the 
GOC only partially met the support price target. The third tranche review
 
was delayed as the GOC failed to provide all the necessary information to
 
the Mission in time to meet the initial release schedlle. The foulrth
 
tranche review was combined with the third and all funds were released in
 
late 1966.
 
The third tranche of the FY 1965 loan was withheld ,util the GOC 
agreed to undertake additional budgetary measures and readjust the pri­
orities of its development plan.; the tranche was released a couple of months 
late although the GOC still had not met all 6f the targets. There is evi­
dence that other tranches were delayed but cften this was due to GOC tardiness 
in submitting the information required for the review; in other instances 
AID/W raised questions about compliance and this, too delayed some tranche 
releases. 
In general, one can reasonably argue that A.I.D. provided a credible
 
enforcement of loan conditions even though enforcement never required the 
actual deobligation of funds. In a world of imperfect forecasting, ex post 
judgment must always reassess the appropriateness as norms for satisfactory 
performance of conditions set down in agreements made many months before. 
Ultimately, fulfillment of the spirit of the original commitment must serve 
as the test of honest effort required for the release of loan funds. The 
record of enforcement of loan conditions in Chile scores well according to
 
this view of the problem.
 
C. Environmental Factors 
1. National Politics
 
Domestic polititiql factors were the greatest single obstacle 
to A.I.D. leverage throughout the loan period. In 1963--64 and again
 
beginning in 1969, the national election campaigns generated strong
 
opposition to government efforts to slow inflation by limiting public 
sector wai," adjustments and increases in other parts of the budget. 
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Between campaigns, vested interests, operating through the
 
Congress, delay and/or seriously weakened reform legislation sponsored by
 
the administration. Fcr instance, it required two years of Congressional
 
debate on agrarian reform before the necessary legislation was approved in
 
mid-1967. And pressure from the military forced wage increases in excess
 
of GOC commitments. In general, the vigorous quality of Chilean political

combat and the ruling party's need to maintain alliances with other parties
 
in order to win Congressional consent to its program greatly weakens the
 
ability of any GOC administration to carry out a broad range of effective
 
reform measures within the short term of 3 or 4 years (between national
 
election campaigns) when it can best function.
 
2. U.S.-Chilean Relations
 
While American interest in GOC policy towards the copper industry
 
and similar national concerns occasionally produced tense moments, the
 
period was generally marked by exceptionally smooth U.S.-Chilean relations.
 
The Frei Government in particular was viewed as an almost ideal partner

in advancing the goals of the Alliance for Progress. Even the GOC decision
 
to forego aid in 1967 -- with all its unhappy consequences -- reinforced
 
the favorable Chilean image since A.I.D. foresaw difficulty in justifying
 
program assistance in a year of rising copper prices. The exceptionally
 
productive relationship with Chile over this period must largely be credited
 
to the competence and diplomatic skill of the Mission Directors and staff.
 
3. Multilateralism
 
Multilateral forces influenced A.I.D.'s leverage in several
 
ways. First of all, there has been a tradition in the Americas that countries
 
can enter into international treaties that simultaneously further national
 
and international interests, a tradition embodied in the history of the
 
Organization of American States. The Alliance for Progress grew out of this
 
political cast of mind and succeeded in reconciling the requirements of
 
national sovereignity with exacting conditions of performance for the transfer
 
of resources on a concessional basis from the United States to the Latin
 
countries. The sweeping reform objectives of the Alliance and its under­
standing of performance conditions for aid were a genuinely multilateral
 
contribution to the U.S.-Chilean experience with program loans.
 
More specific multilateral influence on the program lcans came 
from two quarters. The IMF laid down specific monetary and fiscal policy 
conditions in granting annual standby facilities. Flfillment of IMF 
standby conditions was a standard commitment in the program loan agreements 
and the leverage obtained on GOC policy was largely attributable to A.I.D.'s
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insistence on the IMF negotiations. Another source of multilateral influence
 
was the CIAP. The GOC program was subject to annual CIAP review and
 
criticism and the Chilean Government formally expressed its policy commit­
ments in a subsequent letter to the CIAP secretariat. However, multilateral
 
influence was minimal in this instance. CIAP served largely as an accept­
able recipient of the Letter of Intent formalizing the conditions of program
 
assistance negotiated ear2ier with A.I.D.
 
In the early sixties, there was also some discussion of establish­
ing an international consortim under the leade-ship of the World Bank to 
serve as a consultative group of source of aid. However, Chilean interest 
in the project faded quickly when program assistance on balance of payments
 
grounds was offered by the U.S.
 
V CONCLUSIONS
 
The prcgram loan experience with Chile suggests the following broad
 
conclusions:
 
1. The series of program loans since 1963 gave A.I.D. significant
 
leverage on GOC development policy. Many loan conditions were largely met
 
and some progress was made on the control of inflation and on improved
 
government monetary and fiscal policy. The periodi:! review of performance
 
and the requirements of loan and standby negotiations induced the Chilean
 
Government to adopt its own regular internal reviews of policy.
 
2. The sector loan is probtbly a useful way of dealing with per­
formance targets in sectors not directly under the authority of the Minister
 
of Finance. The separate treatment of these goals engages the officials
 
directly responsible for these areas of policy and limits the threat of
 
tranche delays or deobligations to the sectors where nonperformance is
 
expected to occur.
 
3. The specification of loan conditions as exact quantities which 
A.I.D. regards as guidelines for performance exposes the Mission to criticism
 
for arbitrariness when perfcrmance falls short of the targets. It is
 
critically important for the preservation of mutual trust that A.I.D. and
 
the host government have some prior understanding of what would constitute
 
-n acceptable margin of error. The Chilean experience illustrates this
 
kind of mutual understanding.
 
Ch 89 
CONFIDENTIAL
 
- 23 ­
4. Program loans provided strona support for the effort of the
 
Frei Goverunent to undertake a broad range of difficult policy reforms. 
The experience with Chile shows that a leverage relationship is viable 
with a government of a reasonably democratic and coup-free country. 
5. Finally, program assistance need not be emphatically multi­
lateral in order to yield effective leverage on policy. Multilateral
 
influence is helpful, but it is not essential when a government like the
 
GOC is responsive to suggestions in a bilateral arrangement.
 
M 90
 
COLOMBIA
 
by 
Donald R. Snodgrass
 
March 1970
 
C 91
 
PROGRAM LOAN STUDY: COLOMBIA
 
I. 	 INTRODUCTION Page 1
 
2II. 	 CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCE 
A. Pre-1962 
B. FY 1962: $30 million Contingeny Fund loan 
C. Ff 1963: $60 million program loan
 
D. Fy 1964: $15 million and $45 million program loans
 
E. FY 1965: no program loan 
F. FY 1966: $65 million program loan 
G. FY 1967: $100 million program loan 
H. FY 1968: $58 million program loan; $15 million agricultural 
sector loan
 
III. 	 THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES 14 
A. Did A.I.D. try to use the program loan to influenLce policy? 
B. Did Colombia perform?
 
C. Did A.I.D. influence policy?
 
D. 	Can A.I.D.'s influence be attributed specifically to the program
 
loan?
 
20IV. 	DETERMIANTS OF INFLUENCE 
A. The Conditioning system
 
1. Explicitness and specificity of conditions
 
2. Enforcement
 
3. Number of conditions
 
4. Areas in which conditions were specified
 
5. Dissipation through timc?
 
B. The loan
 
1. Loan size
 
2. Trends in loan size
 
C. Environmental influences
 
1. International politics
 
2. National politics
 
3. Multilateralism
 
D. Personal touches 
23V. CONCLUSIONS 
C 92 
ODLOMBIA
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A.I.D. has made seven program loans to Colombia, involving gross obligations of 
$373 million. Since FY 1963, Colombia has been an important proving ground for 
program loan leverage, using many of the procedures and techniques later applied
 
elsewhere, particularly throughout Latin America. The case of Colombia must thus 
be an important part of our evaluation study. 
A.I.D. 's experience with program lending in Colombia is chronicled in the following 
section. It begins with a rather haphazard balance of rdyrents loan in FY 1962 
and proceeds to increasingly ambitious and sophisticaled attempts to use U.S. money
 
to influence Colombian policy. This trend toward mcre elaborate program loan
 
conditioning, in which the FY 1963, 1964, 1966, and 1967 loans all marked successive
 
steps, is punctuated by unexpected, sometimes violent, breakdowns in relations 
between the GOC and the aid agencies (IMF, IBRD, anid A.I.D.). These breakdowns 
occurred in late 1964, late 1966, and early 1968. The last of these seems to have 
produced a strong reaction to formal loan conditions on the part of the GOC and 
President Lleras personally. It has in fact helped reverse the trend toward 
specific, multiple conditioning; the FY 1968 program loan, signed recently, is
 
less formal in its policy conditioning than its precedessor.
 
Conclusions which emerge from the Colombian experience on the basis of this study 
are reported below, following the chronological account. it snould be noted in 
advance, however, that Colombia's development problems in general and attempts to
 
achieve leverage from program loans in particular are heavily influenced by two
 
cardinal facts, one economic and one political:
 
1) Colombia's development is hampered by severe structural problems, particu­
larly by dependence on coffee for two-thirds of export receipts. These rigidi-Us
 
are so constraining on development efforts and so slow to yield to attempts to
 
modify them that they put a severe limit on the speed of possible progress in
 
Colombian development generally. (It is not clear, however, that Colombia's
 
development problems are inherently more intractible than those of the other
 
countries included in this study.)
 
2) Colombia possesses an unusual political system, which combines free
 
elections with complex regulations designed to maintain political stability. This 
National Front system, a legacy from an earlier era of political turbulence, rotates 
the presidency between the Front's constituent Liberal and Conservative parties. 
It is a profoundly conservative arrangement, as evidenced by the rule (which has 
been suspended in emergencies and modified by special legislation last year) that 
legislation of major substance can be enacted only with a two-thirds Congressional
 
majority. The system provides a unique coupling of two undesirable features from
 
the development point of view: biennial departures from national discipline in an
 
attempt to win the election and absence cf a usable mandate for whichever candidate
 
does eventually win.
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II. CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCE 
A. Pr 
Prior to A.I.D.'s first program loan in FY 1962, U.S. assistance to Colombia was
 
limited. The first A.I.D.-type project loan was made in FY 1961. Longer standing
 
forms of aid consisted of' a small technical assistance program and some PL-480
 
loans and grants. Combined, these types of assistance averaged about $11 million 
annually in the last four years b'efore inauguration of the Alliance for Progress. 
In addition, the ExIm Bank was a large but irregular lender. The IBRD entered 
Colombia as a consistently important source of finance in FY 1959 and has continued 
in this role, with a one-year break in 1965, ever since. In TT 1961 the IDB made 
its first loan to Colombia; its groSa obligations have hocered close to the $25 
million mark each year since. Non-U.S. bilateral a.Ld was, and continues to be, 
negligible.
 
B. FY 1962:$30 million ContingencyiLnd loan 
Program loan activity in Colombia began at the initiative of the GOC, well in
 
advance of an established rationale or procedure for such lending on the part of 
A.I.D. (although after conditioning language had been appended to a Brazil program
 
loan). The following paragraph, from an early 1962.-memo, suggests the mood and
 
methods of the times:
 
"On December 12, 1961, the Colombian Government requested through 
our Embassy in Bogota $120 million in balance of payments assistance on 
an urgent basis. There had bean no advance warning that the GOC would 
require large-scale balance of payments assistance in 1962, in addition
 
to the $110 million in U.S. Government and IMF balance of payments funds
 
drawn in 1961. Our DrLbasn-y immediately began an investigation of the 
Colombian balance of payments prospects for 1962. The newly appointed
 
Minister of Finance, Jorge Mejia Palacio, visited Washington in early
 
January 1962 to reinforce the request made in Bogota in December. An
 
inter-agency task force which had been studying the available data
 
concluded that it would be helpful to have a further investigation of
 
the actual data in Bogota. An A.I.D. technician went to Bogota, and
 
together with Embassy officers and GOC officials, developed a revised
 
and agreed estimate of the prospective Colombian balance of payments
 
figures." 
The compelling rationale for the loan was a large anticipated payments deficit in
 
the first half of C71 1962. Since qverthrowing dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in 
1958, Colombia had been following an auste-'e monetary and fiscal regimen. During
 
1961, however, in preparation for the national elections scheduled for the following
 
March and May, the Government had been loosening up considerably. Import deposit
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requirements had been removed, public expenditures increased, the discount rate 
lowered, and credit controls eased. The prospective payments deficit could thus 
be attributed directly toweak policy. Should A.I.D. reward irresponsibility-­
especially after having made three other "emergency balance of paymnents loans" to 
Latin American countries earlier in the year'? in deciding to go ahead with the 
loan, A.I.D. cited offsetting GOC achievements (including preparation of a 10-year
 
plan) and resolved to press for policy improvement (with devaluation left beyond
 
the pale until after May).
 
From surprise request to loan authorization took only two months (a.lthough two 
more months elapsed before the Tcan was signed). The size of the loan was 
drastically ..duced by shortening the time frame and allowing for debt rollovers, 
reserve drawdo,,ns, and a return to import deposits. There was apparently some 
discussion of GOC poliuies, and one high-level memo reports that the GOC "is now
 
prepared t) undertake all of the financial and economic reforms which we have made 
pricr conditions for this loan." However, I could find no other references to 
policy conditions. Neitrier the loan authorization nor the loan agreement mentions 
any and there is no record of subsequent review of CGOC performance. All funds were 
released after !ealist c conditions precedent were declared met. 
C. _ _}_'6 millionr poram loan 
Following the signing of the $30 oiillion CF loan in April 1962, a series of events 
which were highly favorable from the U.S. viewpoint took place: 
1) 	The Natioral Front won the national elections, which were carried 
out in an orderly fashicn. The newly elected President (Valencia) 
and his Financ;e Minister (Sanz) declared their conmmitment to 
development and far-reaching fiscal reform. 
2) 	The ten-year plan received an endorsement in principle from the
 
"Nine Wise Men" of the OAS and from the IBRD, which undertook
 
to organize a consuItaive group for Colombia. 
3) 	The rate of monetary expansion was reduced.
 
4) 	Import deposit requirements were increased. 
On the strength of these encouraging signs, A.I.D. took up the question of financial
 
support beyond the firist half of 196k. An early conclusion was that. some form of
 
devaluation was needed. The IMF, which had reached the same conclusion, began
 
discussions with the Ministry of Finance to work out a package which would serve
 
as a prerequisite to an IMF Stand--by. In October the Country Team said that the
 
U.S. would "urgently cons'.der" a $60 million loan, should Colombia "adopt acceptable
 
fiscal, exchange, and moz.-tary measures." After ome discussion, it was agreed that
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the 	acceptability judgment would be delegated to the IMF. On November 7 the
 
Ministry of Finance introduced in Congress a wide range of legislative proposals 
embodying the policy changes worked out with the IMF and IBRD. (A.T.D. appears
 
to have been kept informed and chesared the participants on, but does not seem to
 
have been directly involved in designing legal an. policy changes.) 
The policy package included a de facto devaluation from 6.7 to 9 pesos/dollar for 
most transactions, with exporters of coffee, petroleimii, and hides l3ft behind near 
the ola rate. It also included increased consumption and inheritance taxes. The 
new revenues to be generated was estimated at 1,020 million pesos annually. In 
addition, bank reserve requirements were increased and the use of the rediscount 
privilege curtailed. AD. *2ornciudeci th. "ogether with the monetary measures, 
the GOC's present fiscal and exchange plan., if aopted, would bring about a sound 
financial backing for the GiC development program." The loan paper submitted in 
November urged release of "a substantial po.i.on of the loa. . as soon as 
exchange reforms acceotahle to A.1-D. have been implencnted," addinfg that "such 
measures are expected in the immediate f'tare." The rest of the $60 million was 
to be made available later, cased on satisfactory implementation of the remainder 
of the package.
 
Following the successful iT-F negotiations, a U.S. loan agreement was swiftly drawn 
up. The agreement was signed on December *18, less than two weeks after A.I.D,/W 
authorized the loan. The IMF Stand-by, for 52.5 million, was signed in January. 
The new -oan agreement introduced the tranche release procedure to Colombia. There 
were two $30 million tranches. The first half of the loan was released on January 
, 1963 when initial conditions (legalisms plus satisfactory exch,nge reforms) were 
declared met. Release of the second half was not prescheduled, but was to come 
whenever Colombia showed eviden ce of "providing resources, in addition to those 
obtained from the . . exchange reforms, to achieve investment levels called for 
by /i ts7 economic and social development plan.' The nature of the evidence required 
was later defined, in an implementation letter, as consisting of four reports: 
1) 	Documentary evidence of tax measures, accompanied by projections
 
of the effects of these measures on revenues.
 
2) 	 Evidence of appropriate monetary measuxes. 
3) 	A projection (for 1963 and 1964) of revenues, expenditures and
 
the current cccount surplus.
 
4) 	Data, actual a:d projected, on pricesexports and imports, investment
 
and saving.
 
During the first eight months of 1963, while the first tranche was being drawn down, 
the GOC tried to push its tax proposals through Congress. Resistence was strong 
and the Valencia administration did iot show the vig'or A.I.D. would have liked. 
c 9)6
 
-5-

Worse, the Rinister of Labor was dec'eelng wage increases far in excess of earlier
 
projections and calling them a necessary adjustment to the recent devaluation. In 
addition the Bank of the Republic (BO) was intervening actively in the free 
foreign exchange market to support the peso. U.S. Government displeasure was 
conveyed in meetings during July and August to discuss a possible PL-480 agreement 
and release of the seccnd tranche of the program loan. The use of' a Special 
Economic Powers Law to put through the tax package by executive fiat was put forward
 
as a prerequisite to release of the second $30 million.
 
During August, the Special Economic Powers Law was introduced in Congress, passed, 
and implemented by a series of Presidential decrees. In requesting the tranche 
release early in I'eptember, Finance Minister Sanz estimatec. that the new measures 
would yield revenues of 340 mIallion pesos in 1963 and 506 million in 1964. An
 
analysis of the reports specified in Implementation Letter No. I showed that the 
than offset the effects of the wnexpected expenditure increasenew measures no more 
on the piblic finances. The GOC was undertaking additional fiscal and monetary 
damage already been done. the devalutionmeasures, but the had The benefits of 
had largely been dissmopated.
 
In eva'luating the highly equivocal Colombian performance, the Embassy and A.I.D.
 
to be tolerant and look forward rather than backwarud: "Considering
Mission chose 

the delays in obtaining Congressional approval which are inherent in a democratic 
coufltr.:% and considering the very favorable prospects for the future on both the 
tax policy and the tax administration fronts, the Embassy and the A.I.D. Mission 
feel that the delay should be disregarded and the second tranche of the loan
 
released on the basis that tax measures have now been taken to raise revenue both
 
for 1963 and on a full year basis as envisaged in the Loan Agreement." Apparently
 
AID/W took a L .ailar view and release of' the second tranche wai approved on October 8.
 
D. _ andI4 rogram loans_1 Lillion million 
Even before obtaining release of the second tranche of the FY 1963 program loan, 
the GOC put in a bid for a new loan. The request, for $100 million, was made in
 
July. In reply, the U.S. siiid it would talk about continued progreaI aid at the 
$60 million level, plus up to $40 milliol in projects if the agreed self-help
 
measures were 
taken and the U.S. Congress appropriated the money. As quid pro quo,
 
the GO would be asked to negotiate agreed balance of payments and public finance
 
estimates, formulate an export promotion policy, draw up an import budget for 1964,
 
and agree on a tentative list of uses of counterpart.
 
As negotiations proceeded, it became evident that Congressional elections scheduled
 
for May 1964 limited the wrillingniess of the Colombians to make the policy commit­
ments the US. was seeking. Nlor were the GOC negotiators willing to make pro:mises
 
about what they would do after the elections. The U.S. did want to maintain import 
flows and Colombian credit-worthiness during the first quarter of 1964. Accordingly,
 
out of the year's agreed total for separate negotiation.
a $15 million piecc was broken 
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As it turned out, the $15 million loan was marked by protracted delays in negotiation 
and activation. A U.S. proposal was not firmed up until. January 1964. It called 
for three policy conditions precedent: (i) a quantitative current account govern­
ment surplus target (tentatively set at 200 million pesos in the first quarter 
and 1,100 million for the year), (2) an export promotion policy, and (3) a 1964 
import budget. After long discussions of Lnese conditions, and of A.I.D.'s asserted 
right to specify the comrodity list unilaterally, the loan was signed on March 11. 
In its final form, it retained the annual surplus of 1,100 million and the import 
budget as explicit policy conditions but dropped e;cport promotion and, as one would 
expect by this time, the first-quarter surplus.
 
Although the loan wao signed in March 1964, the conditions precedent were not met
 
until late Jiuly and the first disbursement was not made until November. These long 
lags were attributed by one cable to the fact that the loan 
,,as signed by a brand
 
new Finance Minister, Diego Calle Restrepo, who had alienated both his Cabinet
 
colleagues and comnittee Congress by signing the agreemerta of without their formal 
approval.
 
Sometime, earlier, in April 1964, separate discussions had begun on the additional 
$45 million earmarked for program agsistance in f '1964. E'arly 1964 saw rising
coffee prices and improved near-term economic prospects for Colombia. On the 
other hand, the May Congressional electlons produced gains for the Left and weakened 
the Government's resolve to follow austere econoic policles. Under the circum­
stances, the Mission stuck to its prior aid proposal, but only if Colombia would
 
foreswear any significant fin'ther increase in short-term, foreign debt -nd any 
expansion of the recently--formulated import budget for 1964. The situation called 
for a sharpened definition o: program loan policy conditions and the Mission 
responded with a proposal for a much more detailed and structured system than had 
been used before. it established all the basic chaacteristics which have marked 
program loan activity in Colombia ever since.
 
The loan paper prepared to request A. .D./W authorization to negotiate (which was
 
granted on May 14) specified eight performance commitments to be sought from the 
GOC. Together, they comprised a much more comprehensive and specific attempt to 
influence Colombian policy than had been essayed earlier. 
 The eight areas covered
 
were:
 
1) Short-term foreign debt (limit expansion of private debt, reduce 
public debt).
 
2) Import level (keep original 1964 budget).
 
3) Export expansion (formulate program).
 
4) Agricultural planning. 
5) Education.
 
6) Monetary policy. 
7) Eudget policy (a 1,100 million peso target for the current account
 
surplus was stated to be a minimum negotiating objective). 
8) Tax administration (severalspecific steps were mentioned). 
C 98 
UW___A
 
-7-
Despite some internal debate, the U.S. Government decided not to make exchange rate
 
The predictable unpopalarity of devaluation
adjustment a condition of the loan. 

within Colombia, plus a belief in some quarters that economic stabilization could
 
be achieved through sole reliance on monetary and fiscal restraint, provide the reasons.
 
soon as the present proposal is achiered, the
The loan paper went on to say that "as 

Director of the USAID will negotiate the authorized amount and the proposed perfor­
mance commitments with the Colombian Minister of Finance and other appropriate 
Colombian officials. As part of this negotiation, he will seek to persuade the 
of Finance to set forth in a letter his Government's program for 1964 inMinister 
specific terms of undertaking to comply with the eight performance commitments which 
are the basi:.; for justifying this loan proposal." The letter, the paper added, could 
be sent to the IBRD or the OAS Ad Hoc Committee on Colombia rather than directly 
to A.I.D., if the GOG preferred. 
"While the GOC's performonce conitments would be expected to be stated in the 
proposed letter, the U.S. commitrent of funds under the $45 million loan will be 
contained in a separate loan agreement. On the assumption that the Minister's 
letter will in all respects state his intentions in an unambig-ious manner, satis­
factory to A.I.D. as a basis for judging eligibility for disbursement, the substantive 
portions of the loan agreement would be confined to a ,pecific reference to the 
reviews of progress
Minister's letter and to the establishment of provision for two 
to takes place May part of the negotiations . . . thein addition that which in as 
the GOC and the U.S. would conduct a full reviewloan agreement should specify that 

of progress on all points in the Minister's letter , ith such reviews to take place
 
the USAID concludes that the results of
in August and November 1964. As soon t.s 

3ach review are satisfactory, disbusement of the next tranche will be approved. 
USAID will report its fundings hyr airgram for the information of AID/W."
 
give the Mission the sole right to approve tranche releases,
Except for the attempt to 

"the LA system."
this 1964 proposal embodies what has come to be knows as 

Negotiation of this elaborate set of policies and procedures seems to have gone
 
Finance Minister Calle dispatched his Letter of
reasonably smoothly. On July 17, 

Intent to the U.S. Embassy. Together with.a side memorandum, it embodied all the
 
Signing of the loan agreement followed on JuLy 13.
commitments the U.S. sought. 

The new agreement specified three tranches: one of $20 million to be made available
 
when the GOC supplied its self-help program; a second of $15 million to be released
 
after a review of Colombian performance and prospects in September or October 1964;
 
and a third of $10 million to follow another review in January "1965. 
Nothing went right after the loan agreement was signed. Months were consuned in 
negotiating sticky implementation questions involving forward commitment procedures
 
As these months passed, the GOC and Colombia's Coffee
and marine insurance. 

Federation were running large deficits, wh'ch in turn were being reflected in a
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worsening balance of payments. Mission and Washington officials, jointly
 
appraising the situation in November, saw mixed performance, with slippage on the
 
short-term debt, import, and tax conditions of the loan. Nevertheless, "on balance,
 
we conclude that GOC performance in 1964 has been sufficiently good to warrant
 
continuation of disbursement of existing loans." The first tranche of the $45
 
million loan could be released as soon as the implemont.ion issues were0 cleared 
up, although release of the second tranche would be conditioneu on actions to come
 
closer to the loan agreement's policy terms. On December 10 a revised PAAD was
 
signed, giving the U.S. negotiators additional flexibility on forward procurement 
and marine insurance.
 
In December speculation against the deteriorating foreign exchange position flared
 
up, Total insolvency loomed and a near-moratorium was imposed on foreign payments. 
Pressure on the GOC mounted. Assurances of new foreign aid would halt the
 
speculation but negotiations remained deadlocked.
 
As 1964 came to a close, the U.S. began stepping up the pressure for devaluation.
 
By December, the implementation questions nominally being negotiated had ceased to
 
be the real points at issue and became a facade behind which the debate on devalua­
tion was being held.
 
Finance Minister Calle was prepared to giv.e in. He agreed to a devaluation and
 
exchange reform package, and on December 19 he formally proposed a compromise
 
solution to the outstanding implementation issues. A few days later, the U.S.
 
accepted his proposal and agreed to release the first two tranches--despite the
 
lack of the performance rev.iew specified as a pre-condition to release of the second
 
tranche, and despite Colombi,'s patent failure to meet many of the policy conditions
 
cited in the loan agreement; the basis for this decision was a feeling that the U.S.
 
was too deeply committed to Colombia to have any choice. Only the $10 million
 
third tranche was held back, pending the performance review scheduled for January.
 
Enit as things turned out the review was never held. President Valoncia vetoed
 
Galle's proposed exchange refzrr.. As late as January 26, 1965, Calle was still
 
asserting that the review would be held, but a few days later he resigned. His
 
successor, too, stalled. t.S.-Colombian a:.d relations ground to a standstill.
 
Ultimately(November 1965)the third tranche was deobligated.
 
E. FY 1965: No program loan
 
During the remainder of FY 1965 the GOC remained at odds with A.I.D., the IBRD,
 
and the IMF. The aid agencies were fighting for acceptance of an integrated policy
 
package, the main components of which were exchange devaluation, increased taxes,
 
and an end to subsidization of coffee production. Despite heavy pressure within the
 
U.S. Government to mend its relations with Colombia, A.I.D. continued to regard all
 
these as necessary preconditions to either release of the last $10 million of the
 
FY 1964 loan or any new loans. Meanwhile, the economy drifted. Foreign exchange
 
pressure continued, the free rate depreciated by 50%, imports and investment were
 
severely constrained.
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In February a Grand Commission, composed of leading economic interest groups, was
 
convened to study the nation's economic problems. A special session of Congress
 
was called to act upon t e Commission's recommendations and Finance Minister Duran's
 
plan for financing them. Duran had reopened negotiations with the U.S. and IPRD,
 
but like Calle before him he was overruled by President Valencia and other members
 
of the Cabinet and proceeded into retirement. The succeeding months saw continued
 
drift and a series of futile Finance Ministers.
 
F. FY 1966:_ 65 million program loan
 
The failure of the Duran Plan and the continuing government impotence ultimately 
turned business and financial interests, normally supporters of Valencia's Conserva­
tive Party, against him. They brought pressure to bear and in July 1965 prevailed
 
upon him to give both the Finance portfolio and a mandate to do amething with it
 
Vallejo promptly drew up proposals
to their own candidate, Joaquin Vallejo Arbalnez. 

tax surcharge, and obligatory bond purchases.: and
for exchange reform, an income 

submitted them to Congress. After six weeks of legislative procrastination, the 
government used its State of Siege powers to enact Vallejo's proposals by executive
 
decree.
 
the IMF, and the IIRD reopened discussions.
Responding to this long-sought cue, A.I.D., 

swiftly. A new program loan was authorized
Agreement on policies and amounts came 

on November 9. There was a t'.porary pause while Vallejo guided a large wage 
increase for government employees to completion, and when this was done without 
In

exceeding estimates the new loan, for $65 million, -was signed on December 20. 

- a $102.5 million, 12o-month U.S. aidthe press release, emphasis was placed 

package (the remaining components of whien were $10 million in PL-480, $15 million 
in ExIm Bank guarantees and insurance, and 012,5 million in the form of a Treasury
 
36.5 million
Exchange Agreement). On January 1, 1966, an IMF Stand-by credit of 
was added to tha pot.
 
The FY 1966 program loan represents a mature flowering of the "LA system." In a
 
of the ConsultativeStand-uy with the IMF, a memo to the IBRD (in its role as head 
Group), and side letters to A.I.D.--all of which were regarded as vehicles for
 
program loan policy coitments--the GOC pledged itself to a compiehensive,
 
The package comprised 73 separate measoures, many of them
integrated policy package. 

quantified or otherwise tightly specified. Funds were to be released ir four
 
tranches, tha last three of which would be subject to favorable findings in
 
The reviews were timed to coincide with quarterly
quarterly performance reviews. 

tests under the J14F Stand-by.
 
During most of CY 1966, experience tinder the $65 million program loan seemed
 
generally quite favorable. Reviews held on schedule in February-March, Iday, and
 
consider­July-August all produced recommendations for release of the tranche under 
ation. The performance reviews were extensive and searching and involved large
 
The results were conveyed to Washington in
numbers of officials on both sides. 

well-organized airgrams of 100 pages or more.
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Emphasis during the year was on effective follow-up on the Vallejo reforra program.
 
All were anxious to avoid the backsliding which had nullified the 1962 devaluation.
 
Up to a point, this effort met with considerable success. An independent Washington
 
staff review in the Fall of 1966 found that "the Government had met or exceeded
 
the targets established as regards foreign exchange reserves, central bank credit
 
expansion, expansion of the means of payment, fiscal operations, and import liberali­
zation. In particular, balance of payments developments have been very favorable.
 
Only 15% of imports . . . are currently under license. Raw materials supplies have
 
been sufficient to make possible a business recovery. While tho cost of living
 
has risen by about 1/3 the amount of che devaluation, inflationary pressureF- appear
 
to have eased in recent months." On the other hand, "in areas where institutional
 
changes were required by the commitments ,nder the program loan . . . performance
 
was less satisfactory." These areas included development planning, agricultural
 
prices, public administration reform, and export promotion. "Coffee policy also
 
fell short of targets, in part because of a decline in external prices."
 
An important factor in the improving picture during the program loan year ending in
 
September was the victory of the National Front, led by incoming Liberal Party
 
President Carlos Lleras Restrepo, in the Spring elections. On March 20 the Front
 
rang up an unexpected 55% majority in the Congressional elections (although 60% of
 
eligible voters failed to go to the polls); in the Presidential election which
 
followed on May 1, Lleras scored an unprecedented 71% landslide. At the time, this
 
seemed to most obberve s a remarkably strong mandate, which l.eft the GOC in a
 
better position to act than at any time since 1958. However, some retrospective
 
political analyses have stressed the precariousness of Lleras' position vis a vis
 
Colombia's divergent political interest groups and his consequent need to build
 
popular support through nationalistic appeals. This, it is argued, explains much
 
of his subsequent behavior toward the aid agencies.
 
G. FY 1967: $100 million program loan 
Despite the favorable review it received up through the Fall of 1966, Colombia was
 
on the brink of yet another spectacular exchange crisis. As mentioned earlier, 
Colombia liberalized iti imports during 1966 substantially in excess of the degree 
required '- the prograr loan (the loan specified 50%, but actual liberalization 
exceedkA 80%). (Th- -aason for this high degree of liberalization is obscure; 
perhaps the most plausible hypothesis is that the GOC foresaw further liberalization 
as a likely condition of the next program loan and acted to avoid having the move
 
forced upon it.) In response to this liberalization, imports rose sharply in each
 
of the first three quarters of 1966, nearly doubling over the nine-month period as
 
a whole. When coffee prices dropped in the third and fourth quarters and Colombia
 
responded by trying to hold coffee off the world market, foreign exchange reserves
 
came under severe pressure. A U.S.-IMF-IERD meeting in July had partially foreseen
 
Lh&'.reserve squeeze but decided there was no need for extraordinary action provided
 
the U.S. and IMF were willing to extend new loans before the end of the year, as
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they then planned to do. By September, however, the situation was worsening and
 
speculative tendencies were building up. President Lleras, in a meeting with the 
Director, ruled out devalualin but offered two alternatives:A.I.D. Mission 
negotiation of new aid soon or rejimposition -)f direct import and exchange controls. 
The GOC requested accelerated negotiations and a $17 million first tranche on an 
advance commodity financing (ACF) basis. The hands were dealt in a poker game
 
which was to continue through the Fall. 
The game consisted of a complex series of moves, in which the IMF tried to bring 
the GOC to stave itabout devaluation with U.S. aud iTD support, while attempted 
using a 40-yearoff by obtaining additional financing. The U.S. said it opposed 
The COG was urged todevelopment loan to solve a short-term exchange problem. 
pursue other soiurces of finance: a possible loan from the Venezuelan central bank, 
conversion of bilateral trading balances into liquid exchange, a loan from Spain 
using Colombia's large trading balance as collateral, debt rollovers, loans from 
New York banks. 
The U.S. said that ACF and a rollover cf Colombia's gold loan from the Federa]. 
Reserve system were ruled out by the U.S. balance of payments problem. Colombia
 
achieve several of the solutions put forviard byin turn rejected or was unable to 
the U.S. New York banks gradually emerged as the most likely source of supple­
mentary financing but the banks, surprised and alarmed at the size of the separate 
loan reqaests imade by the COG and the Coffee Federation, imposed tough loan conditions, 
which the GOC finally rejected on November 11. 
Negotiations between the GOC and the aid agencies continued, with first the Fund
 
and then the Ban3k taking the lead. Several options on the timing and explicitness
 
but President Lleras, while recognizing the strength
of the devaluation were offered, 
of the technical. case for exchange rate adjustment, would make no commitment of any
 
kind. On November 29, in a surprisemove, Lleras went on television to denounce the
 
aid agencies for their "interference in Colombia's internal affairs." Once again,
 
aid relations had completely broken down.
 
Having demonstrated his independence and ability to withstand intense pressure (and
 
Lleras was fa,3ed, r.n the morning after,
increased his popularity in the process), 

not solved Colombia's fundamental foreign exchange problem.
with the fact that he had 

Under the circumstances, he moved with surprising speed to restore good relations
 
with the aid agencies. An IBRD team was invited down to analyze the situation, and
 
IMF negotiatorsits carefully worded critique was well received by the GOC,. 

returned and helped elaborate a embryonic Colombian proposal for a new exchange
 
system. The new system involved two rates, the lower of which would float upward
 
the other, thus allowing for substantial de facto devaluation.
toward unification with 
With the new system agreed upon, President Lleras still refused to commit himself
 
its Board meetingto a date for its installation. In desperation, the Fund scheduled 
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on the subject for March 22, saying that if the lower rate had not started moving
 
by then the meeting would be po3tponed. The rate did start to move in mid-March
 
and the new Stand-by was announced on schedule. With good GOC-IMF relations restored, 
A.I.D., too, resumed negotiations. A $100 million program loan was authorized
 
on May 2. The loan, which was signed on May 27, was very similar in structure to 
its immediate predecessor. There were four tranches, the first (of $40 million)
conditioned on the signing of a Stand-by agreement with the IMF and the last three ($;20 million each) to follow quarterly Parformance reviews. Specific policy 
conditions, including those incorporated by reference t. GOC letters to the IMF and 
IBRD, numbered 71. (However, to make the initial review held in July-August more 
manageable, it was agreed that certain ,,ubjects would be deferred for later 
consideration.)
 
The policies for which the U.S. was pushing in the 1967 loan were much the same as
 
in past years. Movement toward an equilibrium exchange rate coupled with a limp
promise to resune progress toward trade and payments liberalization (the GOC 
"calculated it will be possible gradually to introduce import liberalization to 
reach an amount equal to 20% of reimbursable import registrations") headed the list. 
Elimination of inflationary influences from monetary, fiscal, and coffee policies

ranked high. Export promotion, development planning, and agricultural and educa­
tional reform were also included, as in past years. A new feature was that U.S. 
export additionality was explicitly mentioned in the loan agreement: commercial 
imports from the U.S. in any three-month period were not to be "substantially less 
than the recent historical ratio."
 
The first quarterly review, which covered the second quarter of 1967, gave the GOC
 
generally high marks in the areas it covered. Minor difficulties were identified
 
in some fields but no explicit loan conditions were missed. The second review took
 
place in November. It, too, revealed generally strong performance. Indeed, the
 
foreign exchange reserve picture had improved so much that A.I.D. and the IBRD urged
 
that the import liberalization target be raised about 20%. The GOG rejected an
 
increase in the target, but promised to attain the 20% level by March 31, "1968. The
 
Bank and A.I.D. replied that import liberalization would be a major issue in 1968.
 
The final review under the 1967 loan dealt with the fourth quarter of the calendar 
year and was held in February, 1968. Like its predecessor, it concluded that
 
Colombian performance on the great majority of the 71 policy issues was satisfactory.

There was, however, one black spot. The U.S. share in commercial imports had fallen
 
from the historical figure of 39% to only 21% in the fourth quarter. Weighing GOC
 
promises to take corrective action, the Mission recommended release of the tranche.
 
Washington pondered, waited for January and February trade data, and finally, in
 
late March, authorized release of the tranche.
 
Meanwhile, though,another cloud was gathering. The GOC had been stalling on the 20% 
import liberalization promised for March 31. As the deadline neared, negotiations
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on 1968 program and agricultural sector loans and a new IMF Stand-by were underway.
 
On March 19 the GOC startled the donors by announcing that it could not go through 
with the liberalization until the fourth tranche was released and the new Stand-by 
signed. Washington immediately withdrew its authorization for release of the
 
fourth tranche. 
H. FLJ L.A8 million program loan: $15 million agricultural sector loan 
A2" ough the U.S. took the position that it could not sign new loans while Colombia 
remained ineligible for the final tranche of the FY 1967 program loan, negotiations 
were never broken off. Bad feeling had been created, however, and progress came 
slowly. The GOC shied away from explicit commitments on exchange rate flexibility, 
import liberalization beyond 20%, incentives for minor exports, and improved tax 
administration. Lleras personally expressed a strong distaste for specific, 
arithmetic, rigid targets and dates, Nevertheless, after the GOC came through with 
its promised liberalization in April and the fourth tranche was released, negotia­
tion of the two new loans--for $58 million and $15 million respectively--was
 
successfully completed.
 
In the light of Colombia's dramatic history with program loans, it is interesting
 
to examine the latest such agreement. It is generally similar in structure to the
 
1966 and 1967 loans, though simpler and less ambitious in some respects. The loan
 
is to cover a nine-month period (the last three quarters of CY 1968). It is in
 
two tranches, $35 million to be released upon satisfaction of legal conditions
 
precedent and the remaining $23 million conditioned on a review of performance
 
Lhrough September. A total of $12 million is rjserved for imports of capital goods. 
The policy areas covered are foreign exchange and trade policies, additionality,
 
monetary policies, fiscal policies, coffee, industrialization, and unemployment.
 
On several of the points which have betLa most sensitive in the past, wording in the
 
1968 letters to tne fl4F and IBRD is noticeably looser than in the past two years.
 
This is particularly true with respect to depreciation and unification of the
 
exchange rate, export incentives, and arrears in foreign payments. (While outlining
 
the principles of its exchange rate policy oral2y, the GOC has scrupulously avoided
 
committing itself to any specific rate of depreciation.) There is no fixed target
 
for trade liberalization, although the GOC does agree either to liberalize imports
 
or to increase import registrations by an amount equal to the margin by which coffee
 
exports exceed the predicted figure of $5.5 million. On the other hand, U.S. export
 
additionality is much more prominent than in the past. The GOC pledges itself to a
 
number of specific measures to help maintain the historical market share of the U.S.
 
Agriculture and education have been taken out of the program loan and isolated for
 
separate treatment. No education sector loan has yet been signed. In the FY 1968 
agriculture sector loan the "LA system" is applied to a single sector. The loan has 
two tranches. Release of the second ($7 million) is conditioned on a review of per­
formance through September. Nine tightly-specified performance commitments are listed.
 
In all, they appear to constitute a somewhat more complete specification of desirable
 
agricultural policy than was made in earlier program loans. 
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III. THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES 
A. Did A.I.D. try to use the proram loan to influence olicy?
 
The FY 1962 Contingency Fund loan was ob-.iously processed in a hurry. It does not 
seem to have carried any meaningful policy conditions. However, A.I.D.'s second 
program loan, in Fl 1963, clearly grew out of an Alliance-kindled interest in 
development plans and policies. The first of its two tranches was conditioned on 
the December 1962 devaluation and exchange reform. Its second tranche was supposed 
to be tied to completion of the follow-up actions necessary to make the devaluation 
stick (essentially, new taxes and temperate monetary policy). GOC performance on 
the actions specified was mixed, but the worst damage was done by actions in an 
area not covered by the loan's policy conditions--wage increases for private and 
public sector employees. One gets the impression that after tLi experience a 
conscious decigioin was made to be much more careful and comprehensive in specifying 
loan conditions. From FY 1964 on an increasingly serious effort was made to exert
 
leverage in an increasing number of fields.
 
FY 1964 program loan funds were split into two separate loans precisely because of 
this determination to improve GOC policies. The first loan, of $15 million, set
 
relatively easy condi' ions, since these were all tha could be obtained on the eve
 
of Congressional elections. The second loan, of $45 million, was negotiated at a
 
time of rising coffee prices and represented an attempt to ensre efficient use of
 
the additional resources being generated. It was the first attempt at a comprehen­
sive policy framework. The attempt was abortive, however, since the wrong policy
 
prescription may have been written and GOG policy progressively deteriorated durirg
 
CY 1964 in any case. This lead to the exchange crisis in December, the unsuccessful
 
attempt of the aid agencies to bring about devaluation, and the break in aid relations^
 
When the GOC finally pulled itself together in late 1965, negotiations were resumed 
and eventually consuimated in the $65 million FY 1966 loan. This loan and its $100 
million successor in FY 1967 represent highly ambitious attempts to specify a policy 
'ramework for Colombia, embracing not only stabilization but also growth, not just 
aggregate policies but also considerable sectoral detal. The FY 1968 loan continues 
this policy emphasis, although it represents a partial retreat in terms of amount 
of action required of the GOC as a condition of the loan. 
There can be no question about whether the U.S. had tried to influence policy in 
Colombia in recent years. For better or worse, we have chosen Colombia as the 
recipient of si-eable development resources anu have deeply involved ourselves in 
her development policies. In close coordination with the IMF and in virtual lock­
s :.p with the IRRP we have generated and tried to bring about proposed policy
 
changes in virtually every subject with an important relationship to development. 
B. Did Colombia nerform?
 
How well have the Colombians lived up to the c6n~eption we and our Bank and Fund 
allies have had of what constituted desirable Colombian performance? The record
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here is an intriguing mixture of short-term performance and the seemingly inevitable 
persistence of major problems in the longer run. 
As already noted, the 1Y 1963 and 1964 loans were pretty clear-cut failures from the
 
leverage point of view. Much of the letter and all of the spirit of the FY 1963 
loan were violated. The FY 1964 loan conditions did not fare much better.
 
Performan e under the IY 1966 and 1967 loans, which represent our most earnest 
attempts to obtain influence in Colombia, is more difficult to judge. In both cases, 
the multitudinous policy cond'.tions specified, many of them ery firmly, were consci­
entiously reviewed and reported on each quarter. These reviews were honest, 
searching, and competent. By and large, they are a record of conditions met. 
An analysis of the thrvee performance reviews under the FY 1966 loan reveals that an 
average of 84% of the loan's 73 separate policy undertakings were reviewed each 
quarter (not counting conditions which were irnelevant to a particular quarter's 
revieu). There were 174 individual instances of commitments being reviewed. My own 
analysis of these instances yields a score of !16 coimnitments clearly met, 23 reviews 
coimnitments clearly missed, and 35 outcomes ambiguous. Thus 6?% of the individual 
reviews found acceptable performance, and only 13% clearly unacceptable performance 
Of course, this takes no account of the relative importance of the various commitments. 
A similar analysis of the FY 1967 loan, which had 71 separate policy conditions, 
shows a somewhat lower degree of diligence (71%) in reviewing the conditions specified 
in the loan agreement and supporting docaments. However, the review findings were
 
even more consistently favorable: there were 97 instances in which conditions
 
specified were clearly met, only 6 in w-hich they were not, and 33 in which perfor­
mance was questionable but not clearly unsatisfactory. Thus 71% of the individual 
revieas revealed acceptable performance, and only 4% clearly unacceptable parformilance. 
Contrasting glaringly with these apparently strong records of performance commitments
 
met are the exchange crisis which marred the end of 1966 and the furor early this 
year over nonattainment of the import liberalization and additionality conditions. 
Two years in a rov, generally positive findings of searching reviews were immediately 
follow-d by crisis. This is a phenomenon which challenges the whole loan conditioning 
procL-.s as it has been applied in Colombia. It must be explained.
 
In late 1966 the GOC had the problem of adjusting to the return of coffee prices
 
to their previous level from a temporarily higher plateau. The GOC had been unable 
to discipline itself and its people to bring off this kind of transition in The past 
and, despite high U.S. hopes for the Lleras government, it proved unable to do it in 
1966. It greatly complicated the problem by liberalizing imports at a reckless rate, 
in advance of assured means of finance. Once in a tight foreign exchange bind, it 
sought additional foreign financing to pull itself out. The aid agencies, while 
r1Q7> 
open minded about dates and forms, insisted on significant exchange rate adjustment
 
as the sine qua non of further Aid. President Lleras not only rejected this
 
condition on political grounds but strenuously objected to all such conditioning on 
grounds of principle. One searches in vain for signs that overly rigid b3rgaining 
poitions or faulty com iunications contributed significantly to the November blow­
up. Soon afterw-ds the i3 agpenei(s won their point on exchange rate adjustment 
(JLhough not without reaxgarrd actions by the GOC), but they had suffered serious 
losses (so far unremedied) with regard to import liberalization, exchange decontrol, 
and--most important of all--the C]C's receptivity to aid conditioning in general.
 
Yet it is not evident tht the aid agencies could have avoided the crisis without
 
abandoning their basic condition for future aid.
 
Again -1- 1968 there was erratic behavior by the COC. It procrastinated its commit­
" 

ment to liberalize 20% of its imports until late in the program loan year, by which 
tire uncertain finanring prospects made it balk at taking the sten. Nevertheless, 
it must be reiterated that the GOC performed very well on the overwhelirLin, majority 
the initial cause of delay ofof the conditions set it..the '1967 loan. foreover, 

the fourth tranclhe was not liberalization bt addltionality, Although additionality
 
had been stressed in earlier reviews it is not ,obvious that the GOC could have
 
known it co-ld constitute grounds for ncniease of a tronche. Indeed, the U. S.
 
Govarnment s'eems to have bel.atadly increased the weight assigned to this factor,
 
pa-rtly as a result of Tr:a ury-Cornrerce pressure on State.-AoI.D. and pa.'tly qo as
 
to use the aditionti.lity question as a means of gaining time for the outcome on
 
liberaiization (which cleriy was an important issue) to become celrified. Thus the
 
,U.S. does seem to have changed the rules on the GOC after the fact. To the extent
 
that Colomba's failure to liberalize was a. reaction to nonrelease of the tranc),e
 
over the additlonality question, this contribuled to the crisis. After the
 
Colombians abrogated their liberalization promise the U.S. was clearly right in 
its refusal to release the tranche, since giving way on this key issue wo.ld probably 
have destroye. the capacity to exert leverage in the future. 
There A'., h.'ever, a ,1ore fundamental sense in which Colombian performance over 
the prco a Loan ;er:oO should be tested. This is the question of significance, or 
ultimu.te e-fectiveness did the principal economic and social va.riables A.I.D. was 
trying to nirilu.,,e through progrm loan leverage show any tendency tc move in the 
desire drections 
The principal. policy objectives pursued through program loan leceragc have be,6n
 
Quite stable over the period studied, They -an be stated as.
 
1) Attainment of price stability at an equilibrium exchange rate 
and an adequate level of investment.
 
2) Lessening of the foreign exchange constraint on growth thurough 
promotion of non-coffee exports.
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3) Agricultural modernization and div:ersification.
 
4) Major reform and improvement of education.
 
While I cannot claim to pass conclusive judgements, there does seem
 
to have been some l .ited progress toward these important goals. 
1) There has been discernible, though not yet decisive, improvement in the
 
indicators of economic stability. inflation remained substantial early in the 
program loan period, but price increases in recent years (and especially in 1967) 
have been within the tolerable range. There has been considerable success in 
devising a:n exchange system which keeps internal inflation from leading to pro­
gressive exchange rate overvaluation and diminished export inct.ntives. Thf; GOC 
has ac;epted the principle that the eaxchatnge rdte shoild move in general f3tep 
with internal prices, but has refusJed to make commitments regk,-rding the ,;peed 
and mechanics of this adjustment. A key to the inflationary problem has long 
been the GCOC's poor domestic revenue performance, averaging 7-- % of GNP, well 
below most other countries at a similar income level and among the lowot in 
Latin America. Revenue growth lagged behind GO grcvth throug h 1965, but in 
1966 and 1967 striking improvement was effected, ith the share of GP collected 
reaching 9% for the first time in a decade and raal revenues rising charply
 
above their p:evious plateau. Considerable progress has been made in raising
 
government capital expenditures. Long extremely low, these more than doubled 
between 1963 and 1967. The level of total investment remained stagnant, though
 
relatively high ('16 8.i. of GNP), tLrough 1967. 
2) 111no- exports (all exports other than coffee ard petroleum) were stagnant 
through 1964. In each yew- thereafter, however, gains have been recorded.
 
Although these gains have nearly doubled the value of minor exports, coffee
 
still acoiuts for more than 60% of coiamodity export receipto and development 
of significant alternative sources of earned fireign exchange will inevitably
 
take a long ti1me. 
3) Some promising departures have been made in agricultural modernization,
 
a field in which the GOC is regarded as ore of the better Latin, American performers. 
Land reform is underway but stil in its early stages. So far, however, the 
growth rate of agricultural output has remained low. 
4.) There has been substantial quantitative growth in the educationa! 
system, but the kinds of qualitative reforms and impr-vements we have been 
pushing for seem generally not to have been made yet. 
In summary, then, the -ecord of ultimate per.1formance is mixed. There are achievements 
to point toi in all. major fields, but there are also important things which have not 
Yet happened. Moreover, some of the improvements just cited are so recent that one
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wonders whether they will be sustained, especially since the problem of maintaining 
development momentum has defeated the '.,lombians in the past. In any case, 
Colombia has not yet maide a decisive hreiikthrough to a sustainable high growth 
path. Although on balan,e the judgement is positive, Colombia cannot yet be 
pronounced a clear-cut success for program loan leverage. 
C. Did A .jinf!ugnce )Ijc ? 
Can the positive, hcpef! tnings that did happell in the areas A.I.D. was interested 
in during the 1962-68 period be attributed to ouxc interest and attempt to use aid 
conditioning to bring them about? Or would they have happened anyrway, even if we bad not tried to lev- r the GO" into doing them? 
One can never answer such questions conclus vely. Howeverfit- ;cpossible to point 
o a nixmber of specific things that. were done eIter we ecpreiid conoiderable 
interost in them, and in sor.e cases visibly Yortad k sue. In such cos, it is 
a reasonably safe bet that leverage was achieved A partial list of such cases in 
the pas.t two years includes the following: 
1) The new exchange rate -ystemdevised in early 1967. 
2) The set of incentives to increase minor exports. 
3) Improvement in the finances of the Coffee Federation. 
4) Improved procedures for processing private foreign investment. 
5) The pilot plan for agricultural diversification. 
6) The enlarged public investme-nt program. 
D. Can A.I.D.'s Influence be attriblited secificalyo to thep o__loan? 
It has already been noted that the U.S. has taken a deep interest in (U 1ombian 
devwlopment, and that we have worked in close cooperation with the ITRD a;nf Ih. 
A.I.D., the Bank, and the Fund have all been the origin of important ideas about 
Colombian development policy. The ideas of the three aid agencies have generally 
been hw-mcnlzed with each other in a genuine interhzange of intellectual equals. As 
in other countries, the U.S. has p eferred to allow the Pank and Fund to 
be the main salesmen of ideas to the Colombians, with the U.S. simply conditioning 
its aid en Golombian agreement with the international agencies. The importance of' 
the FY-nd and Bank roles in Colombia has derived partly from their role as founts ot 
policy wisdom and partly from their own possession of sigrificant resources which 
they can provide or ithhold at will-. The IBPD also draws influence from its 
responsibility for assessing Colombian: performace prior to meetings of the Consulta­
tive Group. However, their powerhas been en6r'Mously enhanced by the support given
 
them by the dominant donor, the United States. 
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The major occasions for the exercise of leverage in Colombia have been negotiations
 
for A.I.D. program loans and IF Stand-bys. In recent years these two negotiations
 
have been carefully timed by the donors so that they become in effect one negotia­
tion. These annual negotiations write the scenario for the more frequent and 
detailed discussions which take place through the quarterly performance reviews.
 
Thus, the U.S.-Colombian aid relation has been so structured that leverage fccLses 
on the prograv loan instrument, The main sanctions for nonperformance are withheld 
tranches and non-negotiated new loans, although simple delays--sometimes allegedly 
for nonsubstantivw reasons--have also been used to exert pressure. 
Program loans 'ave by no means been the dominant form , f aid in quantitative terms 
(they am'cint tc 31' of gKioss obligations by the U.S. and multilateral bodies in 
FYs 196.2-67 inclusive). However, little effort seems to have been made to influence 
policy through other formo of aid, such as A.I.D., IDB, and IPRD project loans. 
Progrm loans and Stand-bys have apparently been thought of as the principal, if not 
sole, vehicl-z for influence. Beginning in IY 1968, sector loans must be added to 
the list. 
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IV. DETUFINANTS OF INFLUENCE 
A number of hypotheses have been put forth about factors which may affect whether 
we influence policy ijitn program loans when we try to do so. These hypotheses can 
only be tested against comparative experience in several countries (if then), but 
some do emerge as possibly relevant from study of tLe Colombian experience alone. 
A. The Conditionin.vS.tem 
1o M, iitzis find speQifJitv o Colombia is an example 
ox' highly specific ie.n conditions. This has meant that when perforimance is reviewed 
there is usmlly no question whether or not a given condition was met. This is no 
doubt a good thing. However, it leaves at least two major problems. One Is maintaining 
the relevance of specific policy .onditions. A target vhich was reasonable at one 
assumed level of coffeu prices may become quite ireasonable if the price nssunpDtion 
turns out to be far off. The 1968 agreement tries to get around this problecu by 
requiring additional liberalization or import registrations if coffee receipts 
exceed a specified amont. The other problem is that while performance on particular 
conditions is fairly unamblguous the weights that should be applied in reaching an 
overall smimary judgerment ax-e by no means clear. in a Colombia-style agreement, 
featuring a lrge number of conditions, there is almost, al.ways at least one condition 
on which performance is demonstrably unsatisfactory. This means that there is almost
always *so weighting system which would produce an overall negative judgement. 
Generally, both sides agree on w.hich are the sLnjor issues, but speciicity on partic­
ular conditions does not guarantee this. It is sometimes argued that under the 
"LA system" everyone knows what the program is and just what hes to be done to earn 
the next tranche, but this is not always so--vitness the nonrelease of the fourth 
tranche of the. FY 1967 loan early this year. 
2. Enforcement. Does Colombian experience shed any light on the hypothesis 
that it is not the conditions themselves but the integrity irith which they arr, 
enforced that really matters? Embassy/Misaion leanings have usurally been toward 
toleration and rationalization of Colombian perfoinance. There has been no instance 
in which the field recommended withholding a tranche. The Washington attitude, 
originally also easy-going, hardened considerably during the period studied. 
Washington's stringent interpretation of perfor aa.nce conditions seems to have bee., an 
essential element in whatever policy influence A.!.D. has l-ad in Colombia.
 
3. Number of conditions. Tt seems obvious to me that there is an optimal 
numbar of loan conditions and that the FY 1966 and 1967 loans exceeded it. A very 
large ntu.ber of conditions strains staff capabilities on both sides, at both the 
negctiation and the review stages. It also compounds the ambiguiJ.ty referred to 
,earlIev. It is doubtful that A.I.D. can use one loan to maintain 
credible leverage over more than a few conditions at any one time. The other items 
listed are there either for window dressing (the host goverument empects to do them 
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anyway and both sides agree that they will look good in the agreement) or for bluff
 
(the aid agencies want something done but are not willing to npill blood to get it 
done). In the latter case, the real oojective of the aid agencies may really be 
simply to legitimatize future discussion of an issue and keep the door open to 
the possibility that it can be scla to the host government through persuasion alone. 
This objective is a creditable one, but saich conditions must be clearly distinguished
 
from genuine fighting issues if we are to exert influence on the latter.
 
for large nuimbers of issues is the need to be ccmprehen-Another legitimate motive 
sive Jn some policy areas. For example, stabilization requires an integrated set
 
is to be successful. The
of fiscal, monetary, and exchang. rate policie 
, 
-'f it 
fact that in Colombia we iere continuously interested in stabilization, among other
 
things, required a certain multiplicity of conditions. But the number could have
 
been much smaller than it was with no loss--almost certainly a gain--in influence.
 
the last 	few years,4. A-reas in which conditions were _2peCfid. In 	
as 
policy conditions were extended beyond the macroeconomic stabilization-cum-growth
 
sphere into institutional and sectoral policies, there has been a discernible
 
The demands on the I-lission staff
decline in the effectiveness of aid conditioning. 
later review policies for particular sectorsarising from the need to formulate and 
to allow a careful job to be done in all areas.and institutions proved too great 
the two sectors which were given most attention,Even agriculture and education, 
share of 	the review time. Moreover, performance on policyreceived 	only a small 
in these areas tended to be wack, in part, perhaps, becuase everyoneuonditions 

understood that the ultimate sanction of withholding a tranche release would never
 
these relatively minor conditions. This,
be invoked becaase of nonperformance on 
however, 	is less a function of the area in which conditions are specified than 
of
 
the large number cf conditions specified and the fact that when there are many 
I see no

conditions some must inevitably be taken less seriously than others. 

U.S. could not have made agricultural modernization, say, the most reason -ihy the 
not saying we should have).important set of conditions if it had chosen to do so (I am 
Colombia 	dces lend some credence to tIe5. Hsiatioi tlouzh time. 
costs of 	exerting Lieerage can cumlate thr-ough time,hypothesis that the political 
of negotia­
making it increasingly difficlult to obtain results in successive rounds impose tough,tion and 	 review. Particularly in 1966 and 1967, A.I.D. tried to 

conditions on the CCG. Despite considerable performance on the 'tems
specific 
flare-ups and considerable hurt feelingsspecified, this attempt did lead to serioLs 
noticeably greater difficulty in negotiating performance conditions
 
-as well as 

in 1968. 
doubt that the aid agencies are now on the defensive in Colombia. There
 There is nc 

are fewer conditions in tht; current program loan and those that remain are less
 
specific. Reviews are to. be less frequent. In general, there is less consensus
 
between the GOC and the agencies about what constitutes a desirable development program. 
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The criteria for fund release decisions are thus becoming more unilateral aftertwo years of detailed ilateral ag'eeme nt. clearlyThis constitutes a retreat fromthe idealized LA model of aid conditioning. It does not necessarily mean that
 program lending will lose its effecti'reness as a tool for influencing policy,
however, because this depends on how A.I.D. respond-
 to any emergence of inadequate

Colombian performance in the future. 
B. The Loan
 
I. ari. e. The level of program lending to Colombia, on a twelve­
month basis, has run at $60 million in FYs 1963 and '1964, $65 million in FY 1966,$80 million in FY 1967, and $78 mil-lion in FY 1968 ($93 million if the sector loanis included). Nominally, the level was determined each year using balance ofpa~nentks gap analysis. Actually, of course, a nmber of other factors alsowereinfluential including Treasury and reluctanceEOB to see US. assistance toColoimbia ri;e. The only change in aid level that was related to perforrmnce
conditions wao the FY 1967 rise, which was intended to help finance a major program
of import liberalization. As has been seen, the 90C not only responded but over­
responded, thus helping to bring on the late-1966 foreign exchange crisis. 
2. Trends in loan size. The loan level has been rising slowly in the
past three years. These have been years of significant but uneven and interrupted
progress. However, Colombian e:qperience appears to tell us nothing about 
the rela­tive efficacy of rising or falling aid levels for obtairing influence. 
C. Environmental Influences 
1. International ,olltics. General diplomatic developments have had littleimpact on the U.S.-Colombian aid -eationship. commercialU.S. interests have had 
an increasingfly important negative influence,, since the O.S. has increasingly

sacrificed development objectives in Colombia for export additionality. 
2. Naton! l nolLtics. Colombia's unique political system makes thegovernment in power more secure but aJ.so less powerful than governments in mostLDCs. With its biennial elections to Congress and its giarantee of a new President 
every 4 years, it is also destructive of continuity. As in the U.S., there havebeen numerous cases in which the administration has been unable to get action it
sincerely wants Congress. relativethrough The security of an administration for
the duration of its term, on the other hand, may lessen its vulnerability to charges
of having sold out to the North mericans (although the for~aula which allows most
commitments to be made ostensibly to the IMF or IBRD no doubt helps reduce the painfor the GOC). The frequency of elections is particularly harmful. If elections areheld every other year and distasteful decisions (e.g. on stabilization) are avoided
during the year preceding an election, then tough measures are ruled out during halfthe time. The kind oL" determined, sustained multi-year effort -that is needed to
solve most development problems is exceedingly hard to get.
 
, ONFIDENTIAL 
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the IMF, and the IBRD3. Multilateralism. As already noted, the U.S., this partnershiphave had a close and fruitful partnership in Colombia. No doubt 
strictly bilateral operation would have has been markedly more effective than a 
been, especially in terms of ability to devise sensible policies and sell 
them to
 
muscle the partnership has comeColombians at minimum diplomatic cost. The in by all three 
rom A.I.D. and the 14F, while intellect has been providedmainly 
parties. 
D. Personal Touches 
style makes enormous demands on the MissionLoan conditioning in the Colombian 
To do it well is even more demanding. Although some of
 Director and his s!taff. 

an effective operation to influencethe work can be shifted to the IBRD and MF, 
broad a scale probably requires a strong Director and a full-time
 policy on so 

one or two economistsfour or five. A Mission with onlyeconomic staff of perhaps 
to work on program loan conditions would clearly have to employ a more modest 
system.
 
V. 0011CLUSIONS 
In summar:, Colombia provides an example of a serious multilateral attempt 
to affect
 
development policies, using A.I.D. program loans as a principal focus of 
influence.
 
The conditioning system used started out loose, reached a high degree of tightness
 
effects of leveragein FYs 1966 and 1967, and was partially rel xed in FY 1968. The 

easily traced. Disturbing elements 
on several important areas of policy arc in 
(I) the frequency of crises, (2) an apparent tendency for resistance
 the picture are 

to aid conditioning in general to bLild up through time, and (3) the failure of 
so far, to become an outstanding develcpmeant performer, despite high aid
 Colombia, 

on policy. Obviously the real making orlevels and significant donor influence 

breaking of the influence exercise still lies in the future.
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PROGRAM LOAN STUDY: INDIA*
 
I. INTRODUCTION
 
Since 1962, the United States and other members of the India Consortium
have increasingly emphasized non-project assistance. 
Coincident with
this movement there has been growing pressure exerted on the GOI to
institute reforms and change 
--
priorities to give primary attention to
agriculture, liberalize imports, free up controls of the domestic economy,
promote exports, encourage private foreign investment (particularly in
the fertilizer industry), and promote family planning. This influence hasbeen exerted both bilaterally and multilaterally with the IBRD as
Chairman of the Consortium playing a pivotal role. Influence was
relatively low key until about 1964-65. 
After the India-Pakistan War,
far more pressure was exerted on the GOI to introduce new policy measures.At the same time, the wa.r itself, two consecutive droughts and uncertain­ties about future aid, made it more 
 obvious to the Indian government thatits economic policies needed a significant change.
 
Program assistance has been the major portion of the A.I.D. program in
recent years. It averaged about $225 million from 1961-62 to 1964-65 in
terms of comnnitments to Indian fiscal years (IFY's) which are April toMarch. There was a low of $50 million in IFY 1965-66 following the India-Pakistan war. Coimmitments rose to $382 million in 1966-67 and amounted to$275 million in 1967-68 comprising more than 85% of total A.I.D. commitments.The level dropped to $217 million in IFY 1968-69. DL project assistance 
has steadily declined. 
lhe U.S. has used program loans for bilateral leverage on Indian economicpolicies in an informaol unstructured way. U.S. recommended policies ortargets have not been linked up specifically to the loans as conditionsprecedent, except for some fertilizer matching requirements; and tranche
releases have not been cycled to formal reviews or target achievements.
Leverage has taken the form of a "continuing dialogue" with GOI officials;
program loan releases have been related to performance implicitly, not 
explic ity. 
Art important 
source of bilateral U.S. leverage, primarily on Indian
agriculture policies and programs, has been the negotiation of PL-480Tltie I sales agreements. PL-480 sales have consistently run at a levelhigher than the program loans, averaging over $230 million (country uses)between 1961 and 
in 
1964, and peaking at $548 million in 1966. Beginning1965 when a four-year PL-480 commitment expired, agreements were signed
for only a one to three months supply of food grains, so that the U.S.could maintain a continuing watch on Indian agricultural policies.
Leverage here has been more explicitly tied to the aid instrument, and
often quatitative targets have been negotiated for e.g. tonnage of 
fertilizer to be Jistributed, acreage to be planted with new seed
 
* Research completed in Februar,- 3969. 
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with minor irrigation facilities. Invarieties, and land to be provided 
terms of Indianthe agreements themselves, targets would be stated in 
there would be more specific condi­self-help actions planned. Sometimes 
in side letters or minutes. We have held up authorizationstions contained 
for PL-480 sales. This has induced the GOI to take actions it might not
 
otherwise ha-ve tr-kerL. 
Much of the conditioning of non-project assistance (excluding 	PL-480) from 
both directlythe U.S. and other Consortiwn members has come from the IBRD, 
to take the lead.and through the Consortium. The U.S. has wated the Bank 

In the spring of 1966, IBRD negotiations with the Indians were rigorous.
 
There was particular emphasis on import liberalization, an area of
 
primary U.S. concern, and agriculture. Other areas covered were export 
promotion, decontrol. of industry, encouragement of private foreign irvest­
ment and family planning. Some target dates were set fcr the coming yeax; 
others relatel to the end of' the Fourth Five Year 	Plan (1971). Discussions
 
about the exchange rate -­were also held with the IMF at that time 
basis fur' the top priority import liberalizationdevaluation was to be the 
program. After these discussions, and an Indian commitment to a new 
economic reform program, the Consortium members agreed to try to supply 
was$900 million in non-project assitance which 'the Bank estimated 
members further promised high levels inrequired for that fiscal year. The 
the future, contingent on the 00O1's carrying through the: program -- and to 
iBflD and the Consortium reviewed Indian executionenable it to do so. The 
of the policies discussed in the spring 1966 YBRD--India meetings over the 
next few years and made further commitments of non-project assistice on 
the basis of Indian progress -rnd need. The U.S. did provide about 42% of 
now. Since the U.S.this as.sistance each year; the percentage is less 
has been the largest single donor, it has played an important role in 
the Indian policy changes which the IBRD would emphasize.determining 

It is impossible to distinguish clearly which Indian policies haie been
 
GOI and which have resulted from U.S., Consortium or
initiated by thc 

!BRD leverage. A slow process of Jersuasion has taken place, not leverage
 
loans or donors. The total volume of non-project
clearly linked to given 
import liberalize i;;lonassistance enabled the GOI to proceed with 
and increase inputs into agriculture, two areas of primary concern to the 
aid donors.
 
II. CIONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF INDIA1 RXDPETRhNCE 
Pre-FY 1962. India received non-project loans from the inception
 
million, butof the DLF in 1958. Individual loans ranged from 	$10 to $40 

a year. There was a
there were frequently more than one signed during 
relatively large technical assistance program, averaging about $20 million
 
India also received
 per year, and a considerable amount of project aid. 

a large amount of PL-480 assistance, lon-project loans were not conditioned
 
in this period.
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if 1962. With the commencement of A.I.D. and the program Loan 
concept in U.S. ?Y 1962, the level of progran assistance was increased 
substantially. The higher level- was to increase the utilization of 
existing Indian capacity. The first large progroin loan was signed in 
June 1962, following an earlier DLF 'on-r-.oject loan of $20 million. It 
- ] ie
was for $200 million, and fulfilled n ear r U. . commitment of '1220 
million for IFY 1962-63 ajde at a Maiy Consortium meeting. (The Consortiun 
ras formed in Ai'gust 195r'- ) No reforms or other measures were linked 
with the loan. A Iran paper discussed Indian seif-help measures planned 
for the Third Five Yer PlFan period, April 1961 to March I96(6. These 
included an increase in the role of investment a a proportion of national 
income, self-ufficiency in food .a.rin: expan s:ion of basi.Le irndustries 
like 	stel, fuel and porer, continued maintenance of reasonable price 
stabililty, increased t.,xittion, and expanded employment . India, with 
five year development plan.s;, art organized tax system, monetary controls, 
and land reform, was con.idered to well .'head of Sost fb lh.e developing 
cotutries to which we were giving assistacre Tre Io n was justified on 
the grounds that commodity assistance wa5 '- to Iuj '- quipment 
to mintain projects ic, fndln. ;-.daexisting capital 3uLr;r'e 
ccmprehensive economic plan,, thie ,)oammoit .t, -uld !!), '' i e:mhl y 
rationall.y al].ocated. Through the (Co-L t i, 'her donoescr.zirted about 
$210 million in non-project assitance tiat y:o the tota. Cor. ortiwn 
aid commitment was 31, 2)5 million, Ther is :o evidenc. t.h th 
Consortium at this tine ,pressured t ,,e into tak.i, 'c .fc self­indiains 
help mensures to .]ua].liy for th assistance 
FY Phe -, prur!Rm si'To6ed Feb-eu.ary.210 mi.l ion 	 ineTi loan 	 1963 was 
part of a U.S. Conslortium c'mmitnert for 3265 idi.ion of ron-project 
assistnxce - .the re.-t wa .upplied by an E,-,im ].oan of August 1962. The 
total 	U.S. Con:sortiuin commitment was $3115 i.i.ion for IPF 1962-63. &ther 
Consortium members contributed abo.t ;ip.Omillion of non-.project assist­
ance out of a total of "I].,6,1-) million. 
Conditions were not attached to the U.S. progrm loan, We wanted to try 
to maintain the momentum of the Third Plan which had fal.len behind schedule 
"and had been further jeopardized by the October 1.962 Chinese attack. A 
CASS written about the time the loan was signed stated we had initiated 
discu:_:ss ions with the GOi to indicate the tyes of changes in Indian 
policies" th.a-t ve aad other don,.rs felt were necessary to bring about the 
optimri usae of al.d, and that we would "urge the IBRD to play the leading 
role in providing cotinuing expert advice to the 7JI in its analysis of' 
its eco'nomie vroblems ." Basic U.S. strategy was said to involve 
* 	 . . using our ai.d .,rograin to .infi.ence Indian 
policies and gearing the kinds ancminourts of 
our aid t) Irtdia',; ecbnomic iTerforirtnce. The 
tend)ency ,'f the ]indians to tll for more 
assistance .o overcome their di f iculties 
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should be countered by eressume from the U.S. and 
other friendly countries for improved. performance 
by India It recoxgnized that there willitself. !:-; 
be limit:; set by Center-State relatiornships, 
political opposition, resistance to change€ , economic 
comp.clxities5, and the dangerS of prCVowJk;.ng. chi:-,ejs 
of interference or rther unfavorabLe reactions." 
we poinYt in i general what to be done. We 
did not propose to (-give the GOT detariled advice on a..l pjblems, We said 
at that t.ime however, that we would consider whi).e de'vecloping a Long Range 
Assistanice "trategy paper "whether it :7-necessary to require positive 
action toward chanfrin( Indian eeoromic po>].lcy as ,3.condition to our aid", 
and that"fature PL-480 sales should be use( as.- the occasion for riegotia-
We stated would out -. way needed 
tion of improved policies particular y for taricultura development" 
FY 1964. In the fall of I.96' the GOI imde a revl.ew of progress and 
exis t,--d in agriculture.shortcomings under the Plan. otabl.e shortcomings 
and p1antIrrigation, use of improved seed ferti.lizerCc onsMIption 
of major public sectorprotection were all far below forecasts. The cost 
projects had increased substantially. Grorirth inhibiting controls over 
There were some brightprivate investment, prices and imports were ra)mipant. 
aspects. Power, coal and transportation targe'ts of the plan were czweeded; 
governirient revenues and the balance of payments had t!cken a turn for the 
more determined to tackle adminis;trative and manage­better. The GOi was 
ment aspects of plan implementation and had set up study committees to 
see how this could be doiie. In December the GCOTIannounced the termination 
size ofof price controls,, on 16 items, and ra:ised the ceiling on the 
firms which would be exempt from industrial licensing from $210,000 to 
$525,000 (at fls hi.Y6 per $]). 
A $225 million U.S. program loa was authorized in January and signed in 
February 1964 to assist the GOI in the Third Year of the "an. It was 
of $499 million in non-pi )ject assistance.part of a Con-sortium commitment 
The total Consortim commitment for that year was $1,052 mu.ion. The 
loan paper for the $225 million loan sumarized the U.S. position on 
conditioning as of that time. It stated: 
"Dining the last year thtere has been some widening and 
opening up of the averues of discussion with the 
Government of India on questions of economic policy. 
This has not waited for the negotiation of the program 
loan. The determination of the total annual aid level, 
preparations for the meetings of the Consortium of
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expression of U.S~ concerns Ln an exchange of views.
 
Aabout economi pblicy fz'om its broadest reach to any 
degre;, of. ref ieme'nt- thie. Country--Teaz-and-A;I-iD. -think --------­
'usef ul he Government "of ,India, whieeserving the 
- and well-documented arguiment even in' areas that tou~ch' 
'~~ the heart 	 of policy." re 
-epaper fix~ther stated: 
...we do' not~think that attachment of specific conditions 
in, the form of targets of achievement, changes in 
* 	 policy, or shifts in emphasis or practice would
 
accelerate or sharpehipresent consideration within the
 
Government of India and we do not suggest any be
 
specified in relation to the program loan.'!
 
<..i~ This answered the question posed the preceding year. We would not s~pecifi­
cally condition our lowa s, but-would use they "continulng dialogue".

approach. The loani paper gave examples of it. In November 1963,

Ambassador Bowles wrote a letter .to the Finance Minister suggesting a
 
careful review of price control policies and mechanisms which were inhibit-.
 
ing production. (This was the beginning of pressure. for liberalization.
 
.The Consortium was brought in as an ally about this pint.) He also
 
Identified the private sector as a source of additional capital and
 
management resources a-nd made a number of suggeations for encouraging theflow of private resources., The Ambassador discussed the significance of
 
,anintensified effort in agriculture in another letter to the Prime
 
!Mii1te'. The~loan paper stated that these and other initiatives were one
 
element in an' extensive pattern of relations "without specific refere'nce
 
tb'll-S. assistance, thetiming of actions under present commitments or~ 

-prospects 	for th e Consortium.tt 
".In the spring of.1964 A.I.D."requested $5Omlliofranitalo-

P toward the 'fourth year of India's plan. loan paper
project -onmmitmerit 	 The
eeaeathe statement "the widening ~
 
~~J'''of'discussion with the GOI onquestions of economic policy.. not . . .~'
 
. --	 about and opening up of the avenues 
Arelated to~the negotiation of particu-lar loans or aid transactions". It;,. 
furher tht and 'negotiation~ regadnsate certainly the discussions 

the large dollar commodity program assist~nce loans formi an' important 

-A ',
em~ht in 	this overall pattern.""The paper concluded agairiithat we did 
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not wish to attach spe.ii conditions to ou' loans. Our concern was to 
"sustain and deepen .ne subst-vtive discussion." Thc loan was authorized 
in April and signed in N.ovember 1964. Meonhi].e, Indian committees had 
continued to study the control. siystems of the economy, and in March 196 , 
decontrol of all non-,i'1,at stcol products was an-nounced. A.I.D, considered 
the steps WFhic. ]loci Mo t Wken in tne prceedJ n six, moni;hs as falling 
well short of what was ,rired, ur =..cy ,.erc steps in a new dir'ection, 
the first ioves away from the .ncIOLuaisJ ecu'trols of recent ye, frs. 
FY 196 5 . At a meeting of the lI D.e- cCi:n.ortiun in May 1964, the 
U.S. indicated it was prepared to provide about 'T2'(,' million of its total 
pledge of $435 million for IFY ,9,4-65 r' fonir of' coriodityloans, 
At the same time the U.S. indicated to the '-I that $225 milli.on woulu be 
provided under conditions similar to those of preceding years, and that 
up to *100 million in additional commodity loans, for a potential maximum 
of $25 million, cold be Erovided to assist ,he GOI ir making ce.tain 
policy adjusiuments. The odditional fiuds could help accelerate and 
broaden thne rxrge of decontrol measwure' hat righ be uMdetaken and 
facilitate the import of aiditionn_! inputs fo.r a,riculttue such as ferti­
lizr. The specific terms of the afict-on" were as follows: (a) An 
add-tior c,]1 dollar of non-projec- aid would be provided for ever, dollar 
equivali:nt of additional fertilizer the Indians,; impor;;ed from free world 
sources above an agreed base. We expected, thit increased fertilizer 
imports co.:vd becomn necessary fo!loving fertilizer price reduction or 
improved diotributior or both. (b) An adiional dollar of non-project 
aid would be provide, for every additional dollar equ-.valent of licensed 
imports of raw materals or commodities shonn; to be required to meet 
shortages thaC had resulted in under- uti.Lization of plant capacity (over 
an agreed bas.) in high-priority sectors, if appropriate price adjustments 
were made where needed. (c) An widition&a. dollar of non-project aid 
wo-uld be provided for each dollar ec.uiva.lent of additional imports 'hen 
imports of a co modity rose (above an agreed base) as a result of relaxa­
tion or elimination of controls, provided that A.I.D. was satisfied that 
price policy for the imports was appropriate. 
As of' February 1-965, the GO had not experimented fua-ther with decontrol.. 
A sharp rise in food prices and a general increase in the overall price
 
level had created an unfavorable climate for the introduction of decontrol 
measures. Further, the new Shastri. government was in the process of 
consolidating its position and did not appear ready for radical new 
measures. The prospects for additional lending under (b) and (e) above 
did not appear likely. However, the 0O1 had moved to expand the import 
of fertilizer and cut back fertilizer prices. The use of additional 
comnuodity loan funds for fertilizer over and above the base was expected. 
The loan was thus tor $190 million, including $150 million to make up the 
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Thereafter PL-i48o agreements were to provide no 4more than a three months' 
supply of "odrisuntilhalf-year supply ofrwsmadein latea 
1967. This was done 'sowe could exert leverage frequently on .Indian 
w had reviewed Indianagricultural policies axdprograms. Previously, 
every yearm, de excuses about the lack of Indian performanceagriculture 
anyway. 	 four-year commitment,
in.deleased the foodgrains By making a 
we,,had- essentially.foreclo ed future, leverage. 
A.I.D. commitments were held back pending passage of the FY 1966 FAA. We 
. iwere thinking,in terms of $250 million in program assistance for the last 
year of the Third Plan if Indian performance improved. When the Indo-Pak 
war broke out on September 5' 1965, all new assistance commitments to 
The Indians were informed in mid-Septemberboth countries were suspended. 

that aid was to be frozen until a valid cease-fire was achieved.' 
After the cease-fire, we negotiated another small PL-480 agreement
 
(September 29th) providing for less than a month's supply of,food grains.
 
In.November 1965,' Secretary Freeman, ,spurred by the U.S. President and
 
and Agriculture ,Subramaniamin Rome,
Congress, met with Minister of Food 
and an agreement on Indian agricultural policies was negotiated. Invest­
more than doubled; duringment in agriculture in the Fourth Plan was to b-1 
1966-67 alone it would be increased by at least 40% even though the 
emergency, caused by the war ,combined with a drought. might require cut­
,
backs in other areas of investment. High annual fertilizer consumption 
domestic production and higher imports;targets would be met by both higher 
shortfalls in domes'vic 'prodction. Basic policyimports would make up for 
changes encouraging foreign private investment in the manufacture and 
distribution of fertilizer were to be implementedi. A fertilizer marketing 
plan was'to be announced by January 6, 1966. Steps would be taken by 
the GOI to operate its own fertilizer plants at fullcapaaity by 
allocating enough foreign exchange to ensure adequate supplies of raw
 
.. 	 materials and sparemparts and by carefully reviewing management effective­
ness periodically. .Specific actions would be taken to-improve the existing 
system of credit cooperatives. "Packages" of agricultural inputs -­
--	 would be made availabl'efert~lizer, improved ceeds, pesticides, water 

to 32 million acres of the most productive land farmed by the more 
target was set of 25 millionefficient farmers. On this selected acreage a 
It 	was agreed that price policiestons of additional food grains by 1970-
would be reviewed periodically to ensure a continuing favorable relation­
ship between the price of food grains and the price of purchased inputs
 
' 

such as fertilizer., The Center!government was to develop a rational food
 Jbetween
'states.AJThe
 
highest priority would be given publicly to'agriculture; agriculture 
would also receive priority in the allocation of foreign exchange. Finally 
the agreement specified a food aid phase-out schedule. This agreement 
is sometimes called the "Rome Treaty" . 
policy and use its power to regulate d'striJution 

p1 '2, 
'
 
, .- ' ,!.'' , , . .. . " -. '. ., 	 , ­
Minister Subram.,iarr retur'ned to Yndia and presented this program to the 
Indian cabinet as a GOI program, The U.S. was substantially su'pporting

policies Subramaniam already f-avoredd but hc needed financial
the and
 
.political support 
oi the rest ni tne ()1. The prograza was also presented 
to th, Iarlitunent in December. A few days later another short-term 
PL-4850 agreement was sigcie-. Th- presentation to Parlinent became the 
loan paper for the lirst p-ograirt loa.n to be negotiated after the war, a $50 million loan excl.,isulIu r furt i Uzer imp-orts signed Jainuary 4, 1966. 
This was to be the only progr-L: l. n uorianntteca to .IFf 1965-66. A condition 
of the loan was that India riatrh the u0 000 tons of nitrogen fertilizers 
to be Il'Jniv.aed by the. loan with an all.ocation from non-A.i.D. resouxrces 
to import at leat un additioiial 300,G0C tons plus necessary Wount,'. of 
related fertilizers and sulphic. u'rtilizer would be applied to tne 
crop be(-innig :i thie spr2'intg of' j_.,U . ?rior to authorizing the loan we 
also obtainea sLecific agreeMUc:n.. on now India would en:col.'uirae privnte
foreign irnve stors in th fert:Llizei indldustry,, including concessions on 
equity participation d on., private nurKetiirg free of price und zone 
limitations. The gM unnouncd thoo, concess.i ono in December. Prior to 
signing the loan, A.I.D. eonsil',era with ap!nroriate rnebrs of Congress
in accordance with Secretary !Rask's eormitient to Congressman Mahoi. in 
September that the "Executive Ernrich woLild consult with apprcipriate
members of the Congress on the situatien in the sub-continent in connec­
tion with making new economic aid loans or grants". A.I.D. further stated 
in the PAAJ to the loaun tnat "prior to conclusion of ic loan, araage­
ments will be mnade for f"u'the.r review of' Indian pollcies and for the 
establicslrie nt of target dates for needed policy change- and adhinistrative
 
improvements." There is no available evidence that, more tha, the above
 
was done. 
The Tashkent Declaration was signed on January 10, 10(.of Vice President 
Htmziphrery [n-formedl the dlans dat t'.e time his visit in Fdbruaryof that 
would provide a $1.00 millior p"ogran loan as an inerlim action to 
allow further consideration of the policy issues involved in the prepara­
tion of the delayed Fourth Five Year Plan. The Indians:; were in great need 
of additional foreign exchange resources, we said, and progress had been 
made in carrying out the Tashkent Direclaration. Military forceswt .being successfully disengaged and political t'e:n sions were lessening. A 
condition of the loan, thouugh not written into the ncr se waspereen nt
that the 001 aloca;e foreign exchange from other resources fur the sane 
purposus as the loan -- to increase the use Of ex.1stirng capacii.y, and 
obtrin ferti.izcr aund other high priority inputs for agr)culture. Th 
request to the President stated that another condition in the iiegotiations 
wo l.d be that highest priority be giver, to econcmic d(:'oelopmenr;; f'uxid.s 
would not be sacrificed to an arms .race. These conditions plus tihe 
provision that the funds be used for uxisting capactity as opposed to build­
ing new capacity or increusing reserves, applied also to a $5o0 million 
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loan to Pakistan. In addition, we would insist that the Indins provide 
"a clear indication of intent to resume their interrupted dialoguc with 
the World Bank on major policy issues in connection with improved develop­
ment plans". The Consortium meeting had been postponed when the war 
began. It was stated agai. that "prior to disbursement inder the loan, 
arrangcments will bef made to assLre effective monitoring of the execution 
by the GOI of re].cvant policy changes and improvements." TI-is probably 
had to do with the GO's matching of imports for underutilized capacity 
and for agriculture. The nature of the arrangements is not in the record. 
The loan was authorized on Maxch 26th and signed on May 13, 1966. It was 
commrittcd to IFY 19u6-67, the first year of the yet-to-be finalized 
Fourth Plan. We felt that tnough this loan wolu. case india's economic 
pinch, we still had a.ple bargaining power left. 
The new Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, visited the U.S. in March. No 
further aid cowmitmeits were made at this time. The $!00 million loan 
had been uiououc d in February, a.nd Ms. Gandhi did not wish to appear to 
be begging for more aid. Further, Lhe U. L. wanted more concrete changes 
in Indian policies. A month after Mrs. Gundhi's trip, Lun Indian Minister 
of Planning, Asoka Mehta, held meetings in Washington with World Bank 
President George Woods and RiMFr'epresentatives. Mehta went to these 
April1-May meetings with considerable flexibility to negotiate new GO1 
policy measres. The negotiations were forcefuil, and the minutes of these 
meetings rovi- the basis for India's new economic reform program. The 
main emphasis -. tue Woods-MXehta meetings (some call them a "Confronta­
tion") was on in"port ibetalization, though ocher areas suci agriculture, 
fanily planning, export promotion and private foreign irnestment were 
also covered. Devaluation, required before imports could be liberalized, 
wi;ssd the hadwas disc ith il. These ciiscussions strong U.S. support 
and encouur.wime:nt. We were 1.tti ig 1he ]IBRD bear the brurt of the con­
ditioning, except for .ricultux'al poiicies, though. we coll!borated closely 
with the PEnuix 1r Iact the I]liD didr not go as far as we wanted on. 
import liberalization e.g., it let ihe Indians keep the licensinrg system 
on l.ibcralized imports. The GOi coLld later use the ]icensing system 
insteal of resorting to fiscal poli 11owever, we felt we had to accept 
21e par:kage and, not reo!:rnithe discu.;sions, 
These negotiations andindia's new economic reform p.'ograrr, provided the
 
basis for a higher level of Corsortium non-project assi stance comritments.
 
The higher level of YO0 million recocmendcd by the Bunk and accepted by
 
the Consortium in it", May reeting was cordi:tioned on India's execution
 
of the policies to which it had committ,.d itself. The $(100 million would
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~assist the program ,and make it possible both the liberalization of 
imports and Iaccelerated agricultural development required increased ~­
imports. The Consortium also ,expected, India ~to carry out other policy 
changes 'which did not directly require imports. .. ' 
r dcnvne other donors 
4' 
-j to more than double their non-project lending -­ 'while the U.S. commitment 
increased bynabout 50%. The total Consortium non-project commitment was 
$4fob­ 450 million higher then in the years preceding.,r 
The GOI'formally devalued the rupee by 36.5% de jure on June 6, 1966. 
The devaluation was probably the most politically difficult element of 
the reform package. A few days after it took place, A.I.D. requested, 
authorization for a $150 million program loan out of FY 1966 funds. The 
loan-vwas signed on July 8th. By that time a 10% surcharge had been elimi­
nated. There had been no liberalization of imports as yet, but! the G01I 
announced the prospect of a liberalization program on June 21st. Industrial 
license requirements were removed from 11 industries on July 4th - the 0 01 
had taken earlier steps toward decontrol of industry in May. We noted 
that private foreign capital investment was being encouraged in fertilizer, 
chemicals and other needed fields, and we said the 001 in-s taking force­
ful actions to assur~e the availability of capital inputs and raw materials 
required to step up food production. 
, .. 
We signed the $150 million loan about a month after the devaluation. We 
signedit to encourage the GO to carry throughwith import liberalization 
anas a reward for devaluation. British and Canadian commitment' also 
camesthrough quite early. The Germans did not release funds till about 
J December dbut then they released all funds for the year at 
considered tLG first phase of the liberalization plan was 
once. What was 
announced.in 
August. Itowas formally rather different from that outlinedpinthe Woods-
Mehta minutes but constituted an effective, first step. Fifty'-inie 
priority industries (we had expected liberalization by commodity) which 
accounted for aohut 75% of industrial production,swere given special treat­
ment. which.in effect allowed them to import as much raw materials and..... ........­
spare parts as 
admlinistrative 
they needed. 
controls over 
The structure of the previotissystem of~ 
import licensing was maintained even for 
these industries, but licenses were to be granted with a minimumi of review. 
Further, firms granted import lIc~enses were 'allowed greater flexibility 
"in'the use of these license .jrawmatei'ials for very high priority 
e~xport industries were plac~d dni 4ei Gerierl License with no restrictions 
on the' quantities imported and with ac ces s to free foreigni exchange,. -Also 
, 
items, were .,deleted from the list'o±' domis ib'llymanufactured goods which 
could not ~be imprted. Further',publi sectors~ ~nu~iswee eurd' 
now to go through the same procedures as private sector industries. 
Previously, public sect-or industries had easier access to imports. 
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AYSS__ The next program loan, for $.132 million, was not signed 
unt . 1967 though it was part of the U.S. share of $900 million in 
Consortri assistance pledged to IFY 1)66-<7. Part of the delay had to 
do wi th lack of progress on the Tashkent Declaration. The delay also 
applied to a $70 million tranche for Pakistan. ilowever, we did tell the 
GOT earlier it could probably count on this tranche. We felt that India 
had been taking steps in the right direction. In January 41967, 33 more 
industries had been added to the decontrolled list. Indii had (ldrarti­
cally changed course in agriculture for the better -- in policy. 
adminisltrative drive and budgetary priority. We wanted the GOT to take 
further steps toward the liberalization of imporls, but measuren already 
taken could not be tested. T1he recession csrused by two consecutive droughts had reduced import demand. 
The pr',rrr;t assistance paper stated that the proposed loan did not provide 
the U.S. government muth further leverage to bring ab-ut additional 
Government policy decisions since it was part of the Consortium package 
for IFY ]966-67 designr-d to finance policy steps already undeartaken. We 
said that by completing the $900 million Consortium package we wou1d 
ensure .:ontinued effective iqmplementation of the import libera. i za Lion 
progr'tf. arid lay the basis for discussion with the GOI on fuct.her steps in 
liberalizing impo-ts lnext year. 'e said we would discuss all important 
poicies with the (lOl incl uding the accelerated agriclltural development 
prograrn, but would f'.,cus on two areas -- future of import ]iber-liz;tion 
and fiscal policies -- because of their importance and likely Consortiln 
follow-up. h,,Tille we woul-d Id; the IMF' mission take the lead in e..pressing 
concern about .inflationary pressures, we -. oul].d support their presentations 
and closely follow the Iin'rT at on o,,.f the 1967-68 budget. 
The Consortinn had met again in April 1967. The members agreed with an 
iBRD assessment that Indi an self-help progress had been substantial.. 
Fhrther prog'ess was desired in the import liberalizaticn prograln, export 
expansion, private investment incentives, and family plnning. 'ihe 
Bank assessed an indian need of another q9oo mill.ion iu non-project 
imports for IFY 1967-1968 for the continuation of the refor program, 
plus another $190 million from the Consortiumi to match a U.S. food offer. 
The actual Consortium pledging session was not held until iiovember, because 
it was important to give an early emphasis to food assistance matching and 
debt relief.
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In May, after the Consortium fulfilled its FY 1.966-67 pledge and agreed 
that $900 million should be provided in FY' 1967-68, the G01 announced 
additional import libe7--lization steps. The liberalization of maintenance
 
imports for the 5C priority industries was continued and improved, in some 
details, Small units in priority industries were given the same facili­
ties as large scale units. They, too, would get as much as they needed. 
for production. Certain aid-financed spare parts were completely freed 
01 controls, and export industries were to be given freedom in choosing 
sources of supply. Greater flexibility was given to conerci.al importers. 
On the negative ;ide, the list of banned imports was expand.ed. 
The U S. in FY 1.96( had exerted conciderable bilateral leverage on Indian 
agric ituxe I1liJie 1-rough negotiation of PL-480 agreements. In the 
negoti.ions peC edirn he February 20, !.967 agreement, targets ior fFY 
167-68 wwere wo.rked out on imports arld domestic production of fertilizer, 
uid.itional planting under new seed varietmes; and number' of acres to be 
cover.A by minor irrigation and plant protection. crc,)tura1eredit9 
rural electr,.afication, Wraining p:ograls for Iaxiet supply of agricul­
tuxal machinery and agricultural research woula be stepped up, and 
specific tax'geLu were set for the next two fiscal, yea's, The ag.reerent 
also stated. thaL ithere woul.d be a timely announcement of food grain support 
prices. Sel-rato minutes of undersl;andir- were signed outside the agree­
ment * The 0C) publicly announced snis program in adva-ce of signing the 
new L-48. agreement to be in a strong position, to maintain that the 
specific self-help provisions which appeared in the agreement merely 
reflected its own deciuions. frobably many of them did, A[ is diificult 
to distinguish U.So-imposed targets from Indian targets. The PL-480 agree­
ments, however, made the iAd.iun Plan comitments firer than they would 
otherwise have been, 
Another P-L..i.0 areement sigrned in June 1]967, provided that India would 
move more heavily into the production of food crops as compared with 
non-.food crop- in world surplus. FY 1971 acreage targets were; set for 
food crops. The agreement also included statements on fanily planning., 
reduction of duties on imported equipnent used in fertilizer plents, efforts 
to find domestic phosphate roc-, and effective nationwide planning to reduce 
food grain losse 
FY 968. 'The next non-project loan, for $5) mil.ion, was authorized 
in Junea 1967 out of FY 67 funds, and .signed in Octobcr. 1t was t-he first 
tranmche of non-project assistanice for [FY 19(,7-68 and wao to help India 
continue the economic refon progr0am which comrmences in 1966. The loan 
paper stated that while no specific C-01 1olicies would be uniquely lin-ked 
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to the loan, we expected to emrphazize import liberalization, added stepo 
wherc p ssible toward further relaxation of ,uminiotrutive controls over 
industry, and continued efor U to i ncr'gee gricultuira]. prod-uction, 
ly ragreedparticularly mintenanice of tne fertilizer import targets previou 
-to in PL-4bQ regotiations. 
At the Noverrbu-r Conv.ortiam 	 rnee ting tle (onorr accepted, an en .Lrrate of' '1*750 
earlier eStimat, of' $900 million, in non­million, as opposed to the 
project a.ina... as the requiraemeon r IMr i9(-'8,Toe Indian, Y reces­
sion had reduced demand for import-. but wi thoa an IDA reinhs~rrt, 
India would Probably obtain onl 'dj$51-3 million. bt~hoer donors Would contri­
bute the snae anount as the Precedirng ya:ur. The Connortium in i ts re(view 
of Indian policien and protrrfsl mphasized agriculture, lemily planning, 
exports and de len ne exnerid.ituxe 
A third ;unplement to the iFeb'ruary 1)(J( P,-80 ,4reenlent (a n.acond in 
[-Jertember rea'i'irmied earlie ' nelf-help provisions) wa signed on 
December 30, 19/0(. There had been a long delay over ng,-,,otiation of poli­
cies and t zrgets. Scretury Freuun went to India again daring the 
were 11 'ted Ij the ugreement.ncgoti.ations. The nelf-help measures negotiated 

They include maintenance of government .xroci.nLement price level:.; ,.ver JJ.
 
procurement targets were exceeded, and creation of buffer st..ockn aus usick/ly 
as conditions would allow. The hoped for buffer stock target lwlan,; 3.5 million 
tons by the i'al. of 1968. Jar fertilizer uvailbLli1y,Foetn acreage 
to be planted under new seeds, crop p:rotection and. i:-'ga.ioXI uu:i.ngL iMY 
1968-69 were set don. The U.". aLter much. 'Afor't was uab]Ue to obitin ,an 
zones, or on twrgetn Fpeorflco:c bufferIndian coraroitrnert to al)olisn food 
accept india's propocal to reduce i.L; fertili.zerstocko. WY did M;use to 
conuAmption: tar'et frn 2.8 to 2.5 million ton. for IFY 198-C); and 
india did make a firut step toward l.iberalization 01' food. zones in late 
March, 196, 
in March, the Mission submitted a request for 1225 million tu raise U. ,. 
program aid to India in ITY 1967-6 to $:295millon, incluling an Export­
import Lnjxk loan of ,20 million. The U.S. conitribution wan over $100 
million lowc' than in the pIat year while other dionor contributions, 
except ior the Italian, remained the ,_Ue or slightly hig'hCr. 
The 225 l, 	 loan was conditioned on spccific self-U million prograir niot 

help actions, W u.ians were to along,, toe lines
the i  expected continue 

of the 196G Woowe-Mhta agreerient, lu futher nto hzil ben taken toward
 
import liberalizaLton, but neither the U.:,. not the I.IRO Faulted India,
 
had been a slow'down in Concorti.tz piedges ofparticularzly as there 

assistance. The loan was signed in May 19(8 to be appli.u. to the IFY
 
ince 	 y,.ar re'troactively.which had ended l4a'ch 31. 	 it wouli fila import in tha. 
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The India Consortium met in May 1968. The major concern of the members
 
was poor Indian export performance. Many countries including the U.S.
 
could not make pledges at that time. The IBRD estimated that India 
required about $950 million of Consortium assistance during IY 1968­
69. The first $100 million was met through successful conclusion of
 
debt relief negotiations.
 
FY 1969. A $23 million U.S. loan for fertilizer and fertilizer 
mixtures was authorized in June 1968 and signed in July. Another $194 
million loan was approved in November and signed in December. It 
included ani eari-ier request for $50 million for fertilizer which had 
not been approved by the President in order to leave options open to 
his successor. The $194 million loan brought A.I.D. non-project loan 
commitments to $217 million for IFY 1968-969) the lowest level, 
aside from the war year,since the beginning of A.I.D. program lending.
 
Another PL-480 agreement was negotiated in the fall of 1968. The self­
help provisions were to include addit-onal storage facilities, incentive 
prices, and the s trengthenig of irrigation, agricultural research and 
fTrmer credit. 
Thus fax the GOI had maintained the liberalization program.despite
 
(a) the total unavailability of IDA funds in 1968, (b) the fact that 
the bulk of the U.S. portion of assistance for 2I.F1967-1968 was not 
made available until after the close of that year, and (c) contraction 
in the assistance pipeline. 'lie Consortium-recommended $950 million 
of non-projecL assistance for IFY 1968-1969 was unlikely to be forth­
coming. We now hoped India would maintain its import liberalization 
program and high fertilizer imports. We did not expect further
 
liberalization at a time of lower assistance levels and an uncertain
 
future.
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III. THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES 
A. Did A.I.D. Try to Exert feverage with the Program Loan ?
 
A.I.D. did try to exert leverage with the program loan, although A.I.D. 
did not usually choose to have specific self-help conditions included 
in programi loan agreements;. We would often wait until the GO had 
taken action before signing a loani aigreement. For instance, the GOI 
made a firm commitment to encourage foreign private investment in 
fertilizer plants be['ore the $5O million fertilizer Ioan of January 1966 
was signed. India devalued in June 1966, before a $150 million progrMn 
loan was signed. Signrig the loan agreement would then be a, reward 
for past performance, less a commitrent for future action. The U. S. 
also tried to obtain Lever.gv .e on Indian performance by pledging an 
overall amount of program loan l'unds to each indian fii;cal year, and 
maintaining a "continuing dialogue" with GOT officials. Further, total 
Consortium offers of non-project assistance were intended to provide 
leverage. The GOI expected Consortium non-project assistance to 
average at least $900 million annually, beginning in 1966. Actually, 
it has averaged much less.
 
The I.BMD took the lead in recommending indian policy changes and targets. 
Before Consortium non-project assistance was committed for the next 
Indian fiscal year, the Consortium would evaluate Indian achievements 
and commitments for future action. Indian shortcomings would be 
discussed with GOI officials at the Consortium meetings, and policies
 
would be recommended. Proposed action or torgets were not, however, 
linked to specific loans.
 
The U. S. did try to tie leverage on future policies more closely to an 
aid instrument in PL-480 negotiations from late 1965 on. Annual quanti­
tative targets such as for fertilizer distribution, and acres to be 
planted under new seed varieties or to be sprayed with pesticides were 
agreed on, as well as qualitative targets such as commitments to build 
Central Government buffer stocks or maintain incentive food grain
 
procurement prices. Sometimes these commitments wotuld be listed in a 
PL-480 agreement under Indian self-help actions planned. There were 
in some instances minutes of understanding outside the agreement,
 
setting down agreed policies and taxgets. 
I 133
 
a17
 
B. Did India Perform? 
Indian self-help performance since 1965-66, when the new economic reform 
progrem was introduced, has been mixed, but performance has been aore
 
good than ba~o There has been a significant reorientation toward 
cmphasis on agriculture and away from extensive controls over the 
cconomy. Less than. satisfactory performance in some areas can be 
explained by the two consecutive and serious droughts of 1965-66 which
 
brought on industrial recession. Further, India has ireceived less non­
project arsistance than anticipated, and future aid levels are uncertain. 
GOI officials have been less than convinced that sane U.S. and Consor­
tium reco.mendations are worth carrying out for ideological or other 
reasons. This is true of extensive decontrol of industr~tja production and 
strong encouragement of private foreign investment where there have 
been powerfulJ_ idcological constraints. India has preferred to concritrate 
on import substitution as opposed to export promotion. Abolition df 
food zones was lifficult in a period of scarcity, and the problem was 
aggravated by -he political relationships airiong the states and between 
the Center ard State Governments. Import liberalization and decontrol 
of' the domejtic industrial. structure have not proceeded as much as we 
would hav- liked. Initial steps were taken in both these areas but the 
further steps expected were not. 
India has been very successf"ul in other areas, often going beyond targets 
set, e.g. on fertilizer imports. The transformation of Indian agricu)2­
ture -- IFY 1967-1968 was a record crop year -- has been almost phenomenal.. 
The distribution of large quantities of fertilizer to Indian farmers, 
for which the U.S. exerted con;iderable leverage and provided a good part 
of the financing, has been important for this success -- so has the new 
emphasl on support prices, new seed varieties, plant protection and 
irrigation. Another program which has made considerable headway is the 
faily plafring progr am assisted by the U.S. and other donors. 
India has definitely perforxjed better since increased pressure was put 
on the GOI starting after the 1963 India-Pahistan war. Part of this 
improvement is due to increased U.S. and Consortiu., leverage, and part 
to the fact that the fidti7s belcajfte convinced that the reforms were 
necessary. The two years of drought served to coavince them that agri­
cultural production must be given top peiority, and after the war they 
were convinced that '.;hey were too dependent on outside assistance. 
IHigher comm atments of non-project aid did enable the Indians to devalue, 
to carry out some iaeasures to decontrol, and tp..push agricultural 
development. 
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C. 	Did A.I.D. obtain leverage?
 
A.I.D. did obtain leverage though it is sometimes difficult to attribute 
specific self-help performance to the leverage of either the U.S., other 
members of the Consortit , or the TIRD, from what the Indians would 
have done anyray. The leverage process was one cf gradiua
1 persuasion 
over a period of time. The !ndiars would. eventually becoue conviaced 
that policies the donors advocated were in tbehr e'nz interest, aid 
would present them as Indian polici,-" hc vo' c u . .nLiyuntied 1-c 
specific program assistance agrenent.. H.v , r Ai oen waited 
for 	the GOT to take specific action bWe' Ugnim; a loan agreement. 
becn suc-As indicated in section B, we and tf-, other dmnen hm', not 
cessful in getting the Yndians to adopt all ihe pol.iciesm have 
advocatei, but we have made great progress 
D. 	 Can A. ID. Leverage be Att!ibulted Specifically to the
 
Program Loan?
 
A. i.D. leverage can be attributed. ,(:, the program Icans as they have 
the time tried exertrwe toconstituted most of A.I.]). assistance during 

program loan negotiations,
leverage. LeveragZe has been appl.ied during 
but also throughcut the year in a "continuing dialogue" with GOT off­
has been informal for the most part. We could prubs,]ycials wht i.ch 

not have obtained the leverage without the progrmn loasn, even if our
 
ac high. '.The prog ru loan financed
total assistance level hed been 
the :ndion economic reform program the way project assistar'ce co'a. 
not. Frther, as one A.I.D. officia3 said, program assistance is desired 
about six times as much as project assistance. Project isssstao:e 
more easily obtained elsewhere, and project funds do rot ,';n as qvi'kI1/. 
Of course A.I.D. has obtained leverage from project assiste~nee .-. or
 
fertilizer ]marketirg, and the
instance on the family plaring program, 

Further, as mentioned previously,
dissemination of improved seeds. 

proved to be an inrpo rtant source of leverage on
EL-480 negotiations 

Indian agriculture programs.
 
IV. DE1 I{INATTS OF LEVTERAGE 
A. 	 T.he onditioning System 
1. 	 Specificity of Conditions 
Some of the agreed targets were specific e.g., fertilizer availability
 
and 	acres to be Tlanted uinder nrvq seeds in a given Indian fiscal year, 
4OW 7), V N( 
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or by the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan. These targets were agreed 
on in World Bank-GOI meetings (particularly the Woods-Mehta meetings
of 1966), and in U.S. negotiations of I°-80 agreements. The targets 
were not tied to specific program loan agreements which were 
not !yci.ed to the end of an Indian fiscal year. Some of the specific 
targets were nct necessarily U.S. or Consortiumr inposed conditions 
but indian Ran targets. The donors might have influenced the GOf to 
.et plan targets of a certain magnitude, but. the targets had usually
beccme accepted by the Indians by the time ar agree-ment wras negotiated. 
Other conditions, such as encour-;ement of' private foreig1 investment, 
were not specific and lacked definite time limits, although the GOI 
was aware of what the donors had in mind. 
2. Nurmber of Conditions 
The U.S. and the Consortium usually emphasized only a few areas at 
oce though many areas would be discussed. Starting in 1966 the two 
areas of emphasis were import liberalization and agriculture. More 
recently we have put more emphasis on export promotion. Most e t:!r;s 
connected with the lndla program are convinced that you can only push 
one or two areas at one time, especially when a few GOT officials may 
have to persuade a Jarge number of others to accept new policies. 
3. Policy Areas ih Which Exerted 
Partly because of the types of policies we have tried to influence, 
qupntbiative conditioning, target dates, etc. make less sense than 
for instance .in monitoring stabilization indicators such at, money 
supply, where more constant surveillance is necessary. The changes 
we pursued in India recuired pressure over a long period of time. 
We were seeking broad policy moves in the "right di'rection" over a 
period of °years. The Woods-Mehta negotiations were to influence the 
period of the whole fourth Five-Year Plan, 1966-71. This is perhaps not 
the whole axswer to the relative lack of quantitative conditioning
in India. India's strong political sensitivity to outside pressure and 
our resiltant inability (or unwillingness) to set quantitative or even 
quaritative targets associated with more forma.l reviews and subsequent
tranche releases are inportant. Indian desires for neutrality and 
acceptance of aid from both East and West must be considered. As 
far as Indian sensitivity and fear of political and public opposition 
are concerned. a tighter conditioning system would need not be 
made public. hoever, there would be grave dangers of public dis­
closure of such a system. 
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4. Rigor of Condit-,on Enforcement 
Negotiation and authorizatio of program loans were not explicitly 
linked to Indian performance. Once loans were authorized and signed, 
there were no conditioned tranche releases or threats of withholding 
or deobligating funds Li' Tndlia perfori:iance were subsequently uncatis­
factory. There was the ii]licit/ rnwritten threat of delays or 
would be undertaken.r..ductlor.s in size when new loan negotiations 
Separate loans were called "tranches" of an IFY cornitment, but they 
were not tranches in the LA sense. 
5. Dissipation Thro-ugb Time 
Leverago has d:ssipated now because the Indians have become hesitant 
to initiate policy changes and then not recei.ve progran loan funds at 
the time and in the amount e:pected. Both the Indians and members of 
the Mission staff were saying in 1968-69 that we can e.peet to obtain 
little ieverage now tha,, our assistance has dropped and future levels 
are vr;ce:tairn. A top indian official said in the sumer of 1968 that the 
GO! wouLd no .nrq'er subscribe to "forward conditioning." We said in 
response we have never required "forward conditioning" but have based 
our assistance on past performance. 
B. Me Loan 
1. Size of the Loan 
The program loan has completely dominated A.I.D. assistanea particularly 
since 1966. !he loans have been highest of any recipient in absolute 
terms, but lowest per capita. Progr.-i loans have averaged less than 
10,, of Indian imports -- abou.t average for the major program loan 
recipients. Poth total U.). (including PIFTLA1O) and total mu.vltilatera]l 
aid to India have been highest of any recipient both in absolute term.s 
and in temns of Indian i'npo-rts; total aid has been lowest per capita. 
2. Direction of hange in Loan Size 
level changed from an aver ge of about $230 million prior to theThe U.S. 
of WO miilicn in .Yt,56 (in terms of commitments to1965 war, to a low 

Indian fiscal years), and then to a high of 1382 million during the first
 
year of India's economnic reform program. awnd $275 million the next ya-,-r. 
In 1969 it dropped to $217 nil n. [he increatse in size in [9"t6-67 brought 
improved Indian performance. As indicated eaxriier, greater t.S. non-project 
assistance (along with the larger conmitments from the other Consortium 
members) helped India carry ow imp.rt liberalization and give a new emphasis 
to agriculture. he low level I 196566 bhelped encourage the indian economic 
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reform program. We were in a good position to exert leverage after 
cutting off aid during the war. The Indians then realized we could mean 
business. The low in 1965-66 was definitely, designed to:increase leverage 
for economio reform and for reduction of military expenditures, elimina 
'tion of hostilities, and negotiation with Pakistan. The lower level to 
wifc progrn loan have fallen in the last two years, however, is decreas­
our leverage, as mentioned earlier. The recent fall in'size can be 
attributed to lower FAA appropriations rather than to an effort to extract 
better performance out of the Indians. The lower level limits the GOIt's 
willingness to plan ahead, particularly to comit itself to further inp&rt 
' :.liberalization, and it may result in retrenchment on some measures already
 
taken.
 
C. Environmental Factors 
*,1. 1 Multilateralism 
Multilateral leverage has played a very important role in India. The
 
India Consortium has existed since August 1958 and has held regular
 
meetings since then, usually more than once a year. The World Bank, as
 
Chairman of the Consortium', prepares a thorough study of the Indian
 
4economy and members of the Consorttu, while considering India's require­
ments for external assistance, discuss Indian economic policies and.
 
suggest reform measures. The World Bank, both in its role as Chairman and 
as an international lending agency, reco~mends policy andprogram reforms 
to the GOI in the Consortium context and bilaterally. Probably the most 
significant single instance of leverage exerted by the Bank was the Woods-
Mehta series of discussions in the spring of 1966 which established the 
new economic reform program on which further Consortium non-project 
assistance was to be based. Here specific targets and policies were 
negotiated and set down, both for the following year and for the fourth 
Five Year Plan as a whole. 
A sketch of Consortium and,TBRD efforts to exert leverage runs as follows:
 
As early as 1963., the,Consortium urged the GOI to operate its controls
 
more flexibly, and in fact, some early progress was made. In 1964 the,
 
Consortium Chairman's report noted that further' Indian efforts were needed
 
i"nthe areas of agricultural development, family planning, export promotion 
and additional encouragement of fo g.*Wprivate enterpr.ise. In March,1965, 
the Consortium expressed doubts abo6t ,Oe adequacy of Indian reform 
Measures taken.r to date and noted thatt i~~lm tl xisted in the areas 
of agricult .iral industrial cap .g owth, city utilization, population growth,
~4~Q'' ;2CjO1t5 'and private foreign investment. frn" edition, the extent of 
go6ver-aent controls over -industry anid Imort~r,'i~s decried. 'Many-of these, 
criticisr.3'resulted from a'two year intensive"study undertaken by Bernard 
Bell'financed'by the Bank but with substantial .collaboration of:A.I.D. 
,economists.'.,, 
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As the Bell study gradually exposed Indian planning inadequacies, both 
the U.S. and other donors shifted from a position of accepting Indian 
policies as more or less adequate, to one of vigorously pushing Indian 
reforn. The issues raised in the Bell re-port were discussed at all Consortiim meetings as well as bilaterally y the Bank 
The Indians did not r.ake significantr olicy changes until 1.966 when the 
Woods.-Mehta confrontation took place. This confrontation, and the speci­
ficreform elan negotiated was a cuiJmination of a few years of pressure 
primar:ily by the U.S. and the Bank, but by the Consortium as a whole as 
well. It .jas an important turning point, The aid donors in the years 
folod.ng the confrontation have made a concerted effort to keep the 
Indian economic refomi prograir, going in the right direction. In this 
effort they have succeeded quite well. 
The I!,,' has also played a leverage role in India. It has est:ablished 
three Stand--by agreements with In(tia since 1963 and has suggested reforms 
primarily in fiscal, monetary, and exchange policies. I'h;rther, the IMF 
has exerted influence as part of its Article XIV reviews and in response 
to India's request fmr tranche releases. At the time of the spring 1966, 
Bank--GOi reetings, the IIT worked with the GOI on the devaluation which 
took place in June 1966. The U.S. supported the DC-F's moves. We were 
clearly in favor of the devaluation which was not something the U.S. 
could push bil'aterally. It is unclear how much pressure the U.S. put 
on the IMF to encourage Indian deval'uation. 1h"e leverage web in India 
is tangled. Separate identification of leverage with any one donor is 
difficult. The whole was more than its parts. The U.S. had im.portant 
influence as the largest aid donor, and we had much to do with determining 
the areas in which the Bank, Consortium and 11,1F exerted. leverage. 
2. International Politics 
India has tried to maintain neutrali ty between East and West. The USSR 
and other bloc countries have had a substantial aid program in India 
which had cumulated to about $1.9 billion through CY 1.967. The GOI 
is somewhat able to play off the East against the West. Each block 
wishes to have an influence in india an,.does not want India too 
dependent on the other.
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3. Domestic lolitics
 
Obvious U.S. or other donor oressure on the GOT would cause it great 
problems politically, not just with the opposition parties but w:ithin 
the Congress Party as well. The Indians are very sensitive to outside 
pressure. A further limit on leverag2e is imposed by often difficult 
Center-State relationships. The State goverrmuents, for instance, have 
primary responsibility for the developnent of agriculture. 
D. Personal Touches 
From 1965o1_969 the President of the United States himself played an 
important r¢o.e in the leverage process with the GOI. Ile personally he).d 
up progra. loans and TL-kO agreements because of dissatisfaction with 
the progress of Indian economic reform, particularly in agriculture. 
he Th'eslident held up authorization of agreements not just to exert 
leverage on Indian economic performance. Dissatisfaction with indian 
foreign policy, especially concerning Vietnam, was important. (Often 
A.I.D. and the USDA have not knoaen specifically why authorizations have 
been held up by the President,) Members of the U.S. Country Tean in 
India have differed considerably over how forceful we should be with 
the GOT. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The bilateral A.I.D. negotiating strategy in the case of India 
cannot be analyzed independently of or relations with the other Con­
sortivt members, in particular, the IBRD. 
2. The conditioning process in india, bilateral and mulilateral, 
included continuing dialogues, anxual negotiations and negobiations 
associated with specific loans. A. !.D. and the other donors were 
general.y satisfied with the framework and promise of the Third Plan. 
Doubts as to the efficacy of Indian planning increased after '1.963 and, 
in early 1966, the IBPD (with A. I. D. 's agreement) negotiated a set of new 
yuidelines for GO! development policy. Bilateral and multilatera. 
everage since 1966 has largely followed that outline. 
3. The ease with which conm'itted loans were released in India 
without performance review. even after 1966, contrast with the rigorous 
trandie-ilease r.cchanism installed in Latin aneri: a. lut the comparison 
is deceptiv e. Fighting issues in India were generall.y focused on GO! policy, and loan agreements were delayed pending GOT action, The 
American "presence" was probably as evident at the policy level as it 
was in Latin America. In India, it preceded rather than followed the 
loan conimitment. 
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4. Bilateral. discussions focused on only t.ro or three discrete 
issues throughout the program loan period. he GOI was certain of 
A.I.D. 's priorities 2r self-help perfonance, and performance since 
1966 has been more good than bad. 
5. A.I.D. s att-ntion was on development policy, since th­
monetary and fiscal acccunt ,were reasonably stable -- mcre than could 
be said for most progran loax recipients. If India had been suffering 
from serious inflation, A. I. D. 's attention would have been diverted to 
stabilization policy and the conditioning mecheaism right have been 
different. 
6. ihec r480 pi-grwn si:bstantially reinforced A.I.D. s hand. In 
fact, improvements in agricultural pol.cy were linked specificall.y to 
the 11,-480 agreement, and A.I.D. succeosfully joined these to the fer­
tilizer conditions (which were either explicitly or implicitly asso­
ciated with the prograam loan) to dcvelop a substantial influence on 
Indian agricultural policy. 
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I. INTRODU CTION 
In absolute size, program assistance to Pakistan represents the third
 
largest A.I.D. effort in loans a,,thorized, and the second largest in loans
 
While the level
actlally released ($794 million for FY 1962 throigh FY 1968). 

of loans to Pakistan axnointed to only one-half of the similar assistance to
 
twice that available
neighboring India, program assistance per capita was 

to the India economy. Viewed as a percentage of imports, program aid to 
Pakistan approached the highest granted to any cointry receiving program 
loans; it averaged 11 percent for the period.
 
The U.S. program loan experience with Pakistan is un-sial in three 
respects. First, the negotiations over program loan conditions in FY 1962-
FY 1968 were condicted with a single, stable GOP regime.* Secondly, 1.S. 
assistance to Pakistan has been formally coordinated with other international 
aid sources, those organized in the Consortiim led by the IBRD. Finally, 
while a variety of self-help measires have been ,irged -mpon the GOP d-iring 
the period ,nder stdy, there has been a greater concentration than in almost 
any other cointer case on a single objective; import liberalization. 
This high degree of concentration on import liberalization wa'.s due to 
two major circimstances. There was a lesser need than in many co'tries for 
pressing for a wide range of objectives since, in general, the economic 
planning and economic policies of Pakistan had been reasonably satisfactory.
 
On the other hand, as a resuilt of stroctuiral changes in the economy, the need
 
for increased amoints and greater flexibility in the import of raw materials 
and spare parts was a most compelling one. Their liberalization, however,
 
was not easy to achieve beca,se of certain risks inherent in the policy change
 
and the strong opposition of certain vested interests that received large 
profits inder the import licensing system.
 
The strict-ral imbalance that characterized the Pakistani economy in
 
the early 1960's -- and which made import liberalization sich a serio"isly 
needed step -- can be traced in large part to the import licensing system
 
established in 1952. In that year a foreign exchange crisis reslted in
 
setting a rigid and detailed import licensing system for Consimer Goods,
 
Ind-btrial Raw Materials; and Spare Parts. The interpretation of "essentiality" 
in the allocation of import licenses was s-1ch as to give the lowest priority 
to Consmer goods, a higher priority to raw aterials and spare parts, and 
the highest priority to capital goods. inis allocation policy, co-upled with 
high tariff protection, resilted in rapid growth of many domestic consimer 
goods ind-sturies between 1954 and 1959. 
This stidy covers only the period of FY 1962 throgh FY 1968. Conseq ently,
 
the sibseqient major political changes, important as they are, are not
 
considered.
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Cne of the elements determining who got raw material licenses was the 
capacity of the applicant's plant which woild ise them. This was a bilt­
in incentive for excess capacity and a drain on scarce foreigu- exchange to 
provide it. Historical import patterns also contin-ed to play a role in who 
got the import licenses. And, with an overvaled exchange rate, the high 
profitability of import licenses coild slipport sibstantial bribes. Moreover, 
the ise of" a complex system in an economy indergoing rapid change inherently 
encointered many sericis administrative problems. A major res,1it of these 
forces, despite some Jmprovements that had been made in the system, was a 
serios shortage of needed raw material imports for the operation of exist­
ing ind,-strial capacity. These shortages were reflected in part in the com­
position of raw material imports themselves. An AID Mission s,-rvey of seventy­
two plants in the fall of 1963 concllded that nearly eighty per cent were 
operating at only one third of capacity, and eighty-seven per cent cited the 
ins-fficiency of imported raw materials as the main reason.
 
The sitiation seems, perticilarly in retrospect, to have clearly called 
for import liberalization. It is trie, of co~irse, that firther major mn­
provements in the import licensing system co,,ld have mitigated at least some 
of the imbalances in the import pattern. B,,t a greater role for arket forces 
was plainly desirable. (De-val,,ation as a partial alternative raised a nimber 
of special problems and, as a practical matter, was considered a less 1scf,1l 
negotiating objective. Conseq,-ently, it is not considered in the rest of
 
this paper.)
 
Program loans, which were jist coming into major ise in the early 1960's,
 
were obvioisly a very good instument for achieving an increase in volime and 
improvement in composition of raw materials, components and spare parts (i.e.,
 
maintenance imports), Increased project aid, of coirse, coild not accomplish 
this. Progrem loans, this, not only provided a means for exercising in­
flience in getting the needed policy changes, b-t provided, at least in part, 
the wherewithall with which to act-ally carry ot the policy of liberalized
 
imports.
 
Despite these factors -- which doibtless do appear somewhat neater and 
clearer in retrospect --- a major exercise in the ,;se of infllence was necessary 
to ind,,ce more liberalized import policies. Advice from varioo otside ex­
pe ts was sometimes conflicting in the degree of emphasis it gave to vario,'s 
policy instiments and this presented the Pakistani policy makers with some 
real problems of choice. Increased import liberalization, even if carried
 
o,,t gradially, carried inherent risks of depleting foreign exchange reserves
 
if the demand shoild trn ouit to be greater than estimated or if the s-pport 
cif program lending should be sbseq-ently rediced. And one cannot overlook 
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the pressire of certain veste. interests that made large profits from their
 
preferred position in obtaining import licunse '. And others, the State Bank
 
in particilar, opposed any changes in the price of imports. Moreover, many
 
political leaders caiitioned against '-ndertaking what they considered to be 
a risky and lnnecessary depart-e from established policy. The stage was 
set for a classic test of ahe ability of program lending to indlice reform. 
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II. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF PAKISTANI EPKERINCE 
A. Pre-19 6 2 and Comarison with Non-program Assistance 
1962, of the to Pakistan was in thePrior to most aid given by the U.S. 
form of defense support and project assistaace. Defense support was eliminated
 
as a form of aid in FY 1963; project aid continlied at high levels 'intil FY 
1964 and fell to low levels.thereafter.
 
a shift from changeFY 1962 initiated dramatic grpi'ts to loans, a dominated 
Between the periods, 1957-61 and
by the introduction of program assistance. 

while the annal loan level
1962-66, the per annuim level of grants fell 51% 

rose by 95%. In the earlier period loans represented some 56% of U.S. aid
 
aid package inobligations; this figure rose to more than 83% of the annual 
the later period. 
PL 480 aid was already at a substantia], annual level prior to 1962 (aboit
 
$64 million). Diring 1962-65 it rose sharply to an annual level of $166
 
million, an increase of 160% over the earlier period.
 
Throigholit the period, the U.S. remained the single largest aid donor 
The next largebt
to Pakistan, contrlbuting 40-45% of all foreign assistance. 

donor has been IBRD/lDA, accoumting for some "16% of the annuial package. Other 
Consortim members, especially Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Canada,
 
have provided 36-39% of the annual assistance program.
 
B. FY 1962: $0.0 and $42.O Million 
Two program loans, for $90.0 and $42.0 million, were made in support
 
of Pakistan's generally acceptable second Five Year Plan, 1960-1965, and were 
not linked to any specific conditions. The level of aid was based on external
 
resource requirements, particularly for maintenance imports. In the program
 
loan dooiments, reference was rade to recent Pakistan performance in intro­
tod1cing import liberalization measures and in the government's decision 
increase its emphasis on agriciltural development. These loans were made as
 
part of the U.S. commitment, pledged at the January 1962 Consortium meeting, 
to make $240 million available in support of the second aind third year (1961­
1963) of Pakistan's Second Five Year Plan (1960-1965).
 
C. FY "1L6__A ).0 and V..5 Million 
The first loan, of $30.0 million, was in £uirther f,lfillment of U.S.
 
commitments to make available a total of $240'million in commodity aid in
 
support of the Plan, as stated above. Although there were no specific con­
ditions referred to in the loan paper, there was a statement to the effect
 
that the Janiary 1963 GOP decision to increase licensing of indlstrial im­
ports to 100 percent of the 1961 import level, "presupposes foreign financing
 
of the magnitude projected by the Planning Commission." 
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The second FY 1963 loan ($70.5 million) was additional sinport to the
government'G Plan rc.17irements for maintenance imports. No specific con­ditioni wa'e stated in the loan docliments, bnit reference was made to thefact that. th ;a1. wais rec-iired to spport import liberalization efforts. 
D. TFY 106 . V00.0 Million* 
The first oeplicit -loe of the programi loan as an instrimuent of leverage

c ,me with the 100 million -oa 1964.
of 	Jauar.y This loan was directly linked 
to .mport libfraliza on for roajor iron md steel categories. The negotia­
tions on the loan had been preceded by the USAID study noted above on raw

uir.erial shcrtageo and excess 
 capacity and by extensive, continuing USAID-

PakistaniJdiscu.ions of the need for a reformed 
 coimercial policy system.A more specific arguiient was thaw t,wih rising Pakistani foreign exchange
 
reerves at that point in time, 
 it wolid be difficvilt to Jl'stify a largerprogram loan w.Ach might primarily be a contributor to those reserves. This
c.ircnastance strengthened the ca.e for some import liberalization and, at the
 
same time, redlced the risk of foreign exchange depletion.
 
The Pakistanis, who were not prepared for a flill-scale liberalization,

proposed that for the first half? of 1964 there be free importation (i.e., no
license reqciired) of pig iron, tin plates, billets and strips from the UnitedStates. These limitations reflected a fear that, even for this limitedliberalization, there might be a demand substatially greater than the AIDfinancing through the program loan. On 	 the U.S. side, there was concern that
starting with a partial liberalization carried risks that some of the momentum
 
for reform might be lost. 
On 	balance, however, the U.S. conclused that the
limited liberalization woiild prove suifficently successfil to encoiirage bolder 
steps at a later date. The end resiult was a $100 million loan (compared to
the reqe est for $130 million) of which $90 million was to be iised for im­portation from tha U.S. of the liberalized iron and steel items.
 
E. FY lq6f:_40 Million 
The U.S. judgment that limited liberalization in conjunction with the

FY 1964 loan woild increase the momentum was justified. The FY 1965 liberal­
ization was a long step forward.
 
* 	 Much of the information throuh FY 1965 is drawn from "A Case Study
of Import Liberalization in Pakistan", dated April 2, 1965, which was 
prepared by the USAID Pakistan. To avoid cumbersome footnotes, no 
special citations are made even in those cases, of which there are 
several, where nearly direct quotations are uised. This excellent
stidy gives every internal evl'aiee of being. a perceptive and acnirate 
description and. assessment of eveht.;. it is also jidged to be such by
participants in the analysis and negotiati6ns of the tiae.
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The U.S. held to its position in the negotiation leading up to the FY
 
1965 loan that greater import liberalization was an essential part of the
 
These views were
J11stification for contining large-scale program lending. 

the Planning Comissionconcerted ulth IBRD officials. By March 196., 
economists were convinced of the desirability of firther liberalization.
 
important facet
(This, incidentally, provides an interesting element of one 

of exercising inflience -- governments are not monolithic and working with
 
one element of a government can often lead to a broadened base.) The
 
IBRD/AID position was that only a broad liberalization coild jistify the $200
 
Other­million of Consortiim cormodity assistance being soight by Pakistan. 

wise, the maximim jistifiable level woild probably be at most the previols 
year's level of $120 million ($100 million from the U.S.), or possibly less.
 
The Government of Pakistan was deeply divided on the issue of decontrolling
 
imports. The man who resolved the conflicting pressulres of insistent demands
 
for import refoi-q, on the one hand, and domestically divided counsel and
 
opposition on thc other, was Finance Minister Shoaib. The natire of his
 
Bit the resuilts are clear.
negotiations with his colleagies is ,inknown. 

Mr. Shoaib was gen-inely interested in making the liberalization as broad 
as aid financing and Pakistan's own foreign exchange woujid allow. He sought
 
a minimlum firm assurance of $170 million of commodity aid from the U.S. and 
the IBRD and asked for an assurance that AID woild slpport the program for 
at least three years. AID responded by assuiring that it wolId "sympathetically
 
examine" a program loan application for $140 million for FY 1965 and wo'ld 
also "carefilly consider" program loan applications of lip to the same amo'tnt 
for FY 1966 and FY 1967.
 
After what the Mission describes as three exhaiisting weeks of negotiations 
in Jline (1964), the agreed package was that Pakistan wouild effect a sibstantial 
liberalization covering at least raw materials and spare parts, wouuld finance 
Free List imports from its own resources, and wolild impose additional taxes
 
on newly freed items of about 10 per cent. The U.S., as already noted, would 
consider a $140 million annual program loan for three years.
 
In his Juune bnidget speech, Finance Minister Shoaib announced the import 
liberalization policy. On Jlily 2, 1964, the government published a decree
 
removing licensing requirements for a total of 51 categories (including nearly 
all indstrial raw materials and spare parts) and on July 14 applied sirtaxes 
of abolt 11 per cent on newly liberalized items. At the Consorti,'m meeting 
shortly thereafter, the U.S. pledged a $140 million program loan and the 
actual loan agreemen' for FY 1965 in that amount was signed in December. 
7-

P!. FY 1966: $50.0 and $70.0 Million (from FY 1966 f'lnds bit made in17 11671 
There was a long gap between the program loan of FY 1965, Tibstantially
agreed to in Jine of 1964 and signed in December, and the first loan of FY 
1966, which was not signed lntil May 4,1966. A nv'imber of factors accounted 
for this, incliding the late appropriation of AID flinds, which were not 
available intil the fall of 1965. Bit, the major reason for delay was the 
India-Pakistan hostilities which broke out in September 1965 aUd the U.S. 
decision to withhold economic assistance from both participants until 
hostilities ended. In December 1965, the Presidents of' the U.S. and Pakistan 
conferred and in January 1966 the Tashkent Declaration was rigned between 
India and Pakistan bringing hostilities to a halt and laying the grolind­
work 	for a rcsompTion of assista-nce negotiations. 
In March 1966, a lean of $50 million was presented for approval in re­
sponse to the cessation of hostilities and the siibseqlent disengagement of 
military forces as well as to balance the $100 mill'Loni loan that had been 
made to India; the loan was signed May 4, 1966. The war and bad harvests
 
had led to a deterioration in Pakistan's development program and this loan
 
was considered interim assistance to meet the most virgent import reqiiirements.
According to the program loan dociment, the loan ias slibject to certain 
"fnderistandings" (which were not really strict conditions), to wit: 
"" 	 Highest priority will be given to the allocation 
of domestic and foreign exchange resomirces to
 
development pirposes, and this priority will not 
be sacrificed to an arms race.
 
"2. 	 The proceeds of these loans and slbstantial amonnts 
of other foreign exchange resolirces will be allo­
cated to finance items needed to sectire fiiller use 
of existing capacity, a- opposed te "se for biilding 
new capacity or increasing reserves." 
In J,ne 1966, a $70 million loan application was sibmitted and the 
agreement'was signed in ?.ugist. This loan vas regarded as a six-month 
slice of a contemplated 0140 million in comi:odity lending for FY 1967. 
(This'first loan was made frou FY 1966 Dinds.) 
G. 	FY 1967: $70 million (excliisive of the $70 million from FY 1966
 
Dinds)
 
The program loan for FY 1967 was, in effect $140 million, made ,lp of
 
two $70 million tranches. Although the first of these was, as noted above,
 
actlially made from FY 1966 finds, the basic rationale as well as the actual
 
time of signing pit both tranches in FY 196',. It will be noted that the
 
amount of $140 million was the same as that 'or FY 1965 and corresponded to
 
the earlier understanding with Finance Minister Shoaib.
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The second $70 million s iae. c:,nIngert ,ipon Pakistan performance 
in the areas of ipciort ... eraPz'tin ard restoration of the development 
budget. it was stat'J in the lo.,2-n paper th.ft the formie: de:ision is affected 
by the loan "Afar mor " t (J Lt.o T-'.e ( 'G- indicated that it p.anned 
to reestabliuh ',.,Y '1'67 t-i;e sar, free l.3t of 56 items origi:,.ly proposed 
for FY 1966, !trhih n ot ineie ed. It f :rth-r indicated ti.at it 
wo].d b,.dget ,:we_*ir '.' ,t e n , as for Fvy 196' at $I p079 ri]j.,on, slightly 
,irnder the , -. r. I.',e Plbal t 4 perca-,ent ov r the Z-7dce-7 Y 66 
develorment b-'idg't,.e eu.,ndItres were plamnned to be red'iced from 
$569 millior in F'Y 1966 (5.A.% GN?) to $4"/2,5 million in Ff 196r, (4.2%GNP). 
In ;pport of its liberKfzahin intentions, the GOP estimated it recw'ired 
$180 million iLi commodity aid in FT 1967. t -the time of the loan, the GOP 
reql.iested U.S s ances that the second loan wolild be forthcoming so that 
there wold be ad2qiaJ:te external financing to s-pport the anticipated increase 
in Jioorts re.silting from the liberalization. 
Prior to initiating the second $70 million portion of the loan, there 
were bi-lateral di, seions between Pakistan and the U.S. regarding the 
cond tiuos stated above. The U.S. position on these matters was developed 
for thu forthcoming July 1966 ConsortimnL meeting, as follows: (1) ". . . the 
major focis" shc!id be on import liberalization which is the "central immediate 
economic issue;" and (2) "a regards defense expendit'ires, we believe Pakistan 
has shorn responsiveness to concerns we have expressed" brot that nevertheless 
this topic shold be considered within a upiti-lateral cont_,xt.' 
The second loan for $70 million was submitted in Janliary 1967 and was 
signed in March 1967. The loan doc',ment stated that on Jily 1966, the GOP 
had introdiced a free list of sixty-six items bit that it was hedged by 
nimerous restvictions e.g., commercial importers were restricted to only 40 
items on the free list. Then in December 1966, the State Bank issled a re­
quirement that all free list imports financed by Pakistan's own foreign 
exchange ol(Id be sl bject to advance approval by the Bank, in effect a 
partial reintroduiction of licensing procediires reflecting concern at a drop 
in foreign exchange reserves from $226 million to $146 million from the first 
to the fourth piarter of '1966. 
At the time this loan reqi est was sibnitted, the Mission stated that 
development expenditires may fall short of targets and that the import 
liberalization program was being implemented more slowly than had been 
hoped. Despite these qialiflcations the Mission conclded that "uInder the 
circimstances" GOP perfonriance on import liberalization in the first half 
of FY 1967 "colipled with the statement of intended action in the second half 
of the year appears to be reasonable flilfillment of the original U.S.-GOP 
understanding of import policy in connection with the second $70 million 
loan." In regard to both defense expenditulres and import policy the Mission 
conclbded that "on balance" GOP performance meets the terms of the earlier 
linderstanding. 
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H. FY :J25.0 and I. 0 Million 
Two progr m loan. were negotiated for FY 1968, making vip a total package 
of $140 million, which again ref_'ects the level of the earlier iinderstanding 
with Shoaib. At the Consortiiim meeting in London (May 1967) and in its 
program swilmission, A.I.D. offered to consider prov1ding $140 million in 
commnodity absitance diring FY 1968. The first $25 million was committed to 
the partial f-onding of fertilizer r'eq, irements and was signed in October, 
1967 The ,,uorpose of this ].can -ia to aoipport Pakistan'L comprehensive plan 
.o .C.ieve in food-grain prodliction by 1970. The loan wasi 
conditioned on the GOP's secliring an eqval amoint for fertilizer imports 
from other scnrces, on "continied good performance in expediting domestic 
prodvction, end on improving the distribition of fertilizer and pesticides 
throligh the private sector." 
In Febr:iary 1968, a program loan recuest for the remaining $115 million
 
was bmittd for 1ash:ington approval. In an AID/W NESA Advisory Committee 
Meetii'g held in Janmaiy, "1968, self-help mean'ires were discissed dealing with 
import policy, creedit poli-,y and the role of the private sector. The Com­
mittee, in a written asse:,']ment attached to the loan presentation, stated 
that over the past sin: onths (ie. since Ju.rie 1967) Pakistan consistently 
had moved towards a more. liberal import policy by (1) redicing administrative 
controls over imports; (2) raising the ripee price of forelgn exchange for 
certain import categorio and (3) encouraging expTorts. The Committee stated 
that the AoI.Dc Mission "is being instr'icted to initiate discissions with 
the Government of Pakistan" on the qiestion of its conservative monetary and 
credit policy. Thin latter isn.-ie was raised in reponse tu the Mission's 
conclisions tat "the total Impact cI Lresent7 monetary and credit policy 
2.ay LU7 excessively cci:nractionazy, preventing possible investment which 
might be safely realized. 
In ginmary, throiighamt the Program Loan period, the major explicit con­
dition attached to tlie loan was the need for Tai.ort liberalization. After 
the war, conditions were extended to incl,cie the level of development and 
defense expenditires, bvit, even duiring this tin e; it was stated that the 
l'central iwiediate economaic issie" was impport liberalization. This does not 
mean that the Mission did not attempt to inf~lence other phases of develop­
ment policy, to the extent feasible. On the contrary, U.S. influence was 
felt thronghoit the whole development field. (See Section IV below.)
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III. THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES 
A. Did A.I.D, try to exert leverag with the program loans?
 
In 1963, the U.S. stated that it intended to use the aid program to 
induice self-help meas'ires in those areas which it believed constrained 
Pakistan's development prcgress. mong the area. mentioned were population 
control, h-iman resource development, development administration, agriciltnire, 
savings and taxes, exchange rate adjistment and trade liberalization, and 
indistrial prodiction. It is obviois that this listing covers most economic 
and social measvres appropriate to the development process. The "inmediate 
imperatives" were stated as exchange rate adji stwent and trad.u liberalization.
 
In order to indce reforms in these areas, U.S. efforts were to be 
directed towards the establishment of conditions as benclmarks against which 
performance could be meaoired, as well as pervasion over time. It was 
stated several times that all aid instruimento ane, programs woild be ised to 
indlice policy changes in sectors where each inst,-ment would be most approp­
riate. For example, PL-480 was one instriment ,ised to indiuce change in 
agrililtiral policy. The U.S. planned to use the Confiortinm and the World 
Bank to press for reforms "in order to reduce the political context of such 
pressure." 
In a more detailed discission of the policy refoxm. mentioned above, 
it was stated thf.at primarily persliasion woild be "sed to indvce self-help 
rather than any more formal and explicit method. The only reforms to which 
program loans w.;ere explicitly linked ware exchange rate adjlstment and trade 
liberalization.
 
As a reoilt of the India/Pakistan war of September 1965, b.dgetar 
expendiu1ires for defense rose sharply and between FY 1965 and FY 1966, doibled. 
After the conclvsion of the war, this became "the most serious and inediate 
issvie between Pakistan and the U.S. . . . " U.S. efforts were then additionally 
directed towards expli, it contairment of Pakistan's defense expenditures. 
In sluf.ci y, the U.S. has attempted to influence n'miero es aspects of the 
economy so as to ene,,re that Pakistan's development progress woild be satis­
factory. Dit in only one area, trade policy, does it appear that the program 
loan was -ised as an explicit tool of leverage. 
B. Did Pakistan meet thepterformance standards of the pr rog loans? 
Thruughonit the entire period of the program loan, the USAID stressed the 
importance of import liberalization. Import liberalization was justified on 
the grouinds that economic growth in Pakistan rexpired a larger and more 
flexible inflow of raw materials and intermediate goods primarily to sipply 
the existing industrial plant and essential agricliltiral inpits. It wouid 
also permit the market mechanism to more efficiently allocate resources than 
the c-mbersome and complex systep, of controls that existed in Pakistan. 
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How siccessfil were USAID efforts? There were a number of shifts in
 
Pakistan's policy in this sector. These were due in part o changes in the 
level of foreign exchange reserves, incliding the major decline in 1966 noted 
above, and to the serioi s disriptive aspects of the India-Pakistan conflict 
of late 1965. B.it, asoide from these breaks, the general trend was a favor­
able one. A NESA region docynment sumarizes the oltcome as follows: "by 
Janiary 1968, when 80 per cent of ind@,strial raw materials and spare parts 
were rinder limited or no controls and entered at 50 per cent or more above 
par vallie, we concllided that a satisfactory str'icbire for achieving oir 
objectives had been set." 
The first major move in import liberalization was taken in January 1964 
with the intord',ction of a free list of fouir major iron and steel items which 
caid be imported from the U.S. under the A.I.D. program without preliminary 
issuance of an import license. Sibseqvcently, this list was e;panded to in­
clu7de a total of 51 items and then in J ly 1965 expanded to 56 it.ems. The 
free list was sispended in the fall of 1965 as a resilt of the hostilities 
wi~h India, the vispension of U.S. aid commitments andj the delay in new 
Consortium aid. In FY 1966, the free list was introduced for 31 items and 
then at the beginming, of FY 1967 it was expanded to inclde 66 items. 
However, this liberalization vas hedged by restrictions. Dririg the fiscal 
year, fDrther restrictions were imposed as a resuIt of delays in non-project 
aid and the overall shortage of foreign exchange. For examiple, in December
 
1966, the State Bank issued a reqiirement that all free list imports financed 
by Pakistan's own foreign exchange reqviired advance approval by the Bank, a 
retreat from previuis liberalization efforts. 
In presenting its FY 1967 loan recommendation, the USAID concluded that 
the GOP performance in the first half of 1967, "coupled with the statement 
of intended action for the second half of the year appears to be reasonable
 
feJ.fillment" of the U.S.-GOP understanding. 
Pakistan introd-.ned an interim six-month policy in July 1967. This 
policy redo'iced the fzee list to 10 items; these accviint for abunt two-thirds 
of the voliime cP the prev-.ous list of 66 items. Fifty-three items were 
shifted to the bon,'s list and a new cash-cuim-bonuis category was introdnced 
for nine items. Under this system, an importer had to surrender bons
 
vouichers covering 50 percent of his desired license entitlement in order to 
obatin a license. In Jily 19, 1967, seven itene were removed from the bonis 
list on the gronds thmt there was Emfficient domestic prod'ction. 
In November 1967, the GOP introdiced a nvmber of import and export 
measnres in response to the United Kingdom devaluation. The USAID concliuled 
that the "asctions taken immediately were appropriate balancing or holding
operations." Initial steps were taken for fiuire exchange rate reform by 
redNicing the variety of export rates in existence. Several of the many 
measires taken by Pakistan were advocated by the Mission.
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In Janary 1968, the Mission reported the introd,,ctin of a new Import 
policy which "meets hopes and expectations for significant liberalization." 
The policy rediced controls over a large nimber of raw materials, inter­
mediate and spare part imports and, at existing voicher prices, this -will 
raise the effective price of foreign exchange by aboit 85 percent above par
 
valie for over half slch imports, conclided the Mission. This new policy 
introdiced a free list, cash-im-bonvrs list, a bornms list and a license list. 
Althogh this new policy covered the period Janiary - Ju'ne 1968 only, the 
Mission said that the GOP "made the point that the general pattern is expected 
to be followed for the next several periods."
 
A review of these developments indicate that Pakistan's efforts to
 
reduice its import controls was infl,'enced to a large degree by the availability
 
of external resouirces and Pakistan's balance of payments siti'ation. Pakistan
 
was particularly willing to redice its controls when its external position
 
was satisfactory. Restraints were re-imposed in part when its reserve
 
position deteriorated and/or external aid was insufficient. Althouugh the
 
GOP appears to accept the theory that a free market mechanism is the best
 
means of achieving efficient reso'irce allocation, its actions are in part
 
responsive to the aboc.e constraints. Overall, the record shows that Pakistan
 
has introdliced import liberalization measures within the constraints imposed
 
by the availability of ex-ernal resoirces. 
On a nimber of fronts where the negotiating objectives were less clear
 
c',t there have also been favorable developments. Priority has been given
 
to development rather than to defense, and the defense bidget was reduiced
 
to about three percent of GNP after reaching a peak of abolit five percent
 
shortly after the war. Th, revised Third Plan (1965-1970) places priority
 
emphasis on agriciltral development and has given additional resoirces to 
credit instiitions which spport private indlitry. Finally, in 1967, the 
GOP initiated a major campaign to curb population growth. 
C. 	 Did A.I.D. get leverage that can be attribited specifically to the 
poram loans? 
One important qiality of the program loan was its ability to transfer
 
rapidly and efficiently a level of resoirces that made import liberalization
 
possible. In jistification of the FY 1965 loan, it was stated,
 
"External assistance in the form of commodity grants and loans
 
has enabled Pakistan to make ise of a relatively fast moving
 
and flexible form of aid, which finances the importation of
 
raw materials, spare parts and general equipment for indistry,
 
and sipplements the amo,,nts that can be made available for these
 
items from Pakistan's own foreign exchange earnings." 
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A jiine 19v6 cable from the Mission indir;ated that both pirposes are 
served by the program loan, ie. it gets necessary resoirces to the GOP and
 
indices it to ne3ertake specific self-help measures. The cable stated that,
 
"2. Acting Director stressed need for bold action in present sitnatior . . .
 
Shoaib indicated he trikes some chances; if U.S. assurances regarding second 
$70 million reasonably Lass1ire~d he wo,,!u expand present 7ree impor_ iit 
to inclide all 56 items on original FY 1965 Free List, 'pluis some others'." 
There is other evidence that import liberalization was dependent ,ipcn
 
the amount of reso'rces made available by the program loan. As late as
 
1967, the USAID stated, "Until recently the scope of import liberalization
 
was determined by estimates of non-project aid availability." Since then, 
emphasis has turned toward establishing a foreign exchange system which 
allows the price mechanism to determine the level aind allocation of import
 
resources. 
The FY 19 68 Program Assistance Paper (dated Febriary 1966) stated that 
the U.S. efforts to stress a market-oriented import policy ust with little
 
success becalise the additional resources to finance the increase in imports 
were not available. And the FY 1969 Program Memorandum (dated A,iglist !967) 
stated that diring the year 'he delays in non-project aid and a shortage of 
foreign exchange led to a reinstitution of some import controls by the GOP. 
The program loan did in fuct assizt in in.di:cing some import liberalization 
in Pakistan. However, there were considerable shifts in governament import 
policy in response to the level of resoirces made available and Pakistan'.­
overallbalance of payments position. Ths, the leverage i 'id whs impartant in 
indicing self-help in this area, along with any leverage ciality per oe that 
the program loan mechnaism may have. The plain fact is that a progiam loani 
is sich an apt instriment for sipporting import liberalization that this 
aspect of its ise and its uise for leverage cannot really be separated. 
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IV DETERMINANTS OF LEVERAGE 
A. The Loan
 
1. Size of Loan
 
Since 1962 U.S. program assistance to Pakistan has remained at a 
high level relative to foreignaid received from all other sources. Most
 
of the time it approached fifty percent of total aid. It is a matter of 
record that the U.S. has enjoyed a dominant voice in negotiations over aid­
related GOP policies. Granting the complexity of factors th;zt produced 
this level of influence, the relatively high level of U.S. air. demonstrated 
a serious commitment to Pakistan's needs which, in turn, encouraged the GOP 
to give careflil attention to A.I.D.'s policy recommendations. 
2. Chjan Aid LeveJl 
The one case where a changing aid level appears to have been of
 
considerable importance was in FY 1965. The $40 million increase in pro­
gram lending for this year was j1stified only becaise of the T1b13i_%tially 
increased liberalization; the alternative, in the absence of liberalization,
 
wo,ild have been the FY 1964 level of $100 million -- or less. Here again 
the interrelationship between the program loan as a meansi of financing 
import liberalization and as a means of indlicing import liberalization 
defies precise disintanglement. Bit it is clear that the movement to a 
greater degree of liberalization and to a higher level of program avsintance 
came at the same time and that they were related. 
For the remaining years, it seems best to think of them as a con­
tinliation of the $140 million ann,,al level with a hiatus caised by the war 
and some confision from the fact that half the FY 1967 level was fuinded with 
FY 1966 money. After allowing for these, the general pattern is one of
 
continuation of both import liberalization and program loans at relatively
 
high levels.
 
3. Dissipation Tr-i 
There is no evidence that leverage from program loans diminished over
 
time in the case of Pakistan. Those who were associated with the loan nego­
tiations and with the continuling discission of Pakistani development problems
 
feel that, on the contrary, there was a perceptible growth of A.I.D.'s in­
fluience over the years. There was an increased degree of Drit-ial agreement 
regarding the goals and strategies most favorable to development and, there­
fore, less frictican over the definition of mit-ially satisfactory loan con­
ditions. This resuilt was probably dvie to the Mission's emphasis on perslading 
the GOP to view proposed measires as its owm proposals before they became 
loan conditions. 
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B. The Conditioning System
 
1. Nlimber of Loan Condito-s
 
Few explicit conditionq were attazhed t, program assistance to Pakistan. 
Some of the loans were lightly conditione) and others were free of formal 
conditions. When conditioning w .o erphasis rested on only one or 
twro policy objectives. The . o '.Iier 3 .,stified this procedire oni i].V 
two go:-nis: (1) neither the GOP ,or AJ o had an aderrate staff to deal 
with more than a few major reform object ,y ne time; (2) in Pakistan 
the progran lo-n was normally designed Ao , hesired reform meas'ires 
- e import liberalization -- henc:. I .'. - e-'" introd'ce reformnt. to 
mea.-ires related to other areas of the eco m r.n.. o.ditions. 
2. Specificity of Loan Conditic.-w 
The major explicit condition attached to pror<;an ,,.e that..... was 
of i,ort 'Liberalization. Other self-help conditior. 3 "Jerr ;l.Plty dis­
%,e,...over the yea.irs bt the Mission relied on persioasion u :bhr than written 
condii: - sec.,re, COP on .11 -is x.-,rpresentedto action them. borderline ca, 
by the -,ersttanding" attached to the first ocstwur loan to the effect that 
restrce alloxation policy wolild give top priority to development needs as 
i>pxoed to eo-tansion of the defense sector. 
3. in lih Cond ion n was Cercis.. 
IRiport liberalization waea a consistent and explicit thewe in all 
° 
A.1. prog.zi loan na:oI.iations with the Government ot' Pakistan. Each 
loan, vas Jistified on th,'e grcinds that import liberalization, which was con­
FI-idere- . major -cqlisite for fuirther growth in Pakistan, wold resilt in 
increaseI upuaput levels that the GOP voild be lnable to fnd with its own 
forge .... s.o The loan an meansg _ program was essential of 
pI~art, ia:}. fniu- of imooot rewuirements. The Contry Assistance Strategy 
ta:t:i:.-)ef cernber 196.3, indicated that A.I.D. woild "Be persuasion and 
.t. c.:1. .s a zw aLeiof irfliencing GOP actions in this sector. The 
p:''.:ztia .kandocimrente did not state the precise conditions that womild be 
e .f-or :ny loun, althorgh therea appears to have been considerable U.S./ 
GOPGI s on thc type of reforms that sholild be implemented. Generally, 
werO given In sIpport of actve.l t:rade liberalization measures with con­
c,-,rrenb stakmernts ,;o the effect that additional reforms in this area were 
necessary. There also was a contini(pis bit ].ess 'irgent dialoguie between 
,the US 1 the on variou,- that desired.AD aand GOP the other pol.cy refo.mns were 
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4. _gor of Loan Enforcement 
The approach nsed by Lhe U.S. to influence Pakistan's policies 
differ in degree from -the approach 'ised elsewhere, particularly in Latin 
America. Tile conditions set by the US. (and the Consortium) were generally 
stated in broad terms witholit explicit and precise targets established and 
witholit specific time liLmits set in performance. Negotiations did indeed 
take place with the GO? and program revieus were made in depth by the U.S. 
and the World Bank (for the Consortim)o Nevertheless, there was no formal 
stipilation that finds woild be released contingent ipon specific GOP per­
fonuance nor were conditions presented in a detailed written form as was done, 
for instance, in ClAP letters, The enforcement technique iised in some cases 
was however a ve-:4r rigorous one, i.e. to postpone the signing of loans irntil 
the desired conditions had in fact been met. tis this general approach any 
less siccessfil than the more detailed approach applied to some other 
cointries? Apparently not, for Pakistan has introdiced many of the types 
of reforms recommended by the U.S. and other donors. However, one cannot 
thereby conclude that this attitude toward enforcement applied in Pakistan 
wolild be eqally prodlictive in other contries confronted with a far dif.­
ferent set of development problems.
 
C. Eniviromijental Factors 
1. National Politics
 
The competence of segrments of the GOP, and government stability and 
cormilzent, established a favorable environment in which efforts to refoa 
and modernlz-e the economy were possible. Development planning and implemen­
tation was rather sophisticated Eanld dvring the second Five Year Plan, Pakistan 
made major economic gains. The assistance rendered by, the Harvard Group and 
the national leader3hip of President Aylb and Finance Minister Shoaib appear 
to have been importan't, factoi's in Pakistan's forward movement. The degree 
of U.S. influence ,as favorably effected by these. conditions. Firther, this 
environment allowed the ission to deal with the GOP on all of its develop­
ment policies irrespective of, and unrelated to, any one specific aid instri­
ment. As the FY 1965 Program Memorandim stated: 
"Broad policy changes . . , sectoral policy changeo . 
and self-help measires have been and will continue to 
be plirsied as part of olr general aid relationship and 
on individial programs." 
It is obvious from an overall reading of the U.S.-Pakistan experience 
that U.S. influence was efficiently directed, and favorably received, be­
cause of the responsiveness of the GOP and its own ability to direct Pakistan's
 
development progress.
 
2. U.S.-Recipint Dipointtic Rf--lations 
Aside from the period of the Indian-Pakistani War in 1961, U.S.-GOP 
relations have been friendly. Two principal factors have combined to pro­
duce this climate for negotiations. First, the GOP has accepted a foreign 
role in the formulation of its development, program. Perhaps becalvse A.I.D. 
negotia-tors relied on perslasion rather thaii on threats to win GOP acceptance 
of desired policy actions ad certainly becaise A.ToD. made allowances for 
the limited political power of GOP negotiators over diLssenting government 
colleaglies, the relationship was free of constant friction and occasional 
crisis. Secondly, U.S. aid to Pakistan was sometimes clearly and always 
in some degree measured by the cru.rrent assistance program to India. A.I.D. 's 
care to avoid charges of favoritism in this respect was a necessary condition 
for the maintenace of continlied good relations throighoit the period. 
3. M'ljtilateralisn 
As mentioned in section !I.F. above, the U.S. planned to use the 
Consortium and the World Bank to press for reforms of all kinds. The Pakistan 
Consortim, set ,ipin 1961, incl,des nine donor colintries iunder the Chair­
manship of the World Bank. The members of the Consortim meet to review 
economic progress amd actually pledge specified. aynaints of aid to the re­
cipient. Prior to Consortiuna meetings, the Bank sends a team to review 
Pakistan's progress and assess the need fcr external resoairces. The Bank 
report then becomes the focus of discission at the meeting. In its report, 
the Dank siggests various policy prescriptions in such areas as foreign trade, 
inv-stment allocation and fiscal and monetary policy. These reviews are 
low-key and do not explicitly siggest that the level of aid wolId depend 1pon 
futire self-help activities; lieal]ly aid was given in response to satisfactory 
reviews of past perfonmance. Obviosly, there may always be an Iplicit 
threat 12)at aid would not be forthcoming, or wolId be reduiced, if reforms 
were not implemented. Nevertheless, this approach does differ from the 
formal and exlicit tranche .-. ease process vised in Latin America. The 
individlial members also present their views on areas requiring policy re­
forms and a general consensus is developed representing the views of the 
Consortilm as a whole,
 
The U.S. role in the Consortium is intensive, and it i somewhat 
difficlult to speak of Consorti-m inflence without considering the impact 
of the U.S. on Consortium policy prescriptions. At the same time the 
World Bank also has been active in this area and in its in-merois bilateral 
disclissions with the GOF clearly indicated that reforms were necessary if 
Pakistan expected to receive adequate assistance. The U.S., the World 
Bank and the Consortium did make effort to influence govermnent policy 
across-the-board. Assistance was given to Pakistan us,ually because it had 
introdiced reform measures which were in line with the general recommenda­
tions made by the donors. For eyample, at the Sixth Consortiuim meeting 
(July 1964), the Chairman stated that in the previous meeting "views were 
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expressed on the need for the Pakistan Government to take action to free 
the economy from some of its controls /in7 emphasized the importance of 
moves to liberalize the import program." As Pakistan "has now adopted the 
kind of import liberalization this groip has been 'irgingher to lindertake 
the members of the Consortim to help Pakistan in . . . it is now lip to 
she needs . . is non-projectcarrying oit this program. The kind of help 
aid to bolster her foreign exchange resolirces against the possibility of
 
a drain on them arising from this program." There is no evidence that the
 
U.S. or the World Bank formally "threatened" to withhold aid if specific
 
this "threat" is implicit in anymeasures were not lindertaken. (Obviously 
aid program and may resilt from developments in the donor countrY as well 
as in the recipient.) Only at the time of the India-Pakistan war was aid 
-- economic and military -- withheld by the U.S. and the Bank, but this was 
not the only, reason why hostilities
a fact not a threat. It was one, buit 
ceased 5etween these two countries; world opinion and domestic economic
 
repercissions obviously affected this decision.
 
The Consortiim related its offers to aid to Pakistan to the
 
recipient's past performance in specific policy areas and at the same
 
Among the Consortiim recom­time recommended further changes in policy. 

mendations were the following:
 
(1) Import liberalization, incl,-ding a consolidation of the free
 
list to eliminate inconsistencies and bottlenecks;
 
(2) Restraining deficit financing. The Consortim slggested
 
that revenle be increased by raising direct taxes, particularly
 
those having higher agriiltiral incomes;
 
(3) Control of pqui'ilation growth;
 
(4) Relaxation of domestic controls; and 
(5) Increased emphasis on agriciltral developiaent.
 
Th3se recommendations have been made in one form or another since
 
The World Bank and the U.S. continually em­initiation of the Consortim. 

phasized that more and more assistance was necessary in the form of non­
project aid rather than project aid, and the Consortiun indeed has moved 
sharply in this direction. Most of the U.S. and Consortium aid in recent
 
years has been in the form of non-project loans. Does this necessarily in­
dicate that inflnence mainly reslilted becaiise of the specific aid instriment 
lised, i.e., the program loan? The program loan was the appropriate form of 
aid reqvired to support import liberalization. At the same time, t>, 
. existence 
of an international mechanism which coordinated donor aid policies and which 
had at its disposal a vast amoint of. funds to slipport Pakistan's reqlirements 
and programs, was an important factor in affecting the direction which de­
velopment policies wo-ild take in Pakistan. The Consortim approach was low­
key and made "recommendations" and "siggestions" to the GOP rather than at­
taching "conditions" to assistance. Given these factors, Consortimm/World 
Bank inflmence and leverage might have been quite effective regardless of
 
the form of aid. CONFIDENTIAL . 
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COCLUSIONS
 
1. 	 The USAID Mission did attempt to influence Pakistan's development

policies and programs and did use program loans as one means of doing so,
thri'gh support of import liberalization measures. This is the main concliision. 
2. 	 In addition, slibceqlient to the India/Pakistan war, re-establishment
 
of development priorities and limitation of defense ex)Tenditlires were major 
conditions. As regards policy changes in these two areas, the program loan
 
sholild not be given sole, or possibly even major, credit for the viccess 
which was achieved. Other factors played a role, e.g.,
 
(a) 	The war, coipled with bad harvests, had a serivis adverse
 
effect on 
the economy of Pakistan. The domestic depression
 
which ensued as well as world opinion indolibtedly were ir­
portant factors in Pakistan's retirn to development priorities;
 
and
 
(b) The pootponement of the Consortiiim in September 196. and
 
the cessation of U.S. aid reduced total external resource 
availabilities to Pakistan. It was stedfastly affirmed 
that aid from all donors would be reimed only if tha war 
ended and Pakistan plt into effect the prioritie- mentioned 
above. As this factor inclided total external aid rosouirces 
it wolild be simplistic to credit the program loan per 5e 
with 	 the major share of inflience. 
3. The program loan had certain chaxacteristics which made it
particularly appropriate a of influencing importas means liberalization. 
First, program loans supplied the typfe of co~nodities ...raw materials,
intermediate goods and agriultiiral inpu'ts -- which the Mission an6 the 
Consortim considered an essential recquirement for firther growth of the 
economy. Second, it sippl-ed a large part of the total antit, of re­
solirces needed to sipport the increase in imports resulting from the 
liberalization measuires. TYvs, it is exceedingly difficilt, even in this 
one area, to separate o'it and credit a leverage q ,ality per se to the pro­
gram 	loan instriment.
 
4. Pakistan's performance and policy changes can be credited to 
factors other thandirect U.S. influence. The GOP, or segments thereof 
consisted of responsive, capable and dedicated persons interested in social 
and economic progress. The Harvard Groip, -the World Bank and the Consortiimn 
played active and vital roles i'n ensuiring that appropriate policies were 
undertaken. Government stability allowed for a basic policy continivim which 
might not have been possible in a more instable political environment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
 
Balance of payments support has been a central component of U.S. assistance to 
Turkey since the inception of the aid program. The first program loan was made in 
FY 1963, replacing at about the same level the DS/SA cormodity import grant p:-ogram 
has been a program loan each year since. Tb-ough FY 1966of earlier years. There 
these loans remained near the $70 million mark, but by FY 1968 the level was down 
sharply to $40 million. 
U.S. Official ComnmomLrt Aid to Turkey 
$millions obligated or granted) 
LL61 6Y FY66 FY7 Fy68HSA FY61 iFYY60 FY 62 
-0.2 - -0.3Grants 66.9 99.8 80.8 79.0 56.0 52.8 4.7 
35.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 65.0 40.0
Program Loans 

in the FY 1964 loan and continued through FY 1967.A two-tranche system was introduced 

It matched the Turkish semi-annual import accounting system, thus permitting each
 
txanche release to be related to a discrete import program. With the FY 1968 loan,
 
all ftinds were released at once.
 
A technical assistance program has continued throughout the period, averaging
 
around $4 million since 1960. PL-480 Title I prog'rams began in the early 1950's as
 
well. The Title I level jumped from $20 million in F 1961 to $100 million in Fy 1962,
 
F1 1966 andback to $43 million in each of the next three years, to $13 million in 
to zero in FY 1967. PL-480 Title II grants have been made for many years, mostly 
through volantary relief agencies. 
Project lending started in the late 1950's. FKxcept for the $120 milLion FY 1961 
loan for the Eregli Steel P2ant, the level of projeot lending was relatively modest 
until 1FY 1964. Since then it has averaged around $60 million per anm.a--almost 
equal in size to the program loan component. 
ignores the military aid program, which has been maintained at aThis discussion 

high level aince the late 19401s.
 
For many years the U.S. was the only major donor operating in Turkey (although 
significant amounts of supplier credits and other less concessional capital flows 
were provided by various European countries beginning in the mid-1950's)o West 
Europeans considered Turkey's perenial balance of payments deficit and other 
Consortiumeconomic difficulties to be primax:ily American problems. The Turkish 
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was formed in 1962, under the aegis of OECD, mainly as a U.S.-inspired means of 
increasing aid from other donors. The non-U.S. aid share rose from 10% (on a
commitment basis) in 1960 to 60% in 1967. The U.S. argued in Ankara and in the
OECD that other major donors had comparable interests in Turkish economic prosperity,

and these arguments bore fruit.
 
The Consorti-n members include all the major developed donor countries (exceptJapan), plus IP/D,'IDA and the EEC's European Investment Bank. The Consortium got
off to a slow ,tart (1965 w;as the first year it mustered the resources agreed by
its members to be required) and has not yet developed the strong common position 
on economic reform which has been achieved by IERD-led Consortia elsewihere (reportedly,
only the IBRD and EFIB have shown interest in self-help conditions for Turkey). Thus,
in repvaecnting its own bilateral interests ar;d as the only locally based spokesmanfor the Consorti.;-ii aid agencies, the USAID Mission often has been alone in trying
to influence GOT developm nt policy. 
This has not been the case, however, for monetary and fiscal policy. The B4F has
concluded a Stand-by agreement with Turkey every year since 1960 (the figure hasflij.-1ta ed between 421.5 and $37.5 million). Each agreement haLs described monetary 
-.nd fio'cal nonditions which the GOT was expected to meet. Most conditions included 
qua1-torny or semi-annual indicators. Thus, in this important policy area, LheU.S. has .ot had to take the lead. Further, though relations with the IMF are close,
xhfe U.,S. has not tried 1o influence the shape of the annual INF-Turkish agreement. 
T.u'key, With a population of' 33 million, rece..i.ved twice as much annual U.S. progr&a
loan aid per capita as Pakitan, and four times as much a T-dia. As a percentage
of' 1;,he TulAkisi Lotal imoort bill, however, U.S. program loans have run at about 
the same ftgzue rs they ha- in most other program loan counta'ies, including 
Latin Aimerica (10%). 
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II. CHRONOLOGICAL ACOCUNT OF TUJUsV. 'XERIENCE 
A. Pre.V-F 
Amual negotiations w.ere held to determine the size of the Sk balance of payments 
grant. The negotiated figivre invariably fell below the Tur-kish request, but the 
discrepency could be explained by lower J.S,. estlmates of the payments gap. Self­
help criteria were not, plugged into the formula. Such !angua.ge a. the followi.ng 
was used by the Mission in that period: "in isome cases it wi.l be useful -to 
indicate to the GOT that unless certain measues are taken, farther technical 
assistance and/or development loans in that particular sector would not appear use­
ful," but it is clear that the threat was rarely conveyed and never related to the 
aid level in general or to the program grant in particul.r. 
The reason was frankly stated in the FY 1963 Field Proposed Program submitted in 
December 1961: "we have interests in Turkey, primw.rily military in character, which 
must not be jeoparidized by abortive attempts to force econc'mic reform." The fact 
that such attempts were prejudged abortive is attributable to two considerations 
prominent in the thinking of both GOT nd Mission officials. that without-.. vast 
structural changes a balance of payments deficit was unavoidable in the near future, 
and that the U.S. G verament wodd not rish losing its strategic position in Turkey 
by withholding balance of payents support in case of poor performance. Moreover, 
the Turks were firmly convinced t.hat in their military/political postutre they 
were already furnishing more than adequate justification br U.S. aid. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. did mna".e some atteinpt and enjoyed some success In influencing 
the cotuse of GOT economic policy. This is particularly true of the period after 
1960, when a young and progressive military reginiie took over from the Menderes 
govexment. IAccordlng to documents of the period such influence w.as extended in 
informal wcr2.y.-discussions and lette'..s of recommendations rather t5han demands and 
signed agreements. TLrkish officials were particularly sensitive to any act that 
could be interpreted by the opposition as concessions to foreigners, and would 
probably have rejected aid out of hand rather than be forced into a compromising 
position. U.S. influence was attributable to no specific componenrt of the aid 
program, though the commodity import grant opened a door to discussion of balance 
of payments problems that otherwise mi.ght have been shut. In the December '1961 
program submission a host of self-help measiux'es "which USOM believes can and should 
be undertaken by the GOT" were listed by sector, including planning, education, 
wa.er resources, manufacturing, agriculture and an omnibus "genora." sector. 
A dialogue on many of these matters bad long since been establishad. In this and 
other documents of the pre-FY 63 period the MissIon clairimed a share of the credit 
for (1) establishment of the State Plaivming Office in September 1961 and formulation 
of the First Five Year Plan 1963-'196, (2) prelirinary investigation of the finances 
of the State Economic Enterprises and first steps toward their reorganization and 
rationalization, (3) introduction of an a'ricuWtural income tax, (4) a new policy 
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on population, and (5) various other self-help accomplishments. The degree of the
 
M1ission's influence in these areas can be questioned, but it had clearly established
 
an interest in, and probably had some influence on these matters. Since there is 
no evidence that whatever influence the U.S. had was attributable to aid conditioning,
 
we must suppose that it stemmed simply from a healthy relationship between GOT and 
Mission personnel., GOT respect for U.S. views on economic reform, and the GOT's own
 
desire (after 1960) to do many of the things that Mission advisers ,wereadvocating.
 
B. FY__ j mi.lion 
FY 1963 saw the beginning of the transition from grant to loan commodity import 
finance. $35 million of DL funds were authorized in June 1963 (and agreed in
 
September), to help cover licensing of imports under the July-December "Eleventh
 
Import Program," in effect enabling orderly deliveries through the first half of
 
FY 1964.
 
In keeping with the self-help theme then beginning to be enunciated in AID/W, the
 
Mission attempted to write into the loan agreement four rather mild covenants on
 
GOT economic policy. An AID/W communication to Ankara endorsed the move, stating
 
that "we wish to reaffirm the principle that Program Loans be utilized to establish
 
and promote more effective working relations, with conditions on basic policies such
 
as those contained in the first four program loan conditions. Furthermore, the GOT
 
must be brought to recognize that future program loans will be reviewed in light 
of performance on these policies." AID/W noted that explicit conditions had been
 
successfully negotiated in Latin America, India and Pakistan (the allusion to India 
and Pakistan appears to have been fanciful).
 
The Mission replied that it was attempting to develop a course of action which would
 
satisfy the new A.I.D. thinking on the tightening of criteria, but the negotiators
 
had to recognize they were working from a base of 15 years of generous, untied aid.
 
The Mission also complained that AID/W may have delayed approval of the draft
 
covenants too long, since there was no longei' sufficient time for a soft sell approach
 
to the GOT before the end of the 1963 fiscal year. 
As it turned out, -the confrontation between the Mission and the Ministry of Finance
 
was c].ose to disaster. Memduh Aytur, Secretary General of the Organization for
 
International Econiomic Cooperation (in the Ministry) summarily rejected any explicit 
conditioning lanfage in the Agreement, and, when the U.S. tried to substitute side 
letters authenticated by the Minister of Justice, rejected them as well. Of no 
avwl were Mission protestations that the conditioning language, which asked only
for consultation before GOT tool action in stipulated fields closely related to 
trade policy, was softer than that executed -lsewhere. Aytur agreed in full to the 
substance of the conditions. Buhavigorously asserted that U.S. insistence on written
 
commitments was not only a breach of sovereignty and a profession of no confidence,
 
but a pocr way to reward the Turks for ItheJi demonstrable achievements since the
 
revolution of 1960, as well as a strange way to close out a grant progrm and shift
 
to loans.
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In the period June-August 1963, the ground rules for the conditioning process in 
Turkey were gradually hammered out. The system eventually agreed upon was to 
include a Preamble to the Agreement which referred to the few broad areas of 
economic policy in which GOT performance would be subject to critical review in 
succeeding negotiating sessions. No economic indicators were listed among the 
conditions. No tranche mechanism was established in the F1 1963 agreement. Over 
the next five years this conditioning sy.cem %as gradually tightened, but one of its 
most visible properties--the absence of explicit, writ-en conditions involving 
specified public policies in any bilateral document signed by the GOT--remained 
unchanged. 
C. FY 196.+: 70 ML)_lion 
In January 1964, four months after the signing of the F. 1963 loan, A.I.D. pledged 
at the Turkish Consortium meeting $70 million in program funds for FY 1964. The 
loan was signed in April 1964. It was released in two tranches--$30 million in June 
and $40 million in August. 
In terms of formal aid conditioning, the FY 1964 loan agreement was slightly F Ve 
explicit than the previous one. There was, as there had been in F( 1963 and )uld 
be in most later agreements, the standard "whereas" clause in the Preamble .gh­
lighting the three or four major priorities of economic policy. 
"Whereas the U.S. Government recognizes that the Government of 
Turkey is undertaking to accelerate its economic development 
in stability and within the framework of the Five Year Plan 
approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly; . . ." 
There was also a clause among the Conditions Precedent which explicitly linked the 
release of the Second Tranche to Section 201(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 as amended, the section which enjoins the U.S. President in a DL determination 
to consider alternate sources of finance, technical soundness, relation to develop­
ment, the country's responsiveness to the needs of its people, and demonstrable 
self-help. The Turks were imhappy about including the last two points, which they 
considered bordering on written evidence of interference with economic policy. But 
they signed anyway. In the Program Assistance Paper submitted in February 1964 the 
Mission remarked that this conditioned second trarcbe mechanism would give it an 
additional opportunity to discuss economic performance with the GOT. However, other 
material indicates the Mission was riot as enthus:.astic as AID/W about using this 
device. Furthermore, the issue seems not to have been brought up prior to release 
of the second tranche; in any case, there was no delay in releasing the tranche. 
Aside from these nominal shifts in formal conditioning, there was also a sharpening 
of the leverage philosophy. In the first LAS review (September 1963), it was argued
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that a minimum of $40 million in program Loan iunds was needed annually to protect 
the U.S.'s politico-military position in Turkey. Above that figure "the U.S. has 
the opportunity to consider (IOT ;-rform rre in implementing the development program 
viithout endangering itsas a factor in determining its voum of aisistance ... 
LAS ,arn:ed that since political and military re­security interest." Elsewh..re the 
quests on top-level Turks were frequent and drew heavily on Turkish g(ocA will, only 
the most urgeni and essential development self'-nelp issues should bc rresented. But 
this "go slow" polic; also reflected 	the previous creditatle performance of' thc 
Turkish authorities. :2,ly if the 511 aoandond- its p:,olicy o.' pianned, coordinated 
rapid development and fiscal responsibiity, the LAS said, would it be appropriate 
U. S. to consider attac-hir,' stricter 	eond_"tiens.for the 
serf aus the Mission was aboutIt is hard tW determ.ine from thy written record how 
conditionir aid on performance. On the one hand, it "rnuicated it was prepared to 
scre's on the Turka if + ey didn't do well, in the other hand, it saidtighten the 
that the Turks w,,ere in a"t doing wKI and U. S. interf.renr. ''as unncecessary 
was incidental toObviously, the debate over what to include in the Lcan Arreerert 
the fundamental issu, , of self-hNe and leverale. The ecO' 057 was prforming well. 
The GOf was perforrixn very wel!i in f'iscal and monetary y' an ;o.rea on 'n,hich 
USAID did not f'oc,s its c:onve'r sations with the 7fl but dide :rhe (0T aware of' 
latent USAID anziuty o.uuld 'l' stability indicators be exceeded, The rGT was also 
performing satisfactorily in twc areas which U]SAID did stress -- reorganization of' 
the State Economic Enterprises and compre ensbi.ve 1-±rm:ing. Tho ;issio,; Director 
had addressed several letter' to, the suggesting4i iMovements the of'GOT p in field 
foreign exchange ,arnings, particu orly in exports, tourism and workers remittanc,.s. 
of rOT con-There had been no J.r'o.ress in this lield for years and little evidence 
cern. Hut USAID in FY 1964 ,'as only belinnin to gear1up for a major assault on 
foreign exchange policy, and couldn't Eave faulted the GOT for not meetini. U. 2. 
priority recommendations in this area since they had not been previously communiated. 
D. F 1965 'Ci rllicri 
An FY 1965 pro';rar loan agreement for $70 million was signed in January 1965. This 
was to be released in two tranches, the first immediately and the second, for sum 
in fact, the second was released ahead of schedule. The$30 million, in July. 

original authorization had specified 	 $80 million for FY 19655, but Mission and AID/W 
from the original agreem,.ent in hopes of proddingstrategy was to withhold $1O million 
other donors into increasing their contributions and forcing the G00t to take action 
on two specific projects (local cost financing at Eregli and access roads for CEETO
 
stations). In two separate actions ($4.2 million in Sept(-ierfoer, *5.8 million in
 
the total to $80 million.
November) the loan agreement was later amended to increase 
the Mission and AIL/I in Ausust and September indicates thatCorrespondence between 
wasGOT compliance with the project requests was assured before action taken to amend 
felt that delaythe agreement. Elsewhere there is evidence that by July the Mission 

in pledging the $10 million had 'induced all the extra Cnsortium aid it was going to,
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and further withholding would be counterproductive. It was clear by then that the 
1965 Consortium fund raising exercise had been successful. Thus, for the first time, 
one could speak of a functioning tranche conditioning process, related to the $10 
million i ncrement. 
The $30 million second tranche, however, was released without any economic review.
 
The loan agresment had omitted reference to Section 201b (or similar economic under­
takings) among the Conditions Precedent and even omitted the Preamble. Except for
 
the handling of the $10 million, the formal conditioning process in FY 1965 was
 
therefore weaker than it had been in FY 1964. This may reflect in part the transition
 
in political power that occurred during this period: the transfer of control of the
 
coalition government from 1r. Inonu's RPP to the reconstituted Justice Party (the JP
 
took power in March, just after the Agreement had been signed).
 
Mission philosophy on program loan leverage had not shifted much, despite a change 
of Mission Directors in the summer of 1964. Given the Anerican political and military 
interest in Turkey, there was still thought to be little scope for manipulating the 
aid level to induce self-help. The FY 1967 CAP submitted in July 1965 restated the 
maxim that it would be impossible to use the ultimate threat of cutting off aid as a 
bargaining weapon because the creQibility of the threat would have been slight. The 
Mision was even more reluctant to make such a threat explicit in the loan agreement. 
It felt insistance on this point would only sour the negotiation process, and would
 
not lead to measurably improved self-help performance. In any case it was not
 
impressed with the argument that self-help performance ought to be one of the primary 
determinants of levels of program lending. The preferred field tactic was to continue
 
the informal dialogue with GOT officials on the few topics which A.I.D. considered 
required priority attention. The Mi,-,sion did not pretend that the results of its 
style of leverage had been or would be striking. It noted that where there was good 
performance it came from the conviction of the Turkish leaders that these policies 
were important. Where there were gaps--"as in foreign exchange earnings"-- there 
had been problems in influencing the authorities to effect changes. Although the 
dialogue had been extensive, much of it had been consumed in wrangling over questions
 
of implementation, such as those connected with the Erc:gli Steel project. There was
 
a limited capacity to influence matters of general policy, and within that constraint 
the Mission felt only a few topics "could be entertained in serious discussions over
 
any particular period." 
Despite continuing doubts as to the ultimate extent of their power, USAID officials 
nevertheless had become convinced that the program loan negotiation was the effective 
focal point of discussions about economic policy. They felt the fact of the loan, 
rather than the threat of its withdrawal, provided an entree to important decision 
centers and thtat American opinions would not be disregarded. In a commuriation 
dated December 1964, the Mission reminded AID/W that in practice there was no explicit 
linkage between program aid and the ceaseless . Is- th the GOT on self-help. Rather 
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it was the continuum of exchanges, against the backgrotud of program lending "which 
should lead to those policy changes at which we are aiming." 
In mid-1965 the Mission prepared an Assistance Completion Plan, designed to show 
what, generally, the Turks (and the do-ors) would have to do if concessional aid were 
to be phased out by the end of the Second Plan period (1972), as desired by the GOT. 
The USAID negotiating strategy formulated in this context took the following shape. 
Highest priority was given to increasing foreign exchange earnings. A list of 
administrative and legislative changes was proposed, dealing with both commodity 
exports and invisibles. Amor the former, a shift away from traditional export 
crops was advised. Among the latter, workers' remittances and tourism appeare( 
particularly promising. Over *.l above those particulars, the U.S. called for a
 
marked increase in the urg ,ncy attached by "the Governm.ent to increasing foreign 
exchange earnings. The Turkls had grorn accustomed to a stagnant export profile and 
an annual trade deficit, and preferred to avoid the structural adjustments, particu­
larly in the private industrial sector, that their elimination indicated. Needless 
to say, complacency with a level of program loan support in a country destined to 
graduate in the foreseeable future was abhorent to A.I.D. and the Mission was urged 
to toughen its posture on this issue. 
The 	other areas of U.S. emphasis were:
 
1) 	 comprehensive pla , which, after the fanfare accompanying the 
creation of SPO and publication of a Five Year Plan, had not lived up 
to expectations; 
2) 	reorganization and rationalization of the State Economic Enterprises, 
which had annval sales of $1 biTTon7 ounted for 20% of all investment 
in Turkey, but could not finance their ovm expansion programs and were 
inefficient in terms of world prices; 
3) 	 a better deal for private inve rs, includin foivn investors. 
The RPP Government had resumed the statist policies of the pre-DP 
period. Private industry had been practically disenfranchised. 
While all parties shared a distrust of foreign capital, there were 
many opportunities to exploit that source profitably without infringing
 
on national sovereignty;
 
4) monetarv and fiscal stability, which both A.I.D. and the Turks considered 
essential to the viability of the development process, had been
 
handled extremely well (with IMF assistance) since the officers'
 
coup of 1. ,y 27, 1960 put an end to the excesses of the Menderes
 
regime; the U.S. preferred to leave the subject to the IMF, with careful 
monitoring by A.I.D. and other Consortium members to ensure that early
 
warning indicators of a resurge of inflation were recognized and
 
dealt with expeditiously.
 
T 172
 
-9-
E. FY 1966: $70 million 
The FY 1966 loan was signed with the new Demirel Government in March 1966. Two 
tranches were designated ($30 and $40 million the second to be released sometime
 
after June (it was released in August). A Preamble noted GOT intentions to
 
(1) accelerate economic development, (2)maintain price stability, (3) increase
 
foreign exchange earnings and (4) consider plans for import liberalization,
 
The design of the mechanism for release of the second tranche departed from the
 
previous blueprint. Pre-loan negotiations had identified, as usual, the policy
 
areas in which performance was expected. But quantitative tests of performance 
were also established. These included mid-year targets. In theory the second 
tranche would not be released uitil USAID was satisfied with performance, measured 
against those quantitative targets. Thus for the first tiii.i (excepting the $10 
million for EY 1965 increment) a mid-year review was programmed to play a significant 
role in the loan process. Furthermore, the GOT gave tacit approval to these
 
arrangements.
 
The reasons why the USAID shifted to a more formally conditioned tranche release
 
amechanism at this time are clear. During the second half of CY 1965 there was 
sudden spurt of inflation, from an annual rate of 4% to 9%. The new Justice Party 
government seemed somewhat less disposed to deal sternly vith the problem than had 
its predecessor. The USAID, which had long maintained a continuing surveillance 
of stability indicators while leaving the dominant role in the field to the Th4F, 
decided to make an expliciu and forceful assertion of the importance it attached to 
the issue. It did so by adopting explicit conditions as prerequisites to release
 
of the second tranche.
 
Three conditions were set. The first, which incorporated the IMF Stand-by Agreement
 
of February 1966 and a few quantitative fiscal indicators devised by USAID, called 
for the restoration of price stability. The second urged an increase in foreign
 
exchange earnings; various possibilities for accomplishing this were enumerated,
 
with emphasis on tourism and the development of exportable forest and mineral
 
resources. The third condition called for development of ,a program for import 
liberalization. This was a new item in the mix of U.S. proposals. Its introduction 
was predicated on a bolief that the continuing unsatisfactory performance of the 
private sector was as much a function of a hostile import regime as of the discrimi­
natory fiscal policies of the previous administration., The Demirel Government had 
made major accomodations to the private sector elsewhere, but not in the import
 
field, and USAID shifted gears accordingly. But the USAID position had not yet
 
crystalized, since it was not apparent how far liberalization could be pushed without 
reform of the foreign exchange system. Nor was it clear whether devaluation would 
be successful. Economists at the Mission were studying these questions throughout 
1966. Token progress indicators of liberalization were specified, for example
 
moving a few key commodities from the quota list to the free list, but the timing was
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left vague. Several messages between USAID and AID/W indicate that neither
 
was prepared to push the liberalization issue at that time. 
As in previous years, performance was pretty good and it is impossible to 
determine whether poor performance would have interfered with the release of 
the FY 68 loan. Under the tranche process that had evolved in 'Iarkey, the 
original Agreement and release of' the first tranche were supposed to reflect 
U.S. satisfaction with accomrl]ishments of the preceding year, while release 
of the second tranche was pegged to accomplishments up to -June of the current 
year. Most of the indicators in both periods were good. Prices rose rapidly 
after July 1965, but the (GOT moved quickly in the Fall of 19615 to restore 
stability and -- according to the I1,F, the .ission, and all indicators after 
February 1966 -- succeeded. Furthermore, the other major area of U. S. interest 
export earninrZs -- showed spectacular improvement. Commodity exports jumped 10% 
in both 19SK and 1965. Remittances from Turkish workers in r;errany and other 
West European countries soared to $70 million in 1)65 (from $0.l million in 1)63 
and $9 million in 1964), partly because of boom conditions in West Europe but also 
because the GUT had instituted a highly successful exchaige rate premium for 
money remitted to Turkey through legal channels. Furthermore (11P and aggregate 
savings indicators compared very favorably to those of other LdC's. It would 
have been difficult to delay either the siCning of tile Agreement or release of 
the second tranche on perforimce grounds, unless A.I.D. had wanted to take the 
Turks to task for having permitted the credit expansion of 1965, which fed the 
price rise in the first place.
 
But there was a problem with perforimnce, as was highlighted in a June 1966 cable 
from AID/W. In that message, AID/W authorized release of the second tranche but 
refused to accept the favorable review by USAID of Turkish performance. The 
difficulty was in the divergence of macroeconomic performance 9neqaelf-help. 
AID/W noted that while Turkey's econory had performed well this/largely attribu­
table to exogenous forces. GOT self-help was deficient in several demonstrable 
respects. The coffinodity exports that had done well were the traditional agri­
cultural crops, and they simply rode the crest of world demand. The GOT had. 
done little to exploit state-owned mineral and forestry resources, or to breath
 
life into the incipient export promotion campaign. Worker rermittances had been 
encouraged by the GOT, but the main explanation for their fantastic groirth was 
the German labor shortage. Even the fiscal measures taken by the Government to
 
break the inflation of 1965 were subject to criticism. AID/W noted that the 
GOT had chosen to draw down reserves and defer budget expenditures. The pre­
ferred way to eliminate an inflationary fiscal bias would have been to raise
 
taxes, restrict credit and adopt more efficient budgeting procediares. Farther­
more, the SEE Reorganization Committee set up earlier had just completed two 
years of study without resolving the basic problems facing the enterprises, 
most of which had to be subsidized by the central fisc. Finally, the cable 
noted that the GOT was dragging its heels on evaluating the existing foreign 
exchange system. Devaluation had become a leading item on the Mission agenda, 
and apparently AID/W felt the Turkish response was unsatisfactory. In short, 
while economic performance indicators were good, GOT self-help indicators were 
Llot. Appariently A.I.D. did not press these points. Even if it had, it might
 
have found progress hard to make in a perioq when Turkish performance, for what­
ever reasons, was relatively good.
 
F. FY 1967: $65 million
 
The FY 1967 loan was signed in March 1967 and released in tranches of 435 
million (May) and $30 million (September). The significant phrases in the 
Preamble to the Agreement referred to (1) accelerating econoraic development, 
(2) maintaining price stability, and (3) increasing foreign exchange earnings. 
In another clause, the Preamble called attention to an expectation that other 
members of the Consortium would finance up to $45 million of program funds. 
Notably missing from the Preamble this year were references to import liberali­
zation and/or devaluation. But a significant addition to the Agreement was 
language explicitly sanctioning a review to precede release of the second 
tranche, "to be rmade available from July 1, 1967 after a review of' the extent 
to wb-ch the purposes of the loan and the events contemplated herein had been 
fulfilled." 
As usual, conditions for release of' the second tranche were made explicit dur­
ing the negotiations. The emphasis was put on adherence to the If1,V stabiliza­
tion program (including ceilings on Central Bank credit to commercial banks, 
State Economic Enterprises, and the central budget), promotion of exports, and 
the Government's success in securing the $45 million. Import liberalization 
and devaluation were discussed, but since the IMP was reviewing these matters 
with the GkOT A.I.D. deferred relating them to the loan. It made clear, how­
ever, that the next year's negotiations would bring them back into focus. 
One related issue that received considerable attention was aflditionality. The 
U.S. wanted to ensure that the progrmri loan would be matched by a nearly equiva­
lent increase in American exports. This sort of condition is not of' primary 
interest to our study, but it overlaps conditions that are, for example, the 
U. S. share of' balance of payments assistance. It was also tied to import 
liberalization, for the elements of' a program designed to encourage imports
 
from America included many of those designed to encourage imports in general. 
Performance measured by macroeconomic indicators was more than adequate to 
justify the tranche releases. Eyports and worker remittances did very well -­
the latter rising from $70 million in 1965 to $115 million in 1966 (though they 
fell off again in late 1966 and throughout 1967 as a result of the slow-duwn in 
West Europe). The tourist industry enjoyed an unpre-cedented boom. The rise in 
export earnings was offset by an even greater rise in imports, but even that had 
its welcome aspects. The 'JOT had permitted "quota" imports to increase 35%, 
which brought relief to many of the industries which had been working at less 
than full capacity because of a lack of equipment, parts and raw materials. 
Finally, prices had stabilized: the October 196 level was 5%below the 
February high, and no notable increase occlirred thereafter. 
However, as measured against the announced +argets for the second tranehe, per­
formance was less impressive. There was bcth good and bad news. !M credit 
ceilings had been exceeded, but the econof was booming and 11F officials felt
 
the additional liquidity was necessary. On the other hand, the Government had 
run a budget deficit and lost foreign exchanige reserves. Moreover, the 
Consortium financing target had not been met. There was a shortfall of about 
10 million from the $45 million target, which provoked the U. S. Secretary
 
of -the Treasury to advise the President .ither to insist on very rig19
 
additionality terms the next year or plan a much reduced loan, or else risk
 
a continuing drain on the U. S. balance of payments. To the obvious dis­
pleasure of the Secretary, the second tranche was released more or less on
 
schedule.
 
G. 1Y 4968:,;40million 
Owing to the Agency-wide sbortage of funds, DL program loan funds available 
to Turkey in FY 1968 .ere less than in past years. Negoiations were com­
pleted and the Agreement was signed in Ma.%y 1968. There ,)as only one tranche, 
Even before th2 reduced appropiration was announced, the Mission recommended 
a reduction in order to induce action b' the GOT to correct its own balance 
of payments problems. A subtle but sigrificant change in the strategic approach 
to program i ending7 had occurred. In the past, the level of progrm assistance 
had been based on what the balance of paynents requirement was likely to be. 
In 11 68, the lvel was based on what the requirement should be assuming certain 
actions were taken. This was surppoi'ted by the IITM, which was discussing overall 
policy reforms with the r;(]T. The willingness of' the IMF and U. S., as well as 
other lenders to provide supplemental financing should the GUT take appropriate 
actions, was explicit in both dialogues. In addition, other lenders were 
su.,porting the lead being taken by the IMF by keeping a close rein on their 
assistance. This is evidenced by the EPA's decision to grant only a 8ix-month roll. 
over of' its 1t68 debt in order to maintain the pressure. 
The FY 1969 Program Memorandum dated August 1967 spelled out two alternative 
assistance prografs. Alternative A assumed no signi ficant new self-help and a 
contmensurately reduced loan lev,,l; alternative B1 ,.ssumed suitable GUT action on 
import liberalization, export promotion and devaluation and a higher Ican level 
(necessitated in part by the projected increase in liberalized imports). Talk 
of aid conditioning was stronger than before. Success or failure in dealing with 
the principal issues -- including, in addition to those mentioned above, fiscal 
and monetary stability and a majur assault on inefficiency in the Turkish indus­
trial sector (both public and private) -- would be the "principal determinant of 
the U. S. response to Turkey's aid needs." The U. S. reaction to failure was 
plotted as a policy of' great stringency and a minimum maintenance level of pro­
gramT aid (Alternative A). 
By the Fall of' 1967. the rhetoric of p:-ogram loan leverage in Turkey was not 
unlike that in Latin America. The 4is:sion stated that program lending gave it 
"extremely importuit" influence with the government on general policy matters, 
which "undoubtedly would be more difficult to obtain if project assistance were 
the exclusive clannel for aid." The Mission intended to make the relationship 
between U. S. aid and Turkish ucc(omrplishment "as close as possible " The signif­
icant differences from the Latin American model were the absence of jointly 
signed statements and a formal raid-.year review/tranche-release process, the 
Turkish Jumie review being a relatively perfunctory exercise. But the pre-loan 
negotiations were supposed to accomplish the purposes of those mechanisms. 
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iII. THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES 
A. Did A.I.D. tzwto tse the .rogrra_ loan to influence li 
In FY 1963, under the influence of' the increasing stress then being placed
on self-help, the Mission tried to attach a formal conditioning procedure

to itv first rogram loan. Although the Turks were ready to talk with
A.I.D about their policies, they utterly rejected all efforts to get

negotiated performance YonditJors. The most this experience 
 could be said 
to have accomplished is that it established the legitimacy of frequent aid
far-ranging subotantive review..s. But even 
 this Imay well have exiSted already. 
After its initial rebuff, the Mission seems to have gone through period

which 
 little aj.ttmpt was made to use the prograrL loan to influence 
a 
policy. 
in 
The inflationary spurt in i:;.5 and the thinking about an Ass stance C •mrletion Plan revived interest in ,;s. :H: the tool.. Thus, the FY I966 loan strenuously
supported conditions in the iMI' Standby Agreement and went beyond them in some
 
cases . The FY 19o'( pattern was simi.ar,
 
"p19 aid bringing

something about its persistent foreign pa ments deficit. At the same time,
high-level staff changes in -USAID/lakara 

By Fi'Y the level was fal Ling, pressure on the ,.ur to do 
happened to lead to increased interestin aid conditioning. As a result, discussions during the 1968 negotiating
session.. were probably more corrmprehensive, franker, and based on better under­lying staff work ever
than before. Turkey's dominating foreign exchange prob­lem as.nd possible devaluation, Liport liberalization, and expocit promotion

-ea-ures to solve it, featured more prominently than in the past, The KY 1968
loan is fr'rsaliy conditionjed on some 
 (though by no means all) of the policiesdiscussed.
 
B. Did Turkei erform'? 
The performance of the Turkish econory since 1960 bas been impressive. GNPg-ojoth has averaged 5,,4% a year at constant prices. GNP per capita went from$250 to more than $300 in just five years, 1962-67. Gross investment has risen -'o18.5% of ('.U. Growth in agricultural output has averaged nerly 5% per annum 
(since. 19(2),Cgro,,rth in industrial production nearly 10%. Receipts from comanodity
exports, invisibles, and remittances have grown impressively. 
Interpretations of this growthfavorable experience vary. As already noted,
many :observers feel that aithouth the GUi's management has definitely improved
since 19(0 the favorable performance is heavily dependent on fortuitous circum­
stances (especially Turkey's location, which a.lowed it to cash in on the WestEuropean labor shortage and tourism boom) and heavy foreign c,,id. Aslessments 
on 'iurkish self-help also diffir. A.I.D. has been generalli agreeable GOCpolicies toin the 1960's, but few would term Turkey outstanding in self-help. A
crucial question is whether the growth pattern is viable, whether Turkey can go
on as it has (though with reduced aid) without adjusting its long-stable and 
exchange rate and opening up its highly protected stateobviously overvalued 
and private industries to foreign comptition. It is those who think it 
cannot who are most likely to be critical of GOTf self-help todate and moct 
likely to favor tightened aid conditioning. 
has taken. In a countryOne cax. noint to many self-help actions which the GOT 
has run a sound monetary and fiscal policy.with an inflationary history, it 
It has planned and managed its development activities with reasonable effective-
S. no doubt explainedness. Its shortcomings (from the U. point of view) are 
largely by Turkey's culture and history. Al Turkish Governments have distrusted 
as well as the private sector (long dominated byforeign investment and trade, 
eventhe Greek and Armenian iminorities) in general. Yet, rerently the GOT has 
begun to show signs of movement in some of its former bastions of inactivity 
(e.g. the broad export incentives announced recently). Thus while the self-help 
record lacks The glitter of the performance record it is far from bleak. 
C. Did A.I.D. influen c oicy? 
A.I.D. influence in Turkey has been limited by traditionalAs has been seen, 
Turkish antipathy to seeming foreign domination, by the importance of U. S. 
fact that Turkey's economic growth -­objectives other than development, and by the 
been rapid. In the foregoing chronological account,sustainable or not -- has 
was ever really conditioned on Turkishthere is little evidence that program aid 
performance. No aid was withheld or significantly delayed for reasons of non­
that such action was never seriously con­performance, and one gets the impression 
sidered. However, this does not necessarily mean that A.I.D. had no influence. 
influence conditionedNor would it necessarily have had more if' it had aid. 
We have ceen evidence that influence on Turkish policie' was exerted through at 
Any all have been more meansleast four other channel,,. or of these may important 
at very recently.of exerting influence than the program loan, least until 
with the India and Pakistan consortia, the TuarkeyThe Consortiun. As compared 
2onsortium has been a weak toal. of irfluence. For one thing, it was originally 
formed primarily as a means of increasing other donor contributions and multi-
Thus, it has been headed by a German andlateralizing aid to Turkey in general. 
Its head has been 'Less interested in policy
backstopped by the OECD in Paris. 

has staff behind him.than the IBRD consortium heads, and he had a far weaker 
Yet the present head is more interested than his predecessor, and has proved to 
be the most effective means of suggesting policies in the foreign exchange field 
aid it,in particular. If accelerated declines in U. S. do not undernine one
 
can expect more from the Consortium in the future.
 
The iMP. IMF advice has been very wyell received in Turkey, and the U. S. has 
done well in achieving its monetary and fiscal policy ends simply by standing
 
behind the Fund. When it became necessary in 1.966, this stance was reinforcqd
 
through explicit use of the program loan negotiations.
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r aotaro Unlike most of thc' major program loan countries, the
 
Turkey program has retained a large capital project component. Previous
 
U1'AID administrations have asserted that they derived much of their policy
 
influence by conditioning this form of aid. Thus, a copper smelter project
 
was said to have been used to influence the allocation of' industries between
 
the private and public sectors, a coal project to get cost-covering pricing
 
in a nationalized industry, and a power project to prompt a general surrey
 
pointing toward possible reorganization of the industry. We have not examined
 
these claims in detail., but it seems obvious that any influence the projects
 
conferred must Ihave been narrow in scope at best.
 
The continuir, dialo e. F': :ally, veterans of the Turkey ,.ission, like all 
other Missions we have stud .ed, emphasize thot much is achieved informally 
throijgh day-to-day contacts with the, host government. One Cormer Director 
of USAID/Turkey is said never to have participated in program loan negotiations. 
but to have exerted. hi.:: influence in periodic metings with various Ministers. 
This kind of dialogue goes on everywh<ore and it is impossible for us to tell 
whether it is more effecti,' one rlace than another. Probably this depends on 
the energy and ability of the Mission staff, plus the receptivity of influential 
people in the host government. 
D. Can A.I.D. 's inffluence o,: attributed to the .or'rarm- loan? 
Relative to most (perhaps aili ) th, othcr countries .n our study, program lending 
to Turkey has been little conditioned oni the nature of host country policies. 
Even attempts to influence policy without aid conditioning (i.e. through per­
suasion) have ben carried( ot th-ouch sveral channels, of' which program lending 
is probably not the most; important. U. 2. influence is less clearly attributable 
to program lending thar it is in other major country programs. 
To see whether the program l.oan should be accorded any importance at all, one 
must ask whether the same aid level, manager in the same way except r.made up 
entirely of' projects, would have obtained the sane results. It is probable 
that it would not. One USAID/Ankara official cormented that "project aid tends 
to consume its own leverage," leaving little room for influence on general 
policy matters. Thi-is is somewhat exaggerated, however, as the size of' the pro­
jects program and the examples cited earlier of influence derived therefrom 
suggest. Also, s-veral technical assistance projects were aimed directly at 
those institutional bottlenecks -- in ezport promotion, industrial reorganization 
and planning -- upon which the Program loan negotiations were focused. But even 
though the leverage attributable to the sum of the parts of the A.I.D. program 
was larger than that due to the program loan alone, the entree to discussions of 
stabilization and trasle policy must be attributed primarily to the latter. In 
other words, if we shifted from progrm to project loanas, we might lose those 
entrance tickets. It is interesting to note that this is also they conclusion of 
the FY 1969 PM, which tried to answer the same question. 
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IV. DETERMINANT.S OF IJ FL EDC L 
A. The conditionino__jsem 
1. Exlicltness and specificity of conditions. We have argued 
that prhr lending in Turkey h been policy-conditioned only in a very 
general sense. (:rtainly there has neen little or no conditioning, of' a 
highly explicit or specif'ic nats e. 
Turks have s teadfa:stly resisted explicit aid conditioning.As we have seen, the 
Since l-01, they have r';fou~sd to sin any ,:,Teercrnt or side letter containing 
Their stronga coarmiitmrent on economic prolicy ' e/.cetiona. 17 feel.infgs on this 
subject are attrihoted by many cbsrvor= to cultural. and political factors, 
when officials of' the ,ienderesnot excluding txc .,' of' the 25CP puries, 
navin rmao similar tients iorr,.Lthout parliamentaryreiime were :cond.nrmod for 
a:e r-eally that exceptional. (-Inapprova., . + is hard o racept that the Turks 
wonders whether the Mission did not overreact to It 2fj experince and became 
years. After all, the GUiPexcessively reluctant to press conditions Jin ]itr 
agreed to the H4A's stabili zation condit:ions ,..,rd to miltary covenarits with 
'ATQ(though w- ar, told that these ar- mor' acrce table in Turkey). 
evidcence that the absenc:e of written commritments ra.deNevertheless, there is no 
Memduh Aytyr claimed in lJ< that the (1(J was prepareda si .ificant Oiff:rence. 
evn ope icta b ks to A.3D-. His onlyto cons it Infor,:ally on any, sub. et and 
officialson.eation was to having to confirm that offer it. wrlninr , Mission 
from this and later periods seem to agree th thn written commtrnent was im­
to Turkish off i - n. i.nfIluence them was''d onmaterial. They say their access 
not affected by the absence of' sah documntat io. 
to the otherThe specificity of aid ,ondltioninE in Turkey hac Men low relative 
been conditi.once primarily oncountries we have studied, I rogram lending has 
the broad acceptaili t,7 or' Turkish policy, including amicable relations with "che 
F,' I+ loar does A.!I.D. appear to have developed a more[Ml'. On].' with the 

to do to reirtn aidworthy. Eve-n
particularized view of what the r((jl would have 
with the F"Y l 5 loan, ho;ever, the degree of saecia!r- it'! remars relatively 
low; it does not encompa-" q:antitatlve tarets or dated a'L..:i nistrat ve or 
legislative actions, for F/oza.-pl.. 
second tranche releases,2. Enforcement. Performane reviews prior to 
in years when they occurred, appear to have ben perf'unctory. lieither with a 
that money might be heldtranel nor with a rew loan was ther eicer any :indi cation 
up for reasons of nonporformarice . Defenders of the 'Turke;/ program argue that 
mer ito:d. 'ertainly the iopressive overall pe:rformance c_such action wa. ever 
the Turkish economy made it diff'icult to claim that self-help was seriousl.y 
nature of those perforiance conditions whici,deficient. And, givn the q nral 
were de fined, it is prob:abi true that enf'orerment cannot be considered a weak 
link in the conditionirn ys-ter 
or The of' cond itions h; , consis-I -m r condi.tions. nuirber loan 
tently been kept ",Tni may subjets -- in:luding sectoral developmenty 
policies -- have been (2iscussd in the loan negotiations, only three or four 
were cited in the Preamble to the Agreement and later reviewed in relation to 
the second tranch, or the next yearls loan. 
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Areas in which conditions werespecified. To the extent that 
program aid can be said to have been conditionted at all, it has been condi­
tioned on solution of the structural imbalance of Turkey's external trade and 
payments, on monetary and fiscal stability, on increased incentives for domestic 
and foreign private investment, and on rationalization of the State Economic 
Enterprises. Results in the monetary-fiscal area appears to have been very
good. In the balance of payments field, probably the most important for future 
development, significant individual actions have been taken, but the basic prob­
J.em and the need for further policy chang-es remain. On questions of foreign 
private investment, the dividing line fetween the private and pu-,lic sectors, 
and organization of public industries, U. S. influence seems to run into strong

ideological barriers. In these areas, attempts to chanjgre policy through tough 
use of leverage would probably fail. A better, though slc er, tactic is to 
educate the Turks and radually lead them toward a more pragmatic, less doctri­
naire approach to development. 
5. DissiTyation "Throuith time. There is no evidence of dissipation; 
on the contrary, the recent move of the GOT off dead centers on export promotion 
policy argues the other way. But the U. S. has only recently started to tighten 
its conditioning of aid, so Turkey rea]l.y provides no evidence on the dissipation 
hypothesis. 
B. The Loan
 
1. Loan Size. Loan size remained roughly constant through FY 1965.
 
It slipped in fiscal year 1967, b>ut only in FY 196",did it fall really sharply.
 
Historically, this drop in aid level seems to correlate with increasing rather 
than decreasint? influence (contrary to the prediction in the lAS). Of course,
 
a lot of other factors were chanruinp at the same time (notably the degree of 
Mission interest in corditionimn aid), and it may be naive -to relate the i,.­
crcased influence ,to the reduced aid. An alternate formulation is tnat being 
able to provide more aid than the recipient expects (fears?) he will get con­
fers leverae, even with a da:linincr alsolute aid level. FY 68, may be no 
exception. Although it appears that the various changes in the trade policy 
area taken -y Turkey since then arc due to negative leverage, the apparent 
threat to the GOT at the negotiations was that, failing reform, it would get 
even less. 
2. Direction of' change in loan size. Ac just noted, the period in­
eludes a declinig aid phase. It does not cover a phase of increasing aid. 
However, Turkish experience is consistent with the view that influence can be 
wrung from a declininu" as well as a rising volume oi' aid. 
C. Environmental influences 
1. International politics. The Tui-k.,h politico-military role in 
the Western alliance has dominated the program Ic-a,. experience. It either 
drastically reduaced the credibility of the self-help conditioning process or 
intimated the principal U. S. negotiators into thinkiMn it did. Which was it? 
Although the Turks argued that they "paid" for U. 2. aid with their -ases and 
divisions, the all:iance has also had sizeable bene.its in terms of Turkish 
national interest, and traditional Turkish cod~qpt±ins of it. Moreover, other 
countries (e.g. Korea, Pakistan ur, to the e-.,y'.lO 0' which have ,een in a 
similar position have proven to e higzhl.y favorable testing grounds f1or condi­
tioned aid. We conclude that, despite sUperficial appearances to the contrary 
Turkey's nondevelopment relations with the U.S. did not rule out aid conditioning. 
__ 
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2. Domestic politics. Until.Demirel won an absolute majority 
for tlie Justice Party in the rparliamenta elections in october 1965, pro­
gram loan negotiations were conducted under~the unsettled conditions of the 
second, third and fourth coalitions. The first two of these were controlled 
-by the RPP the third -by.-the- JP. - The- FY .963.negotiations. had, also.been-played 
out under the shadow of the execution of Menderes in late 1962. The effects of 
political instability may go a long way in explaining the reluctance of GOT 
;<'' 	 ./ .: officials to' make a commitment to a foreign government, an act which must have 
appeared to many among them as political (or even personal) suicide. 
3. Multilateralism. Two institutions should be separately discussed. 
First, the IMF played a major 'role in helping the GOT preserve monetary and 
fiscal stability, and more recently, in reviewing trade and exchange policy. 
It is'possible that U. S. influence in the 1950's was primarily responsible for 
setting IMF up on such a good footing. It is certain that the IMF representatives 
communicated with Mission personnel on important matters, and that U. S. support 
of the .IMF stand-by,programs greatly fortified the IF position. Neverthe iss 
it is also clear that since 1963 the IMF played its part essentially independent 
of the Mission, and must be given substantial credit for the success of stabili­
zation policies. As mentioned above this success in effect preempted the easiest 
field of economic policies, forcing USAID to use whatever influence it had on
 
As mentioned elsewhere above, the'IMF experience also intro­structural problems. 

duced the formal quantitative targeting process to Turkey breaking the ice so
... 
to speak 	for eventual U. S. use of similar targets.
 
The other institution is the Consortium. The Turkey Consortium staff at OECD. 
headquarters in Paris merely manages the thrice-yearly meetings. It does not 
in economic policy and prescribe solutions,attempt to identify problem areas 

as the IBRD staff does for its consortia and consultative groups. The Consortium
 
in exacting self­
as a deliberating group of donors never played a dominant role 
help performance from the Turks, except with respect to monetary and fiscal policy. 
The U. S. was consistently the initiator of any attempts at leverage the Consortium 
m:y have 	made. Other bilateral donors, for example Germany, have not felt that
 
self-help conditions were needed, let alone practicable. (To some extent, both
 
Germany and the German head of the Consortium.now seem to be changing their positiono
 
D. Personal touches
 
As in other Missions, one senses variations from time to time in the approach, 
It is very Mld toattitudes, and calibre of Mission leadership and policy staff. 

tell how much importance to attribute to these variations. Anxiousness to influence
 
GOT policy and volume and quality of staff-work upon which to base recommendations
 
In time, 	it should be possible to see
seem to be at an all-time high at present. 

whether this will make any significant difference.
 
V. CONCLUSIONS
 
The general outlines of the Turkish experience are clear, though some unsettled 
questions :remain. Turkish economic perP.rmance has been well above average, 
though not up to that of the .ver' td-receving, countries. Turkish policy hase s ..
also been generally acceptable'to the .R'Swith t'heLincireasingly important excep­
tion of the balance of payments exchange rate pr6bi'mn (although there are now 
ofA p n e ae 
signs of GOT movement in this area as well). Program aid generally.has not
 
been performance conditioned, except in the broad sense that the acceptable
 
overall policy lines be continued., Certainly formal conditioning has. been
 
.. 	 slight. U. S. influence seemns to have been exerted in-an eniomnt n 
which the volume of aid was only tenuously related to&wh~ther the advice-
-
was followed. 
.. .. 
The 	questions which remain are how great U. S. influence has been under these . 
circunstances and whether it would have been greater if aid had been more
 
conditioned (using one or another of the conditioning.systems applied else­
where in the world). On the basis of our. study, we find these questions diffi­
cult to answer. Yet we 
 cannot ignore them completely.. We must-therefore say 
that we come away from the study"with the feeling that U. S. influence on-

GOT policy (through all channels) has been less thanm'in most of the other
 
countries in our sample, and certainly low relative to the large volume of
 
U. S. aid Turkey has received. We are also convinced that this influence
 
would have been greater if the GOT had been made to-believe that the volume
 
of aid they received depended in part ontheir self-help performance, We feel
 
this thought could have been conveyed without encountering the dilemma of
 
whether to stop aid to Turkey altogether when performance was inadequate,

through the use.of delaying•tactics and marginal adjustments in the aid level
 
(though U. S. unw.illingnessto permit any break in aid relations with Turkey
 
would undoubtedly have reduced U. S. influence).
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I. INTRODUCTION
 
Program loans were introduced in Tunisia in FY 62. They replaced the
 
six year old non-project grant program. They came in at a level one­
half as large as the grant programn, and have remained at about that
 
level, without missing a year, ever since. The Mission has now nego­
tiated the seventh loan in the series, making the program one of' the
 
oldest in A.I.D.
 
It took several years for both the Mission and the GOT to accept the fact
 
that the ground rulc>3 for non-project support had changed, and that the 
negotiators would have to tie the loan to self-help performance. Starting
 
with the FY 64 loan, however, conditions were loosely applied to the loan
 
and annual reviews were instituted to d5 scuss past performances and future
 
plans. 
The conditioning system was substantially strengthened in late 1964 when 
the IMFP marle the first Stand-by Agreement with the GCT, and wrote out an 
explicit set of criteria for the GOT to meet. It was buttressed again in 
late 1965 when the previously dormant IBRD Consultative Group instituted
 
a formal review based on an annual IBRD staff report and the GOIT's Annual
 
Economic Budget.
 
In FY 66, the U. S. moved to a formal tranche review system of its own, 
where explicit conditions were included in the loan agreement and half of 
the loan was delayed pending progress toward meeting them. Most of' the 
U. S. conditions repeated IMF conditions. Some, however, were tougher 
than the IV conditions. Some were not. 
The U. S. never attempted to establish a credible position with respect
 
to the ultimate instrument of leverage -- the threat of withholding or 
reducing the loan. In fact in each intra-agency debate over negotiation
 
strate since FY 62 AID/W tended to adopt the position that, with or 
without GOT performance, A.I.D. wes drawing the program -loan program to a 
close, and that the GO1' ought to start looking to Western Europe to fill 
its need for program aid, LFrther, A.I.D. did not try to fit the level of
 
the loan to performance, or delay the second tranches. At the most, A.I.D. 
prolonged the annual negotiations till GUT had agreed to meet A.I.D.'s 
minimum terms.
 
Nevertheless, A.I.D. seems to have exerted a good deal of influence on 
stabilization policy in Tunisia. With the exception of 1964 and 1966, 
when devaluation and a bad harvest respectively interfered with thc 
orderly working of' tha Tunisian economy, fiscal, monetary and credit indi­
cators performed relatively well (compared to most LDC's). This was due to 
the rigid controls established by the GOT and its willingness to make sacri­
fices in order to preserve domestic stability. President Bourguiba's 
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administration is not intemperate, and would have tried to control infla­
tionary pressure as best it could in any case. The U. S. presence, how­
ever, and the program loan negotiations in particular, appear to have
 
induced a more prudent response than would otherwise have occurred. The
 
U. S. could not have done as well witnout the IF constraints though the
 
dominant day-to-day influence was the American. 
The unusual thing about the U.S.-Tunisian program loan leverage experience 
is that it can be judged relatively successful even though it failed to 
achieve the two most frequently articulated targets. As early as FY 64 
A.I.D. made clear that these were (1) having the GOT find another donor 
of last resort and (2) having the GC)T reestablish viability on the current 
account. The only other logical donor was France. Since Tunisia continued 
to expropriate bits and pieces of the residual colonial portfolio, the 
French were not prepared to be generous. The viability issue was equally 
intractable. Tunisian "invisible" earnings disappeared with the reduction 
of the Bizerte naval base. Her traditional exports derpended mainly on 
preferential or stagnating markets and there had been no increase in these 
exports since the late 1950's. At the same time, like most settled ex­
colonies, Tunisia inherited a high propensity to import. Ioreover, Presi­
dent Bourguiba had initiated an ambitious, popular and successful public 
investment program with a heavy import content. Foreign exchange reserves 
were caught in the squeeze between falling earnings and rising imports due 
to greatly expanded investment. They declined 66q between 1960 and 1964, 
leaving Tunisia with foreign exchange sufficient to cover only three weeks 
of imports. 
The U. S. and i!!/ conditions were intended ultimately to tailor imports to 
earnings. For the reasons just mentioned this was an impossible job to 
accomplish quickly. It was a grim prescription for President Bourguiba, 
who had committed his Party and himself to his social welfare programs. It 
was an uncomfortable position for A.I.D., since those programs conformed in 
every respect to the usual self-help d(velopment indicators and in any case 
the increase in imports attributabie to the de,.elopment progratms was modest 
judged by world-wide stanidards. Tourism is the big growth export; A.!.D. 
supported its expansion verbally, but could not provide financial assistance. 
The current account has not really righted itself yet, although, with sur­
prisingly little encouragement from A.I.D., exports nave betun to mcve 
smartly in the last two years.
 
II. CHRONOLOqICAL SUpM4ARY 
A. Summary of U.S. and Other Donor Aid 
When Tunisia became a republic in 1957, the flow of' public and private 
French capital to the former colony tapered off. The United States Govern­
ment thereafter assumed the role of' Tasjor donor and has kept it for ten 
years. The U. S. has been trying to give up that role during the last five 
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years, and has managed in that time to assemble a Consultative Group of 
other donors under the aegis of IBRD. But Tunisia's relationships with 
her principal creditors --Frsnce and Italy -- have suffered from her ­
increasingly tough position on the rights of expatriates of those countries 
to retain property in Tunisia, and the Consultative Group has never developed 
.. .into had--hoped to Create.the sympathetic and-generous protector the U; S; 
The U. S, insists it will cut off program aid in the next year or so, and 
all concessional assistance shortly thereafter. Tunisia's precarious balance 
of'payments seems unlikelr to improve in that time, however, and there is 
some question whether, without a major shift in France's aid policy, the 
U. S. will be able to withdraw without altogether disrupting Tunisia's
 
fairly successful development pez.formance.
 
The U. S. program in Tunisia started in FY 57 with SA grants of $5 
million for balance of payments support. The SA grant progiam grew rapidly. 
It averaged $20 million per annum in the period FY 59-61, and it was higher 
in FY 62 than ever before ($22 million). The bulk took the form of a cash 
grant. The rest comprised triangular trade arrangements. Then, conforming 
with A.I.D.t s new emphasis on loans, SA grants fell as precipitously as they 
had risen: to $13 million in FY 62 and zero in FY 63. 
They were replaced by DL program loans. These have continued annually since 
FY 62 at a level of $10 to $15 million. A.I.D.'s FY 68 loan for $10 million, 
the seventh in the series, was signed in Tunis in June 1968. 
Project lending began in FY 58. It has averaged about $9 million per annum
 
over the last ten years, but has been substantially lower than that average
 
during the last three (FY 65 $6.8 million, FY 66 zero, FY 67 $6.7 million).
 
In dollar terim the most important component of the U. S. program, 
at least since the phase-out of SA grants, has been PL-480. This has con­
sisted of two elements, a Title I wheat program whose size has fluctuated
 
according to Tunisia's annual grain crop (and reached a high of $22 million
 
in FY 67), and a major Title II Food for Work Program (which was recently cut, 
then restored). As discussed in SectionlMC the Mission refers to PL-480 
as its "other" major instrument for gaining leverage on th-. GOY1's economic 
program. 
In addition to. these capital and commodity flows, a technical 
assistance effort has been maintained since the inception of the U.S. pro­
gram. U. S. dollar obligations on technical assistance have varied between 
$1 and $2 million, and these funds have been augmented by dinars from the 
PL 480 counterpart accounts. 
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Chart 1 shows the relative size of these component parts of the overall
 
U. S. program. Notice particularly the fall in non-project/aA etMission
 
shifted from SA to DL appropriations:
 
Ten Years of U. S. Aid to Tunisia, FY 57-67
 
(Net Dollar Loan Authorizations and Grants - millions)
 
FISCAL YEAR
 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 i967 
Loans
 
Project - 4.3 4.4 23.5 10.0 2.4 8.3 10.2 6.8 - 6.7
 
Program - - - - - 10.0 15.0 10.0 10.0 15.0 14.8 
Grants
 
-DS/SA 76.0 15.3 21.5 22.2 24.8 5.3 - - - -
DG/TC 2.0 10.5 1.1 0.4 1.1 2.0 2.1 
PL 480
 
Title I . . . . 11.4 4.5 10.6 3.8 13.2 - 22.4
 
Title If - 6.6 7.2 1.5 57.8 12.2 23.9 18.4 21.2 1.7 7.7 
Around $8 million DG funds were used for commodity imports.
 
Program loans of $10 to $15 million cover 5% of Tunisian's total imoorts,
 
a relatively small share compared to the other programloan countries where
 
the share varies fiom 1%l to 161j. Prestunably the share size should influence
 
leverage, since the smaller the share the less one would expect the recipient
 
government to be pushed to the hard decisions it otherwise would have avoided.
 
The evidence indicates otherwise, that in fact the U. S. leverage exercise
 
has been no less successful than elsewhere. In per capita terms, program
 
loans of $10 or $15 million are not out of line with the other program loan
 
countries. They are less than in Latin America, and higher than in IESA.
 
French aid has been erratic since 1957. Technical assistance (particu­
larly school teachers) has continued without interruption at a level valued
 
at an estimated $10 million per annum. But the variouE channels of official
 
French capital aid -- loans, debt roll-overs, and protected markets for
 
Tunisian wine and wheat -- have frequently been closed in retaliation for
 
nationalization of French farms and corffr uial property in the ex-colony.
 
For example, official French annual loan dishursements during the period
 
1960-66 are estimated conse-utively, at (in $millions): 0, 0, 1.6, 12,2, 3.9, 
0, 0. In the last two years, howcver, the French have joined the Italians 
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and ermans in trying L, develop some frainework f'or coo, -rating with the 
Tunisians in financing the now perennial deficit on current account. 
Total non-U.S. bilateral aid, including French, :ias grown steadily to its 
present level of' $50-60 million from about !25 million in 1961. 
The ]I3RD plays a double role in Tunisia, as chairman of' the Consultative 
Group and as a donor in its own right. The CG was formed in 1962 in response 
to a GOT iequest, (though the U. S. was the prime mover in the operation). It 
includes each of' the major West European donors plus Kuait, Canada, the U.S., 
and the IM.tP. It was weakened after 1'13 by the Fren.h walk-out, but since 
late 1965 has regrouped and taken a stronger role. The grroup calls for an 
annual review of (IW' economic policiJes. The IBNJ) serves as secretariat to the 
CG. It prepares a Jituation report for the armua. review session, recomends 
modifications in the propose..d budfct and economic policies, and suggests to the 
C", an aid level target. (Since this is a Coinsultative Group, not a Consortium, 
ple.dges are not made.) 'io demonstrate its favorable impression of' C(T economic 
policy and the state of health of' thce Tunisian economy, the iBRPJ pledged 
!100 million in December 1)(5 to thie Tunisia Four Year Plian (19,5-6t). Seventy­
five million dollars of' that now has been obligated, a significant share for 
local costs.
 
The 1T, has played a major rol.e in Tunisia's stabilization policy since 
19611, when the deterioration of' foreizn exchange reserves assumed crisis 
proportions and the first Stand-by Agreement was signed (October 1, 1901). 
The Stand-by has been renewed each ye:ar there-ater. Conformiiing to usual 11.7 
posture, the Areements impose CCond:.i tion on GOT policy, with quantitative 
targets to measure performanc--. At first the IMF;' conditions were limited to 
credit policy, but have since been extended to the (,W' budget and export and 
import programs. During the early 1960's the U. S. had insisted on an IlaF 
role in Tunisia's stabilization policy, and has since strongly supported, and
 
coordinatcd its own conditions, with the IMF program. 
In general, Tnisia's economic performance in the early years after inde­
pendence was comparatively goud. She continued Franc( 's colonial investment 
program and, in 1 ,0, initiated a major national planning exercise. Fiscal 
and monetary policies were conservative: the budget remained balanced, 
prices rerrained stable. TPhere was no significant domestic: or for(ign debt, 
and Foreifn exchanre reserves rose steadily through 1Y.), holding steady in 1960. 
Undoubtedly this good record inf'luenced U. ;,. decisions on the overall aid 
prog ramr. 
There was no attempt to condition thej level of' that program -- or of' the 
SA commodity import component -- on perf'orance criteoria. Those levels were 
determined on the basis of the projected balance of payments garp, and political 
f'actors. Nevertheless, the U. S. enj.o<,d substantial in'.luence with the GOT, 
for example it shared with France the credit for isetting the Tunisians started 
on the planning exercise. 
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B. FY 62: $10 million (DL Loan I/Oll) 
A.I.D. authorized a t10 million loan in May, 1962, to complete the
 
commodity import assistanc(: program for FY 62. Already $13 million of SA
 
(and DG dollar grants) had been obligated. The Agreement was not signed
 
until November, and disbursements did not begin before October 1963, a
 
year later. These delays were due to unexpected procedural problems, par­
ticulai-ly one of developing a list of acceptable imports as required under
 
the new procurement source restrictions of the DL authorization. Since U.S.
 
exporters (including PL 480) then claimed only a tiny fraction (30%) of
 
Tunisia's import market, additionality was more or less ensured if American
 
products could be identified for import. West Europeans monopolized the
 
trade in equipment, so the problem was either to find raw materials and
 
other non-equipment goods of U. S. brand suitable to the Thiriians, or to 
reorient Tunisia's existing trade patterns. Both proved difficult, and
 
this diffiuulty is one of the impo 'tant explanatory factors in understanding
 
the constant $15 million ceiling on the annual allotment, and the protracted
 
haggling that frequently characterized the negotiating sessions.
 
There were no economic conditions written into the loan agreement.
 
Nor were there any side agreements related to the program loan. However,
 
conditioning language had already appeared at this time in GOT-A.I.D. dis­
cussions on the U. S. long-term commitment.
 
During his visit to the U. S. in May 1961, President Bourgui'Ia dis­
cussed the possibility of long-term aid to Tunisia's draft Ten Year Plan
 
(Perspective). This was followed by several AID/W visits to the field to
 
examine the proposal in detail, and in December, 196], the P!atterson Mission 
recommended a long-term aid commitment of around $180 million. A U. S. 
obligation of $18O million for the period 10963-65 was under conisideration in 
A.I.D. in the Spring of 1962, i.e. at the time the first program loan was 
authorized. This figure represented 50% of what USAID had. estimated would 
be the foreign exchange requirements of the Three Year Plan (TYP). In dis­
c'ussions before and during the visit to Washington of Den Salah, the Tunisian 
Minister of Finance and of the Plan, in February, 1962, the GOT agreed to 
some general conditions for a major long-term commitment of DL funds. These 
included (1) avoiding inflation, (2) protecting,the level of foreign exchange
 
reserves and (3)periodic joint reviews of rJrograms under the TYP. 
The othcr reason for the appearance of conditioning language in GOT-AID 
discussions was tihe sudden deterioration in Tunisia's foreign accoluts. The 
high rate of public investments since Independence, which the Perspective 
and the draft TYP planned to increase even further, but half of which was com­
posed of work relief profrrans and social infrastructure projects (e.g., housing), 
*The Persuective Decennale de Development 1962-71 was first presented in draft in
 
August 1961, but specific investment proposals for the iext three years were dis­
cussed in the Three Year Plan 1962-64, approved by the National Assembly in
 
May 1962. USAID's opinion was that it would take four years to reach the TYP tar­
gets, which made the FY 1963-65 U.S. commitment compatible with the time frame of
 
the official TYP, (although the commitment referred to obligations and the TYP
 
expenditure).
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cormmensurate increase in exports.had resulted in higher import levels, with no 
Tunisia sustained a $20 million loss of foreign reserves in 1961, from $97 to 
the ambitious investment targets of the$77 million. The Mission warned that 
anTY1' would lead to a cmntinujLng decline in rescerves, and equally predictable 
in donesti" pri. :; . Jt F.it that any lonr-t*rm ii. S. conmL:tment shouldsurfge 
to avoid these blows.be mrade centingent ueoni the V(IJ' taking adequate st:ps 
C . FY . llion (Dl Loan P/Out 
In Octob,:r, Ii[)' A.] . . formal Ly corrmmitted the .li O mil.lion package 
were to be spelledagreed to in February For the three year proram. S2pcI cs 
in D-cember 1962 indi­out in i dividual loan discussions. A memno to the (OT 
cated the J. 2. was prepared to entertain a request for a non-project loan for 
FY 63 o $10.-$]9 mil lion. The loan was not authorized unti.l. ay, 1903 -- five 
in , '73, but disburosements didn't begin unti.1months _later. It, was sijgrd 
w.er- doe to I. A. concern f ,r the ;,vr] oad cd pipeline 
no FY 6? 1oan dstishur o''miUs wV'rn makd i,:foreJune 1)01. These clas 	 October, 13 , arising from 
thes, delays ,rious 	 financingsource: lrocureircrlt probL.ons; urpcctad posed 
A.ter long bargain­
nrobl,.ms for (I(fl' and weak,:d the U. 2J	. -leverage position. 

barter arrngemeiinUs for *PV.,5 million ol'
 ing A..D. allowed Tunisia to include 

'. origin. !:,2 economic policy conditions we,.re
petroleum products of non-ij. 
to the loan and for all- practical ;irposes the le_.velwritt.r i into or attached 

the rease of the loan were divorced from econom ii.c policy
and the timintr of 

considerations other than those specified by the T'{' and the 3-year A.I.D.
 
commitment. 
edged towards a gradual shift entirelyIn FIct, A.! .D.'s inti rnal debates 
loans being phas.d out by a $5 milJjon annual to project loans with program 

decrease in the loan ]evel. I. . procur:rermet problems contribut,2d to this
 
natural

shirt in strat';,y7. A.f.D. emphasized to the (;V(' that the Latter's 

trading partners in West Europe were the aicp~ropr]ate sources for non-project
 
From We--stern .uroJ.ui donors.
aid. llnfortunately, A .1.. .ot little support 

The .,e' ried hard to ohb)ain programri aid from non-I .S. sourc(s and did secure
 
about !!,10)m:.ilion par year. All, according to on,- memo to the, A.I.D,
 
Administrator, were having trouble acceptirig the fact of a major I 2. policy
 
past pattern of untierd uid. The Laual CAP narrativeschane awa from the 
reason :;.erlously con­bear evidence that the Mission itslf with good did not 

tre possibility of droppin program oanms after 1FY3. !,v,,rtheless
sider 
tha.t non-pro.j ct a3sistancethere was apparently widn:Spr! aO agreement in A.J .D. 
progrrm, a:.sumIng! that Tuni sia'sshould p Lo.. n. 6minishinu role in the 'Puiiisi an 

sources.
provenr needs could b, rnp-t 'rom other 
it is unlike:ly that the Missi on considered the- program(liven this shift, 

loan the rmain vehic) . for aplying leveragey, ] everage it expected to derive
 
from the n-O com iitment. Letters had beer exchang,-d at the time of
:li mil.: 
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the commitment in Cetober 1962. in one of them, the GOT agreed to four
 
specific conditions: to raintain sufficient foreign exc.ange reserves,
 
to pursue monetary and fiscal policies consistent with economic growth

without inflation, to integrate all pliblic investments, including work
 
relief projects, into the central capial budget, and to arrange with the
 
U. S. for periodic reviews of progress under the TYP.
 
A.I.D. hoped with these conditions anid review sessions to impart a
 
sense of urgency to the GOT over the continued deterioration of domestic
 
and foreign balances. To thc surprise of' she Mission, Tunisia had almost
 
hit the "ambitious" investment target scheduled for 1962, a 31%/1 increase
 
over 1961. But it did so at the expense of substantial increases in borrow­
ings from the Central iBank and the first signs of inflationary pressure on
 
prices. Worse, the deficit on current account of' the balance of' payment was
 $20 million higher in 1962 than 1961, and total reserves in December 1962
 
were down to $68 million (reflecting not only the pressure of investments on
 
imports, but large irreversible losses of foreign exchange earnings from the
 
French base at Bizerte and the Algerian rebel headquarters staff). Thus the
 
stability conditions informally agreed in early 1962 had gone by largely
 
unobserved. A.i.D. insisted the (K)T take them seriously in the future.
more 
The FY ,'> CAI' submitted in July 63 identifies a long list of subsidiary
reforms and initiatives which the Mission apparently discussed with Tunisian 
authorities. Most concerned the restoration of' stabfliJy: deterring low 
priority investments, discouragement of non-essenticL imports, tourist promo­
.Ion and thie .ike. Others, however, were growth o'iented. These included 
those (a.ling fCur divelo-rment of (1) water rescurces, (2) manpower resources, (3) agricultural output and (1) capital infrastruoture, which the CAP identi­
lied as A.I.D.'s fnur major progrm goals. A.I.D. was obviously caught in 
a difficult position. OIn the one hand it expected the (;OT to cut back on 
its investmcnt plans, on the other it encouraged investment in selected areas 
of the economy. Stabilization and development policies can conflict in the 
short run, nevurtheloss several sections of the CAP suggest that the USAID
 
intended to use the "limited" amount of' ieverag-e remaining under the $180 
million program loan c-ramitment and the Ioint reviews to press for improvements 
on both fronts.
 
b. FY 64 : ::1 million CDL Loan /019) 
The ?Y 6!A loan was authorized in April 1964 and signed in Jun(. The 
Agreeme_,nt itself' included no explicit economic conditions. Star.b,.rd condi­
tions dealing with verification were met in October of the same year and dis­
b)ursem:ents startd tle, next day. 
Such Unusually expeditiou. handling of the loon belies two important
Features of the vY (il loan operation. First, it involved for the first time 
in pro .ram loan negotiations a side letter from the (T agreeing to certain 
conditions. Second, it was 3% below the previou.s year's leveL and was 
clearly considered an "i'iterim" measure by A.I.D. 
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Tunisia's domestic and foreign balance had again deteriorated in 1963.
 
Though physical progress under the Plan was impressive, the consequences for
 
the budget, prices and foreign exchange reserves were in line with the pre­
dictions of the Mission. Public borrowing jumped from $28 million in 1962 to
 
rose 5.3%, forcing the GOT to institute
$72 million in 1963. Wholesale prices 

tough controls on retail prices and wages and apply strict import quotas.
 
Then, shortly after AID/W authorized the FY 64 loan, the W((1nationalized the last 
of the French farms and the French retaliated by terminating all financial aid to 
Tunisia.
 
In view of these developments, A.I.D. delayed notifying the r;UI of the 
authorization acti.on, and instead insisted that the GOT first agree in writing 
to make a determined effort to bring investment and the foreign balances back 
into line. Specifically, A.I.D. required assurances of ('OT willingness to draw 
up a program to improve its balance of' payments and 'o seek additional non-U.S. 
aid of a program type. Moreover, A.l.D. asked the (,11 to agree to request 
assistance from the IBRD staff in drawing up such a program Ln advance of the 
Consultative Group meeting in the Fall of' 1901. Amlong the corrective measures 
suggested by A.I.D. were the ones emphasized the previous year plus recommenda­
tions for devaluation (at the "appropriate" noment) and the possible use of IMF 
credit.
 
Len Salah, the Minister of' Finance and the Plan, honored this requst in 
May 1),4 by sending letters to both USAID and IBI) bearing an outline for 
corrective action and asking for IBRD services in filling it. These letters 
satisfied A.I.D. The U. S. indicated, however, that the question of future 
program assistance to Tunisia would be considered "in the light of the program 
taken by other donors."adop%,,ed, the v" -ws of' th- iBJ) staft', and the position 
It is difficult to determine, the relative importance of the factors which 
could explain the fall in the prugram loan ! irding level in VY r4 from $15 mil­
lion to $10 million. Documentary evidence suggests A.I.D. was intending to 
carry on at the $0-$l5 leve.l fot at least another year, and the discussions 
with Ben Salah point in the same direction. On the other hand, the procurement 
problem had not eased, and combined with the pipeLine 	the $10 million level 
more nearly approximated th maximum conceivable level of transferrable resources 
of approved origin within the period covetred in the economic ]ustification. 
Finally, it was obvious that -'i'rerformance had not met even the loose standards 
lji], nonperformanceA.I.D. and 	 to 
the 	level of lending cad t) bef cut. Of the three factors, the last played a 
was 
established by Jn 11 i and presumtably reflect 
relatively minor role. In other words, thouFh A.I.D. gradually tightening 
the conditioning process, it wast applying penalties for nonperformance. 
E. FY 65: $10 million (DL Loan /0214) 
The FY 65 programr, loan was authorized in June 19(5, signed in July, and 
disbursed starting in ovember. (economic conditions were written into the 
Agreement or in side letters. As in FY " , the loan was referred to as an 
the annual deficit and not necessarily"interim" measure to help the , inance 
indicative of the level of' future program loans. 
--
10 
A.I.D. policy on program loans to Tunisia had shifted again during the
 
preceding year. The final LAS report of January 1965 set the stage. It
 
recommended that A.I.D. give up the hope of transferring the burden of prin­
cipal donor to West Europe. rather, in its effort to bring an early end to
 
concessional aid to Tunisia, A.I.D. should encourage wherever possible im­
proved performance on the part of the Tunisian's themselves. Meanwhile the
 
$180 million commitment was moving very slowly, causing G(OT officials to 
blame the U. S. for their troubles. In fact, only about $100 million was
 
obligated during FY 1963-65. LAS considered the overall aid level to be the
 
source of general leverage, but fo-'used on the program loan as the principle
 
instrument available to the U. S. "to influence those general policies upon
 
which optimum growth depends." The principal author, a consultant from outside
 
AID/W, suggested that a minimum level of progran loan aid be identified conform­
ing to overriding political considerations and absolute economic necessity, but
 
that the annual loan should vary above that within an incentive range "in which 
incremental assistance above minimal needs would be provided on tile basis of
 
commendable self-help undertakins." An annual level of $30 million -- far 
above previous estimates -- was suggested as the maximum figure consistent with
 
the possibilities for direct procurement and barter arrangements within U. S.
 
regulations.
 
The LAS report also tried to define the boundaries of the leverage opera­
tion. It reiterated the major policies where further action was desirable. 
It warned, however, that certain subjects were particularly sensitive (e.g., 
the role of f'creign private capital and the desirability of social welfare 
investments) and that the U. S. could not expect to exert much influence over 
(;urf policies in those areas. It also warned against over-indulgence in 
quantitative indicators. Ufhile accepting that some budget and credit perform­
ance criteria were .usepta.le to precise measurement, the LAS pointed out that
 
the most important actions were long ralge and impossible to measure against 
specific tests. Nevrthelss, annual negotiations based on reviews of past 
performance arid the proposed budget were called for, and specific guidelines
"'or policy reform were set forth. 
Documents of the same age as the LAS show that Mission planning conformed 
generally to the LAS straterj. The GUf had promised to prepare an Annual 
Economic Budget for lj', (AEDP) and to make it available for a Fall 1965 review 
with A.I.D. and the Consultative ';roup. It was the prospect of a full review 
of' 1966 budget plans that persuaded the Mission and AID/W to push through an 
"interim" measure for FY (5 (addressed largely to CY 195 delivery needs) 
devoid of specific conditioning, languaige and targets outside of those defined 
by the IMF stanidby. 
Other important developments accompanied the redefinition of AI.D. policy. 
In September, 1901, after sidferini! further losses in foreign resources (by then 
down to $39 million) and threatened with an exchange crises, the GOT signed its 
first Stand-by Agreement with the 1MF ($14 milliou). The l11f' stabilization 
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program called for an immediate devaluation of the dinar by 2(Y/0 , a 10% 
increase in taxes in 1965, and ceilings on (1) Central Bank credit to the GU', 
(2) Central Bank credit to commercial banks, and (3) net commercial bank lend­
ing to the GOT. The dinar was devalued in September 1964, IMF reports at the
 
time of the FY 65 program loan negotiations indicated satisfaction with GUI' 
performance on taxes and credit.
 
Secondly, the GOT had adopted the U.S. recommendations for prepara­
tion of' an AEB relating the new multi-year investment plan for 1965-68 to
 
yearly budget estimates. As mentioned earlier, the first AEB was scheduled
 
1966 fiscal year. Drawing on
for release in late 1965 and covered the GU 

its previous experience, the U. S. made no commitment to the targets or the 
financing needs of the Second Tunisian Plan.
 
Thirdly, the IBRD/Consultative Group was being strengthened in 1965 to 
provide a multilateral forum f'or the annual review of' performance and require­
ment s. 
The U. S. had been actively
These three developments were encouraging. 

with the 114F, formulation of an AEB, and revitalizationpromoting GU' relations 
Cc, and progress on all three fronts promised significant improvementsof the 
in monetary and fiscal policies and consequent relief to the balance of payments. 
The austere flY stabilization plan adopted by the (;OT was expected to cut 1965 
(GO a major socialimports 331 below 1)04. Further the had reduced few of the 
which A.I.D. had Lrgued ought to be tailored to budget availabilities.i.vestments 
The plan which the ;Cfl' had developed in late 19604 for improving the balance of 
payments was "not fully satisfactory" to the Mission, but the jelling of ((YI' 
relations with 1MF and the iBRD ofl'fered welcome support to the Mission in its 
efforts to persuade the GUI' to more practicable programs. 
F. FY million Loan #02()$11:... (DL 
Although authorization was originally promised for December 1965, follow­
review of' the AEB, the FY '6 loan was signed in May 1966 under newing GOT 

ground rules. Six economic conditions were included mnong the Conditions Prece­
dent. The loan was split into two tranches -- of' $8 and $7 million -- and
 
release of' the second was made r:ontingent upon those conditions. In addition,
 
the GUI' was told that further prograMN lending would depend upon several actions 
to protect the 1J. 2. balance of payments. 
The six economir conditions were all stabilization measures. The GOT was 
1M,' ceilings on 1)6A domestic credit. It was ex­obliged to adhere to the new 
gross 1)6(, investment to available noninflationary finance,pected to limit to 
those in­increase the surplus on tbe current budget in order to help finance 
f'reign exchange implications of thevestments, and to indicate the budget and 

gross investment package. It was expected t,) limit the use of short and medium
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term suppliers credic for financing the payments deficit. (Suppliers credits -­
particularly French uand Italian -- comprised a disproportionate share of Tunisia's
 
foreign debt and annual debt service.) Finally, the GOT was asked to liberalize
 
the import licensing system for essential goods, thereby stimulating private
 
sector imports.
 
In side discussions associated with the loan, but not as conditions for
 
disbursements, the Mission further advised the GOT that the U. S. Government
 
ez:pected the latter to take account of the U. S. gold problem, and tailor its
 
foreign economic relations accordingly. In particular, the GOT was asked to
 
(1) survey the U. S. to identify additional U. S. exports suitable to Tunisia's
 
needs, (2) consider holding more of its dollar reserves in New York banks and
 
(3) seek to improve its short-term debt position, especially with France. The
 
origin of these recommendations was the 1J.S. Treasury, which had advised
 
President Johnson that it was concerned with the indirect leakage of program

loan dollars to West Europe and would oppose future program loans unless remedial
 
action was taken. The Treasury's objection, combined with the new procedure of
 
interdepartmental and Presidential approval, actually delayed the authorization
 
by several months.
 
The Mission justified the original loan on the basis of the three favorable
 
developments mentioned in the last section (referring to the IMF, AEB, and CG),
 
and the obviously painful decisions the GOT had to take in order to conform to
 
the TIMF program (for example, taxes were increased by 10% across the board, credit
 
ceilings were strictly observed and capital expenditures had been reduced). More­
over the major maero-economic indicators had performed well during 1965 -- a 5%
 
annual increase in G?;T' without significant inflation.
 
In September 1966, four months after the Agreement was signed, thE Mission
 
advised AID/W that the second tranche review was completed and that the economic
 
conditions precedent to release2 of the second tranche, in general, had also been
 
satisfied. This was open to question, since the budget targets were later
 
exceeded and two of the credit ceilings were in jeopardy. But the 1966 harvest
 
was far below expectations and this factor could reasonably be blamed for most
 
of the budget difficulties. Furthermore, the GOT had held supplier credits well
 
within the ceiling. In any case, ATD/W concurred with the Missions's judgment
 
and the second tranche was released, on schedule, in early October.
 
A.I.D.'s long-range strategy had shifted once again. FY 66 documents
 
suggested a swing back toward the older position, which postulated thal .he
 
entire A.I.D. program was an interim device to tide Tunisia over until a viable
 
relationship with her trading partners could be worked out, and that the program

loan in particular had a very short future. Indeed in a May 1966 memo to the
 
A.I.D. Admin~strator the Bureau of the Budget advised that the President had
 
approved the FY 66 loan only after consideration cf the Administrator's assurance
 
that Tunisia's cooperation would be sought in adopting measures favorable to the
 
U. S. balance of payments, that the GOT would be advised the U. S. intended to
 
phase out of program lending by FY 69 or FY 70 and that while the total need for
 
program aid would disappear by 1972, other sources of program loan support ought
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to be vigorously wooed in the interim. What accounted for this latest turn
 
in A.I.D.'s Tunisia policy is not clear. Pressure from the U. S. Treasury
 
was obviously an important element. In the May 1966 Program Memorandum (FY 68-72),
 
the Mission still referred to the program loan as a major instrument for
 
leverage, and the listing therein of socio-economic objective,, and self-help
 
requirements was still dominated by the kinds of overall economic policy pre­
scriptions which presumably the program loan was most effective in deaivering.
 
Two points should be added. First, despite the primary importance of
 
the balance of payments constraint on stability and growth no increase in ex­
ports had occurred since the late 1460's and apart from the general encourage­
ment of' tourism, no special emphasis was attached to export promotion in the
 
U. S. leverage operation (relative, for example, to the exalted position of
 
this policy in U. S. leverage strategy in Turkey). Second, A.I.D. had began
 
in 1966 to increase pressur,2 on the GOT to improve the climate for private invest­
ment and to reform the import regime to accommodate the needs of domestic
 
private investors. This did conform with program loan experience elsewhere.
 
G. FY 67: $15 million (DL Loan //033)
 
The FY 67 loan followed the previous year's pattern, stipulating two
 
tranches of $8 and $7 million. The second was conditioned upon a series of
 
explicit conditions -- somewhat longer and more quantitative than in FY 66 -­
which were written into the Agreement. The loan was signed in May. The first
 
tranche was released in July and, following USAID's somewhat scanty but favor­
able review of performance, the second was released in October. Disbursements
 
started in December. 
The U. S. conditions were tied closely to the IWF program of December 1966.
 
The Fund had responded to U. S. suggestions that the Stabilization Program cover
 
areas of domesti- and foreign economic policy hitherto ignored, and thus, of
 
the eight self-help measures specified in the FY 67 Loan Agreement, six referred
 
to the IF list. These six covered domestic credit, the investment program,
 
suppliers credits, the ordinary budget, disbursements of counterpart funds and
 
management of state enterprises. The two conditions added by the U. S. dealt
 
with agricultural productivity and the import licensing system (particularly the
 
earmarking of loan funds for essential private sector imports).
 
Ben Salah fought successfully in early 1967 to eliminate a series of
 
quantitative targets which the Mission attempted to write into each condition
 
to beef up the IMF program. He revealed that the FY 66 Agreement had been
 
approved by the GOT Cabinet only after four days of sharp debate. The Minister
 
objected in principal to using the Agreement for stating U. S.-Tunisian policy
 
agreements, inasmuch as the document was widely distributed in the GOT and
 
could be easily misunderstood or misused. lie felt there were more appropriate
 
and discreet instruments for expressing mutually agreed policies. Ile said the
 
top administration officials were determined to avoid another battle in the
 
cabinet, and were naturally distressed to find that A.I.D. was trying to toughen
 
rather than loosen the explicit conditioning process. Cable traffic between
 
the Mission and AID/W cn this issue was heavy during April and May, with AID/W
 
arjuing that such conditioning language was common in program loan agreements%
 
that it served a useful purpose, that the GOT had not observed the less formal
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targets set in 1965 and 1966, and that the IH was agreed with this strategy.
 
The Mission was more in sympathy with Ben Salah's position. In the end, the
 
U. S. successfully retained a strict 110 million dinar ceiling on investment
 
(which it felt was the heart of' the stabilization program and an essential
 
complement to the iMF credit ceilings) but acceded to weaker language for the
 
two new conditions. The signed conditions were on the average far less
 
quantitative than those proposed in the Program Loan Paper.
 
Performance criteria were (again) only loosely observed in releasing the
 
FY 67 tranches. Two of' the three IMF credit ceilings for 1966 had been ex­
ceeded in October 1966, though both were soon recovered without penalty from
 
the IMF. Total public investment in 1966 exceeded the implicit level established
 
in the FY 66 Agreement. The current budget surplus had decreased, rather than
 
increased. Major short-term credits had been arranged which, while not defined
 
as suppliers credits, nevertheless had the latter's undesirable features. Net
 
foreign exchange reserves remained at the extraordinarily low level of three
 
weeks import equivalent.
 
On the positive side one could point to the reestablishment of price
 
stability (following 18 months of moderate inflation consequent to the
 
October 19614 devaluation), a slight decline in government equipment imports,
 
a dramatic rise in private capital imports, improving relations with France
 
(including the prospect of a new start to nonproject aid), increases in export
 
earnings from phosphate, tovrism and crude oil, and a functioning consultative
 
mechanism, based on the AEB, involving both the Consultative Group and IF..
 
One could also argue that the poor fiscal performance in 1966 and 1)67 was 
partly explained by two years of' drought, which depressed revenues and increabed
 
public relief expenditures. Overall, mid-1967 data supported release of the
 
second tranche. But in any case, negotiations on both the original Agreement
 
and the release of the second tranche do not seem to have been delayed because
 
of performance factors.
 
A.I.D. was clearly pointei toward phasing out the program loans as soon
 
as possible, probably in FY 69. It reminded the GOT that the latter would soon
 
have to find a'+.'nae sources of nonproject support. The hardening U. S.
 
position on.this issue L.htected the anxiety of other Agencies in Washington
 
over the final destination of U. S. program lorn dollars. Some saw the opera-

Lion as no more thai, a device for funding Tunisia's short-term debts with France
 
and Italy. Additionality was a hot issue in the spring of 1967, although there
 
were signs that American exporters were beginning to develop a strong position
 
in Tunisia.
 
H. FY 68: $10 million (DL Loan #038
 
'The world-wide shortage of DL funds in FY 68 forced the U. S. to lower
 
the offer to Tunisia. In fact for several months the figure was set in AID/W
 
at $5 million. It was pushed up to $10 million in April 1968 just before
 
President Bourguiba's second visit to Washington.
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Whether the level would have dropped below $15 million in any case,
 
due either to poor performance or to A.I.D.'s stited policy to reduce non­
project lending, is 1Pard to say. For one thing performance was again pretty
 
good. The "key" investment ceiling of $110 mi-lion dinars had been exceeded,
 
but I. and USAID agreed with the GOT that some now foreign exchange avail­
abilities justified the increase (the II' argues that this is an example of 
how quantitative indicators sometimes fail to do the job.) :,ost of the other 
FY 67 conditions .iere met with room to spare. With respect to A.I.D.'s policy 
on nonproject leading, the aid level figures projected in the January 1968
 
Program Loan Paper would suggest that the Missi on was assuming nonproject 
lending would go on at the same rate ($10 million per annum) at least through 
FY 70. The implication of' these two facts is that the cut primarily reflected
 
the funding problem. 
The :-lission's draft Program Loan Paper recommended a list of conditions, 
based on the 1)6J8 I- program, comparable to those of the previous year.
 
A1D/W, under pressure from other Agencies in the U, S. Government, was forced
 
to add other ones, including detailed instructions for improving relations with 
the private sector and a variety of agricultural policy changes. (The Mission
 
strongly oblected to these additions.) It seems odd that A.I.D. would attempt
 
to toughen an established conditioning process at precisely the time it was 
lowering the offer (and even threatening to cut it to zero) .nd while other donor 
aid had grown to nearly $100 million per annum. Nevertheless, the longez 
list was successfully negotiated. The $10 million loan was signed in June 1968. 
There will be two tranches, the second following a September 1968 review. 
The !ission continues to refer to the program loan as an important 
vehicle for pursuing U. S. interests. The draft Program Loan Paper dated
 
January :LJ made the following appraisal: 
"In summary, program aid, effectively utilized, has raoid economic 
'pay oft' potential across a broad spectrum cf the Tunisian economy 
with particular emphasis on the key areas of U. S. interest. Through 
it, development strategy can be influenced, 'growth points' can be 
supported, production bottlenecks can be eliminated, private sector 
investor confidence can be maintained, U. S. commercial relationships 
full use of' AID dollars in the U.S. can be assured andstren.thened, 
GOT economic policy and priorities influenced on a continuing day-to­
day basis, as required." 
AIDW,ecesarlymore respos- eon its promises to the President of' the 
AID/W, necessarily Cabi oisns!oelinits progrsen to Tuisian a 
United States and his Cabinet to eliminate protram lending to Tunisia as 
quickly as possible, nevertheless could agree that program loans "provide us 
with our, most effective lveratoe in negldotaatingaself-help and essential 
policy changes." -In hort, oth the field and headquarter staff have expressed 
thiemselves in writing to bue satisfied that the progrram loan provides a means 
to exert leverage on Tunisian policy, primarily on the stabilization policies
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identified in the Loan Agreements but to some degree also on the long list
 
of developmental reforms which (with the exception of agriculture) were
 
excluded from the program loan negotiations but which Mission personnel were
 
continuously discussing with their counterparts.
 
III. TIHE PRINCIPAL ISSUES 
A. Did A.I.D. try to exert leverage with the pr[oram loab? 
The answer is that it didn't in 1962, when program lending to Tunisia 
began, but that it gradually developed a conditioning system which, by now, 
in form if not in rigor, is much closer to the LA than the NESA model. This 
development took place within the context of an internal A.I.D. debate over 
the advisability of doing away with program assistance. 
Explicit conditions on economic policy were first imposed in 1962 in 
conjunction with the $1O million multi-year commitment. They were not 
directly related to the FY 62 and FY 63 p:rogram loans, and performance was 
not a central issue in dccisions on the level of the loans and timing of their
 
release. During the next two years, however, the link was established. In
 
FY 64 A.I.D. insisted that before the agreement was signed the GOT invite IBRD 
staff to help formulate a balance of payments program that would halt the loss 
in foreign reserves. It is possible to interpret the reduced level of lending
 
in VY 64 and FY 65 ($10 million in each, compared with $15 millions in FY 63) 
as a deliberate effort to keep the annual offer low until substantial improve­
ments had been made in the annual planning and budget systems and until the 
pressure of' domestic policy on the balance of payments was relieved. 
The LAS report in early 1965 articulated the new thinking on program

loan leverage. The program loan was identified as the principal instrument 
for influencing growth policy. The report was modest in its estimates of the 
degree of' influence the U. S. could expect from an increment equivalent at 
best to a few percent of' the annual import bill. But it obviously thought 
the cumulative effects of' a sustained conditioning process were very promising. 
A new conditioning system was installed in the FY 66 Loan Agreement. 
Six stabilization policy prescriptions were explicitly introduced into the 
Conditions Precedent, and the loan was divided into two tranches of which the 
second was not to be released until a joint review of-Tunisia's performance 
established that the conditions had been met. b'urthermore, the next year's 
loan would depend upon continued acceptable rerformance in these areas and 
others discussed verbally with the ';Y' at the time of' the negotiations. In 
1966 a set of' side conditions dealing with additionality were attached in­
formally to the agreement. That procedure was not repeated the next year,
 
but a large group of recommendations dealing with both stabilization and 
development policy were uider continuing discussion throughout this period
 
and by implication were conveyed to the G(OT as implicit guides to U.S. largesse. 
;,J k0I2IED 
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In FY 67 and FY 65, A.I.D. progressively expanded the system by adding
 
quantitative indicators to conditions that previously omitted them, and by
 
adding conditions dealing,with private imports and agicultural policy.
 
The GIP fought this expansion, claiming that it could have political reper­
cussions and was no improvement upon the implicit understanding that already 
existed. A.I.D. n,!vertheless was able to strengthen the language in the FY 67 
Agreement, and attain in the ii 68 Agreement. The fact that A.I.D. made the 
powe- play in 196(8 df spite a reduction in f'unds -- the Mission was actually an 
unwii-±ing instrument of conditioning strateuj~ -- suggests that some officials 
in AID/W were convinced the conditions were paying off' ( or at least that 
officials of' the UJ.S. Agencies represented on the Development Loan Committee 
were so convinced).
 
An important ele.ment of program loan leverage in Tunisia is the collabora­
tion of A.].D. with T1fK'and the IBRD, particularly the former. TICF Stand-bys 
have been agreed annually sinc, ctober 1964, which means that Tunisia was 
accustomed to explicit wri-.te conditions before A.I.D. introduced them into 
the agreement in early 1/ri. lit also means that the leverage process was multi­
lateralized. But the Mission has usually led, not lagged, the IMF tean: U. S. 
encouragement of' a CUJ-114F relation was important in 1964, and the U. S. steered 
the I41' toward more frequent use of' quantitative measures and a wider range of 
policy prescriptions. Thus, A.I.D. gained leverage through the GOT-TNF rela­
tionship. 
Another important element of' program loan rvirerage in Tunisia is the 
emphasis on the negotiatiois and the annual reviews that preceded them. The 
66 and second tranchetwo-tranche system was introduced in FY in theory the 
was related to performance during the imnmediately preceding period. But the 
midterm review doesn't seem to have been taken seriously. Moreover the annual 
loan level itself' seems to have been divorced from self-help performance, the 
$10 to $15 million range was determined on balance of payments criteria. Given 
that the level and release of* program loan finds was in practice not tied to 
self-help, the explanation for any leverage- that we did exert would have to be 
simply that as the major donor America could insist on reviews and negotiations 
and influence (OM policy through the continuing dialogue. 
B. Did A.I.D. et leverage? 
The primary focus of' A.I.D.'s conditioning process until recently has
 
been the level of fore:ign reserves, in particular on tailoring the level of 
imports to earnings. At least this is the irnplication of' mcst forrnal submissions 
to AID/W. A secondary targ,-t hasiemn on (ncouraging the :',0(jjseek other donorsto 

to take ovrrm ro.l,, of' of' last resort O ,.ounts,
A. I.D. tn Aender n both 
Tonisia has don, ,'' aid If thes,! are the :%,!rdards of leverage then the an­
swer to the question is no. 
There are three reasons why these were unnecessarily harsh standards.
 
In the first place the problems addressed were exceedingly difficult. In the
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second, the GOT actually tried rather hard to do something about them -- with
 
one (explicable) exception. In the third, the GOT did other things which
 
A.I.D. wanted it to do, though these waits were not all expressed in the pro­
gram loan negotiations.
 
First, Tunisia was caught in a cross fire on the current account from
 
which there was no immediate relief. Invisible earnings fell precipitously
 
as the French and Algerians withirew. Traditional exports were boxed in and
 
vulnerable to forces beyond Tunisia's control (wine and wheat enjoyed French
 
preferential treatment at the pleasure of the French, olive oil faced increas­
ing competition from vegetable oils, phosphates saw no promising market oppor­
tunities). A moderate increase in imports was vital to sustain Pres. Bourguiba's
 
popular investment programs and achieve the targeted 6o rate cl growth. Since
 
there was a rigid -r.2ort control system already in effect and not much fat on
 
the list of nonessential imports, and since earnings were falling, balance in
 
the current accc'mt in the short run really meant cutting the investment import
 
program. This, in turn, meant sacrificing a successful growth progiam. It was
 
a lot to ask of the President. With respect to inducing the West Europeans to
 
guarantee the import program, the obvious choice was France. But Franco-

Tunisian relations were shaky -- tne expropriations in 1964 knocked the French
 
out of an active donor role for two years -- and A.I.D. couldn't press the
 
Tunisians to compromise on such a sensitive issue.
 
Second, the GOT self-help record on the current and capital accounts was
 
not unimpresgi.ve. Import controls were tightened, and cuts were made in pro­
jected expenditures for social infrastructure and work relief programs. The
 
GOT devalued the dinar by 2011a when the IMF told it to. It kept a remarkable
 
degree of control over wages and prices. It also has stayed under the IMF credit
 
ceilings almost continuously since 1964. In fact it conformed well to the spirit
 
of the A.I.D. conditions, which was to protect the trade balance by avoiding in­
flationary fiscal and monetary policies. Moreover, it played ball with the IMF
 
and IBRD, set up the Annual Economic Budget, and dramatically increased local
 
revenues. These are the progress indicators that were of primary concern to
 
the reviewing officers in the Mission. Though the announced goal was spelled
 
out in terms of foreign reserves, their working objective was to promote an ade­
quate stabilization constraint on Tunisia's ambitious development program and
 
in this accounting they could taxe some satisfaction. The GOT failed only to the
 
extent that the total job that hiad to be done ceq,ired much more.
 
Third, the GOT overall self-help record as such -- apart from its impact on
 
the fureign account -- was quite good. Most of the reforms and measures identi­
fied in the last paragraph would have been acceptable indicators of performance
 
in their own right. In addition, there has been some progress in such areas as
 
the rationalization of the state enterprises (e.g. railroad rates have increased
 
and the deficit eliminated) and the easing of controls on private sector partici­
pation (a development baik was turned over to a private group; 7Mo of the program
 
loan imports have been directed to the private sector in the last two years; etc.).
 
Self-help performance doesn't necessarily imply U. S. leverage. The
 
Tunisians may have done these things anyway. It is quite clear, however, that
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the GOT has shifted substantially since 1961 towards a fiscal position which
 
balances growth against stability, and has paid a price in foregone welfare 
investments. It also has accormmodated itself to the budget review process 
sponsored by the U. S., TiF and !BPD, end inevitabl absorbed the disciplines 
involved, The dramatic loss in foreign exchange between 17)60 and 1964 would 
have forced Tunisia to take some corrective action. The U. S. presence, 
particularly directed through the program loan negotiations since early 1964, 
undoubtedly helped shape the action program.
 
Parenthetically, on- should notice the differences in how A.I.D. handled 
the Tunisian and Turkish leverage operations. Both countries were characterized 
by fairly stable prices and a reasonably high rote of fgrowth. Both were 
threatened by a deterioration of the current balance. In Turkey A.I.D. let I10d' 
handle the stability indicators and put most of its own efforts into export 
promotion and exchange ret~orm. 'In Tunisia, A. .D. te, ad up with IMF on the 
stability indicators, and postponed export promotion and exchanre reform. 
Tunisian exports have done well in the last two years, particularly crude oil, 
phosphates and tourism. But the Mlission couldn't have predicted this five years 
ago (except tourism), and did little with its program loan to malkc it come about. 
The Mission arguei, however, that the GOT was doing about all it could for exports. 
C. Can the leverage be attributed specificaliy to the program loan? 
Until FY 64 the U. S. made no use or the progra.. loan as an instrument 
of leverage. In fact it explicitly attributed whatever influence the Mission 
had to the whole A.I.D. program. But it didn't really try to use the influence 
to affect particular policies, and, not surprisir6ly, didn't have much to show. 
Starting in FY 64, A.I.D. took a more active position on stabilization
 
policy and began to direct its influence through the program loan. The con­
ditioning system was substantially in place by early 1966. But as noted above,
 
the U. S. insisted throughout the post 1963 period (with the exception of 1965) 
that the program loan would be dropped soon regardless of performance and 
rarely manipulated either the loan level or release date to enforce its con­
diti--s. In these circ:ustances, the credibility of the performance-loan re­
lation must have been nonexistent. If the GOT was performing, it wasn't doing
 
so to buy a second tranche release or a new agreement. The instrument of 
persuasion was apparently not the loan itself, but the opportunity it provided 
to discuss matters of general economic policy. The Tunisians knew they had no 
influence on the size of the program aid package -- when the U. S. was ready 
to cut it out of the program it would be cut, until then it would carry on at 
the old level. If this interpretation is correct, whatever specific leverage
 
A.I.D. had on any single policy was due to the American presence or the over­
all A.I.D. program, anJ only in part on the progrjan loan. The program loan 
was a fundamental source of leverage, but it was/concealed source and at any 
one time the GUT probably could not have identified its role. 
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I have not yet mentioned the PL 480 sale and loan agreements. For the 
last two years these agreements hav set conditions on GOT performance in the 
area of agricultural policy. These conditions were made explicit in the agree­
ments and set forth in some detail, i.e. establishing a network of marketing 
the reasons the GOT objected to the inclusion of agricul­cooperatives. One of 
tural policy in the FY 67 progzram loan was that the same points were already 
covered in the 1L ),"0 documents. Insofar as these conditions were confined to 
the agricultural sector, there is no ccnfusion of results with the leverage
 
effects of the program loan on stabilization. It is worth noting, however, that 
there has been little overall increase Mn agricultural output for years, but 
structural adjustments promising future increases have been made. 
D. Were leverage effects mixed with resource transfer effects? 
No, because the resource transfer effect on performance occurs when A.I.D.'s 
an in impoits or a shift in importconditions are dcsigned to encourage increase 
ccmposition. Most of the A.I.D. conditions since 1964 have tried to discourage 
imports. Thero is of course the one exception where, starting, in the FY 67 Agree­
ment, A.!.D. argued for a greater private sector role in the econoray, and got the 
,u to accept a minimum percentage for the share of loan funds which would be 
allocated for private sector use. The share is now running at 70%, considerably 
the initial minimum of 24). These funds were channeled through inter­higher than 
mediate credit institutions, and, considering the matching funds offered -y local 
secondary borrowers, resulted in a reallocation of internal investment funds. To 
the extent the import control system has had to be modified to accommodate the 
U. S. requirement, one could talk about resource transfer effects. Put there has 
been no serious effort to push the GOT toward liberalization. 
IV, DETERI4INAMTS OF LEVEPJA(E 
A. The Loan 
1. Size of' loan. There is no evidence of a correlation of size of loan
 
with leverage, and in any case the level has generally been determined by source-

The U. S. in FY 68 was able to squeeze more conditions into
procurement factors. 

a smaller loan offer. But it remains to be seen whether it will get any more
 
leverage.
 
2. Changing aid level. The program loan level is about half that of 
the 	annual nonproject grant program which preceded it. But the program loan level 
and the shifts between thosehas remained between TlO and $15 million since FY 62, 
two figures has had no demonstrable effect.
 
A.I.D.'s leverage has probably increased
3. Dissipation through time. 

siace FY 64. But the conditioning system has been toughened. It is impossible
 
to guess what t~ie difference in performance would have been if a tough system had
 
been imposed at the beginninf of the period and not changed.
 
13. The conditioning system
 
1. Policy area in which exerted. Prices have been very s-'.ble in 
Tunisia. The only inflationary periods followed the 1964 devaluation, and the 
poor harvests in 1960 and 1966. F'iscal: policy has been generally successful as
 
well: revenue is way up, current expenditures have increased only gradually, and
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the ambitious investment projections of earlier years have been substantially 
reduced. There was slippage; from some of' the IUF/AID fiscal indicators in 
FY 67, but that can be attrbuted to the poor 1966 harvest. I gether there 
has been some progress in improving the operations of the state enterprises. 
Further, the GTP in the last two years has kept well below IMF/AID ceilings 
on Suppliers Credits. These were the principal policies which were specified 
in the Loan Agreements. None of them did badly. Some did very well. None of 
them, however, had tlHe salutary effect on the current account the negotiators 
hea hoped for. 
2. Rigor of' loan condition enforcement. The conditions were not
 
enforced at all, in the sense that tranches were reduced or delayed pending 
improved performance. See the discussion in section "III. A." above. 
3. Specificity of' loan conditions. In FY 66 USAID shifted to a sys­
tern which included explicit written conditions, some with quantitative indicators, 
on a variety of stabilization policies. The credit indicators were violated 
briefly in 1966, Lut otherwise have been respected. Some of the qualitative sta­
bilization policies were adhered to; some were not. The investment indicator was
 
violated, but was later criticized by IMP and USAID as not having been appeopriate
 
("as things turned out"). There has not been mucn progress on either of the two 
development conditions added to the FY 67 Agreement. From this experien:e it is 
hard to judge whether qumatitative indicators are to be preferred. 
The deterioration in the country's rmonetariy and credit accounts led 
eventually to the 114F loan and the introJuction of explicit conditions. History 
appears to indicate several instances in which the GOT was either unable to stay
within the IF ceilings, or had difficulty in meeting them, but bent over back­
wards to do so. During the draft AEP exercise of September 1966 the G(O' pulled 
ack from investment targets that would have resulted in breeching th2 I14F ceil­
ings after USAID pointed out the importance of observing the IMF arreement and 
the close relation of U. S. aid and other aid to that agreement. It is difficult 
to say whether -the inclusion of specific U. S. targets equivalent to those of
 
,
the It,4actually strengthen the iT programs, but the COT did have two "contracts" 
to worry about and, unlike the IPf', A.I.D. was in residence to guarantee observance 
of the *joint targets. The remarkable success of' the Government's monetary and 
credit policy was obvious before the 1MF conditions were first anmounced in 1L964. 
It isn't possible to say whether the GOT would have got along as well without the 
IMF ceilings, or whether the I, programs were improved by tle support of specific 
U. S. targets. 
4. Number of loan conditions. There is no information t make a judg­
ment. Two conditions were added in FY TY to the six included in the trail-blazing 
FY 66 Agreement. The Mission report "satisfactory" progress on both, but there 
is reason to dispute that judgnent and in any case we have no idea whether their 
inclusion diluted A.I.D.'s leverage from the other six. 
C. Environmental factors 
1. National politics. A.I.D. has been dealing vil.h President Bourgui.ba,
 
the Neo-Destour Party, and a fairly stable political-environment since 1957. The
 
Tunisia program loan leverage experience shculd be as free from domestic political
 
disturbance as any country experience could be.
 
70o1 
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''2 'International Politics., The U. S. has a strong interest in$preserving-friendly r'elations with'.,'resident' lBourbuiba. His moderating role. 
-~nj the Arab family- of: nations, and, the', Palestine dispute, has fitted 'well with 
U . foreign policy. I Therefore ;"it"is-reason .able to suppose that the level 
o:~f'~ program' lending, which the GOT strongly prefe-'s'to, project' lending, has. 
~j;Ybeen~determined a'smuch by' political factors. a'sanything else. This would ~ 
conceivably theinfueceFrnc-lpeon G ' h of leverage we got'.oh relL itive.a~i~ deemnupeoo munt a , ofth... 
As sometimes advisors and as major tradi-ng partners they could have exerted a 
negative s 	 perormance with respect to each,t
 
A.I.D. conditions. I have not looked into this. 	 , .. 
~',.'. -MultilateralismE Without doubt Liultilatezalization of lie con­
dtoing process substantially improved it3 effectiverr ;i.The IBRD/CG was n 	 " of 1g"496 took an
io'eaiebetwqeeh 1962 and 19614, but stai-Ging in the f'aAol16 oka 
active role in program review. Since the 'aznual C(Q sessions preceded the 
A.I.D.,program loan negotiations by several months, they provided a forum for 
the U. S. to develop other donor support inadvance, of the negotiations. But 
theS also, exerted influence in their own right since the GOT sent top level 
officials'.to the meetings and was exposed to the principalconcerns of all 
its donors. The CG would have been more influential had France been a willing 
member, but Franco-Tunisian relations were strained throughout mach of the 
period. 
The.I1AP input was even more substantial. The Stand-by Agreement pro­
vided the' vehicle for. imposing controls on domestic monetary and credit policy. 
~Later 'it Included fisr-al and trade policy as well. Most of the A.I.D. con­
ditions simply referred to the IMF programworked'cut in November andDecember 
of the, previouis year. It is not clear to what degree the U. S. would or could 
* 	 have taken over these fLnctions if the IMF'had absented its position. The
 
annual Stand-bys everaged $10 million since 1964, not much less than the
 
average A.I.D. program loan and presumablyo.f no less appeal to the ,0T. 

V. CONCLUSIONS ,,.> 
The Tunisian experiencewith program loans suggests the following 
coniusionz:
 
A. Through~ the loan negotiations' nd accompanying dialogue, A.I.D. 
secured considerable influence over theshape and, direction of GOT policy. . 
:.Althudgh:o progess would have occurred inthe absence of program loan3, 
ioa 	n deserve credit. for some of. towards stabili-.
:egotiations 	
­ztion,' effective planning rationalization of agricultural investments, and'
'hetailoringof imports tof earnings.'' ,>' 
' 
' 
2 
' 
, 
i *'. 
i'thi'advance 

,,:.' . 
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B. The "leverw.:t operation" is something of a minsnomer in the 
Tunisian case. While it is true that the (. S. ncgotiating teams occa­
sionally acted toiwh over the inclusion of conditions in loan agreements, 
most of' the U. S. influence was exerted inf'ormally and reinforced policy 
any-way. Mission argues that 
trie i(/-' 1;ask ia frctiono of 
decisions which the ' (Oi' ,,rz close to akin- The 
nothinw was lost by not takir,, Lo ,r 
mid-year test., nor i),[avodin any s i.ri of' a, preiur-dness t,) us': the instru­
ment s of i,'crge -- the twrat tu'with old or !du.e a .[afl 
(,-oordirnat ci ;itL ,'Ij.nd IBRD ,reatly reinf'orce d U. 2. influence, 
takini- much of the stin-, out of' Llateral interference. 
D. Th( commr-dabie self-help 1perfurmance appears to be related to the 
strength and continuity of President Bourg~uiba's goverrrnent. 
KOREA 
by 
Elizabeth Carter
 
March 1970
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Program Loan Study: KOREA * 
I. INTRODUCTION
 
Program loans are a relatively recent form of aid to Korea. The first one 
was signed in FY 1966, after a long period of U.S. assistance. Two more 
followed, one in FY 1967 and one in FY 1968. A fourth and fifth were planned 
for FYs 1969 and 1970. Although these loans have been small -- $10 or $15 
million out of a total U.S. aid program averaging over $300 million -- they 
have been an effective and imuortant instrument of leverage. Each loan has 
contained only two to five quantitative conditions, all related to one 
policy area -- stabilization. The U.S. has released proportions of the two
 
equ-al tranches of each loan according to the number of conditions the Koreans
 
met.
 
Program loans have been used for leverage on Korean stabilization performance
 
along with SA comodity assistance grants. The grants preceded the loans 
ani have been continued simultaneously at higher, though declining, levels. 
The first program loan, in FY 1966, was for $10 million, while the SA grant 
was $60 million, and A.I.D.'s total program $144 million. The F1 1967 
program loan was for $15 million (later reduced to $12.5 million when part 
of a tranche was deobligated after the ROKG did not meet a condition),and the SA 
grant wa& $45 million in a total AI.D. package of $113 million. The FY 1968 
program loan was $10 million, the SA grant $30 million, and the total A.I.D. 
package, $75 million. During these three years there were large MAP and PL 
480 programs for total assistance programs of $420 million, 335 million and 
$35, dllion, respectively. Altho.'gh total U.S. assistance was used for
 
leverage on Korean stabilization, tnie program loans and grants were the
 
primary direct instruments. 
SA program grants have been designed to help fill a large resource gap, and 
the local currency proceeds generated by SA-financed imports have been used 
almost exclusively to support a substantial military budget, important for 
U.S. security in Northeast Asia, and for Korean participation in Vietnam. 
Since 1962-63, SA grants have been used to exert considerable leverage on
 
Korean stabilization performance. The U.S. has withheld parts of the grants
 
because of poor Korean performance, or offered an additional amount beyond
 
that announced to induce the Koreans to make certain policy changes. 
The program loan was introduced in Korea for a nuber of reasons. It was part 
of the general shift in the Korea program from grarts to loans and from
 
emphasis on budgetary support to development. Further, with the SA grants being 
cut back,some thought Korea needed another form of commodity aid. Probably
 
more importantly, many felt A.I.D. had less leverage than desired through the
 
SA grant because of its importance for political support, military budget 
support, and for covering critical short-tern, import flows. Tne program loan 
wa introduced as a carrot, a marginal element of assistance, but one 
specifically aimed at stimulating better stabilization performance.
 
• Rest rch completed in November, 1968.
 
2.
 
Since 1963, the U.S. has i.pplied leverage on Korean stabilization performance
 
by negotiating annual stabilization agreements with the ROKG at the beginning
 
of the calendar year, which is also the Korean fiscal year. The negotiations
 
have involved hard bargaining, and the Koreans have had to accede to tough
 
conditions, both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative targets have
 
included year-end ceilings on money supply, central and local government
 
budget deficits, and credit volume by sector, as well as floors on revenue and
 
Korean foreign exchange reserves. Negotiation of a stabilization agreement
 
has been followed by joint quarterly revIews of performance, where targets 
have been set for the following quarter. Theie have also been constant communi­
cations and joint staff work on stabilization policies. 
Each year there have also been negotiations on the Korean budgets, culmina­
ting in a budgetary agreement between the two governments in late August just 
prior to the subrainsion of the next year's bitlget to the National Assembly. 
Thus two major sets of negotiations -- one Focusing on the budget and the 
other on the total annual stabilization prograwr, peritted mutually reinforc­
ing action at. two key policy pressure points and pennitted the negotiations to 
be more detailed than if the whole package had to be negotiated at one time. 
The discussion of the following year's budget also led to a review of the 
cuirent .,ear budget arid permitted A.I.D. to exert pressure on that budget in 
the latter -art of the year when major decisions were being made. The provi­
sions of the budgetary agreement have been incorporated into the following
 
stabilization agreement. The budget discussions have dealt with a wide range 
of matters affecting both stabilization and g owth, and hav included some 
largely informal U.S. intervention in regard to key budget allocations to 
support selected policies and projects such as fwnily planning, agricultural 
pricing and stockpiling, and local currency support for A.I.D. supported
 
projects and programs. We have tried to block ROK approval of bad investment
 
projects, and get the ROKG to reduce or eliminate undesirable subsidies, and 
improve tax administration and local government finance. The key concern of' 
the budgetary agreement, however, has been increasing domestic revenue and 
using the budget properly to produce an optimum effect on stabilization and. 
grcwth goals.
 
We have used potential SA grants for leverage on the negotiation of the annual
 
stabilization program., in the beginning of the calendar year. We have usually 
announced the total SA program for the U.S. fiscal year after the conclusion 
of a satisfactory stabilizaticn agreement,and then released some funds. We
 
have released additional SA finds at intervals during the year, after review­
ing performance under the stabilization agreement. (Fund releases have not 
been closely linked with the negotiation of budgetary agreements.) Program 
loan agreements have been signed later in the year, incorporating key quanti­
tative targets taken directly from the stabilization agreement or formutlated
 
in line with the general policy directives of the agreement. All three loan 
agreements have included year-end targets So that performance could be covered 
for the entire Korean fiscal year.
 
K 213
 
3. 
Deobligation or withholding of program loan funds was easier than with
 
the SA grants. The program loans were offered as a bonus, and the conditions
 
were specific enough so that little value judgient was required in deciding on a
 
tranche release. The release of funds was clearly and unambiguously tied to
 
condition fulfillment. At the discretion of the Mission Director, overfulfillment
 
of one condition coLt.d compensate for a small shortfall on another, but the ROKG
 
was not aware of this.
 
The SA grants had other important purposes, and the conditions of the stabilization
 
agreement to which the grants were linked,though comprising more or less one 
policy area, as opposed to the typical LA program loan, were nevertheless large 
in number and not always quantitatively defined. Value judgments on performance un­
der some of' the conditions were required,and political pressure could be applied
 
more easily to obtain the release of funds.
 
II. CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF KOREAN EXPERIENCE 
A. Pre-FY 1966 
From 1957 to 1961, the ROKG and USOM signed annual stabilization agreements, with 
primary emphasis cri price stability, achieved by agreement on a money supply 
ceiling. Within this limit,permissible budget deficit and credit expansion 
programs were established. The two governments worked closely together on 
economic Policy through a combined economic board. There was a considerable 
degree of price stability from 1957 to 1960. Our annual SA grants averaged 
over $200 million during this time. 
Economic stability deteriorated between 1961 and 1963, as the military regime
 
which took over the government in May of 1961 tried to accelerate
 
the pace of capital formation and to lessen the country's dependence on
 
foreign aid by means of a very high rate of monetary expansion.. After the coup, 
the U.S. felt that political instability made rigid implementation of the 1961 
stabilization agreement undesirabl.e. At the same time the US had made the decision 
to cease basing the co=rodity import level (SA grants) on a calculated budget gap
 
and to convert the basis to foreign exchange ne The result was a greatly
 
reduced SA level, from about l76 million in FY 1961 to $93 million in FY 1962; 
and we began to tell the IOKG to epqect further reductions each year. We in­
tended not only to stop the depressing effects on domestic production of 
easy imports at overvalued exchaige rates, but also to put pressure on the 
ROKG to col?.ect taxes and to earn dollars to pay for its own imports. Korean 
visible exports w6e;e then only f20-35 million, for a country of about 25 million
 
people. Although we continued to offer sound economic advice, the Korean
 
generals (a) did not believe we meant what we said, (b) did not yet understand
 
the troublesome effects of inflation, and (c) enjoyed both a pipeline of earlier
 
aid and relatively high foreign exchange reserves.
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Under these circumstances, USOM felt it did not have the immediate leverage to 
intervene but rather that sound strategy called for a wait until the ROKG had 
exhausted its immediate dollar resources and thus until it had to seek U.S. 
funds and listen to our advice if it wanted them. This result was not long 
in coming, particularly as the Koreans accelerated their problems with ill­
conceived actions. 
By early 1963, credit expansion, the budget deficit and the balance of payments 
situation had begun to cause such rampant inflation that the Koreans had to 
come to USOM on USOM's terms. The Koreans first made a major effort to seek 
a greatly increased aid level, sending a high-level team to Washington to 
reverse USOM's position. But the U.S. stood firm, refusing to raise the 
level planned, to respond to ROKG budget pressures,or to relax pressure for 
self-help and against unwise Korean action. Moreover, from November 1962 to 
May 1963, USOM refused to approve any new economic aid, including SA, DL, arid 
PL-480. 
Thus, after its firmness had beer, sorely tested, USOM's struaegy had worked. 
In February, 1963 a joint task force on stabilization was set up. During the 
Spring there were rigorous negotiations on stabilization targets for the end of
 
1963. by the end of May, the U.S. aid the ROKG negotiated a stabilization 
agreement with year-end ceilings on the budget deficit, comercial credit expan­
sion, the money supply, ana drawdown of Korean foreign exchange reserves. A 
working group consisting of U..i. and Korean technicians was -o review progress 
toward these and related goals every two weeks >ntil the end ot the year. Under 
the agreement reached in May, te availability of $15 million of FY 19'3 MA 
funds was to be contingent on these targets being met. Adherence to th1je 
stabilization targets was a prerequisite also for aLy further Development Loan 
approvals durirg FY 1964. The '15 million out of FY 63 funds was originally 
planned for release in three $5 million tranches -- in August, October and
 
December, but the total ainount was withheld even during the Korean election 
campaigns in the Fall of 1963. We were trying to pressurize the 
ROKG into meeting the year-end targets agreed to in May and were particularly 
worried about the Korean foreign exchange position. We wanted performance, 
not just promises. The withholding of the '15 million was used as a political 
football in the election campaigns, and the ROKG tried to cover up the fact 
that the U.S. was not soslhr condoning its 1-963 stabilization performance. 
In November, $10 million of FY 1964 SA funds were released after negotiation 
of some key elements of tne CY 1964 stabilization program. We released another $3. illion in December. But it was made clear to the ROKG that the withheld 
FY 1963 funds would not be released unless CY 1.963 performance were satisfactory. 
In early 1964,we negotiated the full CY 1964 stabilization agreement with trie 
Koreans, and in March released more FY 1964 funds. The witiheld FY 1963 funds 
were released in March too, but only after we confirmed that CY 1963 targets
 
had been met. The $15 million was thus withheld for a considerable period of 
time.
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In April 1964, SA funds were used for leverage in a different way. We agreed to
 
release an additional $10 million out of deobligated FY 1964 funds, beyond
 
the agreed annual amount of $66.2 million, if the Koreans devalued the won. On
 
May 3, 1964, the Koreans devalued the won, and we granted them the additional
 
$10 million. Within a year, then, SA funds had been withheld to induce 
performance on the one hand, and on the other, an additional amount was granted 
as a reward for good performance. 
The CY 1961; stabilization agreement was revised in July in light of the deval­
uation. During the rest of CY 1964, the U.S. used some grant releases for 
leverage on the Koreans to carry out the revised program successfully. Per­
formance was not entirely satisfactory, and there was some Korean fudging of 
year end target figures. 
In CY 1965, FY 1965 SA releases were conditioned on the negotiation of a 
sa.t i sfactory cY 1965 stabilization agreement, and performance during the first 
half if the year. All I'YJ 1965 funds planned for the first half of the year 
were releas ed, although performance was less than satisfactory on all fronts. 
In early l965, we began discussion on the possibility of a program loan, as a
 
bonus for good performance. Negotiations on the program loan were used for
 
leverage on Kcrean nolicies. USOM indicated to the Koreans that if May stabili­
zation target., were met, the preparction of a loan application would begin in 
June. Actio:n was delayed on the application as there was excessive expansion of
 
credit to the fiscal sector* in April, and a deficiency in net foreign reserves 
of March and April, contravening the provisions of the stabilizationat the end 
agreement. 
we limked releaseTo sum up the pre-progrrur loan period, beginning in 1962-1963 
of SA funds to negotiation and execution of the stabilization program. Some
 
funds however, were released regardless of performance. Our leverage problems
 
eased after Park's election in the Fall of 1963, as his government initiated
 
the CY 1)63 year-end targets. Park'san anti-inflationary program and met 
carried out on a fairly sustained and comprehensive
anti-inflationary program was 

basic with a growing sophistication in financial techniques, in close working
 
association with USOM.
 
The use of leverage prior to the program loan period had major tactical problems, 
deriving first from the fact that the SA was a major political issue with even 
the press understanding fairly sophisticated distinctions between various levels
 
and fiscal years. The SA level was regarded as the major and easily identified
 
* Central and local government plus PL 480 sales deposits. 
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indicator of U.S. attitudes towards Korea in a period in which the attitudes
 
and actions of the ROKG towar'ds the holding of elections, which the Korean
 
public assumed to be a major U.S. policy objective, varied. Thus, the Korean
 
public was never clear whether our decisions were motivated politically (by
 
a desire for elections) or economically (i.e. by a desire for good stabiliza­
tion performance). In fact, they were both.
 
Equally troublesome was the fact that, with Korean foreign exclhange earnings 
still very low, the Korean economy depended on SA imports for much of its 
essential raw materials. We could not withhold all SA for long without 
damaging the economy directly and without raising doubts about future U.S. 
support, a perhaps even more important, if indirect source of potential '
 
damage to the economy. SA generated local currency support of tlie Korean military 
budget was an equally -mportant factor. The Koreans were also aware of our 
tactical dilemma. Thus, the withholding of' assistance was a game of chicken, 
a test of wills.
 
The program loan concept was devised to work for leverage purposes with the
 
SA program. First, it would permit a reward for good perfermance while the EA 
program continued to carry primary leverage for the stabilization agreement. 
For example, thc stabilization agreement required a balanced budget, to be 
enforced by control of SA releases. We recognized, however, that budget
 
balance could be achieved at various levels, higher levels permitting greater
 
funding for development. The program loan therefore provided a bonus for
 
improved revenue collection which would in turn support a higher balance and 
greater investment. (Though higher revenue targets were included in the 
stabilization agreement, A.I.L. 's main concern in judging performance under 
the agreement wa: a balanced b,'dget) Second we recognized that not all SA 
could be long withheld, but ie exrressly stated that program loan funds could 
be fully cancelled. Thus, the prDgram loa,. provided a second layer of non­
project import financing which had for leverage purposes greater flexibility. 
B. FY 1966 - The First Program Loan 
Negotiations for the first program loan were resumed in the summer of 1965, as 
June stabilization pcrformance had improved, and we had negotiated adequate 
third and fourth quarter stabilization targets. At this time we indicated what the 
performance targets of the program loan might be. in August we proposed specific 
targets. They were based on the stabilization agreement, but some of the quan­
titative targets, such as a private credit ceiling, were referred to only in
 
general terms in the stabilization agreement, and an interest rate reform was
 
referred to obliquely. (However, we had asked for some action by May 1965.)
 
The program loan was for $10 million. The fwds would be released in two equal 
tranches based on performance in the third and fourth quarters of CY 1965. There 
were five criteria for each tranche release; performance under each would be the 
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basis for the release or withholding of one-fifth of the tranche. in other words,
 
the meeting of each target wa-s wortih $1 million. This was so stated in the loan 
agreement. The criteria were Gle following: (1) Government revenue performance 
would be evaluated in terms of whether 116" domestic revenues exceeded 45 billion 
won t'ough the third quarter and t5 billion won through the fourth quarter. 
(The 1965 budget originally proposed a domestic revenue total of 57 billion won). 
(2) Private savings (time and savingL; lc.,osits) performance,as the ROKG was 
informed in early September, wuuld be evaluated in terms of implementation of 
a satislactor" interest ref'orm plan in the third quarter. Performance in thc. 
fourth qartei wcld be eval.i-ted according to whethei the average end-of-month 
levels of private savings for October; November, and Dec embex. exceeded 20 
UillioI, won. (3) Private credit performance would be evaluated in texns of 
whether average end-of-month net, private credit in both the third and fourth 
quarters stayed below a 40 billiQ won ceiling. (The ceiling wab established in
 
late July.) (4) (kvernment credit performance would be appraised on the basis 
of whether averajre end-of-month credit to the fiscal sector rem-ined below 20 
billion won in soth the third and fourth quarters. (5)Finally, performance 
in the area of' forreig exchange reserves would he etaluated on the basis of 
whether the ROKG could prevent the drawdown of net loreign uxchange assets to 
a position below the $15 milliorn floor jointly agreed in March as part of the 
CY stabilization program.
 
After A.I.D. procedural delays, the loan was authorized and then signed in December. 
Meanwhile, the Koreans had met the third quarter targets. There are strong 
indications that the program loan provided the added incentive for the passage of' 
the interest rate reform which had been sought for some time without success. 
Inclusion of the implementation of interest rate reform as a criterion for per­
formance under the program loan i; believed to have been a significant factor in 
the ROKG' s decision to convene the National Assembly in mid- ieptember (despite 
continuing opposition boycott in connection rith ratific,'.tion of the treaties 
with Japan) to pass legislation raising interest ceilings and to implement the 
dramatic reform on September 30, in time to meet the third quarter deadline. The 
rest of the targets for both the hird and the fourth quarters were met, and the 
two tranches were released. Korean domestic revenue performance was outstanding. 
The results showed revenues of 67.8 billion won. The Koreans learned what they 
could do if they tried hard. 
At trie same time, we continued to use SA releases for leverage on stabilization 
pcrfornance. in November, a $14.6 millioi SA grant agreement was signed. 
A condition precedent wan assurance of the continuation of satisfactory stabiliza­
tion performance under the CY !965 stabilization programn. The agreement also 
asked that the Koreans pr-duce 750,000 IMT of' lime during CY 1966, to assure the 
efficient application and utilization of' fertilizer included in the SA import program. 
Amendments to this grant agreement, which were like new agreements in that they 
provided different conditions precedent, followed through to February 1967. 
The first amenhment, dated March 30, 1966, was signed after a satisfactory 
].966 stabilization agreeme t had been negotiated. The amendment provided for 
an additional $24.4 million. $18.4 million would be furnished immediately, 
and the remaining $6 million ,ould be released after the IOKG had furnished 
assurance of the initiation and continuation of satisfacuory performance 
through the first quarter of CY 1966 in line with the stabilization agreement.
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The whole amount was iniially to be based on March 31, 1.966 performance, 
bit for the $1.8.14 million the conditions precedent were waived, as Korea 
needed timely fertilizer imports f'or spring application, and there would other­
wise be a break in the flow of corrm.o'fities. 
After another eychange of letters on stabilization in April, a second amendment 
was signed, providing an additional KI:P21 Of this anont, millionmillion. $15 
would be released :1.mediateiy, and the remaining amount after assurance of 
continuation of sat-isfactory perforrr,,ancr: through May 31st. We subsequently said 
the conditions precedent of both these amendments had been met and released 
all funds. 
C. Fy i967 - The Second Program T.ian 
The second program loan, for 1;15 million, was authorized on July 1st, and signed 
on July 3, 1966. Tts two equal tranche releases were to be based on performance 
through the end of the s.cond and fourth quarters of CY 1966. The loan was 
conditioned on .ewer stab:i .izatiorn performance criteria than the first loan. 
There were two criteria for release of the first tranche and thrce for the second. 
We though further leverage was not required on private svings and foreign 
exzhazige re;serves at the time, as perfonnance in these areas had been good. 
The two criteria by which second quarter performance would be judged were a net 
domestic credit ceiling of 59 billion won (covering net private sector, fiscal 
sector and fertilizer sector credit sub-targets as established under the 
stabilization agreement), and a domestic revenue target (January I to June 30) 
of 45 billion won. 'ie criteria for the fourth quarter were a net domestic 
credit ceiling of 6') billion won (avwrage end-of-month for October, November, 
and December), a domnestic revenue target of 100 billion won (January 1 - December 
30), plus a budgetary pavynents carryover limit of 3 billion won. 
All. targets were based on the C"Y 1966 stabilization agreemer". We thought 
that these three targets would give the most poweril feasible leverage that 
year over the stabilization progran as a whole. They would all be difficult to 
achieve. Meeting the domestic revenue target would be remarkable, according 
to USOM, as '.hen it was negotiated (in the January-February stabilization 
agreement talks) it represented. a very large raising of ROKG sights on revenue. 
The 100 billion won target represented more than a 100, increase over the 
49 billion won domestic revenue of 1961, and a 47% increase over the 67.8 
billion won revenue of ].965. Pressure exerted through the stabilization 
negotiations had much to do with further invigoration of revenue raising efforts 
in the Spring of 1.966. 
The second program loan ,agreement did not specify that the meeting of each per­
formance condition wo'ld be linked to a proportionate amount of each tranche. 
We felt that the Koreans resented the "schoolinasterish" approach of a 
"point system," especially after good CY 1965 performance. However, the "noint 
system" was still applied. It was put in a side letter from the Mission Director 
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to the Deputy Prime Minister. The effect was thus the 	same. The two criteria 
each and the threefor the first tranche release were worth $3.75 million 
criteria for the second tranche, $2.5 million each. The finds for whatever 
carried over and addedcriteria for the first tranche were not met could be 
to the second tranche, Y'-'vid3 not eligible for release after the four-th 
quarter could be held .:nd released if performance were adequate in the -,,cr 
in the loan agreement; norfirst qgarter of CY 1967, but this. was not stated 
was the fact that the Missiorn Director could decide whether overfulfillinent 
of one target compensated for a small failure on anothler, petiiizting .release 
of the whole tranche.
 
met, and the whoLe trancheThe two criteria for the first tranche release 	were 
the three criteria for thewas released. The Koreans did not meet one of 

second tranche release, the budgetary carryover ceiling for December 30, 1.966.
 
The ceiling was 3 billion won, and the actual carryover was 5.2 billion won.
 
The target was thus missed ve2y substantially together with a closely related
 
and very important sub-target of the fiscal sector balance for the year. A
 
number of other provisions of the 1966 stabilization program were not fulfilled.
 
Accordingly, USOM withheld $2.5 million, or one third of the trancne, and it was 
that meeting the other two targets did notsubsequently deobligated. We held 
target. At Korean request thecompensate for the wide miss of the carryover 
withholding of the $2.5 million was held confidential to avoid the embarrassment 
of public knowledge.
 
$20 million of FY 1967 SA funds were planned. for release in December 1966.
 
Based on conditions in October-November, we anticipatud that a number of 
year-end targets of the 1966 stabilization agreement would not be met. There­
fore, $7.5 million of the $20 million was withheld. it was later to be used 
for leverage in negotiating the 1967 stabilization agreement since we did not 
have sufficient fund flexibility to lose the funds entirely. The remaining 
amount, $12.5 million was released, under amendment #3 (dated December 30th) of 
the November 1965 SA grant agreement, The only condition precedent in the 
was that Korea spend $7.5 million of its ovn foreign excharge onamendment 
grant allocated foxfertilizer and related costs, to equal the amount of the 
The grant 'was to have provided $15 million for fertilizer.fertilizer. 
was negotiated. AsIn January.-February 1967, a CY .96T stabilization program 
in the past) the ROKG agreed to continue to work with USOM to develop quarterly 
stabilization targets, as well as to review and adjust the program jointly as 
such needs arose during the course of the year. In April, a new SA grant agree­
iient, for $32.5 million, was signed. it included the $7.5 million Withheld in 
December, 1966. For the first time, an SA grant agreement provided for the 
three tranches, though the effect of earlier agreementsrelease of funds in 
was almost the same. The first tranche of $8.5 million was to be made avail­
able on evidence that the ROKG and A.I.D. had executed a satisfactory stabiliza­
tion progru agreement to be carried oub by the ROKG in CY 1967. Both the 
second and third tranches, each $12 million, would be made available during 
the second quarter of CY 1967,, subject to satisfactory performance under the 
stabilization agreement. Satisfactory performance as of March 31, 1967, was 
to be the basis for release of the second tranche, and there was a provision 
for carrying over part of the funds to the third tranche if performance were
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not: li' ~pr to'atrenhetr prersure-ao" ofliMayi3t11967, was to be the basis 
for dibusf; J f tr'n he. Thp*udnot if perfor-on'wonthethird cold be, redcod 

mance were. ihiaequatet te time r the last t i re se. 'amendment
:anche, 

t-.1the:Wnan Md tranche
r tin y pro ie d corh oulanofti e 77,:i funds on' the10. 
basis of Ia1 pc'onaciod~ oiet A.I.D./W obligation date 'targets. 
:All-.fune :Prr'aed :undr the Fet,967-reeent were -released1 '- -
'D I 2968 -The -Third Prgrav Loan 
I1he'third p'rog'am loali for $10 million, was not authorized until flecembuer 2, '1267,' 
nor signed iuntil eruary 13,,,1968, thou'&. release of the first of two equal 
tranche 4'toasa be based on perfo -nc June 30,hof The delaythe bsa .1967. 

had to do with FAA appropriation problems, and, problably primarily,, a lack of
 
priority given to the loan inthe White House, not Korean performance. The
 
Koreaens were made aware of.the targets in April, 1967., Expansionary pressures
 
exiqt..spriorto the Jue 8th Korean'elections. The seccnd quarter . performance
 
. rite6e. tofstrengthe rOKG tolimit the rise in liquid.ityduring
the' electionperiod, and to mop up any excess liquidity as soon 'as pos ible 
afte th~elctii~.Thecrieria fo ue3,1967 performance were, (1) As of 
<the end,f June, thetotal mniey supply'could not exceed 78,billion wonland 
fiscal 'ector 1 credit could not exceed 15.5 billion won. (2) On a second quarter 
averageenid- of-mnth basis, the total money supply could not exceed 78.5 billion 
ond cheditto the fiscal sector could not exceed 17.2 billion won. All the 
'tar'gets were mnet, 'and the tranche was released after the loan was signed in 
~early 1968,. 
The criteria for .feebr 1 1967, aard release of the second .tranche,"were"
 
afointhelciosquarter average end-of-Mnthbasis,,aor,
(1) On them. The c i alterr30,d the total moneyeed t supply
 
could not exceed.82 billion won; and fiscal sector credit could not' exceed 

l5,16illion won. (2) The, gross 'carryover of the central govern~ment budget on,
 
December 31, 1967,' could not~exceed 3 billion' won. All the targets were based
 
on the.,1967 stabilization ,agreement . USOM/ROKG stabiization agreement~ alway~s
 
included money supply ceilings, but this was the first time the'inoney supply
 
was' specifically included as a program loan criterion. '"'
 
During the Fall of 1967, the ROKG had strong d:oubts that 'it could ,eet'December
 
stabilization targets, including those ii~the program loan. UOM; oeer
 
maximum presgure for restraint, refused to alter them. it agreed to modifyr the
 
stabilization agreement only to allow' deficit expenditures in the government t
 
th xtent' that these deficit expenditures constituted direct payments into time 
and savings,'deposits, and therefore did not'result in any expansion~ of ,thel money 
supply Lduring the fourth quarter. ''rI. ' . 
p <I ,.:: ;;:. pp .. . . .. ,, ) :: : 
The Koreans met both' the fiscal sector and budgetary carryover criter ia at the 
end of CY~1967, but did not meet the year-end money supply ceiling of 82 billion 
won. The money supply had increased to 89 billion won. 
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Instead of withholding psrt of the second tranche, we decided that more 
leverage could be obtained by amending the loan agreement and basing the second
 
tranche release on the conclusion of a satisfactory CY 1968 stabilizatlon
 
agreement and performance through June 30, 1968. The focus of the criteria for 
performance )-j June 30 would be on key problem areas in the stabilization effort 
and foreign exchange management policies which were primarily responsible for 
the Korean failure to res-train monetary expansion in 1967 within acceptable 
limits. 
We had planned to release $10 million of FY 1968 SA flinds in the forth 
quarter of C 1967. This release was withheld, partly because of less than 
satisfactory performance, but also so that all of the lower level of SA flinds for 
FY 1968 ($30 million) could be used for leverage in negotiating a satisfactory 
1?68 stabilization program, along with the $5 million second tranche of the third
 
program loan.
 
A 1968 stabilization agreement was negotiated in February. It was more comipre­
hens'.ve than past agreements in enumerating objectives, targets, policies and 
actions to be undertaken in each sector--.fiscal (central and local government), 
foreign and private credit. A 25% total money supply increase was targeted for 
the year. There would be joint monthly meetings to monitor progress and 
performance, to agree on sp3cific policy and other measures, and Lo feport 
monthly to the regular Econonic Cooperation Committee which met quarterly. 
Further, stabilization commitments to be made to the DMF during forthcoming 
Stand-by negotiations were incorporated in the agreement for the first time. 
The Koreans felt they had opened themselves ap to far more U.S. influence on con­
crete stabilization measures than in the past, and resented the fact that the 
second tranche of the program loan was tied to new specific performance criteria. 
The ROKG thought that policy direztions should he set in the stabilization 
agreements, and then the ROGK would perform as best it could. It now felt 
capable of successful self-help on stabilization without specific strings and 
numerical ceilings applied to tranche releases. 
The amended conditions precedent for release of the second tranche of the 
program loan were: (1) As of June 30, 1968,credit to the fiscal sector would not 
exceed 15.5 billion won, excluding changes in 1968 due to the operation of the 
Grain Management Special Account. (2) As of the June 15 to June 30, 1968 reserves 
period, Bank of Korea general rediscounts for commercial banks, excluding export 
loans and certain types of commercial bills, would be eliminated. (3) KFX * 
import approvals to be financed by credit of over 90 days and ander 3 years would be 
limited, to 25 percent of total import approvals for the period January through 
June 1968; and (4) As of June 30, 1968 the ROKG would be adhering to the 
terms of the IMF Stand-by agreement. 
* Korean foreign exchange 
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To comply with ROKG wishes, a morley supply ceiling was not put into the loan
 
amendmeent. We thought monthly sector reviews plus the cornditions in the amend-

Ment would provide adequate safequards. Eligibility to draw under the
 
term" of an IMF Stand-by was ma e a progran loan condition f'or the first time.
 
Tnis was meant to establish a Lasis for increaseu relation of' U.". fiund
 
rel.eases to performance jider iYM' Stand-bys as U.S. assistance phased out,
 
and was to help insure udequ .te 1;erformance in the absence of a fixed money
 
tsupply target in the loan agree.en . T::ere were ri June 30, 1906 targets in theStand-by, but the ROKO was commit te t.o remain throughout the Stand-by period 
(through March 1969) within ceilings limiting total central bank credit to govern­
ment and limiting expansion of total bank assets, with ioth ceilings subject to 
adjustment in th1-e event foreign assets declined below the January level. 
The Koreans reported in July that thicy ihad met the revised Largets for the 
second tranche release. As of RGovemoer, tnere had not yet been a formal U.S. req et 
for release of the funds, but the Koreans probably did meet the revised t&rgets. 
E. FY 19L9 - The Fourth Program Loan. 
A fourth program loan for $10 million, as planned along with a smaller IA program
 
grant of' $20 million. These two ins;truments plus PL-460 Title I would he used
 
together for leverage in the negotibtion of' a new stabilization agreemenu.
 
After agreement on a satisfactory stabilization program tLhe entire SA grant
 
i uld be released (as it -;as in 19065) along with tie first tranchie of' the 
prograin lea. The second program loan tranc:e would be based on satisfactory 
performance througl, mid 1969. In view of' the comparative smallness of the SA 
program and of the total won generated by it for military budget support, USOM 
did not think it practical to release the hA fiaids in instaliients. On the 
other hand, the program loan, which was _.;igned to finance private machinery 
imports and whioh vas unrelated to military budget -u;port, could be released in
 
tranches as in the past. The approach planner, US(, believdwould help meet
 
ROKG objections to strings attached to aid, as mosc funds would be released after
 
negotiation of the stabilization agreement. Holding off on the second tranche of
 
the program loan, would help assure USOM that self-help performance commitments
 
would in fact be carried out. Thus, despite Korean progress in controlling 
inflation, USOM felt it had to continue to link funds at least partially to
 
performance, not just premises. 
The 1969 stabilization prograin was to focus on key economic policies with regard
 
to Korea's monetary system, external trading system, and capital market. For
 
monetary policy, an effort would be made to rely to the maximum extent upon
 
detailed stabilization agreements worked out between the ROKG and the IMF. 
Timing problems might not make that practicable as IMF negotiations have proceeded
 
on a schedule differing from U.S. requirements. The U.S. would try to work this
 
out in discussions.with the 11,. 
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I1I. THLE PRINCIPAL ISSUES 
A. Did A.I.D. Try To Exert Leverage With The Progrw Loari? 
The program loan was introduced in Korea as a marginal incentive element in the 
aid package. The funds would clearly have to be earned by good performance. 
Some officials thought that a declining level of program SA plus its importance 
for the Korean economy made it infeasible to use the sanction of withholding a
 
portion of SA if stabilization targets were not met. Import financing under 
the program loan, on the other hand, could be flexible. Disbursement was
 
never inevitable, nor did it have to be. And the specific quantitative targets
 
linked to specific amounts of each tranche made the criteria for judging por­
fornince and amounts to be released unambiguous. Performance under the whole 
stabilization agreement, to which SA grant releases were linked, could not be 
judged as objectively. It was more difficult to decide how much of an SA tranche 
to release. However, SA funds continued to be released in tranches util the 
spring of 19 68. Besides they were usie for leverage on both negotiation and 
execution of stabilization agreements. The requirement to obligate funds 
before the end of the fiscal year made it necessary to base release of fuids 
on May perfomance for the first half of the Korean fiscal year, and to obtain 
early release of the following U.S. FY SA funds for leverage on the second 
half of the Korean fiscal year. Program loan agreements, on the other hand, 
could require performance throughout the Korean fiscal year. The second and 
third loans were conditioned on mid-and end-year performance.
 
B. Did Korea Perform? 
All targets for both tranches of the three program loans were met except two. 
There were about 20 targets in all, so that is a record of 90%, ignoring 
relative importance and possible fudging of figures in some cases. There is 
every indication that the Koreans tried hard to meet the missed targets too, 
though other pressures countered these efforts. 
Starting in 1963-64, the ROKG became more and more convinced that Korean 
growth could proceed without inflation, and the ROKG became increasingly 
committed to stabilization policies. The stabilization program has been 
fairly successful. The problems of inflation are not solved, but 
they have certainly lessened measurably compared to the 1961-63 era, particu-­
larly considering the phenomeral growth of the economy since then. The money 
supply grew by 33.1%, 30.1% and 42.5% in 1965, 1966 and 1967 respectively, 
compared to a rate of 40% between 1961 ara 1962 (60% between mid-61 and 
and September 1962), but the increase in wholesale prices was 
9.6%, 8.8% and 6.8% in 1965, 1966, and 1967, compared to 20./,% in 1963, and 
35.0% in 1964. The GNP deflator has sho-m annual price increases of 12.9% and 
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11.7% in 1966 and 1967 respectively, as opposed to 28.2% and 32.0% in 1963
 
and 1964.
 
The porformance of the Korean econo,,*, as is well known, has been outstand­
ing in recent years, with remarkable improvements beginning in 1963-64. Between 
1963 and 1967, GHP grew by an average annual rate of about 9.3%, and 
per capita GNP by an average of 7.6%. Exports increased 484, (41, per year) 
from 1962 to 1967. Industrial production increased by 21% in 1967, typical
 
of recent ;erfoixnance. 
Agricultural production rose by about 40% in four years (1962-1966). Pro­
duction declined in 1967 because of a drought. In the first year after 
the interest rate reform, time and savings deposits increased by 169%, and 
in the next two years the annual increase was by 900%. Domestic savings in 
1967 represented ]c..6% of GRP, compared with 6.9% in 1963. After a 14% 
annual rate of increase from 196' to 1964, domestic central government revenues 
increased 38 in 1965, 68% in 1966, and 43% in 1967. The ratio of domestic 
revenues to CNP increased from 7.0% in 1964, to 1 ..'4 n. 196 7. The central 
government budget was kept in balance during this period, while the share of
 
the budget supported by U.S. aid declined from 36.75 in 1964 to ]6.6% in 1967. 
Annual foreign exchange earnings more than tripled between 1.963 and 1967, and 
foreign exchange , -serves m.re than doubled. 
USOM expected Korea's overall economic performance in 1968 to be the
 
best since the Korean War. GNP was expected to grow by a record 14%,per capita
 
by 11. 4.
 
C. DId A..D. Obtain Leverage? 
Each year the prospect of receiving a program loan provided an incentive for 
the Koreans to reach the targets for the first tranche release before the 
loan was even signed. Fairly clear evidence of extra effort to meet a cri­
terior, was the passage of the interest rate reform, in a special session of 
the National Assembly, in time to meet the deadline for the first tranche 
release of the first program loan. The reform was said to be something the
 
U.S. had been pushing for some time without success. Another indication 
of the leverage of the program loan conditions was the extra effort the 
ROKG made to increase revenues in the spring of 1966 to meet the loan 
target for June. 
Although the Koreans became more and more committed to stabilization, and 
to the goals we espoused, the targets which A.I.D. established in the stabi­
lization and program loan negotiations did raise Korean sights considerably, 
and required the ROKG to push harder than it would have otherwise. Though 
the amount of the program loan was small, the ROKG wished to avoid the 
embarassment of withheld or,deobligated funds. The U.S. was highly respected 
by the Korean public, and U.S. disapproval was not taken lightly. Also, 
knowledge that the U.S. had withheld aid for poor performance might weaken
 
Korea's credit standing and abili ther lenders. Further,the
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Koreans never knew how poor performance in mecting program loan conditions
 
would affect U.S. decisions on other parts of the aid program. 
On the other hand, the ROKG economic inistries used the conditions precedent
 
of the program loan to counteract inflationary programs or policies proposed
 
by other ministries. The program loan provided Finance Ministry economists 
with an excuse for unpopular policies they wanted to carry through anyway. 
D. Can A.I.D. Leverage be Attributed Specifically to the Program Loan?
 
A.I.D. leverage cannot be attributed entirely to the program loani, especi 4ly 
since it was such a small percentage of the total assistance program,and of 
the Korean trade gap. The weight of the total aid prograzm, the respect which 
the Koreans had for the U.S. in general and for the USO14 staff and consltants 
in particular, plus the close working relationship U.S. personnel had with a 
competent group of Korean counterparts were important elements in the lever­
age picture. 
Further, specific leverage on stabilization was exerted through the mechanism 
of spaced SA grant releases along ith progrr loan tranches, and the SA 
grants were the key elements in the negotiation of the annual stabilization 
pe'ogram. Prior to FY 1966, PL-4Fo and project DL were even used for leverage 
on stabilization performance, and the conditions precedent for some project 
loans, such as au increase in electricity rates, have been related to stabili­
zation goals. 
Whien all the foregoing is taken into account, however, the prograir ]oan it­
self was important, despite its smll size. 'Te Koreans probably thought 
they were ,rore certain to receive declining SA program assistance no matter 
what their Ierfomnance, whereas they knew the program loan was specifically 
based on perforzrance. Performance was more easily judged deficient in the 
program loax system; there were just a few targets, and little opportunity 
to insert value judgments. The Koreans were pleased to be able to qualify 
for program, loans -- a sign of their progress toward self-support. Further, 
some of the conditions of the program loan (for instance the revenue targets) 
pushed the Koreans beyond what they woiu~l have been expected to do (balance 
the budget) to be eligible for an SA tranche.
 
As already stated, the political repercussions of deobligation for poor
 
performance was something to avoid. The Koreans were mbarrassed by the
 
fact that $2.5 million was deobligated in the Spring of 1967. The deobli­
gation was taken to mean a lack of U.S. confidence, and there was fear it 
might therefor reduce the confidence of both the Korean public and other 
aid donors.
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SA funds d g the progran loan period were withheld but never deobligated. 
The use of the withholding threat, coupled, with the real d. lays in 
releases, proved generally sufficient to establish our credibility and make 
the ROKG linsuxre whether we were bluffing. But the withl:oldirig was rot as 
obvious, and all funds were eventually granted. This is not to forget 
the most embarrassing withulolding of $15 million in FY 2,963 SA during the 
Koreans strove very hard to rual.ifyelections in the Fall of 19. The 
for those funds, and to qualify on time. In retrospect delays in release 
proved to be effective leverage. 
IV. DE TR. LNAIITS OF LEVERAGE 
A. The Loan
 
1. Lize of the loan (and SA grants). 
The program loan was a small percentage of the A.I .D. program, and the 
individual tranchcs werc far smaller than the '71A traniciies. Size seems thus 
to have huii little to do with the amount of leverage of the programl loan. 
The CA grants, though larger, were bccomirg a decreasing proportion of 
the aid program ever, year, as the Korean-s well knlew arid planned for. A 
complete phase-out of L, wuas anticipated by both governments for the ear].y 
to do withseventies. Thus size of tic grants; too probably had little 
leverage. 
2. Direction of change in size. 
We never offered a laager or smaller prcgram, loari cori, igenrt on past 
performance. All three loans were plarned Lo be $10 or $15 million, and 
the Koreans probably kniew this. The LA grants were declining annually. 
Perhaps the ROKG has thodght they would decline even faster if performance 
were poor. This is somewhat doubtful as the ROKG knew of our commitment 
to Korea. A.I.D. is expecting to have less influence as the SA level, as 
well as the tot.al A.I.D. program, declines further. This is one reason 
A.I.D. put fulfillment of 11FT standby conditions into the 19W5 stabilization 
agreement and the third program loan. A.I.D. was hoping to have the IMF
 
take on a much larger role in 1969.
 
One could say that in the past A.I.D. nas induced better performance by 
reducing non-project assistance. For instance, the large drop in commodity 
to great lengthsassistance bctweren 1962 aund 1963, indluced the Koreans to go 
to raise ti.eir own revenues and increase exports. Performance has continued 
to improve as assistance declines. 
B. The Conditioning L'ystem. 
1. Seci ficity of conditions. 
Program loan conditions ave been quantitative, and A.I.D. could quite 
One condition,
clearly ascertain success or failure in meeting them. 
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the interest rate reform, was generally stated, but the Koreans were well 
aware of what was required. The SA grant conditions related to execution 
of the stabilization agreements as a whole. The stabilization agree­
ments contained many specific conditions, and some general ones. Moreover
 
A.I.D. did not emphasize equally all the provisions of the stabilization
 
agreements. Eligibility for SA funds was thus more difficult to ascertain,
 
yet easier than if diverse and unrelated areas, such as secondary education
 
and dxawdown of foreign exchange reserves, had been included in the
 
agreements.
 
2. Number of conditions.
 
Since there were a small number of conditions in the program loan, the
 
ROKG knew it could not easily slip by with poor performance on any of
 
them. Perhaps the choice of a small niuber of indicators which are
 
considered key measures of performance, is a good idea, and could be 
applied in other countries.
 
3. Policy Area in which exerted. 
It is probably si gnificant that the program loan and SA grant conditions 
related to only one main policy area, stabilization, and one considered 
to be very important by both the Koreans (over time) and A.I.D. There 
were no subordinate policy areas for which action was required in the loan 
agreements. The same thing could have been done with another policy area. 
Success might have been less, for instance, in agriculture, where there
 
has been less commitment on the part of the P0KG. There is aiso the 
question of the control of the Ministry of Finance ovr other Ministries 
(e.g., it has more control over macro policies than agriculture), plus 
the common assertion that stabilization policy is more amendable to 
quantitative conditioning than other policies.
 
4. Ri or of condition enforcement. 
Specific targets were linked to specific amounts of program loan funds. 
One third of one tranche was deobligated when the ROKG did not meet one of 
three conditions precedent. Meoting of the other two targets was not enough
 
to compensate for failure on the one. Another tranche was delayed and
 
new conditions set whun the ROKG failed on one of three targets. Enforcement
 
of SA grant conditions was not as rigorous. Although some tranches were
 
delayed, the Koreans eventually received all of the funds planned, and
 
could thus partially call our bluff. 
Enforcement of program loan condition& was rigorous, but not 
rigid. Targets would be changed during the year if warranted by changing 
7 
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circumstances, and the Mission Director did have the discretion to enable a 
small shortfall on one target to be compensated for by overfTlfillment on 
another. The provisions of the stabilization agreements also were not rigid.
 
In the Korean setting, some restraints on the use of leverage should be noted. 
Since Korea was heavily dependent on A.I.D. for foreign exchange, we chose not
 
to withhold for long funds that were urgently needed by the economy. For
 
example, the punishment for breached conditions in 1966 was tempered by the 
need for fertilizer imports, a need. that had a. time cycle wlholly separate from 
overall economic performance. Moreover, since our political objectives could 
not permit real damage to the Korean economy, and since funds were never un­
limited, we had to use available fiunds for dual purposes: to withhold for 
punishment and then make again available. Although the latter step re-used the 
same money that had been withheld, new conditions were soughit and obtained 
before it was committed a second time. This fact, plus the timing delays 
involved, enhanced our credibility and Korean performance without actual loss 
of funds. 
5. Dissipation through tune. 
A.I.D. leverage is decreasing now as the ROKG feels capable of handling its 
stabilization policies itself. The ROKG has been arguing strongly recently 
that the U.S. should negotiate only on overall policies in the beginning of the 
year, and let the ROKG work out the program without further strings and 
quantitative targets. Leverage has not so much dissipated over time. The 
Koreans just feel that they are now experienced enough to work things out for 
themselves, particularly as we have planned for them to be self-sufficient in
 
the seventies and have been reducing our assistance gradually to this end. 
C. Environmental Factors. 
1. Multilateralism. 
The U.S. has been the primary source of leverage on Korean stabilization. Our
 
leverage has been directly with the ROKG through the negotiation of annual
 
stabilization agreements, joint quarterly reviews of performance, and constant
 
communication and joint working groups.
 
a. The IMF. A secondary source of leverage on Korean stabiliza­
tion has been the IMF. IMF leverage has come through the negotiation of 
annual Stand-by agreements since 1965. There had been four consecutive Stand­
by arrangements negotiated through 1968: in 1965 for $9.3 million, 1966, $12 
million, 1967, $18 million, and 1968, $25 million. The Koreans had not yet had 
to draw under the Stand-bys. The IMF has negotiated stabilization conditions
 
for the Stand-bys usually several months after the U.S.-ROKG stabilization
 
agreement has been signed. The conditions have been roughly similar to ours,
 
but not easily comparable, so the IMF would not appear under U.S. control.
 
There have been discussions with the U.S. abcut the conditions and coordination
 
of policies, however, both in Wash'ington and Seoul.
 
IMF conditions, with probably some exceptions, hae been less rigorous than 
ours, not initially, but because the IMF haq -b6een.iuch more amenable to 
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changir, them during the couzrse of a year. Further, since the ROKG did not 
need to draw under the Sta-nd-bys, the conditions were less meaningful.
 
The ROKG wanted the Stand-by arrangements, however, to enhance its inter­
national financial respectability in the eyes of the IBRD and other
 
potential donors; and the ROKG might have to draw in the future.
 
The U.S. instruments for stabilization leverage (the stabilization agreements, 
and program loan agreements) did notbudget agreements, SA grant agreements, 
At that timemention adherence to an IMF Stand-b until the Spring of 1968. 
negotiation of a Stand-by was inserted into the stabilization agreement, and 
ability to draw under the Stand-by as of June 30, 1968, was made one of 
four conditions for the second ta-anche release of the amended program loan. 
This was done to further emphasize the need for objective criteria related 
to the program loan release, to strengthen assurance of adequate performance
 
supply target, and to ultilateralizein the -.bsense of a fixed money 
leverag,. on stabilization a- i: .hsiistance declines. We are now encourag­
ing the ]2MF to negotiate tougher and more comprehensive Stand-by arrange­
ments as a partial substitute for U.S. leverage.
 
b. The Consultative Group. Since December 1966, there has 
been an IBRD-led Consultative Group for Korea. It met in
 
Eleven countries took part in the 1968
December 1966, and May 1968. 

meeting, nine in the first. The eleven were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
and the U.S. Other participants were the liF, and the UNDP; the ADB 
and Austria acted as observers. As with most Consultative Groups pledges 
were not made at the meetings. Korea's annual. Ovexall Resources Budget 
was presented, and the IBRD presented reports on the current economic
 
position and prospects of Korea, plus a suinniry of projects requiring
 
external financial assistance. The Korean economic situation and the Five-

Year Plan were discussed, but no attempt was made to exert leverage on
 
Korea. There has reportedly been no eeal substance or searching questions 
in the meetings. The IBRD has not been a sigrificant donor in Korea. In
 
the past 'itwanted to stay out of an area of predominant U.S. influence,
 
and )ne that was still threatened by financial instability. In 1968 some
 
Bank staff were saying that the Koreans were doing so well they did not needthe 
Bank's assistance. Predictions were,however, that the BanKy would move in
 
with a bigger program in the future. 
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Other donors were not involved in progiam lendir,7, and much of the
 
assistance has been commercial credits. The second largest donor after the
 
U.S. was Japan. About half of its $68 million assistance commitment in 
FY 1967 was reparations payments, and thus its leverage was limi ted. The 
next largest FY 1967 commitment, $47 million, was that of Italy and was 
mostly commercial credits. IDA committed $25 million, and Germany $18
 
million.
 
2. International politica.
 
The respect and appreciation which the Koreans have had for the U.S.,
 
because of our assistance after World War II, the Korean War, and our
 
substantial assistance program since, has had a lot to do with the success
 
of our overall leverage on stabilization. However, these factors are
 
limited by the depth of our political commitment to Korea, a fact well
 
known to the Koreans. Moreover, since the Koreans now give us assistance
 
in Vietnam, they can be more relaxed about fulfilling stabilization
 
conditions at home.
 
Fear of U.S. abandonment after reconciliation with Japan made the ROKG more
 
amenable to conditioning.
 
3. National politics. 
From 1963-64 to 1968 there was little or no effective opposition to the Park
 
government, except over the 1965 settlement with Japan. This made it
 
easier for the ROKG to take tough decisions, cnd carry out tough policies.
 
D. Other
 
1. Amount and quality of staff work. 
One of the most important factors accounting for the amount of influence 
the U.S. had on Korean stabilization performance was the quality of the
 
USOM staff economists, plus the consultants working in the ROKG, and
 
the respect their ROKG counterparts had for them. The two groups worked
 
closely and constantly together on the stabilization program.
 
2. Training. 
The Korean counterparts became not only committed to stabilization them­
selves, but more and more skilled and competent as economists. A
 
substantial technical assistance program in the fifties was important. 
The program included extensive training of Korean economists.
 
The stabiliza;ion program, with its associated leverage, had 
an important ed:cational effect on the Koreans over the period between 1963 to 
196:,,. The program worked. And as it did so, what started as a largely U.S. 
program, accepted by the Koreans as necessary to get the required aid, became a 
joint program, and now is becoming increasingly a Korean program. If leverage 
and its use has diminisned, the need for it has also decreased. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS
 
The program loan has been used very successfully for leverage in Korea.
 
The relationship of the loan to the SA grant, plus the special relation­
ship of the U.S. and Korea, perhaps indicate that the Korean experience
 
is not wholly transferable. Nevertheless, the Korean experience does
 
suggest certain te~l-iques applicable to other countries. For example,
 
the establishment of a small number of key specific conditions for release
 
of program loan funds could be applied elsewhere. A.I.D. could make very
 
clear that meeting all of a small number of condi+.ions was required for
 
release of funds. The recipient would thus know what the real require­
ments were. When there are many conditions, even within one policy area,
 
there are more trade-offs, and the recipient may not be expected to meet
 
even a majority of the jonditions. The recipient may have little idea
 
of vhat is expected, )r suspect (sometimes correctly) that many or most
 
of the conditions ar4, if not window-dressing, at least only goals toward
 
which to aim.
 
The specific conditions in Kcrea were linked to one general policy area -­
stabilization. The conditions could be linked to for instance, one
 
sector, or they could apply to diverse areas, provided the conditions
 
were carefully selected, i.e. reasonable, reachable, and relevant.
 
The conditions must have the proper degree of flexibility, according to
 
exogenous factors which could influence the recipient's ability to meet
 
them.
 
The program loan itself could be a small part of a total assistance
 
package, or a large part. If it were small, it could be linked in an
 
undefined way (as far as the recipient is concerned) to the rest of the
 
program. LI other words, the recipient would not be sure how poor fulfill­
ment of a small number of conditions, would affect the rest of the aid
 
program. If the loan were large, the weight of the loan itself would be
 
influential.
 
In Korea, specific conditions were linked to specific portioigof a tranche,
 
This method could probably be applied in other countries. The important
 
point is that release of funds is unambiguously linked to performance,
 
if A.I.D. easgerly desires that performance.
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